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This thesis draws upon the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to, firstly, diagnose some 
of the restrictions contemporary life places upon a Deleuzian “thought without an image,” and 
secondly, to offer some means through which we might enter this more creative, life 
enhancing thought.  As such, the thesis comprises a project of Nietzschean ethics, to the 
extent that it mounts a critique of today’s dominant thought forms, but exercises this critique 
as a preparatory move before turning to thought as a more active and affirmative force of/for 
life.  The thesis argues that the dominant images of thought operating in our current milieu 
are of two primary modes: representation and information.  Limitative representational 
thought structures, such as identity, resemblance and opposition, have, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, defined what it means to think since classical times, prevailing through 
philosophy’s Platonic, Cartesian and Kantian phases, and into the present day.  Proceeding by 
way of a series of actual examples, the thesis examines the contemporary functioning of this 
image of thought, focusing on such representational axes as individualism, science, gender/ 
sexuality and race.  In addition to this classical mode, though, the thesis also problematises 
our current informational milieu, proposing that it is, in fact, engendering a supplementary 
image of thought, one that also regulates what thought can do.  This image includes the 
mediatisation of thought, its channelling through networks of control, and its confinement by 
the requirements of the digital.  Cutting across both the representational and informational 
images, however, is the potent axiomatic of capital, which further and perhaps most 
powerfully delimits how thought today can function. 
 
In resistance to these restrictions, the thesis proposes a thought without an image, whereby 
thought is nothing less than creation: the bringing into the world of the radically new, of 
difference-in-itself.  This thought is materially embedded, traverses such spheres as 
philosophy, nonphilosophy, politics, micropolitics and aesthetics, and is interlinked with 
Bergsonian duration, Spinozian affects, and, above all, with the Deleuze-Guattarian virtual—
the full reality of all that can be.  Again by way of a range of actual examples relevant during 
the writing of this thesis, its second part maps this more potentialising thought along three 
lines of flight: though “ordinary” affects and the concepts and events to which they relate, 
through the strange sensations that art makes perceptible, and through the creation of change 
that Guattari’s aesthetic approach to the “post-media” era enables.  Through each of these 
realms the thesis conceives of life in machinic, ethological terms, expressing an ontology of 
becoming that bespeaks the interrelatedness of all aspects of the cosmos.  In this approach, no 
one element is privileged (including the human), and thought is conceptualised as an 
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[There is an] immense crisis sweeping the planet—chronic unemployment, ecological 
devastation, deregularisation of modes of valorisation, uniquely based on profit … .  
Guattari, Chaosmosis 132 
 
It is not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons. 
Deleuze, "Postscript on Control Societies" 178 
 
 
Project of/for Deleuze-Guattarian thought 
 
This is a project of and for a Deleuze-Guattarian image of thought, or thought without an 
image, in response to what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari see as the serious limitations 
placed upon contemporary life by dominant ways of thinking under advanced capitalism.  
Working at the end of the 20th century, these philosophers/activists take a utopian approach 
to philosophy, in the sense that, for them, the word utopia denotes the “conjunction of 
philosophy … with the present milieu” (WP 100).  Thought and life, therefore, are indivisible, 
which means that anywhere that thought is restrained, so too is life.  The keystone of 
Deleuze’s philosophy (which Guattari also endorses) is that “[l]ife is difference, the power to 
think differently, to become different and to create differences” (Colebrook, Gilles 13).  Hence, 
when the power to think is confined by a particular image of thought, as well as by a capital-
oriented, market-constituted world, the diversity that is life’s ethical potential is severely 
curtailed.  At the same time, however, because “thought is creation” itself (D+G, WP 54), a real 
commitment to thinking otherwise—thinking in ways that resist dominant paradigms—can 
lead to new, more life-enhancing ways of living.  This project comprises an attempt to, firstly, 
apprehend some of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari (hereafter D+G
1
) see that thought 
is constituted and restricted in this current milieu, and, secondly, to propose some pathways 
by which conceiving of and engaging in thought differently can move us beyond these 
restrictions.  As such, this is a broad-based, ethically oriented project, where ethics is 
understood from the post-structuralist viewpoint—as a sensitivity to openness and difference 
(Popke 298).  To conceive of thought in this more ethically productive way is to subscribe to 
what Deleuze calls “thought without an image” (DR 132, 167).  Deleuze, whose "noology" 
studies the historicity of images of thought, claims that each period of philosophy has 
produced a particular model for thought—which is to say a “system of coordinates, dynamics, 
orientations: what it means to think and to ‘orient oneself in thought’” (ATP 376; N 148).  The 
representational image of thought, for example—for a long time our most dominant image—is 
a "dogmatic, orthodox or moral" one, predicated upon the supposition that "thought has an 
affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true" (Deleuze, 
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DR 131).  Thought without an image, on the other hand, beginning with “a radical critique” of 
dogmatism, effectively frees thought from all traditional “presuppositions” about how it must 
proceed (Deleuze, DR 132).  For Deleuze (and Guattari), it is only when thought is released 
from any delimiting image that it can actually “begin to think” (DR 132).  Since this project 
strives towards constructing some Deleuze-Guattarian ways in which we might “begin to 
think,” in response to contemporary constraints upon thought, the first part of this 
introduction concerns some initial aspects of what such “beginning to think” might mean.  In 
other words, here we offer a broad theoretical introduction to the Deleuze-Guattarian concept 
of thought.  From there, we make a general survey of some of the salient facets of life in the 
current milieu—as a forerunner to Part 1 of the thesis, wherein our dominant thought systems 
are examined and critiqued.  The next part of the introduction continues with the theoretical 
outline of Deleuze-Guattarian thought, but now characterised as a mode of resistance.  Then, 
the introduction deals with the matter of how the thesis is structured, as well as some issues 
pertaining to methodology.  At that point it becomes appropriate to address three of the most 
well known critiques of Deleuze (and Guattari), and explain why, for our purposes, we are able 
to countermand them.  Finally, we suggest some ways in which this project makes a significant 
contribution to research.   
 
To think, for D+G, is a multifarious enterprise.  In large part, what they mean by thought is 
philosophy, since that is the thought-discipline they practise in.  In defining philosophy, D+G 
declare it as "the discipline that involves creating concepts" (WP 2).
2
  Strictly speaking, then, 
for D+G, philosophical thought always functions to create new concepts: not concepts that 
refer to pre-given essences or true forms (in this sense a concept would be merely "a container 
for cognitive content" [Penner 45]), but concepts that are singularly, processually created in 
response to "problems without which they would have no meaning" (D+G, WP 16).  Briefly, the 
concept is the "act of thought" that "speaks the event" (WP 21), and by "event" D+G do not 
mean a specific happening, but rather the incorporeal intensivities that underlie (or overlay) 
every actual occurrence or thing.  As Gregg Lambert explains, "concepts attempt to grasp the 
diversity that makes up the conditions of experience" (Non 3), with this diversity overflowing 
spatio-temporal manifestations.  If we are doing philosophy, if we are striving towards new 
concepts, it is important to remember—as Deleuze points out when discussing Foucault’s 
“theorising”—this thinking is “never just a theoretical matter”; rather, it is "to do with vital 
problems … To do with life itself” (N 105).  It is also important to acknowledge that concepts 
do not make up some closed philosophical set, but are always open-ended entities—as Paul 
Patton makes clear: “[b]ecause concepts are always created in relation to particular problems, 
and because different problems themselves may be interrelated, any given concept will be 
located in a series of virtual relations to other concepts” (Deleuze 14).  Therefore, thought as 
philosophy, as concept creation, is an open kind of thinking, wherein the problematics of life 
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constantly introduce new, self-seeding nodes, making concepts ever transforming.  In 
accounting for the newnesses that are always available to feed thought (and life), Deleuze 
makes use of Henri Bergson’s concept of the virtual, which, simply put, refers to “the open 
creativity totality” or the “full reality” of all that can be (Deleuze, B 111; DR 211).  Concepts are 
created from a virtual whole of thought, a potentiality that is “real without being actual, ideal 
without being abstract” (Deleuze, B 96).  Particular concepts are “actualisations” of the virtual, 
differentiations that have to be created (not copied) from a multiplicity of lines of potential.  
In this sense, D+G’s notion of thought as philosophy is, as Dorothea Olkowski suggests, “not a 
model, not a program[me] or ideology, but unceasing creation,” wrought from the virtual 
multiplicity that is thought’s whole (“Beside” 291).  As a project of/for Deleuze-Guattarian 
thought, then, this thesis is concerned with taking on philosophy, which does not mean we 
have to be professional “Philosophers.”  "Philosophers must come from anywhere," Deleuze 
tells us; “not in the sense that philosophy would depend on the popular wisdom you can find 
pretty much anywhere,” but in the sense that our work strives to produce creative encounters, 
across a range of disciplines, which might move us towards new concepts (TRM 146). 
 
As important as concept creation is, however, D+G take pains to point out that there is 
another wing or side to philosophy that is just as crucial: "nonphilosophy."  Before the 
creation of concepts there is a prephilosophical "absolute ground"—a "plane of immanence"—
from which concepts can arise: a "moving desert that concepts come to populate" (D+G, WP 
41).  This ground comprises the nonphilosophical, which is, according to D+G, "perhaps closer 
to the heart of philosophy than philosophy itself" (WP 41).  Thus, "philosophy needs not only a 
philosophical understanding, through concepts, but a nonphilosophical understanding" as 
well, which is “why philosophy has an essential relation to nonphilosophers, and addresses 
them too” (Deleuze, N 139, 164).  Therefore, as well as covering a more properly philosophical 
concept-creation, this project also operates on a nonphilosophical plane.  What comprises this 
nonphilosopical plane are not concepts, but concepts' "two other dimensions": percepts and 
affects (Deleuze, N 137).  To state this differently, Deleuze-Guattarian thought “strains toward 
three different poles: concepts, or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and 
hearing; and affects, or new ways of feeling.  They’re the philosophical trinity” (Deleuze, N 
165).  What these “three inseparable forces” achieve, ultimately, is the running together of 
philosophy and art  (Deleuze, N 137).  Thinkers who do this, according to D+G, are "'half' 
philosophers but also much more than philosophers," since they "decisively modify what 
thinking means" (WP 66-67).  If our modified understanding of thought involves affects and 
percepts, it is important to remember that, for D+G, affects are not feelings in the usual sense; 
rather, they are “becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby 
becoming someone else)," just as "[p]ercepts aren't perceptions, they're packets of sensations 
and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them” (N 137).  We will 
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develop these notions of “affects” and “becoming” as we proceed, but, in this general overview, 
we first acknowledge a related keynote: the prepersonal character of Deleuze-Guattarian 
thought.  In both its concept-based (philosophical) and percept/affect-inflected 
(nonphilosophical) nature, this thought is a non-humanistic one, or, as Deleuze puts it, a 
thought “oblivious to the wisdom and limits of the organism” (C1 51).  A worthwhile starting 
point in considering its non-human nature is to understand Deleuze-Guattarian thought as 
contingency.   
 
If thought is contingent and relational, "[i]t cannot be regarded as a fact that thinking is the 
natural exercise of a faculty," or that, as "everybody knows," we are always already thinking 
beings, even before any philosophical or conceptual arguments take place (Deleuze, DR 130, 
132).  For Deleuze, "thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought (DR 147).  In 
other words, "the possibility of thinking can no longer be understood as something … 
predestined for the cogito—... the mere possibility of thinking in no way guarantees the 
presence of a subject who is yet 'capable' of it"  (Lambert, Non 6).  Thought is not reflection or 
recognition, as representation would have it, but occurs as a radical contingency—as an 
involuntary, necessary response to gripping problems as they arise.  To this extent, thought is 
always "in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside," rather than 
any practise of interiority (D+G, ATP 376-77).  Deleuze further explains:   
Something in the world forces us to think.  This something is an object not of recognition 
but of a fundamental encounter.  What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a 
demon.  It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering.  In 
whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed.  In this sense it is 
opposed to recognition.  (DR 139) 
Philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato makes a similar argument: [t]hought is an activity that 
expresses itself in an assemblage of evental relations between the body, the incorporeal, the 
brain and the other (qua envelope of possibles)" ("Dialogism").  Deleuze-Guattarian thought, 
thus conceived, has nothing to do with truth, knowledge, common sense or logical process.  
Instead, it is what happens (the "event" of what happens) when we are confronted with "the 
unexpected, the indecipherable, a disruption or a dislocation" of our habitual thinking 
patterns (Clements 54), and are thrust into the "differentials of thought" (Deleuze DR 194, 
199).  And because this thought is "primarily trespass and violence, the enemy" (Deleuze, DR 
139), it is always difficult—an event of disturbance, perplexity, intensity.  While in 
representation’s dogmatic image "[w]e are led to believe that problems are given ready-made, 
and that they disappear in the responses or the solution" (DR 158), Deleuze-Guattarian 
thought, or thought without image, does not reach neat conclusions.  Rather, as soon as it 
reaches some sort of solution "a new curve of the plane, which at first we do not see, starts it 
all off again, posing new problems, a new batch of problems, advancing by successive surges" 
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(D+G, WP 82).  Thus, thought as problematisation is always and only "difference [covered 
with] more difference" (Deleuze, DR 145).  
 
A thought that is radically contingent, involuntary and connected to the sensible is far 
removed from a cognition-based model of thinking.  In other words, a Deleuze-Guattarian 
(non-)image of thought is derived from an “unabashedly ‘inhuman’ philosophical naturalism” 
since, for Deleuze, thought occurs in concert with forces moving through us.  This means that 
thinking is “something that we undergo rather than simply something that we do” (Due 50).  
As Deleuze puts it, "far from being the properties or attributes of a thinking substance, the 
Ideas which derive from imperatives enter and leave only by that fracture in the I, which 
means that another always thinks in me, another who must also be thought" (DR 199-200).  
The other that thinks in me is the problematical, the forces of the outside.  Ideas, then—the 
"'differentials' of thought"—are not produced by "a Cogito which functions as ground or as a 
proposition for consciousness,” but are related to "the fractured I of a dissolved Cogito" (DR 
194).  In Deleuze's ontology the Cogito must be dissolved, since individuality occurs at a "sub-
representative realm beneath the form of the 'I' and the matter of the 'Self'" (Metcalf).   Here, 
there is no pre-formed, distinct, thinking self, but only a "pre-individual field of singularity" 
(Metcalf).  Such a view connects with D+G's logic of multiplicity, whereby the world is 
composed not of substantial entities, but of multiplicitous, pre-individual, intensive 
differences that affect one another, constantly actualising and de-actualising as changing 
assemblages.  For D+G, this process also bespeaks Benedict Spinoza's theory of affects, which 
describes how, as forces encounter one another, they affect the capacity of each to act and to 
become (ATP xvi).  In a world of encounters, forces, prepersonal intensities and on-going 
affectivity, all life is a fluid and mobile process.  We are not distinct thinking beings who 
"have" thought/s; rather, "the fractured I and the dissolved self are actuali[s]ed as fragile, fluid, 
and temporary surface effects," arising from a deeper realm of pure differentiation (Metcalf), 
that includes thought. 
 
Faces of contemporary capitalism 
 
We propose to position Deleuze-Guattarian thought as a creative response to some of the 
central problems of our times, and as an escape route from the restrictive images of thought 
entangled therein.  While the subject of Part 1 is these limiting thought forms, we offer here a 
generalised outline of our current milieu.  From the many theoretical attempts to define the 
particular social, economic and political landscape we inhabit in this first part of the third 
millennium, several overlapping themes emerge.  One possible starting point is the 
unavoidably “globalised” nature of the contemporary world.  For David Harvey, the concept of 
globalisation encompasses “a process, … a condition, … [and] a specific kind of political 
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project” (Spaces 54).  In a more telling comment, he describes globalisation as signalling “a 
profound geographical reorganisation of capitalism” (Spaces 57).  The key word here, of 
course, is capitalism, since, as Lawrence Grossberg emphasises, “the very meaning of 
globali[s]ation” derives from the geographical expansion of economic markets (148).  Indeed, 
because the cultural condition of capitalism is what emerges as the crucial background (and 
common ground) in many theorists’ critical appraisals of how the world works today, it is 
perhaps a more pertinent starting point for any broad sketch of contemporary life.  There is 
any number of descriptors for contemporary capitalism—post-industrial finance capitalism  
(Spivak 179), technocapitalism (Kellner 289), informational capitalism (Castells, Information 
18), hyperindustrial capitalism (Stiegler, "Disaffected"), to name but a few.  In any event, as 
Manuel Castells points out, present-day capitalism “has undergone a process of profound 
restructuring” (Information 1).   For Fredric Jameson, this restructuring is explainable in largely 
economic terms, as the giving way of capitalism’s “productive moment,” in favour of "the 
moment of finance capital” (251).  Capital is, for the first time, “free floating”—"no longer 
[living its life] in the factories and the spaces of extraction and production, but on the floor of 
the stock market,” frenetically pursuing speculative capital—“the new kinds of profits available 
in financial transactions themselves” (Jameson 251).  Other notable theorists move beyond the 
realm of pure economics: Douglas Kellner, for instance, argues that the change is underpinned 
by the conjoining of capital with “the increasingly important role of technology“ (289).  
Kellner's term for this development is “technocapitalism"  (289), a phase “in which technical 
and scientific knowledge, computeri[s]ation and automation of labo[u]r, and information 
technology and multimedia" perform analogously "to the function of human labo[u]r power, 
mechani[s]ation of the labo[u]r process, and machines in an earlier period of capitalism”  (289-
90).  Castells, for his part, also focuses on "the technological revolution" of our present time, 
but his emphasis is firmly upon “information technologies," with his well-known contention 
being that the informational era has facilitated the development of a new kind of 
organisational logic: that of  "the network enterprise" (Information 1, 17, 187).  This logic is 
extrapolated both to the operating structures of corporations, which, in recent decades, have 
needed to become more flexible and efficient in order to remain competitive, and to the 
organisation of electronic information delivery systems themselves.  Castells' summation of 
the processual arrangement of the network enterprise is that "[i]nformation circulates through 
networks: networks between companies, networks within companies, personal networks, and 
computer networks.  New information technologies are decisive in allowing such a flexible 
adaptive model to actually work" (Information 177).  Because information networks effectively 
disqualify the restrictiveness of time and space, and make possible real time interactions, their 
contribution to information productivity and exchange is enormous. 
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Overall, the strengths of the information technology network are often regarded to be its ever-
increasing expansiveness, its flexibility, and its utter pervasiveness.  However, as many 
commentators observe, some of the very "strengths" of network-based culture are also its 
afflictions.  Pervasiveness, for example, can be regarded as a power-driven invasiveness.  To 
begin to explore this claim, it is useful to consider Nicholas Thoburn's suggestion that in 
contemporary capitalism, the late-Marxist concept of hegemony is no longer an appropriate 
model for understanding power arrangements.  Capitalism has entered Marx's "real 
subsumption" phase, which prompts Thoburn to argue that "an expanded understanding of 
production" is more apposite to the way power works today (80).  By "production," Thoburn 
means "production considered as the patterning—or mobili[s]ation, arrangement and 
distribution—of rich social, technical, economic and affective relations" (80).  Thoburn draws 
this perspective from the recent Italian socialist tradition of thought—of which Mario Tronti 
was a forerunner—that extends Marx's real subsumption of life under capital by defining 
contemporary capitalism as a "proliferation of productive relations across the social" (Thoburn 
80).
3
  For Tronti, this is the moment of the "sociali[s]ation of capitalist production," when 
"capital itself … becomes uncovered, at a certain level of its development, as social power.”  
Michael Hardt describes this Italian theoretical insight as the recognition that "creative 
practices across the range of terrains ... are the labo[u]r that produces and reproduces society” 
("Introduction" 6).  When the whole of society is subject to the principle of "unleashed 
production" (Massumi, "Requiem" 56), the concept of hegemony—which is predicated upon 
an autonomous political base—is superseded.  If capitalist production now means the 
production of the totality of life, politics can no longer be circumscribed within the sphere of 
the politico-economic; instead, the political, as well, is "subordinated to capitalist regimes of 
production" (Thoburn 82, 80).   
 
In a social landscape that is, for the first time, defined by widely dispersed production, new 
forms of power will emerge.  Several theorists have taken up this question of power under the 
conditions of unlimited social production— Lazzarato, Franco Berardi, Antonio Negri (and 
Michael Hardt) and Paolo Virno being some who have contributed from the Italian context.  
Many theorists in this vein have, in fact, built upon the work of Michel Foucault, especially as 
interpreted and extended by Deleuze.  In order to grasp the workings of power in this 
productive/informational/technological/network-based society, then, we also turn to Foucault 
and Deleuze.  For Foucault, in the historical epoch immediately prior to our current one, 
Western society was configured in "discipline"-based terms: in the eighteenth, nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, social order and command were serially effected by way of the 
"major sites of confinement" through which an individual must pass—the family, the school, 
the factory, the prison, and so on (Deleuze, N 177).   The development of network culture, 
though, has brought a new paradigm of power: "control societies are taking over from 
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disciplinary societies," Deleuze tells us (N 178), which means that "power is no longer exerted 
primarily through disciplinary deployments, but through networks of control" (Hardt, 
"Withering" 23).  To understand control, Brian Massumi suggests reading the concept 
cybernetically, but with "systems' control of input, output, and the transformative operations 
effected in the autonomic machine … applied to bodies (defined as broadly as possible, to 
include images) rather than to information" ("Requiem" 57).  Instead of a methodical, 
institutional mechanism, then, as power is in a disciplinary society, power-as-control is of a 
free-floating kind.  This is a power befitting a society comprised of "diffuse social production" 
(Thoburn 82).  Paul Virilio adds another perspective through his claim that such 
technologically and informationally distributed control is fundamentally penetrative of 
individuals (Information 39).  Hardt and Negri concur, describing control as "immanent to the 
social field [and] distributed throughout the brains and bodies of … citizens" (Empire 23).   
Through the myriads of overlapping networks to and within which we are connected, then, 
"the normalising apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily 
practices" have become intensified and generalised (Hardt and Negri, Empire 23).  Put another 
way, generalised control can be regarded as the "self-transmuting overlay of disciplinary 
techniques across social space"—procedures also known as "modulation" (Thorburn 83).  So 
significant is the power dimension of network society that many thinkers, of whom Hardt and 
Negri were perhaps the first, have conceptualised the emergence of new forms of "empires."  
For Hardt and Negri, contemporary "Empire" signifies a "new global form of sovereignty" 
(Empire xii).  They describe Empire as a decentred ruling mechanism, incorporating “the 
entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.  Empire manages hybrid identities, 
flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command” (Empire 
xii-xiii).  Other theorists of empire point more to the economic dimensions of the electronic 
network: Rita Raley, for example, argues that the "Electronic Empire" or "eEmpire" is "the 
apparatus of our time," since it represents the "convergence of electronics and commerce"; and 
with "information as its chief commodity," it is the primary site of corporate capitalism today 
(120, 122).   
 
Perhaps underlying these theories of empire, however, is a more critically significant approach 
to control society—Foucault’s concept of "bio-power.”  This concept bespeaks the epochal 
transformation in sovereign power's focus: from the classical notion of the power to simply 
take life away or let it live, to the modern notion of the power to administer life—or the power 
"to invest life through and through" (Foucault, Will 138-39).  In Foucault's theory, bio-power 
directly targets the body: "its disciplining, the optimi[s]ation of its capabilities, the extortion of 
its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, [and] its integration into 
systems of efficient and economic controls" (Will 139).  The idea that a system of "regulatory 
controls" effectuates bio-political power (Foucault, Will 139) is all the more relevant today, in 
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the modulatory regime that is network/control culture: as John Marks observes, "[b]iopolitical 
processes as defined by Foucault have become part of the fabric of everyday reality in 
advanced capitalist economies" ("Biopolitics" 333).  Indeed, Foucault's remark that bio-power 
amounts to "the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery" of capitalism is highly 
relevant (Will 141), since capitalism today, as a social power, is concerned with the very 
production of life.  Virno explains: "while money is the universal representation of the value of 
exchange—or rather the exchangeability itself of products—life, instead, takes the place of the 
productive potential, of the invisible dynamis" (84).  In contemporary capitalist society, then, 
"[t]he living body becomes an object to be governed" because it harbours such diverse 
productive powers: "the potential for speaking, for thinking, for remembering, for acting, etc" 
(Virno 84).  For contemporary philosopher Bernard Stiegler, bio-political control today is 
especially concerning, due to the pervasiveness of the disseminating structures of 
technological/informational capitalism.  According to Stiegler, the world is now 
"hyperindustrial," controlled totally by the mediatised "hypermarket," which means that life is 
"completely reduced to consumption" ("Disaffected").  For Stiegler, this yields a "horizon of 
despair," since marketised information and media technologies effectively bring about 
cognitive and affective saturation of the individual; in turn, this leads to an alarming 
"generali[s]ed disaffection" of the population ("Disaffected").  On this view, contemporary 
biopolitical control may be even more penetrative than Foucault could estimate, due to the 
increasing conflation of life with media, technicity and capital. 
 
Stiegler's concern with the disaffection of the population brings us to a further important shift 
in the workings of power today—a shift that, for some theorists, supplements and extends the 
control methods of biopower.  As Thoburn explains, "[t]his orientation toward production and 
control" also marks a movement in the nature of power to incorporate the processes of 
"communication and affect" (83).  Massumi agrees: "[t]here seems to be a growing feeling 
within media, literary, and art theory that affect is central to an understanding of our 
information- and image-based late capitalist culture" (Parables 27).  Accordingly, then, 
Stiegler's disaffectedness is not brought about by a lack of affect in contemporary culture, but 
by what Massumi calls "a surfeit of it" (Parables 27).  It must be again be acknowledged, 
though, that affect in this sense does not correspond directly to emotion or a personal feeling.  
Rather, this affect is a pre-personal, autonomous intensity (Massumi, Parables 27, 35), which is 
sensed/registered before any conscious/emotional processing of the experience.  It operates 
solely at the bodily level.
4
  As Massumi explains, this meaning of affect is related to Spinoza's 
notion (also taken up by D+G) that bodies affect one another: affect-in-itself is the transition 
in—that is, either enhancement or diminishment of—a body's state, brought about by the 
impact of another body (and, again, body here is broadly meant) ("Navigating" 212).  When 
affect is registered, there is "the passing awareness of being at a threshold," of passing from 
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one bodily state to another (Massumi, "Navigating" 217).  In information society, bodies-as-
images carry/communicate significant affective charges, compressing manifold intensities into 
small bytes of information, so that one need not “so much read the encoded information, as 
sense and embody the pattern or the pulsion" (Thoburn 84).  Communication (the core 
process of information society) is, therefore, productive, to the extent that these images 
convey preconscious intensities that directly affect bodies.  For Patricia Ticineto Clough, the 
workings of affect are intrinsically linked to control since control actually operates by way of 
"investment in and regulation of a market-driven circulation of affect and attention" (19).  She 
further explains that “control aims at a never-ending modulation of moods, capacities, affects, 
and potentialities, assembled in … bodies of data and information (including the human body 
as data and information)” (19).  The aim of control, then, is always to maintain productivity, 
and, increasingly, the means of disseminating control is by way of affective channels.  Like 
Thoburn's notion of post-hegemony, Massumi calls this a post-ideological form of power, 
since in a control society "[d]irect affect modulation takes the place of old-style ideology" 
("Navigating" 233).   
 
More recently, Massumi has extended this idea of affect manipulation through his theory of 
"pre-emptive" power—a concept that is linked to what he sees as a post-September 11 
transformation in governance.  Prior to 9/11, Massumi tells us, the dominant mode of 
government in the West was "neoliberalism," a mode that promotes the freedom of 
"individuals to act according to their personal interest, as rationally indexed to the needs and 
opportunities of the market economy that sustains them" ("Future" 1).  Neoliberalism is 
connected to biopower in the sense that each is economically driven—operating through the 
premise that every aspect and action in an individual's life has potential for capital.  
Accordingly, "whatever amplifies an individual's productive powers eventually settles into a 
reinforcing systemic adjustment" of the market (Massumi, "Future" 2).  A significant correlate 
of such a neoliberal milieu is a climate of risk and fear:  what if something happens to affect 
productivity?  What if the market drops?  When all of life is capital, these are life-threatening 
questions.  (Virno makes the related argument that due to the breakdown of "substantial 
communities" in "post-Fordist" capitalist society, we are subject to both an experience of direct 
fear—of losing one's job, for example—and to generalised anguish—or an "absolute insecurity" 
[34-35].)  The approach of neoliberal governance, however, for Massumi, is to maintain this 
affect-based mood of fear through a strategy of minimal interference; because the market is 
"autonomously self-organi[s]ing" and "self-regenerating," individuals are encouraged to 
become more speculative, more productive, so as to enable the system to re-adjust (Massumi, 
"Future" 3).  This strategy aims also to maintain the population's hope in the (always 
unpredictable) future (Cooper 128).  The events of 9/11, however, forced a tipping point, 
upgrading the generalised, fluctuating mood of fear/hope into a crisis of panic—the object of 
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which was/is terrorism.  The greatest threat to productivity now has the face of a terrorist, and 
thus generating a sense of security has become politically, which is to say economically, 
paramount.  For Massumi and Melinda Cooper, then, neoliberal governance has become 
augmented by a kind of "neoconservatism": a political style that is more future-orientated and 
interventional.  It works like this: if the government fosters a constant state of alarm over 
something that will happen (a "state of permanent warfare," as Cooper calls it [128]), it pre-
emptively manipulates the future.  And when the threat of terror is always present 
(maintained by codes of "alertness"), governance can manage our fear of a (now certain) future 
event, and can operate by providing security.  As Massumi explains, security comes from the 
"governmental logic" of the "foregone conclusion," as well as from sudden, confident, pre-
emptive, George Bush-style strikes of active "command power" ("Future" 6-7).  The key point 
here is that such governance functions almost exclusively along affective channels, doing away 
with "logico-discursive" reasoning and empirical facts (Massumi, "Future" 6).  A "sense" of 
security in an "atmosphere" of on-going fear is now what enables the market to continue to 
function.  Massumi describes this issuance of power as the deployment of the "affective fact" 
("Future" 7,10), which surely signifies the deepening of capital's control over not only 
what/how we produce ourselves—for the market that is us—but over our very sensibility.   
 
Thought as a weapon 
 
In terms of ethics, this current technological/informational milieu brings forth serious 
concerns regarding the limitations placed upon life, as a purely creative force, by advanced 
capitalism.  In a cultural climate permeated by biopolitical control, affect modulation and 
neoconservative governance, questions must be raised as to what potential there might be to 
access any of the creative, differentiating force of life outside the mechanisms of capital.  As 
we have indicated, D+G nominate thought as a particular, privileged pathway for creativity: 
"thought is creation," they tell us (WP 54), and "[t]o think is to create—there is no other 
creation—but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in thought" (Deleuze, DR 147).  The 
impact of our capitalist milieu upon the processes of thought is, therefore, a critical matter, 
and Part 1 seeks to sketch out some details of this detrimental effect.  But there is more we can 
do than understand the impact on thought.  In his seminal essay, “Postscript on Control 
Society,” Deleuze calls for an active response to “the harshest confinement” instituted by 
contemporary “mechanisms of control”: "[i]t's not a question of worrying or of hoping for the 
best,” he tells us, “but of finding new weapons" (N 178).  Accordingly, this project strives to 
find a "new weapon" of resistance in re-imagining how thought might work as a truly creative 
force today, outside its enclosure by representation, and as a function of information for/of the 
market.  To do this would be to help remove creativity’s internal obstacles, so as to liberate the 
“truth” that is “the creation of the New” (Deleuze, C2 147).  To turn to thought as a weapon of 
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resistance is also to invoke what D+G call “counterthought—a way to “take thought 
seriously”—so as to escape conformity with the State (ATP 376-77).  Such an act of resistance 
also recognises Foucault's suggestion that "there are always possibilities of changing the 
situation" since, in power relations, "resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to 
the [other] forces of the process" of biopower (Foucault 386).  If resistance did not come first 
power relations would not exist, since "it would simply be a matter of [blind] obedience" 
(Foucault, Foucault 386).  Moreover, for Foucault, resistance is eminently creative, as this 
interview fragment reveals:     
Q:  [A]s you see it, resistance is not solely a negation but a creative process.  To create 
and recreate, to transform the situation, to participate actively in the process, that is 
to resist.  
MF:  Yes, that is the way I would put it.  To say no is the minimum form of resistance.  
But naturally, at times that is very important. You have to say no as a decisive form of 
resistance.  (Foucault, Foucault 386) 
In Lazzarato’s estimation, Foucault’s concept of resistance constitutes "the reversal of 
biopower into biopolitics,” which amounts to transforming “the 'art of governance' into the 
[creative] production … of new forms of life" ("From").   
 
In Deleuze’s view, “whenever one creates, one resists” (ABC), and if thought is creativity itself, 
thinking is resistance par excellence.  As John Rajchman interprets Deleuze, "thinking is always 
directed against powers that resist or block its ramifications and complications" (73).   
Rajchmann’s comment is helpful since it indicates the primacy of thought over the more 
normative notion of resistance.  When we talk about thought as resistance we do not mean 
that it is secondary to constraining forces: rather, thought’s creativity is foremost, and, when 
forces of power seek to capture it, it resists as a function of its ongoing productivity (D+G, ATP 
531n39).  The very joy of thought lies in "lead[ing] life to the limit of what it can do" (Deleuze, 
NP 101), which also means  "the creation of dissonance and divergence" (Colebrook, "Joy" 224) 
in relation to established norms.  As Peter Hallward rightly notes, in contemporary life we are 
often “held down, in the first place, by what [we] take to be unalterable constraints of [our] 
actual organic form,” and then “we restrict thought to the mere supervision of those forms of 
mental behaviour (recognition, classification, consumption …) which preserve our bio-cultural 
distinction” (58, 59).  A resistant thought, on the other hand, proceeds by way of (pre-
cognitive) encounter, thereby unearthing unforeseeable singularities and an uncapitalisable, 
self-differing difference.  Such thought will be bio-political in Lazzarato's sense, inasmuch as it 
will reverse the relationship between power and resistance, since thought as this resistant 
force will always precede control.  And in overcoming the self who thinks, we will become 
"everybody/everything": in other words, "become-imperceptible” (D+G, ATP 279)—which is to 
say no longer one "who masters the world[,] but one who feels the very joy of life in an 
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intuition that is no longer directed towards the realisation of some external end" (Colebrook, 
"Joy" 219)—such as capital.    
 
To take a slightly different approach in establishing our weapon of resistance, we might 
address the question: why thought?  In other words, as Claire Colebrook asks, "[w]hy think?  
What is the function, purpose or point of philosophy [with its counterpart nonphilosophy] in 
a world directed more and more towards efficiency, outcomes and effort?" ("Joy" 214).  The 
simple answer, again, invokes D+G's non-humanism, which, importantly, also incorporates 
their philosophy of desire.  In short, this desire—unlike the psychoanalytic desire-as-lack 
attributed to a subject—is the positive, productive force of life: the force that "form[s] 
connections and enhance[s] the powers of bodies in their connection" (Ross 63).  Put another 
way, this desire is “the creative energeia of life” (Spangenberg 97).  If all of life is desire, which 
is to say multiplicity, difference and creative production, the kind of thought that moves 
beyond the self and the organism is related, then, to the enhancement of life.  In Colebrook’s 
explanation, we think “not to arrive at who we are, not to realise our inmost powers, but 
because life is desire.  Life is the potentiality for force and synthesis that pays no attention to 
the already formed" ("Joy" 216).  Thought, in the non-representational, Deleuze-Guattarian 
sense, is a process of creation that can take us out of the illusion of transcendence—the 
illusion that to think is to practise an essential, human cognitive logic whose aim is to 
establish and conform to the laws and truths of life.  Deleuze-Guattarian thought is, rather, a 
process that realises (all of) life's pure potentiality.  If thought can flow as a creative force 
without reference to restrictions external to itself, it can help life express more of its fullest 
potential.  This kind of thought, therefore, bespeaks a capacity to go further than a humanistic 
perception of the world, in order to “intuit[…] the world as such, not from this point here and 
now for me, but as it would be for all time, for any subject whatever" (Colebrook, "Joy" 217).  
Life is multiplicity, pure difference-in-becoming, and the thought that moves outside of all 
creatural constraints (such as, for example, the ubiquitous "Money, Gold or the Dollar" 
[Deleuze, F 76]), intuits (in Bergson's sense) the potential of the virtual.  Again, this thought is 
not merely an act of self-maximisation, but is, more significantly, an unleashing of all 
creativity—even to “create lives and worlds that are incommensurable" (Colebrook, "Joy" 224).  
And to think in this way is eminently joyful, since, as Deleuze states, "[i]ntuition is the joy of 
difference" (DI 33).  The joy referred to here again invokes Spinoza, for whom joy is an affect 
or passion marked by the "passage to a greater perfection, or the increase of the power of 
acting" (Deleuze, SPP 50).  Therefore, if thought multiplies the potentialities for life by 
intuiting difference, it will also enhance the powers to be, thus calling forth joy.  Thinking, 
then, in D+G's sense of a creative force, is an ethical act, to the extent that it increases the 
potentiality of life.  We think “because we can, and if we can … then we ought to.  Why?  For 
Deleuze [and Guattari], life in general proceeds by maximising its potential; philosophy [and 
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non-philosophy are] directions by which a certain line of life (thinking) increases its power” 
(Colebrook, Gilles 14).  Thought increases life’s potential by thinking/intuiting/affirming the 
power of difference.  If thinking means "discovering, inventing new possibilities of life" 
(Deleuze, NP 101), it is an apt weapon of resistance to the constraining forces that face us 
today.   
 
Structure, methodology, will to power 
 
The body of this thesis consists of two parts.  Part 1 comprises an exploration of some of the 
ways in which thought, as conceived by D+G, is restricted by the predominant power 
mechanisms of contemporary life.  These mechanisms, inextricable from late capitalism, are 
deployed through informationalism, biopower and other techniques of control.  At the same 
time as these control mechanisms are present, however, a particular “image” of thought—what 
D+G call the dogmatic or classical (representation)—continues to prevail.  This image, as with 
any one image, also constrains thought’s creative power.  Part 1 addresses each of these 
limiting aspects, through dividing them into two kinds of problems: firstly, the problem of the 
dogmatic image; and secondly, the problem of control.  The strategy of problematising these 
issues is intentional: as we have said, Deleuze-Guattarian thought is never pregiven, but is 
always a response to the vital problems we encounter.  More, though, as Deleuze says, “[t]he 
‘problematic’ is a state of the world,” by which he means we will find no definitive solutions: 
because of “the reality of the virtual” (DR 281), the world is always-already a problematising, 
differentiating structure.  We can think, or create Deleuzian “Ideas,” in response to problems, 
but these ideas/solutions will only be provisional, as life remains dynamic and, therefore, ever 
problematising.  Such provisionality does not devalue thought’s efficacy, though, since it 
always retains its power to create and think the new.  Returning to Part 1’s content, we begin 
in the first section (Problem 1) by outlining the tenets of representational thought, which 
include notions of the thinking subject and his/her ideas, the categories according to which 
thought is structured (identity, resemblance, opposition), and the practices of binary logic and 
hierarchisation.  We see how, at the time of the Enlightenment, such ways of conceiving life 
are linked to the State, so that reason and rationality become officially authorised as thought’s 
supreme modes of functioning.  Such modes of thinking are highlighted in the modernist 
project of science, which seeks to know and, therefore, master the material world, and 
Enlightenment reasoning also sets up dominant identities—white, male, heterosexual, for 
instance—relegating their “opposites” to states of negative otherness.  In this section of the 
thesis, we consider the status of such thought today, beginning with the notion of 
individualism.  We contend that even in postmodernity, and with the decentrings and 
distributions of networked, late capitalist culture, individualism (albeit in revised format) 
persists.  Having established a contemporary version of the classical human subject, we follow 
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what Rosi Braidotti proposes are the three main dialectical axes of otherness—nature, gender 
and race (“Posthuman” 76)—in order to investigate how elements of representational thought 
continue to endure, firstly in the practice of science, and also in dominant conceptualisations 
of sexuality and national identity.  In this process, we explore such present situations as stem 
cell research, gay marriage and immigration/asylum seeking.  As a segue to Problem 2, we 
consider, from D+G’s perspective, the force of capital—in terms of representational thought 
becoming thought-for-the-market.  In Problem 2, we further examine the workings of capital, 
but now as it underpins what may be called our milieu’s new, informational image of thought.  
In investigating this informational image, we focus on the networks of control through which 
information flows, highlighting the checkpoint systems that capitalise on our every 
movement.  We also consider the impact of contemporary media upon thought, with 
television and advertising proving most deleterious from D+G’s viewpoint.  New media, 
defined as those relating to digital computer technologies, have a more complex relationship 
to thought, but in this section we focus on the ways in which these media foreclose thinking 
through the limitations of their binary systems.  The internet presents further problems, with 
search engines like Google and social media such as Facebook being undeniably tied to profit 
generation and/or identity promotion/management—practices that are entirely unrelated to 
any ethical engagement in thought.  We finish this section with the capture of affect by 
capital, the media and contemporary governance, a serious concern when, for D+G, affect is 
the intensity and drive at the very heart of thought.        
 
After Part 1 outlines the two kinds of problems creative thought is hindered by today, Part 2 
maps some responses to these problems.  For D+G, such responses have the potential to be 
“cutting edges of creation,” which they also call “lines of flight” (ATP 531n39).  The concept of 
lines of flight refers to abstract lines “according to which multiplicities change in nature and 
connect with other multiplicities” (D+G, ATP, 9).  Ronald Bogue offers further elucidation:   
A line of flight is a line of escape from any fixed and stable order.  It is a line between 
things, between clearly demarcated entities and identities, a zigzag, unpredictable 
course that disrupts the coordinates of an organi[s]ed space.  … [W]hat is essential is 
that the line of flight is a line of becoming-other, of metamorphosis and constant 
transformation.  (Deleuze’s 130) 
And so we designate our responses to the problems set out in Part 1 as “lines of flight,” or a 
“thought that moves,” both from problems to responses, and also between different kinds of 
responses.  Specifically, we map three lines of flight: the first travelling between affects, 
concepts and micropolitics; the second, exploring the notion of thinking through art; and 
finally, investigating how thought can be conceived in Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm.  
Generally speaking, the first line of flight charts a thought that is a kind of 
philosophy/nonphilosophy, moving through such pathways as the “ordinary” affects of 
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everyday life and how they can lead to concept creation; the micropolical moment of the “half-
second delay” between the registering of affect and consciousness; and Bergsonian duration 
and intution as a mode of what Lauren Berlant calls “stopping to think” (“Thinking” 6).  Here, 
we also examine the potential of a particular contemporary event (the global financial crisis) 
to give rise to new concepts of “revolution” and “democracy” (which, for D+G, are provisional 
concepts, as indexed by their preference for the terms “becoming-revolutionary” and 
“becoming-democracy”).  The second line of flight moves in a different direction, taking a 
course through art as a form of thought (or another kind of nonphilosophy).  For D+G, 
thought, being nonhuman, can also be carried through the nonhuman affects and percepts—
sensations—that are proper to art: indeed, Deleuze writes that art’s sensations “mobili[s]e 
pure thought” (PS 98).  Art also has a political vocation, “in the sense that it elaborates the 
possibilities of new, more, different sensations than those we know” (Grosz, Chaos 70), which 
D+G phrase as “confid[ing] to the ear of the future” (WP 79).  Of course, by “thought as art” we 
do not mean art as representation, but art as a force that effects difference in the world.  We 
investigate some of the ways in which thought works as art through examples from three 
genres: Australian aboriginal painting, contemporary dance, and digital/interactive art.  The 
project’s final line of flight explores Guattari’s “aesthetic paradigm”—his extrapolation of the 
aesthetic techniques of artistic creation to the ethical reinvention of subjectivity.  For Guattari, 
it is possible to reappropriate subjectivity (individual and/or group) from capitalist forces of 
capture, enabling a more creative self-production, and for this task the technologies of the 
“post-media” era can be particularly useful.  In our exploration of what Guattari’s aesthetics of 
existence mean for thought, then, we pay particular attention to the functioning of electronic 
and communication technologies, such as the internet.  We explore a range of real situations 
to guage how such technologies can be utilised to implement aesthetic techniques of 
experimentation, in order to enact a more ethico-political, transversalising thought for the 
creation of life.  
 
In each of these lines of flight, and also in Part 1’s study of our limiting images and practices of 
thought, we take a situated approach.  This means that our thought process is guided by a 
series of actual, present-day occurrences: examples from life in the current world.  True 
thought always occurs in relation to life’s events, D+G tell us—it is never a disconnected, 
theoretical practice.  Therefore, in proceeding by way of real life examples, we ensure that our 
thought remains vital and connected.  As Braidotti suggests, “[w]e need schemes of thought 
and figurations that enable us to account accurately for the complexities of our historicity” 
(“Of Poststructuralist” 26).  The events of our time are neither simple, nor linear, but are, 
rather, “multi-layered and internally contradictory phenomena that combine elements of 
ultra-modernity with splinters of neo-archaism: high tech advances and neo-primitivism at the 
same time” (Braidotti, “Of Poststructuralist” 27).  If we are to generate different, more life-
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affirming ways of thinking, we must start with actual accounts of our own embodied and 
embedded subjectivities (Braidotti, “Of Poststructuralist” 27).  The actual accounts or 
examples we explore derive from real happenings; they are not “selected,” therefore, but are 
encountered during the time of thesis construction, and are taken up for the opportunities 
they present to engage with the kind of thought we are striving for.  But there is another 
valuable inflection to such a process of exemplification, as Massumi points out in his 
discussion of Giorgio Agamben's notion of the "example" (Parables 17).  For Agamben, the 
"example" is a logical category that is neither particular nor universal (Agamben, Coming 9-11), 
meaning that, in a thought-project such as this, the traps of transcendentalism can be avoided.  
Rather than being an essence or a form, the example is a "singularity," which means it is a real 
and distinct case that, significantly, also holds, stands in for, or serves, all cases of a similar 
type (Agamben, Coming 10).  Thus, the example can be regarded as both a self and a relation, 
which is to say it is "a belonging to itself that is simultaneously an extendibility to everything 
else with which it might be connected" (Massumi, Parables 18).  A technique of 
exemplification, then, is necessarily one that works through connection and relation, and this, 
as Massumi notes, will also give rise to "terrible powers of deviation and digression" (Parables 
18).  One never knows where an example will lead, or what other cases it will connect with and 
extend to.  The result, overall, “is a systematic openness: an open system" (Massumi, Parables 
18), making this technique of exemplification well suited to a project of/for Deleuze-
Guattarian thought.   
 
And with this idea of systematic openness we arrive at the question of methodology.  As a 
project of Deleuze-Guattarian thought, this thesis is also a praxis of their “thought without an 
image,” which already sets up a challenge to the traditional academic notion of method.  The 
kind of thought D+G affirm is experimental and indeterminate, which is to say: creative.  
Necessarily broad ranging and open-ended, thought without an image follows a “rhizomatic” 
logic, with “rhizome” denoting a system of diversity connecting “states of things of different 
status” (D+G, ATP 7).  Therefore, the links between ideas tend not to follow a conventional 
narrative arc, or a propositional order of hierarchical concepts.  Rather, there is a logic of 
immanence, unfolding as a process of its own movement and encounters—making it 
impossible to map comprehensively in advance.  As Deleuze says, “one cannot prejudge the 
outcome of research”—there is always uncertainty in this process (DR 143-44).  It is normally 
the case, however, that research is regulated and controlled by institutions of discipline, so 
that creativity is delimited beforehand; Andrew Murphie explains: “[t]his is the attempt to 
standardise and recuperate research into a certain order before it occurs, even if in terms of a 
standard deviation or pre-fixed range of variations or possible modulations” (“Clone” 3).  
Overall, though, this attempt at order is doomed (Murphie, “Clone” 3), since, according to 
D+G, all life is process (AO 3-5): variation—even in acts of repetition—is the condition of the 
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world (Deleuze, DR xvi).  Rather than follow a strict model for how this thesis should be 
written and structured, therefore, we are engaging in what can be called “research-creation.”
5
 
In this process, we strive to “engage in the creation, exploration and use of techniques for the 
generation of newness, not the radically new as a break[,] but newness as emerging from 
modes of participation, contact, transduction and relation” (Thain 3).  In other words, 
situatedness and relationality are key, since they demand “an attentive posture, an openness to 
what is already happening, an expanded perception of what we are already participating in” 
(Thain 2).  From here, thought is set in motion, thought that can only produce the new since it 
is generated by singular circumstances—again, not knowable in advance.  In this process of 
research-creation, as Alanna Thain points out, “[p]riority falls not onto one term or another … , 
but to the ‘creative inbetween’” (2).  Hence, the project is constructed in a zone of 
indiscernibility—the “border between knowing and not-knowing”—which is, according to 
Deleuze, exactly where “one must settle in [in order] to have something to say” (ABC).  
Working in such a way is to embrace unexpected digression and being prepared for failure or 
even “outbreaks of stupidity” (Massumi, Parables 18).  Such risks are part of experimental 
activity; “[i]f you know where you will end up when you begin, nothing has happened in the 
meantime” (Massumi, Parables 18).  And because of the ongoing processuality of life/thought, 
this work is not meant to be exhaustive, or a conclusive undertaking or statement.  Rather, it is 
an assemblage, which Deleuze defines as “a multiplicity … made up of many heterogeneous 
terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them” (D 69).  Furthermore, not only 
does an assemblage of writing set up internal connections, it connects with the outside (what 
is outside itself)—with other assemblages of all kinds—as D+G make clear: a written text 
“exists only through the outside and on the outside” (ATP 4).  Such a work is, by nature, 
unfinished in itself.  In evaluating a writing assemblage (such as a book, or a thesis), then, D+G 
take a pragmatic approach, not asking what it means, but asking “what it functions with, in 
connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other 
multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed … “ (ATP 4).  The effectiveness of 
thought is determined by how well it connects to new contexts, so as to help see things other 
than as they currently are.  In this way, we can “produce new means of acting on the present” 
(Patton, Deleuze 133), and contribute to bringing about the “new earth and people” that D+G 
call for in resistance to life’s repressions (WP 108). 
 
Because we are following a thought that moves contingently in this work, the writing will not 
be partitioned into the conventional, discrete “chapters” of an academic thesis.  Instead, the 
thinking is presented as segments with sub-headings, but even these boundaries are not 
absolute enclosures.  Ideas are likely to spill beyond these confines through overlaps and in 
various moments of repetition (as may already be evident).  For Deleuze, repetition is, in fact, 
productive, for by nature it does not repeat the same: because life is always in process it only 
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ever introduces the new.  Repetition, for D+G, is determined by Friedrich Nietzsche’s “eternal 
return,” according to which what returns is only the be(com)ing of difference, and what 
repeats is always singular and utterly unique (Deleuze, DR 41, 1).  Repetition is, thus, an 
affirmation of singularity and difference.  Braidotti calls this “creative repetitions,” maintaining 
that “[r]evisiting the same idea or project of location from different angles is ... not merely a 
quantitative multiplication of options, but rather a qualitative leap of perspective” 
(“Elemental” 218).  At the same time, there may be gaps between ideas presented in the 
project’s segments, but again, these are not necessarily unfruitful: thinking along the rhizome 
involves leaping across breaks and ruptures (Deleuze, D 26), and, as Deleuze, says, sometimes 
“it’s in these holes that movement takes place” (N 138).  While we do not follow the convention 
of chapter divisions, we do, however, break the work into two parts.  As we have said, Part 1 
presents an interpretation of how thought is constrained in our contemporary milieu, and Part 
2 follows several creative lines of light.  Although both parts follow a logic of immanence, Part 
1 is somewhat more exegetical in style, which, we submit, is in keeping with its representation-
based subject matter.  It would be a mistake, however, to construe this two-part arrangement 
as an Hegelian movement of contradiction, whereby thought evolves according to a process of 
negation; indeed, Deleuzian philosophy is highly critical of German idealist Georg Hegel’s 
negating dialectic, which only allows difference as a negative (and derivative) reaction to an 
originary term.  Rather, this work is conceived according to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s 
“critique,” which means it is a project of “active ethics” (Olkowski, “Nietzsche’s” 122)—aiming, 
firstly, to examine the forces taking hold of thought today, and, secondly, to create new 
possibilities for thought and life.  For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s great contribution to philosophy is 
his affirmative approach, as Bogue explains: “Nietzsche’s ultimate goal is to enunciate an 
affirmative and active thought, one that will counteract the negative and reactive thought that 
has dominated Western philosophy from its inception” (Deleuze and Guattari 18).  Nietzsche’s 
affirmative thought is, for Deleuze, a completion of Immanuel Kant’s project of critique, which 
Deleuze sees as merely a “politics of compromise”:  
In Kant, critique was not able to discover the truly active instance which would have 
been capable of carrying it through.  
... 
Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which 
saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge 
and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves.  (NP 89) 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, through his notion of “will to power,” brought about “a 
reinvention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it” (Deleuze, 
NP 52).  As a project of Nietzschean critique, therefore, we invoke this will to power, which, 
according to Nietzsche himself, is the “unexhausted procreative life-will” (Thus 98).  In 
Nietzche’s view—which informs D+G—“ours is a world of becoming, of constant flux and 
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change in which no entities preserve a stable identity,” and, concomitantly, nature “is an 
interrelated multiplicity of forces,” which are either active or reactive (Bogue, Deleuze and 
Guattari 20).  The will to power is “a general orientation of becoming” (Bogue, Deleuze and 
Guattari 22), which can go in the direction of either affirmation (the “becoming active” of 
force) or negation (the “becoming reactive” of force) (Deleuze, NP 54).  It is important to 
realise that the will to power is not an anthropocentric concept—it does not want power; 
rather, it determines and evaluates the forces at play in a phenomenon as either active or 
reactive, and the quality of power as either affirming or denying (Deleuze, NP 85).  Thus, as a 
“source of meaning and value” (Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari 24), “the will to power is 
essentially creative and giving: it does not aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it 
does not desire power.  It gives” (Deleuze, NP 85).  It is through the will to power, therefore, 
that Part 1 of this project does not comprise a negativising kind of critique.  Instead, it is 
creative in the sense that it is an active examination and evaluation of the forces at play in our 
milieu, even though it does diagnose the forces themselves as negativising and limiting for 
thought.  The manner in which Part 2 is creative is in its working to “express new forces 
capable of giving thought another sense ... a thought that would affirm life ... thought [as] the 
affirmative power of life” (D+G, NP 101).  Overall, then, we are undertaking a project of ethical 
critique in Deleuze-Nietzsche’s terms: critique as the will to power that evaluates the negative, 
as part of a process of seeking to make thought active—which is also to discover and invent 
new possibilities of life (Deleuze, NP 101).   
 
One final aspect of the project’s methodology requires explication.  The reader will already 
have noted the use of the plural pronoun “we”; this strategy acknowledges D+G’s rejection of 
the individual “author-function” in favour of the concept of the writer as multiple (Deleuze, 
TRM 139; D 17).  In the first words of A Thousand Plateaus, D+G tell us: “The two of us wrote 
Anti-Oedipus together.  Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd” (3).  
Each writer is populated by others—other books, people, encounters—all of which expand the 
writer beyond her/him-“self.”  “We are no longer ourselves,” D+G write, “we have been aided 
inspired, multiplied,” and, therefore, “[t]o attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this 
working of matters, and the exteriority of relations” (ATP 3).  Writing under the pronoun “we” 
recognises that the writer is not working alone, but is thinking with others—D+G certainly, 
but also the plethora of other thinkers and lines of thought that affect this project.  It is to 
appreciate that, according to D+G, “[t]here isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages 
of enunciation” (K 18).  Deleuze further explains: 
Utterances do not have as their cause a subject which would act as a subject of 
enunciation ... .  The utterance is a product of an assemblage—which is always 
collective, which brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities, 
territories, becomings, affects, events. ... The author is a subject of enunciation but the 
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writer—who is not an author—is not.  The writer invents assemblages starting from 
assemblages which have invented [her], [she] makes one multiplicity pass into 
another.  (D 51-52) 
In Deleuze’s view, working multiply in such a way is also to enact a micropolitics, since it relies 
upon negotiating relationality and submitting to variation (D 17).  This stance of favouring 
difference is an act of resistance inasmuch as it destabilises the sovereignty of the author over 




In recognising that we are thinking with others it is important to also acknowledge that there 
are prominent theorists who have produced negativising critiques of D+G’s approach.   In 
recent years, three such critiques have emerged—by Alain Badiou, Peter Hallward and Slavoj 
Žižek—and, as a means of validating our taking up of D+G’s work, the arguments of these 
notable theorists require some consideration here.  Whilst the procedure of this thesis as a 
whole is not, by design, polemical (that would be antithetical to a Deleuze-Guattarian style), it 
is hoped that this (necessarily limited) account and rejection of these critiques will support 
our preference—and reinforce the case—for D+G’s project.  We make these appraisals in the 
knowledge that some of concepts addressed here will pre-empt what follows in the thesis; we 
anticipate that any cursory treatments will be more thoroughly attended to as we proceed.  
We begin with Badiou, whose work Deleuze: The Clamo[u]r of Being (hereafter Deleuze) has 
been comparatively well received and is now widely known.  As a philosopher himself, Badiou 
addresses this work to Deleuze’s sole and more patently philosophical writings; indeed, he 
regards the collaboration with Guattari as something of a contamination of Deleuze’s 
philosophical integrity (Buchanan, Deleuze 136).  As Éric Alliez puts it, Badiou’s image of 
Deleuze “can and indeed must lead us to dismiss the works co-authored with Félix Guattari, 
beginning with Anti-Oedipus” (“Anti”), the implication being that these works contribute to a 
“naïve” and erroneous image of Deleuze: that he is liberator of the multiple (Badiou 11).  That 
Badiou does not focus on Deleuze’s work with Guattari at all—works that are crucial for this 
thesis—is perhaps one reason we could sidestep Badiou’s claims, especially when Ian 
Buchanan has shown how their first work together, Anti-Oedipus, has a “theoretical backbone” 
constructed by the earlier Deleuze, primarily in Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 136).  
Indeed, Deleuze himself acknowledges this very point in the preface to Difference and 
Repetition’s American edition: “Everything I have done since [Difference and Repetition] seems 
an extension of this book, even the books Guattari and I wrote together” (TRM 300).  There is, 
therefore, a strong linkage—dismissed by Badiou—between the work with Guattari and 
Deleuze’s earlier solo writings.  To the Badiouian charge that Guattari corrupted Deleuze as a 
philosopher, we could also refer to Deleuze’s statement that Guattari “was nearly more 
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philosophical than if he had been formally trained in philosophy, …  he incarnated philosophy 
in its creative state” (qtd. in Stivale, Gilles 6).  However, as has been demonstrated by several 
astute scholars, Badiou’s claims against Deleuze can also be justifiably circumvented due to 
their being based on serious conceptual misreadings of Deleuze.  Badiou attacks several 
aspects of Deleuze’s thought, but, above all, rejects the notion that he is a philosopher of 
difference, claiming instead that the “very core” of Deleuze’s philosophy is devoted to “a 
metaphysics of the One” (24, 17).  In other words, for Badiou, Deleuze’s overall project “is most 
certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One” 
(11).  Badiou’s general argument, succinctly stated, is that the “power proper to the One,” for 
Deleuze, is the virtual, and this, in Badiou’s view, amounts to a reliance on transcendence—a 
kind of Platonic “univocal sovereignty” (52, 46).  This transcendental univocity subsumes all 
actual beings, in the sense that every “actual being univocally possesses its being as a function 
of its virtuality” (Badiou 43).  On this reading, multiplicities, or actual differences, occur not so 
much as images of the One but as simulacra, as “multiple forms of being”—which further 
implies that “[t]he multiple acceptations of being must be understood as a multiple that is 
formal, while the One alone is real” (Badiou 24-5).  
 
As noted, there have been numerous rebuttals to Badiou’s claims.  Nathan Widder, for 
example, takes exception to the last Badiouian point outlined above, calling it “a joke to 
suggest that for Deleuze actual multiplicities are unreal”; he also makes known that “Deleuze’s 
words are never used to substantiate this claim” (“Rights” 438).  Widder, moreover, points out 
that “it is certainly questionable whether the virtual can adequately be characteri[s]ed as a 
realm of Oneness and not of disjoined multiplicity” (“Rights” 438).  Widder argues that Badiou 
is “hard pressed” to uphold this claim “in the face of Deleuze’s explicit analyses of 
multiplicities that are constitutive (and not so much merely simulacral)” (“Rights” 438).  
Significantly, we can also recall that Deleuze himself takes pains to state that “[t]here is 
neither one nor multiple,” and that “[m]ultiplicity remains completely indifferent to the 
traditional problems of the multiple and the one” (F 14), suggesting a dubiousness to Badiou’s 
easy “mapping of Deleuzian vocabulary onto the terrain of the One and the Many” (Widder, 
“Rights” 438).  Michael Goddard also questions Badiou’s reading of Deleuzian univocity, 
proclaiming it “far from clear” that Badiou’s reading proves Deleuze “a thinker of the one 
rather than the multiple” (“Misrecognising”).  Deleuze’s univocity is more aptly read as a “flat 
non-hierarchical conception of being” (Goddard, “Misrecognising”), or as an ontological 
immanence that comprises only multiplicity as such.  Even Badouian scholar Sam Gillespie 
concedes that Badiou “overstates the point” regarding Deleuzian unity without considering its 
advantages: “[i]sn’t the case that this unity is present only because it presupposes the best 
possible multiplicities, the greatest lines of flight?” he asks.  Goddard is more forthright in 
seeing Badiou’s reading as “a series of rhetorical flourishes designed to disconnect the thought 
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of the multiple and the event” and link it with the “Platonic One” (“Misrecognising”).  Overall, 
Goddard rebukes Badiou’s “procedure” throughout the Deleuze book as comprising “a 
deliberate misrecognition of immanence and materiality, a warping of Deleuze’s dynamic and 
material concepts of immanence, the virtual and temporality into mere masks of the One and 
the ideal” (“Misrecognising”).  Prominent Badiou translator and philosopher Alberto Toscano, 
while commending Badiou’s book for confronting “the most daunting aspects of Deleuze’s 
thought,” also points out that Badiou employs certain “tactics of reading and exposition” (“To” 
229).  Referring to Badiou’s condemnation of Deleuze-Guattarian concepts, Toscano feels 
Badiou is so “eager to undo the reign of the joyous schizo” that he “engages in a rather 
excessive swing in the opposite direction” (“To” 230).  Toscano identifies such tactics as 
“quietly import[ing] Heideggerian [and other foreign] terms to characterise key moments in 
Deleuze’s work,” the “interjection of terms which cannot achieve the level of concepts,” and 
“the practice of forcing a concept out of its particular constellation”: such tactics amount to a 
“conjuring trick,” achieving a “Brechtian alienation-effect” and rendering Deleuze 
unrecognisable to those who thought they understood his work (“To” 230).  Toscano’s 
protestation is that in aiming to present a “Neoplatonist Deleuze,” Badiou assumes, through 
his particular deployment of vocabulary and concepts, “what should be the result of his 
enquiry”: thus, instead of taking the more credible path of unravelling the Deleuzian system 
“from the inside,” Badiou “succumbs to the polemical temptation and ends up painting a poor 
and deflated portrait of Deleuzian ontology” (Toscano, “To” 231, 230).  Many other theorists 
take particular conceptual pathways or make further notable points in defending Deleuze 
against Badiou; there is not, however, the scope here to fully detail all this evidence.
6
  Finally, 
though, we do call attention to one important, very recent book-length work, the first such 
text to attempt a thoroughgoing and close analysis of Badiou’s claims against Deleuze.  In his 
Badiou’s Deleuze, Jon Roffe makes a step-by-step “assessment of Badiou’s assertions about 
Deleuze in light of specific moments in Deleuze’s work”; in other words, he carries out “a 
procedure of testing, in which Badiou’s claims about Deleuze are put into contact with the 
Deleuzean text” (Badiou’s 160, 6).  Roffe is not concerned with the “correctness” of either 
Deleuze’s or Badiou’s philosophy, but, rather, to establish whether there is sufficient evidence 
in Deleuze’s writings to support Badiou’s each of Badious claims—including those relating to 
“being, method, the virtual, time, truth, the event, subjectivity and thought” (Badiou’s 160).  
Roffe’s hard-won conclusion is that “[s]imply put, Badiou is wrong about many aspects of 
Deleuze’s work,” and that his reading is “marked throughout by error” (Badiou’s 160).  With 
regard to Badiou’s key thesis that there is an “ultimate ontological unity” to Deleuze’s 
philosophy, Roffe’s numerous investigations produce a finding that concurs with Toscano’s:  
Rather than being the key element in Deleuze’s thought, it is rather the a priori 
assertion on Badiou’s part that he imposes on Deleuze’s work.  The thesis of the One 
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is thus used by Badiou as a lens through which he examines Deleuze; it is not a claim 
of Deleuzean thought that he has uncovered.  (Badiou’s 160-61) 
At this time Roffe’s finding constitutes the most definitive statement on this matter, giving us 
cogent grounds upon which to disregard, for our purposes, Badiou’s opposition to Deleuze.  
 
As to the question of why Badiou would launch his polemic, much has also been said.  Peter 
Osborne calls it a work of “strategic brilliance,” pointing to Badiou’s judiciousness in releasing 
this work when he did (19, 20).  In the landscape of Continental philosophy between 1968 and 
1997, Badiou, in contrast to Deleuze, was very much a fringe figure.  Throughout this time he 
did, however—as he tells us in Deleuze—enjoy a professional relationship of sorts with 
Deleuze (albeit a distant one), which culminated in an exchange of letters between the pair 
not long before Deleuze’s death (2-6).  As Badiou notes, the two shared a commitment to 
philosophy as such, at a time when “‘the end of philosophy’” was a popular theoretical dictum 
(5).  Indeed, as John Mullarkey states, Deleuze and Badiou approach philosophy by way of a 
similar set of “core concepts and attitudes”—it is their methodologies in relation to these that 
“fundamentally differ” (1).  (For instance, while Deleuze pursues a logic of sense and sensation, 
Badiou is committed to the rigour of Cartesian mathematics [Mullarkey 3].)  But to understand 
the strategic goals of his Badiou’s Deleuze book, consider this timeline:  from his position as a 
marginal philosopher, Badiou publishes his magnum opus, L’etre et l’événement, in 1988, which 
proclaims the “‘return’ of philosophy” (Osborne 20); D+G publish their bestselling What Is 
Philosophy (in French) in 1991, also upholding the importance of philosophy, and including a 
small reference to Badiou’s “interesting” though ultimately “transcendental” philosophy (151-
52; this, nevertheless, can be read as some sanctioning of Badiou by a major philosophical 
figure); their private, professional correspondence in the early 1990s during which they 
“clarify” their discordant positions (Badiou 6); Deleuze’s death in 1995; the publication of 
Badiou’s broadside against Deleuze (in French) in 1997.  Examining this timeline from the 
point of view of Badiou’s professional development, we can observe: a little known philosopher 
gaining professional proximity to a preeminent one, drawing alongside him, and, upon the 
latter’s death, “making-over his rival’s house” to use Osborne’s words (20), or setting himself 
up as “the future of philosophy,” to use Goddard’s (“Misrecognising”).  Badiou’s strategy of 
building an image of the “paradoxical tandem” between himself and Deleuze in the 
Introduction to his book (4) positions him at the same level as his rival, an image that the rest 
of the book sustains and builds upon.  Eleanor Kaufman also notes how Badiou “implicitly 
equat[es] his status as a master thinker to that of Deleuze” in the body of the book (Deleuze 
87), especially in the passage when he avows that “none of us escape … the equivocal role of 
disciples” (Badiou 96).  In other words, master philosophers like “us”—Deleuze, Badiou 
himself—deal with similar problems.  But when master philosopher Deleuze is shown—by 
Badiou’s book—to be philosophically misguided, only master philosopher Badiou is still 
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standing.  In effect, his critique works to make a space for himself as Deleuze’s successor.  
Such strategising, added to the serious conceptual distortions in Badiou’s portrayal, is surely 
ample substantiation for our rejection of Badiou’s Deleuze.  What we have provided here is, of 
course, not a comprehensive appraisal of Badiou’s argument or of his own philosophy, nor is it 
to say that his critique is altogether without merit for Deleuzian scholars; these, however, are 
matters for a different thesis, one more explicitly focused on this philosophical standoff. 
 
As the leading English language interpreter of Badiou (Protevi), it is perhaps not surprising 
that Peter Hallward, in Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, has been 
said to be “indebted to Badiou’s reading” of Deleuze (A. Smith 151).  Like Badiou, Hallward also 
reduces Deleuze’s “multiple interests and vocabularies” to one “singular logic of Being” 
(Protevi), but for Hallward, the “main idea” underlying Deleuze’s entire oeuvre is that “being is 
creativity” (Hallward 1).  While creativity is undoubtedly a central tenet for Deleuze (and for 
this thesis), Hallward portrays Deleuze’s creativity as, overall, a project of univocity, thereby 
making Deleuze—à la Badiou—into “an essentialist, neo-Platonist thinker of the One-All 
rather than a thinker of multiplicity” (Grimstad 46).  Hallward’s reading of Deleuze’s creativity 
is, to this extent, carried out in terms of a critique, even a polemic.  Other respondents to 
Hallward agree that once he establishes his argument, he proceeds by way of a very particular 
“transformation of Deleuze,” working “by means of selection and omission” (Shaviro, 
“Hallward”), and ignoring all the “minor threads that lend Deleuze’s work depth and nuance” 
(Gilson, “Peter” 429).  From Hallward’s insistence that the logic of creation is “the primary if 
not exclusive focus of Deleuze’s work” (7), several related, objectionable conclusions ensue.  
Before considering these, though, we observe that Hallward translates the complexity of 
Deleuze’s ontology into a tripartite conceptual schema: being as creation / equals active 
creatings (or creative processes) / which beget passive creatures (or created objects)—whereby 
“creatings” correspond to the realm of the virtual, while “creatures” are actual forms of being 
(27).  Much more will be said throughout this thesis about the relationship between D+G’s 
virtual and actual, but here we note Hallward’s interpretation: “[c]reation is precisely the 
immanent combination of both creature and creating, [but] only one of these terms is active” 
(28).  The critical point in Hallward’s reading is that “all of the productive, differential or 
creative force in this dual configuration stems from the virtual creating alone, and not from 
the actual creature” (28).  In other words, only the creating virtual “differs or produces”: any 
actual, “constituted or creatural identity is in reality only the simulation or semblance” of the 
virtual creating (Hallward 28).  As Steven Shaviro notes, there is no denying that Deleuze does 
endeavour to grasp “the real conditions of emergence—the virtual that generates the actual,” 
but Hallward makes the actual altogether passive, and then adds an extra dimension to the 
virtual (“Hallward”).  Hallward presents Deleuze’s virtual as “a spiritual quest to escape the 
actual altogether, to dissolve the phenomenal and ascend into an entirely immaterial, spiritual 
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realm of pure creativity” (Shaviro, “Hallward”).  In Shaviro’s view, this depiction of the actual 
as inert and the virtual as a spiritual realm is “a fatal and crippling misunderstanding” 
(“Hallward”).  Hallward attaches this spiritual element to Deleuze’s ontology by establishing a 
link between it and the beliefs of theophanic thinkers (including Meister Eckhart and Sufi 
philosopher Ibn al-‘Arabi), in whose account the virtual aligns with God: “every individual or 
thing is conceived as a manifestation or expression of God or a conceptual equivalent of God 
(pure creative potential)” (Hallward 4-5).  According to this “‘theologi[s]ing’ rhetoric” 
(Protevi), the aim of humans, as created things, is to use thought as a virtual creating to reject 
the material concerns of the world and to return to God as the “absolutely creative being” 
(Hallward 2).  In a sense, Hallward’s mystical reading sees Deleuze’s actual as “‘fallen’ in 
relation to the virtual,” and characterises Deleuze as “a thinker of actual beings oriented 
towards their own dissolution in the virtual or One of creativity”(A. Smith 153).  This 
understanding of Deleuze leads Hallward to the following conclusion: 
Rather than a philosopher of nature, history or the world, rather than any sort of 
“fleshy materialist,” Deleuze is most appropriately read as a spiritual, redemptive or 
subtractive thinker, a thinker preoccupied with the mechanics of dis-embodiment and 
de-materialisation.  Deleuze’s philosophy is oriented by lines of flight that lead out of 
the world; though not other-worldly, it is extra-worldly.  (3)      
The implications of this statement are significant and extremely tendentious.  In Hallward’s 
view, because Deleuze’s being-as-creativity is oriented towards “a contemplative and 
immaterial abstraction,” there is no hope for Deleuze’s (and D+G’s) philosophy to contribute 
to any project of political change (7).  Hallward’s final statement on Deleuze is that because he 
promotes contemplation in the virtual plane over what is happening in the actual world, 
“those of us who … seek to change our world and to empower its inhabitants will need to look 
for our inspiration elsewhere” (164). 
 
If Hallward’s assessment of Deleuze were to be taken as accurate, the aims of the present 
thesis would become null and void.  If there were no viable weapons of resistance and no 
political relevance to be found in D+G’s work, we would have to turn our attention to other 
thinkers.  This is not the case, as the thesis will make evident, and, to this extent, much of our 
project can be read as a refutation of Hallward’s stance.  That Hallward’s position is mistaken 
is a point well made by many scholars, with his error resting fundamentally on one key issue.  
As Anthony Paul Smith summarises, we can disqualify Hallward’s critique of Deleuze on the 
basis of “his exegetical mistake concerning the virtual and the actual” (155).  Hallward’s 
rendering of Deleuze’s virtual/actual is as an “essential dualism,” which he also hierarchises in 
terms of “the unqualified dependence of the actual upon the virtual” (82, 47).  In separating 
the virtual from the actual and aligning Deleuzean thought with the “superior” realm of the 
virtual, the actual is made passive and impotent, and transcendentalism is invoked.  But 
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Deleuze’s virtual and actual is not a hierarchised dualism; rather, it is structured by way of the 
interactivity of “reciprocal determination”  (Deleuze, DR 209).  James Williams provides a 
lucid discussion of this process in Deleuze’s thought, and, specifically, in relation to the virtual 
and the actual: 
Deleuze insists on the interdependence of the two fields.  The virtual is only fully 
reali[s]ed as proper through a process of actuali[s]ation.  Or, in another formulation, 
the virtual is incomplete without this actuali[s]ation.  In return, though, the actual is 
incomplete without its differentiation in the virtual.  So both realms require a 
completion that depends on a process within the other.  (“Deleuze” 92) 
As Deleuze puts it, there is a “perpetual exchange between the virtual and the actual” (D 150).  
Sam McLean concludes that Deleuze’s virtual-actual is “irreducible to the restrictive apparatus 
Hallward imposes,” since there is a large amount of textual evidence to show that Deleuze 
articulates “a distinctive ontological fold amounting to an ‘intensive multiplicity’ of 
diagrammatic connections between the virtual and actual.”  Indeed, Deleuze makes clear by 
way of the concept of immanence that his understanding does not divide the two into distinct, 
ordered parts: “[t]he plane of immanence includes both the virtual and its actuali[s]ation 
simultaneously, without there being any assignable limit between the two” (D 149).  Moreover, 
there is a “tight circuit” between the two, which “we are continually tracing from one to the 
other” (Deleuze, D 150), in both directions (D+G, WP 155-56).  The question of how Hallward 
came to misread Deleuze’s notion of immanence and arrive at this “ultimately unsustainable 
Deleuze rend[er]ing” has been addressed by Gregory Seigworth (“Little”).  Seigworth explains 
that “immanence inheres in the persistent resonances and refrains of the affectual,” whereas 
Hallward pays little attention to the role of affect (“Little”).  For Seigworth, this is not very 
surprising, “given Hallward’s intellectual alignment with … Badiou (for whom Spinoza is 
decidedly more geometrical, whereas Deleuze’s Spinoza is intensely passional” (Seigworth, 
“Little”).  Passage between the virtual and actual occurs by way of affect, as Seigworth clarifies, 
and as this thesis will elaborate.  In refusing to “account for affect in any thoroughgoing way … 
Hallward cannot hold together—but rather chooses to split in half—the way that the virtual 
and the actual … reciprocally determine one another” (Siegworth, “Little”).  There are other 
untenable elements to Hallward’s analysis, such as his dismissal of any conjunction between 
Deleuze’s aesthetics and political thought/action—which, again, this thesis will inveigh 
against.  Further, as Shaviro argues, in polemically denying that Deleuze has any interest in 
“complex processes of material emergence” or political forms (Hallward 176n10), Hallward 
“utterly ignores the ways that Deleuze [both without and without Guattari] expressly uses his 
concepts of transformation to understand the inner functioning of ‘late’ (or post-Fordist) 
capitalism” (Shaviro, “Hallward”), and Paul Patton provides clear elaboration of how Deleuze’s 
work with Guattari has “an inherently political vocation” (“Deleuze’s” 216).  Goddard adjudges 
Hallward’s book on Deleuze as, overall, rhetoric, “and rhetoric designed specifically to 
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reinforce the ascendancy of Badiou and by association Hallward himself in the field of 
contemporary political thought” (“Misrecognising”).  On the basis of this evidence, as well as 
that which will unfold during the course of this thesis, we reject Hallward’s critique of 
Deleuze.      
 
Slavoj Žižek, the third of Deleuze’s critics to be dealt with here, is also aligned with Badiou: he 
admits to relying “extensively” on Badiou’s reading of Deleuze for his own Deleuze book, 
Organs Without Bodies (20n24), and the two (along with Hallward) are at the forefront of the 
New Communism movement, which we will return to shortly.  Žižek’s Deleuze book has been 
characterised as an odd text: Robert Sinnerbrink regards it as a “strange Hegelio-Lacanian 
encounter with Deleuze” (62), while Widder sees it as “a very strange book that is purportedly 
concerned with Deleuze’s thought yet devotes at best 20 per cent of its pages to it” (“From” 
207).  Kaufman notes that “what counts as Deleuze” in Žižek’s book is “all over the map, at 
times hardly resembling Deleuze at all” (Deleuze 88), and Hanjo Berressem points to the 
plethora of digression and irrelevancies.
7
  At the outset Žižek announces that the “starting 
premise” of his book is that “beneath … the popular image of Deleuze based on the reading of 
the books he co-authored with Félix Guattari, there is another Deleuze, much closer to 
psychoanalysis and Hegel” (xi); in other words, “Deleuze equals Hegel” and, relatedly, Deleuze 
is “deeply Lacanian” (Žižek 48, 49).  That Deleuze would equate to Hegel is totally antithetical 
to Deleuze’s own stated position: “[w]hat I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics” (N 
6).  Nevertheless, Žižek proceeds to read Deleuze through a Hegelio-Lacanian lens, which 
leads him to renounce the joint Deleuze-Guattari books (Guattari was a “bad influence,” Anti-
Oedipus was “arguably Deleuze’s worst book” [Žižek 20-21]).  Before turning to and ultimately 
rejecting Žižek’s argument, it is worth considering why he might be so invested in drawing 
Deleuze and Hegel into the same philosophical camp; Berressem has the following suggestion: 
 Anybody who has ever read one of Žižek's books knows that the two basic attractors 
around which his thought revolves are Lacan and Hegel.  As the philosophical 
supplement to Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegel is probably even more important to 
Žižek than he is to Lacan. … For somebody so invested in Hegel, Deleuze, in his 
acknowledged and often repeated dislike of Hegel, must present a formidable 
irritation.  He is the philosophical itch Žižek would love to scratch.  
In Berressem’s view, however, the true test of Žižek’s success in this book lies in the extent to 
which he can “see/imagine the true measure of the Deleuzian project.”  In fact, he does not: as 
mentioned, Žižek dismisses entirely the works with Guattari, and considers only a small 
portion of Deleuze’s writings as “Deleuze proper (Žižek 20).  But it is almost exclusively The 
Logic of Sense that Žižek refers to in this text—not surprising, since he considers this Deleuze’s 
specifically Lacanian book (27, 82).  Accordingly, as Berressem points out, Žižek fails to engage 
“directly and in detail with Deleuze’s texts, their contexts, their internal logics or with the 
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complex resonances between his various texts” (Berressem), and, indeed, often relies on other 
authors’ readings of Deleuze.  Such lack of confrontation with the full gamut of Deleuze’s work 
makes Žižek’s study narrowly referenced, and already throws into doubt his sweeping 
conclusions. 
 
These conclusions relate to Žižek’s issues with (again) Deleuze’s virtual/actual, which, as they 
emerge in The Logic of Sense, Žižek regards as being “fundamentally incompatible” (21).  To 
summarise, Žižek sees Deleuze’s entire “conceptual edifice” as relying on two oppositional 
logics: “[e]ither the infinite field of virtuality is an immaterial effect of the interacting bodies[,] 
or the bodies themselves emerge, actualise themselves, from this field of virtuality” (Žižek 22).  
For Žižek, this opposition amounts to “dialectical materialism” versus “mechanical 
materialism” (88-89), or the “good” Deleuze of The Logic of Sense versus the “Guattarized” 
Deleuze of Anti-Oedipus (21), and, because of its Hegelio-Lacanian resonances, Žižek 
advocates the former.  Žižek explains how he sees the relevance of Lacan: “the basic premise of 
Deleuze’s ontology [in The Logic of Sense] is precisely that corporeal causality is not complete.  
In the emergence of the New something occurs that cannot be properly described at the level 
of corporeal causes and effects” (27).  Thus there is a gap in the emergence of the new, and this 
gap suggests a “positive notion of lack, a ‘generative’ absence” (Žižek 35).  Leaving no question 
that this is a Lacanian lack, Žižek equates Lacan’s objet petit a with Deleuze’s “quasi-cause” 
(27): for Deleuze the quasi-cause is the incorporeal instigator of that which exceeds the 
material (LS 94), which is to say the gap, and for Lacan the objet petit a is the “lack of the real” 
that drives desire (Grosz, Jacques 75).  (Later, Žižek also nominates Deleuze’s quasi-cause as 
the “Lacanian phallic signifier” [83].)  But for Žižek, Deleuze abandons this logic after The 
Logic of Sense, turning toward Guattari “because Guattari represented … an easy escape from 
the deadlock” (21). As Daniel Smith explains, “[t]he easy escape was the abandoning of a good 
Lacanian ontology (event as effect), for a bad Guattarian ontology (event as production and 
becoming), with the implication being that “[i]f Deleuze had stuck with the insights of The 
Logic of Sense, he would have been able to enter into a becoming-Žižek, and not wandered off 
into the desert of Guattari” (“Inverse” 638, 639).  In doing this, Žižek believes, Deleuze 
“bypasses engagement with the central paradoxes that lead post-Hegelianism and 
psychoanalytic theories towards a true materialism … in which meaning and sense emerge 
from a foundational lack (Widder, “From” 208).  
 
As Nathan Widder points out, however, there is a much more “subtle and complex 
relationship between Deleuze and Lacan” than Žižek accounts for (“From” 209).  In Widder’s 
view, Žižek’s ascribing to Deleuze a series of “sharp divisions,” such as The Logic of Sense 
versus Anti-Oedipus, and emphatic positions such as Anti-Oedipus being a “wholesale rejection 
of psychoanalysis,” are both “self-serving and simply erroneous” (“On” 209-10).  In fact, as 
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Daniel Smith elucidates, Anti-Oedipus comprises “a reading of Lacan” (“Inverse” 639).  Putting 
it another way, Anti-Oedipus is actually “an attempt to take Lacan’s profound thought to its 
differential and immanent conclusion,” and to this extent, “Deleuze can be seen as one of 
Lacan's most profound, but also most independent, disciples, inventing a whole new set of 
concepts to describe the inverse side of the symbolic structure” (D. Smith, “Inverse” 647).  
Indeed, in discussing Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze acknowledges his and Guattari’s indebtedness to 
Lacan (N 13-14), and Lacan himself appreciated their efforts—telling Deleuze, after its 
publication, “What I need is someone like you” (qtd. in D. Smith, “Inverse” 635-36).  Žižek, 
therefore, in dismissing Anti-Oedipus, completely fails to represent the relationship between 
these two thinkers.  Moreover, in praising the psychoanalytic elements of The Logic of Sense, 
and equating various Deleuzian concepts with supposedly Lacanian equivalents, Žižek again 
carries out a misreading: “the psychoanalytical account of the genesis of sense in The Logic of 
Sense, worked out over some 50 pages and eight series of the book, is carried out through a 
reading of Melanie Klein, not Lacan”—a matter Žižek seems not to notice (Widder, “From” 
210), since he does not mention Melanie Klein at all.  It is, perhaps, not difficult to understand 
why Žižek would commit this oversight: “acknowledgement of Deleuze’s use of Klein, who 
treats both the castration and the Oedipus complex as secondary, would completely 
undermine Žižek’s thesis” (Widder, “Conference”).  
   
Žižek’s misunderstanding of the psychoanalytic in both The Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus is 
but one shortcoming of his book on Deleuze.  As has already been noted, Žižek’s notion that 
Guattari corrupted Deleuze with a whole new line of thought in the latter book is also 
misguided; there is, in fact, “a real continuity between the so-called good and bad Deleuze and 
not the split that … Žižek  [and Badiou] contend” (Buchanan, Deleuze 136).  Widder concurs, 
stating, “Deleuze’s early psychoanalytical writings … show him already to be on a decidedly 
anti-Oedipal path” (“From” 211).  Buchanan also takes issue with Žižek’s representation of 
D+G’s concept of the unconscious as “primitive,” or pre-social: Buchanan shows this claim to 
be “patently false”—it can be rejected “simply by remembering that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
most fundamental point in Anti-Oedipus is that unconscious desire is part of the very 
infrastructure of society and vice versa” (Deleuze 150n9).  Other Žižekian claims have been 
repudiated; for example, Widder provides textual evidence to demonstrate that it is “simply a 
joke … to equate the virtual with pure becoming and the actual with stable and reified being, 
as Žižek consistently does … or to proclaim that virtuali[s]ation and actuali[s]ation are two 
sides of the same coin” (“From” 227n4).  Berressem also points out that to structurally separate 
these two realms “is hardly tenable,” since there is a relationship of “topological inclusion” 
between the two.  Lambert sees Žižek’s entire reading of Deleuze as reductive, to the extent 
that it “telescopes the virtual,” reducing it to the position of psychoanalytic fantasy; at the 
same time, though, Žižek’s reading of fantasy is structured by contradiction (Who’s 89).  
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Shaviro claims a further weakness in this book to be the fact that Žižek overestimates 
“cognition, understanding, and comprehension as mental activities,” and (like Badiou and 
Hallward) ignores the role of affect; in this he “follows Lacan and Hegel in considering such 
questions to be epiphenomenal at best” (“Žižek”).  In fact, this overestimation of human 
consciousness is a salient point upon which Žižek’s reading of Deleuze comes undone.  In a 
key passage, Žižek links Deleuze to Hegel by way of the concept of immanence.  “If there ever 
was a philosopher of unconditional immanence, it is Hegel” he writes, implying an overlap 
between the two philosophers due to each upholding the same concept (53).  However, Žižek 
betrays his misunderstanding of Deleuze’s immanence when he outlines Hegel’s: Hegel’s is 
“the immanence of our thought,” or “the immanent movement of our thought-experience” 
(53)—a wholly conscious process.  As we have seen already, Deleuze’s immanence is certainly 
not confined to consciousness: for Deleuze, Hegel’s immanence would amount to “a plane of 
transcendence within a much more inclusive ‘plane of immanence,’” since consciousness 
cannot be separated from the much broader whole of life of which it is but one part 
(Berressem).  In Berressem’s estimation, Žižek’s keenness to subsume Deleuze into Hegel, 
leading to such crucial misreadings, means that his book is ultimately a failure. 
 
As Goddard sees it, Žižek’s whole misreading of Deleuze’s virtual is not so much a mistake, but 
a “deliberate refusal” for strategic reasons (“Misrecognising”).  And it is for these same reasons 
that Žižek identifies the post-Logic of Sense Deleuze as “an ideologist of today’s ‘digital 
capitalism,’” whose politics are necessarily impotent (Žižek xii).  (Žižek’s point here is that the 
decentred, impersonal logic of digital capitalism is ideologically supported by Deleuze’s theory 
of life as “erratic affective productivity” [185].)  These strategic reasons, as Goddard explains, 
concern reinforcing the power of his own leftist agenda “as the key voice in contemporary 
political theory” (“Misrecognising”).  Goddard points to the fact that the thought of D+G has 
become a “key resource” for emergent forms of politics and subjectivity in new left 
movements, and, in discrediting Deleuze’s potential to facilitate political change, Žižek is 
working to clear a space for his own political imperatives (“Misrecognising”).  However, as 
Sinnerbrink notes, Žižek’s critique of D+G’s politics (that is, Deleuze’s political stance post-The 
Logic of Sense) overstates the “ideological complicity” between our present “neo-liberalist geo-
political context” and Deleuzian ontology (81).  While there may be elements of D+G’s 
philosophy that could be strategically mapped onto this context, many of their concepts are 
fully enabling of “contesting, undermining and transforming” this context (Sinnerbrink 81).  
Overall, Sinnerbrink makes a powerful point: 
[T]he theoretical anxiety behind Žižek’s critique … is that Deleuze and Guattari may 
well be doing what Žižek identifies as the crucial task at hand: attempting to think the 
New in order to create possibilities of creative resistance and social transformation 
that shift the coordinates of the prevailing frameworks of theory and practice. Rather 
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than construing Deleuze as a dialectically superseded precursor, or as an unwitting 
apologist for postmodern capitalism, Žižek’s own critical project could benefit from 
recognising that Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics is a response to precisely those 
deadlocks concerning ontology and politics that Žižek himself identifies.  (85) 
Unfortunately, Žižek’s project has not taken this road, and in recent times, has become more 
conjoined with Badiou (and Hallward) in a movement termed “new communism.”  This 
movement, officially beginning with the Badiou/Žižek organised 2009 “Idea of Communism” 
conference, aims to champion the “communist hypothesis,” which is to say (as is stated on the 
back cover of Badiou’s book The Communist Hypothesis) the “‘eternal’ Idea of communism”—
so as to effect a “radical rupture with capitalo-parliamentariansim.”  For Badiou/Žižek, 
communism throughout history has been an “ongoing struggle for human emancipation” (A. 
Johnson), and it is now time to usher in the Idea’s “third era” (Badiou, Communist 260).  As 
Žižek puts it, “You’ve had your anti-communist fun, and you are pardoned for it—time to get 
serious once again!”  Getting serious means working “to bring the communist hypothesis into 
existence in a different modality” (Badiou, Meaning 115).  What this modality will look like is 
yet vague, but the rhetoric suggests “fantasies of revolutionary agency” (Shaviro, 
“Communism” 154).  Political theorist Alan Johnson regards it as a “new form of left wing 
totalitarianism,” which may, disturbingly, appear particularly attractive in the current global 
politico-economic context, given its extreme oppositional stance to liberal democracy.  
Johnson defines it as leftist totalitarianism due, in part, to its belief in imposing the 
revolutionary will against the majority, and its “refusal to face up to the criminal record of 
actually existing communism as a social system.”  Goddard also notes its proponents’ tendency 
to purify communism from “its unfortunate association with Stalinist purges, Gulags and 
repressive regimes” (“Misrecognising”).  Even more disturbingly, there is a commitment to 
“the transformational power of revolutionary violence” (A. Johnson), which, Johnson contends, 
borders on left-wing fascism.  Indeed, Žižek sees no problem with the history of communist 
violence “per se,” proclaiming that “[f]rom a radical emancipatory perspective … violence is 
always legitimate” (although, he concedes, it may not be necessary) (“Jacobin”).  One of the 
movement’s aims, then, is to “‘resignif[y]’ terror, the ruthless exercise of power, the spirit of 
sacrifice” (Žižek, “Holding” 326),  and, Žižek states, “if this radical choice is decried by some 
bleeding-heart liberals as Linksfaschismus [left-wing fascism], so be it!” (“Holding” 326).  For 
Goddard, this return to “an authoritarian Maoism, Leninism, Stalinism or Jacobinism” is 
“highly regressive,” and expresses a “blatant [anthropocentric] will-to-power on the part of its 
proponents” (“Misrecognising”).  Confronting the present world’s political, social and 
economic instabilities indeed presents opportunities for new approaches to thought, as this 
thesis contends.  But rather than following the rallying cries of the new communists, we agree 
with Goddard that “a real critical engagement with the materialism and immanence of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s … project, despite the distortions it has suffered at the hands of both its 
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detractors and its defenders, might, in contrast, provide a more useful starting point for 




Having dealt with the three foremost negativising critiques of D+G, and with the political 
orientation of their authors, we return to our thesis proper, to offer our understanding of 
where its significance, in terms of research, might lie.  One of its springboards is Robert C. 
Thomas’ 1998 essay, “Whatever Intellectuals,” in which he poses several questions pertaining 
to the “relationship between ... thought and being in ‘post-disciplinary societies.’”  These 
questions concern such issues as the nature of representational thought in a society of control, 
the curtailment of thought by contemporary state forms, how the affective potential of 
subjectivity is expropriated in the historical present, as well as the significance of D+G’s 
nonphilosophy for thought as a mode of resistance.  Although Thomas’ essay is, by now, a 
decade and a half old, many of the issues raised therein are still highly relevant in this 
historical present, and, to our knowledge, have not yet been taken up by research in any 
sustained manner.  Thomas’ own aim is more to problematise these issues than to offer any 
committed responses, although he does sketch out the figure of a “becoming-intellectual” (or 
“whatever-intellectual” in Agamben’s parlance)—a figure not prescribed by any particular 
mode of thought but characterised by “its capacity for thought as such.”  For our purposes, this 
figure remains somewhat humanistic: it tends to ascribe thought to a human thinker, in the 
form of an intellectual way of being that exists outside of contemporary forms of regulation.
8
  
Nevertheless, many of Thomas’ questions remain entirely apposite, and are productive of some 
of the lines of thought this project follows: these include the notion that thought is a potential 
Deleuze-Guattarian weapon of resistance in the face of control capitalism’s attempts to 
contain it, and also the idea that nonphilosophy—the plane of immanence that we explore, in 
Part 2, as both “ordinary affect” and art—is fertile ground for thought as creativity and 
invention.  Further, Thomas’ question regarding the status of knowledge/thought as 
representation today, in an informational era, is a useful one, and we take up this question in 
Part 1, when we examine contemporary thought in its dimensions of representation and 
information.  The side by side evaluation of these two aspects of thought as they operate today 
is distinctive: while (following Castells) there has been a plethora of research exploring the 
multifarious effects of network culture, and there has been some focus on the contemporary 
detriments of representational thought (for example, Alexandre Lefebvre’s critique of the 
dogmatic image’s hold over the domain of law), this project strives to be unique in its 
consideration of both alongside one another.  It is hoped to draw attention to the fact that—
while the implications for thought as informationalism are currently more widely discussed—
dogmatic thought continues to present serious problems. 
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Another way in which this thesis aims to make a novel contribution to how thought might be 
remade in the present world is by bringing to bear some of the work Guattari produced 
without Deleuze.  To be sure, there are numerous overlaps between their ideas, but Guattari’s 
singular contribution to social and political philosophy is often overshadowed by Deleuze’s 
ouvre and by their joint work.  We foreground Deleuze’s work in many of the following 
segments, but, because Guattari was more attuned to the potential contribution of “post-
mediatic” (or informational) developments to thought, and to the reclamation of subjectivity 
from capital, we engage his more exclusive ideas in Part 2’s final line of light.  Specifically, we 
draw on his conception of an ethico-aesthetic paradigm to develop a possible Guattarian 
image of thought, one that might offer new ways of articulating such current events and 
undertakings as Wikileaks and open source practices.  Guattari’s term “transversality” can also 
help illustrate what we submit is another unique aspect of this thesis: its cutting across a 
diverse range of disciplines, scales and dimensions.  From philosophy to nonphilosophy to art, 
from scales of everyday life to dimensions of the political, from affects and sensations to 
concepts, we aim to mobilise a creative and self-engendering way of thinking, one that 
performs a Deleuze-Guattarian (non-)image of rhizomatic thought as it explores it.  Through 
this transdisciplinarity, and through consulting a broad range of theorists, we mean to make 
diversity a core issue of the project.  And because the project utilises actual examples from the 
life/time through which this thesis is written, it can only offer a singular contribution to 
thought, to the extent that this composite is utterly unique.  By “singular contribution,” we 
mean to invoke Deleuze’s notion of singularity, which he uses “to specify that events [and 
objects] are not strictly subsumable under general categories”— general categories subsume 
“particular” objects (Murphy 221).  A singular object or text is both a “unique point” and “a 
point of perpetual recommencement and of variation” (Conley, “Singularity” 253).  In other 
words, it is a unique power of difference.  Indeed, the value of this work, ultimately, will be 
determined by its power of difference, in terms of how well it sets anything new in motion.  As 
Patton points out, Deleuze’s conception of thought is fundamentally pragmatic: “in the end, 
[its] value is determined by the uses to which [it] can be put, outside as well as within 
philosophy” (Deleuze 6).  If it can engender new thoughts and sensations, new lines of flight, it 
will be, in D+G’s, phrasing, “Interesting, Remarkable, or Important” (WP 82)—which is to say, 
a valuable contribution to research-creation.  After all, “[t]here are only immanent criteria.  ... 
[T]here are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life” 










PROBLEM 1: DISCIPLINED THOUGHT—THE PROBLEM OF THE DOGMATIC IMAGE 
 
 
Orthodox thought, or, thought as representation 
 
Both before and alongside the “distinctive practice of philosophy” D+G developed together, 
Deleuze’s own writings maintained a steady focus on “the question of the nature of thought” 
(Patton, Deleuze 18).  It is in Difference and Repetition that Deleuze first addresses the notion 
of an “image of thought,” by which he means the “implicit presuppositions” that background 
the way we think, or the set of presumptions that “everybody knows” in terms of “what it 
means to think and to be” (129-30).  For Deleuze, the history of thought has been dominated 
by one particular set of presumptions or “Image”: that thinking merely requires “an individual 
endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought,” that “[n]atural good sense or 
common sense are [the] determinations of pure thought,” and that such “thought has an 
affinity” with truth (DR 130, 132, 131).  These presuppositions make up what Deleuze calls the 
dogmatic or orthodox image of thought, which, regardless of its variances, is generally based 
on “the form of representation or recognition,” where “[r]ecognition may be defined as the 
harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object” (DR 131, 133).  Hence, 
this model relies upon “the unity of the thinking subject” and a form of identity in the object/s 
perceived (Deleuze, DR 133).  As Patton points out, this model therefore entails “the conflation 
of thought with knowledge,” which is to say the presumption that “knowledge is ultimately a 
form of recognition” (Deleuze 19).  Thus, from Plato to Descartes to Kant, the model of 
recognition reigns supreme: “whether one considers Plato’s Theaetetus, Descartes’s 
Meditations or Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, this model remains sovereign and defines the 
orientation of the philosophical analysis of what it means to think” (Deleuze, DR 134).  So 
while, conventionally, Aristotelian logic is viewed as quite separate to the structures of the 
Cartesian and Kantian models of thought, inasmuch as Aristotle places the object in 
transcendence rather than foregrounding the subject, Deleuze finds a common principle that 
unites the three: for him, any philosophy’s “implicit presupposition [of] a pre-philosophical 
and natural Image of thought” amounts to the “most general form of representation,” and 
“[t]herafter it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with 
Being or with beings (DR 131).  Massumi describes representational thinking as resting on a 
“double identity,” which involves “the thinking subject, and ... the concepts it creates and to 
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which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy” (“Translator’s” xi).  He 
further explains:  
The subject, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are 
applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity.  
Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence 
between these symmetrically structured domains.  The faculty of judgement is the 
policeman of analogy, assuring that each of the three terms is honestly itself, and that 
the proper correspondences obtain.  (“Translator’s” xi) 
In Colebrook’s terms, “[m]an, mind or subject becomes that ‘mirror of nature’ or spectral 
doubling of a world grasped representationally,” and further, “the mind of man [acts] as a 
meeting point or court of judgement between the world and its representation” (“Questioning” 
50).  Representation and judgement come together in Deleuze’s term “doxa,” which refers both 
to what everybody knows (common sense) and what everybody is supposed to or should know 
(through good sense) (DR 134).  Representation, then, as the mode in which we think, operates 
through fixed standards, thereby subordinating difference to “the complementary dimensions 
of the Same and the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed” (Deleuze, DR 167).  As Gregory 
Flaxman expresses it, thought, in this image, is “conceived in advance of empirical vicissitudes 
and thereby projects itself into the future as an anticipative matrix that turns any encounter 
into one of recognition” (11).  This image currently permeates life’s many domains, as Olkowski 
confirms: “in most political, social, artistic, ethnic, economic, scientific, linguistic, and 
philosophical practices, ... representation—organi[s]ed around identity, opposition, analogy, 
and resemblance—dominates” (Ruin 20).    
 
The logic of representation is accentuated somewhat differently when Deleuze writes A 
Thousand Plateaus with Guattari.  In this book, D+G emphasise the classificatory and negating 
thrusts of thought as representation, when they characterise this thought in terms of 
arborescence or a tree system.  “The tree is already the image of the world, or the root the 
image of the world-tree,” they state, using the branching of a tree and its roots to explain “the 
law of reflection,” or “the law of the One that becomes two, then of the two that becomes four” 
and so on (ATP 5).  Representation, then, with its “mirroring” of objective and subjective 
reality, adheres in general to a “Binary Logic,” while also assuming “a strong principle unity” 
(D+G, ATP 5). Melissa McMahon describes the pervasiveness of this system of thought: 
[T]his … concept has a long pedigree in the history of philosophy, whether explicitly in 
Aristotle’s model of conceptual division (represented in “Porphyry’s Tree”), or 
implicitly in any philosophy that assigns a central principle (even “being” itself) in 
order to organi[s]e around it a series of secondary orders, tertiary orders and so on.  
(50) 
D+G also give an account of the various manifestations of the root system: 
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[W]henever we encounter this formula, even stated strategically by Mao or 
understood in the most “dialectical” way possible, what we have before us is the most 
classical and well reflected, oldest, and weariest kind of thought. … Binary logic and 
biunivocal relationships still dominate psychoanalysis …, linguistics, structuralism, 
and even information science.  (Thousand 5) 
D+G’s mention of the “dialectical” here refers to the image of thought/truth first proposed by 
the Hegel, who uses the model of human historicity to demonstrate what he sees as the law of 
“negative unity”: “everything is inherently contradictory[;] … [contradiction] is the root of all 
movement and vitality (164, 439).  For Deleuze, not only is Hegelian negation another 
movement of thought that adheres to the arborescent model, but it is also an essential feature 
of the concept of difference under representation: the primacy of identity is always 
accompanied by its negative, difference from the One is defined by its contradiction (DR 263).  
Therefore, while Hegelian contradiction might appear “to push difference to the limit,” it too 
submits to the categories of representation (Deleuze, DR 263).  In Massumi’s summation, the 
actual “modus operandi” of the tree-like or dogmatic image of thought as representation is 
negation, and overall, the deeply embedded structures of “[i]dentity, resemblance, truth, 
justice, and negation” provide the  “rational foundation for [social] order” (“Translator’s” xii).  
Massumi’s reference to social order serves to remind us, too, that representational thought is 
not merely the domain of philosophers and public intellectuals; as Todd May points out, the 
dogmatic image of thought is “our heritage”—“it is our template for conceiving the world” 
(Gilles 76-77, 74).  For Massumi, since modernity at least, the corollary of the somewhat overt 
collusion between dominant philosophical projects and the State has been the “more insidious 
… propagation of the form of representational thinking itself, that ‘properly spiritual absolute 
State’ endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric” (“Translator’s” 
xii).  Here, Massumi recalls that what Jean-François Lyotard calls the “fully legitimated subject 
of knowledge and society" (33) was born two centuries ago: 
The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the 
first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, 
which was to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and the U.S.  
The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and 
Schleiermacher) was the "spiritual and moral training of the nation," to be achieved by 
"deriving everything from an original principle” (truth), by "relating everything to an 
ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea" (the 
State).  (User’s 4)  
The end result was that “each mind [becomes] an analogously organi[s]ed mini-State morally 
unified in the supermind of the State” (Massumi, User’s 4).   
 
 38 
What D+G call call State thought, then, follows an arborescent or representational logic, and 
has its origins in the beginnings of modernity.  For D+G, the “State” is an abstract type of 
power not fully equivalent to its concrete manifestations (S. Newman 6).  Rather, it is an 
“abstract machine which organi[s]es the dominant utterances and the established order of a 
society, the dominant languages and knowledge, conformist actions and feelings, the 
segments which prevail over the others” (Deleuze, D 129).
9
  As Saul Newman puts it, the State 
“essentially ‘rules’ through more minute institutions and practices of domination”—it 
“overcodes and regulates these minor dominations, stamping them with its imprint” (7).  The 
thought that conforms to the model given by the State apparatus—reason and rationality—
“defines for it goals and paths, conduits [and] channels” (D+G, ATP 374).  And because this 
thought also serves to maintain the State, an important “exchange” occurs between the two: 
“[o]nly thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by right, of 
elevating the State to the level of de jure universality” (D+G, ATP 375).  Additionally, in 
keeping with the representational principle of rationality, “the State gives thought a form of 
interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of universality” (D+G, ATP 375).  Because 
the representational model is universal, the State defines itself as “the rational and reasonable 
organisation of a people” (D+G, ATP 375).  State thought or power, under this rubric, is merely 
common sense raised to its absolute, which means to obey the State is to obey “pure reason” 
(D+G, ATP 376).  Again, the path this thought takes is tree-like: “there is a central unity, truth 
of essence—like Rationality—which is the root, and which determines the growth of its 
‘branches’” (S. Newman 10).  Let us revisit the tenets of arborescent logic:    
[T]rees are not a metaphor at all, but an image of thought, a functioning, a whole 
apparatus that is planted in thought in order to make it go in a straight line and 
produce the famous correct ideas. There are all kinds of characteristics in the tree: 
there is a point of origin, seed or centre; it is a binary machine or principle of 
dichotomy, with its perpetually divided and reproduced branchings, its points of 
aborescence; ... it is a structure, a system of points and positions which fix all of the 
possible within a grid, a hierarchical system or transmission of orders ... .”  (Deleuze, 
D 25) 
The binary machines of State thought that Deleuze refers to effectively disallow the virtual of 
difference, instead trapping identities into particular categories.  For Deleuze, there are 
“[b]inary machines of social classes; of sexes, man—woman; of ages, child—adult; of races, 
black—white; of sectors, public—private; of subjectivations, ours—not ours” (D 128).  To 
these, we could add: sane—insane, disabled—non-disabled, human—animal, human—
machine, and so on.  Of course, further branchings may occur: “if you are neither black nor 
white, you are a half-breed; if you are neither man nor woman, you are a transvestite” 
(Deleuze, D 128), each of which are still identities designated by the arborescent machine.  
Overall, this is a hierarchical process, as Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr affirm: “[w]ithin 
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this framework, difference can only be conceived of as a deviation from one single model: a 
hierarchical differentiation starting and descending from the dominant signifier (the white 
(hu)man Face, the majoritarian, white, hetero, able bodied male)” (4).  Furthermore, this 
dominant signifier provides the ideal standard by which we are judged: “what defines the 
majority is a model you have to conform to” (Deleuze, N 173).   
 
The matter of conformity alludes to another important aspect of State thought—its emphasis 
on judgement, applied according to “eternal values,” the “rights of man” (Deleuze, N 122), and 
the “law, institutions, and contracts” (Deleuze, “NT” 148).  Taken together, values, rights and 
laws form the crux of sovereignty, and, as Deleuze notes, these “have been part of the history 
of sedentary peoples from the earliest despotic states to modern democracies” (Deleuze, “NT” 
148-49).  The concept of “sedentary peoples” refers to the process by which the State 
apparatus, through a deployment of reason, “parcel[s] out a closed space to people, assigning 
each person a share and regulating the communication between shares” (D+G, ATP 380).  In 
other words, through the same kind of thinking that traps identities into categories, the State 
“captures” its subjects and fixes them to particular ways of being through notions of rights and 
laws.  To escape the sedentariness of State thinking, D+G advocate a kind of “nomad thought,” 
one that can move outside such absolutist structures as “truth” and “law,” and allow for more 
dynamism and singularity.  And to resist the aborescent logic of representation, they propose a 
rhizomatic thinking, based upon the image of a spreading “subterranean stem” rather than 
roots and branches; assuming “very diverse forms,” the rhizome—with its principles of 
connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity and rupture—“includes the best and the worst: potato 
and couchgrass, or the weed” (ATP 6-9).  We will explore some of the potentialities of this 
latter thought in Part 2, but, for now, we repeat some of the characteristics of its State thought 
captor: “logos, the philosopher-king, the transcendence of the Idea, the interiority of the 
concept, the republic of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought, man as 
legislator and subject” (D+G, ATP 24).  Summing up a little differently, we could say that State 
thought “is the discourse of sovereign judgement, of stable subjectivity legislated by ‘good’ 
sense, of rocklike identity, ‘universal’ truth, and (white male) justice” (Massumi, User’s 1).     
 
Enlightenment continued: individualism 
 
We have already mentioned the significance of modernity’s beginnings for the development of 
the dogmatic image’s State thought.  In order to begin investigating the persistence of this 
thinking in current times, we return to modernity, or, more accurately, to what is often seen as 
its fountainhead, the Enlightenment.  One of the predominant strands of representational 
thought, following from the Kantian model, features the existence of the all-important 
thinker, the human agent who creates and controls thoughts, ideas, and, by extension, life 
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itself.  According to many theorists, the notion of this particular thinker developed during the 
Enlightenment—that “explosion of intellectual energy in eighteenth-century Western Europe,” 
when French philosophes such as Diderot, Voltaire, and Scottish “luminaries” such as David 
Hume and Adam Smith, mounted a critique against the long-standing absolutism of the 
aristocracy and the church (Hall 2).  Kant, too, from the German context, was a key figure, as 
Foucault notes: “Kant in fact describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going 
to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority” (“What” 37-38).  For 
the first time, it was proposed that “human agency, if properly informed by enlightened self-
knowledge, was perfectly capable of controlling society—for what was the latter but the 
aggregated wills of individual men and women?” (Hamilton 55).  And, as Peter Hamilton 
further explains, such ideas did not remain merely in the discourses of the philosophes; rather, 
they were taken up “by a wide range of populi[s]ers and political activists,” quickly becoming 
the predominant way in which people thought about the world and their relationships (55).  In 
terms of the everyday, this led to a thinking “directed towards constancy, recognition and 
efficiency” (Colebrook, “How Queer” 23).  In a wider sense, Stuart Hall lists some of the 
leading ideas of the Enlightenment as “progress, science, reason and nature,” and describes 
their effects thus: 
These [ideas] gave shape to the promise of the Enlightenment—the prospect which it 
opened up of an unending era of material progress and prosperity, the abolition of 
prejudice and superstition and the mastery of the forces of nature based on the 
expansion of human knowledge and understanding.  (2) 
As might be expected, the Enlightenment’s intellectual questioning also involved an intense 
focus on—with a view to developing—that aspect of the social we now call “economic” (V. 
Brown 128-29).  Vivienne Brown notes, for example, how Enlightenment thinker Adam Smith 
is often considered the “‘father’ of economics,” due to his “scientific study” of the emerging 
“modern, industrial, profit-seeking economy” (129).  With its vast dimension of rational, 
economic “progress,” therefore, modernity is usually identified with the rapid development of 
modern industrial capitalism (Giddons 55).  Indeed, in Jim McGuigan’s terms, modernity is 
capitalist civilisation (96). 
 
The Enlightenment, modernity, capitalism: across each overlapping movement the same 
representational image of thought endures.  And what have also endured—even under the 
contemporary condition of late-capitalism or that cultural phase called post-modernity—are 
many of the key principles created and upheld by the paradigm of Enlightenment/modernist 
thought: reason, science, progress, universalism and individualism (Hamilton 21-22).  Of 
course, capitalism’s own defining principle rewrites the purpose of any Enlightenment, 
modernist and even postmodernist tenets; we will return to this.  But first, we investigate 
some of the key elements of Enlightenment and modernist thought that continue to subsist 
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within contemporary capitalism, beginning with the core concept of individualism.  This 
concept is, of course, that which endorses the individual as “the starting point for all 
knowledge and action” (Hamilton 22), and that places “the beliefs and desires of individuals” 
above any “holistic” or collective goals (“Individualism” 416).  It is not surprising that such an 
egocentric view of the world melds with earlier forms of capitalism—those emphasising 
private ownership of economic enterprises (Clarke 22); as sociologists Anthony Elliot and 
Charles Lemert note, individualism “came to be one with the older ideals of the European 
bourgeoisie” (xiii).  However, individualism has continued to endure through to capitalism’s 
present neoliberalism phase, as we will now see.  Neoliberalism, as promoted strongly by the 
governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, has become the 
world’s “central guiding principle of economic thought and management,” as well as the 
hegemonic way of understanding capitalism today (D. Harvey, Brief 2, 3).  It is a hugely diffuse 
system, as David Harvey observes: “almost all states, from those newly minted after the 
collapse of the Soviet union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New 
Zealand and Sweden, have embraced … some version of neoliberal theory” (Brief 3).  What, 
then, are the central precepts of neoliberal theory?  Ultimately, neoliberalism continues to 
turn upon the rights of the individual; indeed, it puts in place extra measures to reinforce 
individualism’s stronghold: 
[T]he theory takes the view that individual liberty and freedom are the high point of 
civili[s]ation and then goes on to argue that individual liberty and freedom can best be 
protected and achieved by an institutional structure, made up of strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade: a world in which individual initiative can 
flourish.  The implication of that is that the state should not be involved in the 
economy too much, but it should use its power to preserve private property rights and 
the institutions of the market…  .  (D. Harvey, “On Neoliberalism”) 
Put differently, neoliberalism is “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills”—in a institutional framework whereby “[s]tate interventions in markets (once created) 
must be kept to a bare minimum” (D. Harvey, Brief 2).  Elliot and Lemert tie together 
neoliberalism and individualism on the basis of their origins in Enlightenment thought: 
“[t]here can be no argument with the claim that historically liberal (hence, neo-liberal) 
principals of the free market owe to the same nineteenth-century versions of the 
Enlightenment culture of reason as the liberating resources of the modern individual” (xvii).   
 
But while it may seem clear that individualism remains intact under neoliberalism, how does it 
stand against the backdrop of late or (post) modernity, when, according to Marshall Berman, 
people’s lives are shattered “into a multitude of fragments” (17), or in the fuller landscape of a 
late capitalist world?  In this broader context, one might well question whether individualism 
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is still a valid concept.  Let us start with the postmodern argument—that the contemporary 
individual is in a “maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal” (Berman 15).  According 
to many theorists, regardless of these postmodern circumstances, the concept of individualism 
persists.  Ziauddin Sardar, for instance, argues that because postmodernity is an extension of, 
rather than a break from, modernity, the key Western values of the contemporary world 
continue to be predicated upon a deep-seated individualism (13, 61).  Jim McGuigan, too, 
agrees that postmodernity is but a continuation of modernity, and claims that even today’s 
transformed notion of a supposedly decentred, hybrid and fluid identity can be read as simply 
“the latest manifestation of Western individualism” (103).  As Sardar asserts, this is 
individualism redoubled, or taken to “a new level”: “[p]ostmodern individuals … are forever 
acquiring new identities, creating new universes of realities, consuming whatever they think 
would satisfy their insatiable quest for meaning, identity and belonging” (39).  This notion of 
consumption brings us to the issue of late capitalism, which is, D+G would argue, more salient 
than matters postmodern.  Here, we can begin with Anthony Elliott’s proposal that today we 
are in the throes of a “new individualism,” by which he means that individualism has become 
“suitably modified and adjusted” to fit a world of “technology-induced globali[s]ation and 
[transformed] capitalism” (33-34).  Elliott’s new individualism is made up of four dimensions: 
“a relentless emphasis on self-reinvention; an endless hunger for instant change; a fascination 
with speed, dynamism and acceleration; and a preoccupation with short-termism” (32).  
Overall, this individualism, predicated as it upon “the instant making, reinvention and 
transformation of selves,” makes a changeable identity its core, which means “it is not the 
particular individuality of an individual that’s most important,” but, rather, “how individuals 
create identities [and] the speed with which identities can be reinvented and instantly 
transformed” (Elliott 34).  For Elliott, this new individualism is evident “in the pressure 
consumerism puts on us to ‘transform’ and ‘improve’ every aspect of ourselves: not just our 
homes and gardens but our careers, our food, our clothes, our sex lives, our faces, minds and 
bodies” (34).  With a wide range of “market-directed solutions available—from self-help to 
therapy culture, from instant identity makeovers to plastic surgery”—we are left in no doubt 
that “there’s nothing to stop you reinventing yourself however you choose” (Elliott 35).  
Individualism in this new paradigm is “on a par with shopping: consumed fast and with 
immediate results” (Elliott 35).       
  
From a different perspective, Massumi designates this current postmodern, late capitalist 
phase as neoconservatism: “[t]he neoconservative transnation-state corresponds to what is 
called ‘postmodernism’ on the cultural level, and in political economy ‘postindustrial society’ 
or ‘late capitalism’” (User’s 128).  In the Introduction we discussed neoconservatism in terms of 
its future-oriented, interventional, affect-based governance style, but, in terms of capitalism, it 
has another inflection.  Neoconservatism is capitalism one step beyond neoliberalism, to the 
 43 
extent that it is “the coming out of capital” (Massumi, User’s 131).  In other words, it “is the 
clear perception by a liberal nation-state of the capitalist attractor in all its purity, ... a new 
golden age of greed that dares to say its name” (Massumi, User’s 131).  Neoconservatism is 
personified by such men as Donald Trump, who embody capitalism as an abstract desire, 
expressed through “a mania for accumulating numerical quantities ... [,] for accumulating 
greater and greater sums, with no other interest or aim in life” (Massumi, User’s 131).  This may 
be the infiltration of the individual by capital as never before, but the individual as figurehead 
remains.  Certainly, we must acknowledge that D+G also argue that the individual in 
contemporary capitalism has been effectively privatised or “sold off”—to the extent that it is 
no longer the person herself who is important, but, rather, her capital or labour capacity (AO 
272).  Individuals have become “‘figures’ of capitalism; the capitalist as personified capital—
i.e., as a function derived from the flow of capital” (D+G, AO 286).  In this vein, Colebrook 
calls the individual of late capitalism a universal/global subject, who is the “capacity to signify, 
exchange and communicate” (Colebrook, “Sense”).  Along similar lines, Deleuze also claims 
that in contemporary control capitalism individuals have become “dividuals”; this term means 
to describe how “control man” has become a decoded individual, a functional figure, that 
“undulates, moving among a continuous range of different orbits” (N 180).  Nevertheless, as 
Massumi observes, when “the moral and philosophical foundations of national and personal 
identity have crumbled, making a mockery of the Stateform[,] the world keeps right on going 
as if they hadn't” (User’s 5).  In other words, while it may be entirely overcoded by capital, the 
figure of the individual remains a strong mythical construct.  We may function as dividuals, 
but individualistic standards continue to apply: how many possessions, how much money in 
the bank (or at least able to be liquidated), how expensive the cars/houses—all are still reliable 
indicators of each individual’s cultural value.  Populist media outlets besiege us with “Rich 
Lists” and billionaire profiles with predictable frequency, upholding the heroic personage of 
the super-rich as the society’s ultimate success.  Even in the face of the recent global financial 
crisis—which might have provoked a serious examination of individualistic mores—the model 
of the individual prevails; Elliott and Lemert explain: “as the world navigates [its] financial 
misadventures ... , what we see are the traces of the older liberal dogmas. … [A] very good 
many politicians, policy-makers and economists cling to the tacit individualist assumptions 
that for so long guided the crypto-theologies of modern progress” (xvii).  Such a retreat to 
dogmatic structures of thought in the event of social tumult is not new.  Two decades earlier, 
Guattari describes how the shake-up of globalisation and the excesses of late capitalism 
provoke a return to “subjective conservatism”: 
Faced with this situation, the most [post]'modernist' capitalist formations seem, in 
their own way, to be banking on a return to the past, however artificial, and on a 
reconstitution of ways of being that were familiar to our ancestors. We can see, for 
example, how certain hierarchical structures (having lost a significant part of their 
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functional efficiency as a result, principally, of the computeri[s]ation of information 
and organi[s]ational management), have become the object of an imaginary 
hypercathexis, at both upper and lower executive level ... . Similarly we are witnessing 
a reinforcement of segregationist attitudes vis-i-vis immigrants, women, the young 
and the elderly. Such a rise in what we might call a subjective conservatism is not 
solely attributable to an intensification of social repression; it stems equally from a 
kind of existential contraction ... involving all of the actors in the socius.  (TE 31-32)  
Therefore, when faced with destabilisation, we cling to the saving lies of the Enlightenment, 
including that which delineates us as (albeit consumable) identities.  In Braidotti’s appraisal, 
there is an “ontological insecurity” generated by the displacements of globalisation, resulting 
in “nostalgia for the lost sovereign position”: these two effects, she argues, amount to “two 
faces on the same coin” that is our experience of life today (Posthuman 74).   
 
The consequences for thought of this persistence of individualism are grim.  For D+G, true 
thought is a result of an encounter with something as yet unthought—it is not the act of a 
unified (or even a destabilised) capitalist subject falling into line with what is “known” to be 
“true” or “right.”  Everyday acts of recognition and reinforcements of dominant identities do 
not engender thought: thought must be set off by the sometimes violent shock of real 
problems with no solutions—with only singular pathways of contingent response.  While ever 
thinking belongs to a subject, proceeds according to a categorising logic, and privileges some 
kind of an individual, thought as genuine creation is blocked.  The fullness of being 
potentialised by the virtuality of thought’s involuntary encounters is curtailed by the 
preformed possibilities that make up the individualistic domain, even under late capitalism.  
As we shall explore in Part 2, true thought proceeds as part of a relational matrix, an 
ethological/ecological arrangement involving many overlapping participants—both human 
and non-human.  D+G emphasise the idea of “a deep vitalist interrelation between ourselves 
and the world, in an ecophilosophical move that binds us to the living organism that is the 
cosmos as a whole” (Braidotti, “Elemental” 214).  According to this notion, “[t]hinking is the 
conceptual counterpart of the ability to enter modes of relation, to affect and be affected, 
sustaining qualitative shifts and creative tensions accordingly” (Braidotti, “Elemental” 214).  
Since such thinking does not presuppose separate entities, it “interrogate[s] and unsettle[s] 
the instrumental rationality, abstract individualism, reductionism, and [the] exploitation of 
people and places that the epistemologies of mastery have helped to legitimate” (Code 21). 
 
Truth, knowledge, science  
 
Lorraine Code’s comment regarding “epistemologies of mastery” brings us to another 
Enlightenment vision that continues through to the present day: the discipline and practice of 
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science (surely one of the most dominant epistemologies of mastery).  As an epistemology, 
classical science strives to produce knowledge as “the effect of a deployment of scientific 
reason upon the theat[re] of the world” (Braidotti, “Elemental” 211-12).  In philosopher of 
science Isabelle Stengers’ account, when “we speak of science or society [in traditional terms], 
progress is the dominant image” (Invention 151), and progress in science is defined by “efforts 
on the part of scientists to understand the world[, resulting] in a virtual image or 
representation that develops over time, approximating the actual world with increasing detail 
and accuracy” (Gaffney, “Superimposing” 87).  This production of knowledge about the natural 
world is founded upon “patterns that are conventionally believed to inhere to the object itself 
and that are broadly conceived as natural laws or universal constants” (Gaffney, 
“Superimposing” 87).  Classical science relies upon procedures of “reproducibility” in order to 
establish the veracity (the “truth”) of data, and, as D+G state, “[r]eproducing implies the 
permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced” (ATP 372).  The 
model of science that has become our standard, then, can be broadly described as “the work of 
rational subjects collecting data and building representations of the ‘outside world’” (Gaffney, 
“Superimposing” 89), coming closer and closer to a complete picture of the physical truths of 
the universe.  That which cannot be reliably measured and corroborated according to fixed 
schema is outside the boundaries of these truths, and is to be discounted.  Such an 
exclusionary stance takes a particular approach to difference, as Peter Gaffney explains: 
[Classical science’s] ability to work directly with matter is exemplary, but its tools are 
only designed to identify quantifiable differences in time and space—which is to say 
that it does not concern itself with difference as such, only with questions or problems 
that arise during the individuation of a particular difference, from the more or less 
stable diagram of its outcome.  (“Introduction”) 
In privileging epistemology over ontology, science builds knowledge according to a particular 
(instrumental) plan, thus failing to account for difference in itself, or the virtuality of all that 
is—which, according to D+G, enfolds the observer and the observed into the same monistic 
life-world.  From another standpoint, Braidotti argues that the dualistic model of science feeds 
the “dialectics of otherness” advanced by other projects of modernity (“Elemental” 216).  As she 
puts it, “according to the unitary subject of classical humanism,” there are “three main 
dialectical axis that [are] used to constitute otherness ...—gender, race [and] nature” 
(“Posthuman” 76).  Leaving aside for now gender and race, it is the othernesses of nature that 
science utilises, in the sense that they function “as the embodiment of difference that holds up 
the self [—sameness or identity—] in a dialectical relationship” (Braidotti, “Posthuman” 76).  
The essentialising dualism of science is an epistemology of mastery, therefore, to the extent 
that difference therein is a perjorative one, defined by it having an inferior essence.  
Accordingly, the natural world represents “indifferent and inert matter” available simply for 
“the operations performed on it by man” (Heilbroner 135).  In Braidotti’s explanation, 
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“scientific inquiry and exploration has been historically an outward looking enterprise, framed 
by the dominant human masculine habit of taking for granted free access to and the 
consumption of the bodies of others,” including all the bodies of “nature” (“Elemental” 216).  
Science as this project of mastery can actually be traced to the pre-Enlightenment phase, when 
René Descartes proposed that mastery over the natural world would “increase man’s happiness 
because, as it progressively frees him from determination by ‘nature,’ it increases his autonomy 
and brings his human nature to greater perfection” (Schouls 110).   
 
Turning to D+G’s philosophy, we see that science is conceptualised therein as being one of two 
kinds: either “royal” (also called “legal”), or “nomad” (“minor”) (ATP 361-74).  Royal science, 
the science supported by the State, aligns with classical science: it is based on “the primacy of 
the fixed model of form, mathematical figures, and measurement,” and “only tolerates and 
appropriates perspective if it is static” (D+G, ATP 365).  Royal science proceeds according to 
“the ideal of reproduction, deduction, or induction ... [; it] treats differences of time and place 
as so many variables, the constant form of which is extracted precisely by law”: the law that 
the same conditions should produce the same phenomena (D+G, ATP 372).  Nomad science, 
on the other hand, does not seek to reproduce, or to “discover a form,” but, rather, follows the 
flow of matter in order to search for its “singularities”; it “engages in a continuous variation of 
variables, instead of extracting constants from them” (D+G, ATP 372).  As Jeremy Hunsinger 
clarifies, nomad science is “the science that moves beyond mapping, measuring, discovering, 
and label[l]ing the truths of the world” and is, instead, “the science of what is becoming, what 
will be, what is being created” (273).  In D+G’s account, the two modes of science exist 
interactively: nomad science “cuts the contents of royal science loose,” while royal science 
continually works to “appropriate the contents” of the more experimental nomad science (ATP 
367).  This constant appropriation of the inventions of nomad science gives State or royal 
science a position of dominance: it “retains of nomad science only what it can appropriate; it 
turns the rest into a set of strictly limited formulas without any real scientific status, or else 
simply represses and bans it” (D+G, ATP 362).  For Stengers, royal science advances through a 
process of “mobili[s]ation”: any rise in experimental practices occurring in science today is 
reclaimed by the “mobili[s]ation” of a stabilising, familiar model—one that reduces diversity to 
sameness; this works to maintain “order in the ranks of researchers” and to re-establish 
rationality and representation (Invention 113-15).  Science is a “discipline,” Stengers tells us, 
because it aligns the interests of researchers toward a common goal: even “guerrilla” scientists 
have to imagine themselves “as belonging to a disciplined army” (Power 118).  While State 
science mobilises its researchers to uncover the truth of forms, then, other potential modes of 
life are excluded.  Even in the present day, Gaffney proposes, when contemporary scientists 
tend to “acknowledge the epistemological limits of the exercise as a whole,” a kind of 
naturalism endures: while scientists may be developing “an increasingly complex picture of 
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nature, characterised by far-from-equilibrium models of change” such as complexity theory, 
there is a “lingering tendency to approach the problem [as] a ‘dialogue’ between thought and 
nature” (“Introduction” 10, 17).  In other words, the old models apply: chaos and complexity 
models continue to be scientistic in approach.  Although they are concerned with randomness 
and surprise, such theories still strive to account for it: they still attempt to confront chaos 
through providing an image of it.  The aim of such theories is still to be useful in the 
advancement of humankind, and science continues to mobilise its thought according to “a 
single historically specific point of view” (Gaffney, “Introduction” 8). 
 
Under advanced capitalism, the key to the State’s mobilisation and channelling of scientific 
endeavours lies in the “institutional support” it gives to research projects, through “policy and 
capital” (Hunsinger 272).  As Hunsinger puts it, the State and science “have an alliance to 
suppress certain kinds of creativity, to limit certain kinds of innovation, and to structure the 
scientific process and the knowledge process as capitalist products” (277).  Massumi concurs, 
noting that the issue of funding is at the top of the agenda in science laboratory discussions 
(Parables 235); in spite of calls for science to remain “pure,” corporate financing is “integral to 
science’s continuation” (Parables 234).  This means that “[a]t profitability, science passes a 
threshold. Now it is science that becomes something new: capitali[s]ed technique; 
technologi[s]ation, with all its spin-offs” (Massumi, Parables 233).  In relation to 
technologisation, Hunsinger addresses the role of “cyberinfrastucture” policy—which is the 
policy that accompanies infotechnics, or the computerisation of science.  In Hunsinger’s view,  
“cyberinfrastructure policy is part of a new control system for science,” inasmuch as it brings 
together capitalism and science processes: “the values of science as process [and] knowledge as 
process are overwritten with the values of capitalism, science as production, knowledge as 
object” (272, 271).  In other words, because it is geared toward profit-making, State-fostered 
cyberinfrastucture “blackboxes” or hides the processes of its research, focusing only upon 
certain (saleable) products.  Therefore, the cyberinfrastucture underpinning computerised 
science has only “constructed yet another objectified science” (Hunsinger 274).  One example 
of a burgeoning area of science research that has been sequestered by the State in this way, as 
Nikolas Rose demonstrates, is biotechnology (Politics 35).  Rose describes how the coming 
together of State, science and capital in biotechnology was signalled in the UK in 2000 by then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, who announced, “biotechnology is the next wave of the knowledge 
economy and I want Britain to become its European hub” (Blair).  At the start of the twenty-
first century, according to Rose, “the value of the biomedical biotechnology complex—biotech 
companies (working on everything from therapeutic stem cells to DNA paternity testing), 
pharmaceutical companies, manufacturers of machinery [and so on]—was immense” (36).  By 
2010, even with the global financial crisis, companies in established biotech centres of 
Australia, Canada, Europe and the US achieved “a record-breaking aggregate net profit of 
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US$4.7 billion, a 30% increase from the previous year” (“Beyond”).  The biotech industry faces 
its challenges, to be sure, such as the issue of regulatory protocols around drug safety; but 
overall, the push to bring products to the market is obdurate—in the Asian biotech sector as 
much as in the aforementioned centres of production (Rose 37).  In order to apprehend the 
power of the capital/State alliance in science, it is useful to consider a specific biotech 
example, one that has played out in the public arena over recent years: stem cell therapy.    
 
“The Truth about Stem Cells: The Hope, the Hype and What It Means for You,” the cover story 
of Time magazine’s August 7, 2006 edition, immediately evokes such ideological principles as 
science, reason, progress and universalism.  Again, these principles are characteristic of the 
Enlightenment and of its extension, the Western modern, both of which connect with the 
structure of thought’s dogmatic image.  Around the time of this Time story, stem cell research 
was hugely topical in Australia, as a new issue figured in the debate: the legalisation of 
therapeutic cloning for medical research purposes.  Therapeutic cloning, defined, is “the 
splicing of DNA from skin cells into eggs to produce stem cells, also known as master cells, 
which are capable of forming all the tissues of the human body” (“Australia Lifts”).  Such cells 
can then, theoretically, be used to grow new organs or repair disease processes.  This type of 
stem cell therapy differs from reproductive cloning, in which the stem cells would be 
implanted into the uterus in order to produce a child.  From 2002, both reproductive and 
therapeutic cloning were prohibited in Australia, but, after a parliamentary conscience vote in 
late 2006, the creation of embryonic stem cells for research (therapeutic cloning) was to be 
allowed under licence (Then).  The practice has been legal in the UK since 2004 (Pilcher), 
while in the USA the situation is a little more complex: from 1996 until 2009 legislation 
effectively prevented any government funded research, although privately financed work could 
proceed (“Stem”).  In 2009, President Obama issued an executive order permitting 
government-supported research, but this was blocked in 2010 by a federal judge, only to be 
reinstated again in 2011 (“Stem”).  Stem cell research involving human embryos is a highly 
charged issue from political, moral and religious viewpoints, with much of the debate taking 
place through election campaigns and in media forums.  Originally, a large part of the debate 
“focused on the moral status of the embryo and the acceptability of using embryos for research 
purposes,” but, increasingly, “the issue is no longer if [embryonic stem cell] research should 
proceed, but rather how it should proceed” (Lo et al 1454).  There are two ways (at least) to 
account for this shift from “if” to “how,” from politico-moral uncertainty to the focus on the 
best way forward.  In the first instance, the research is driven by the persistence today of the 
scientistic belief that investigative, empirical research—with its emphasis on rationality and 
intellectual rigour—advances our knowledge of life, with the overall goal being to follow 
humankind’s natural line of progress.  The aforementioned Time magazine article exemplifies 
these classical notions: while it acknowledges the “politically loaded” aspects of the debate, it 
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speaks ultimately in terms of “real areas of progress,” and “breakthroughs [being] achieved”; 
moreover, the article concludes that while the debate is complicated, “the best role for 
legislators and Presidents may be neither to steer the science nor to stall it but to stand aside 
and let it breathe” (Gibbs 27, 32).  Similarly, when federally funded embryonic stem cell 
research was allowed to continue in the US in April 2011, the Coalition for the Advancement of 
Medical Research (a lobby group for the use of regenerative medicine) made the following 
statement: “This is ... great news for the scientific community, so that they may continue to 
apply for grants and know their research will be able to move forward.”   
 
But while ideals of rationality and progress continue to underpin current scientific practices, 
there is an even more formidable driver: the abstract machine of capital.  In this context, 
politico-moral debates around stem-cell science will ultimately prove no match for capital’s 
power.  Just as the 1970s controversy surrounding genetic engineering did not prevent that 
branch of research from proceeding (Wright), stem cell science will continue while there is 
promise of capital gain.  As Massumi points out, government under contemporary capitalism 
is not about the will of the majority, but, rather, is defined by the “directly capitalist terms” of 
productivity and profit (“Requiem” 59).  It was this motivation, primarily, that propelled Texas 
state Governor Rick Perry, in April 2012, to push for a relaxation of Texas’ stem cell treatment 
laws: since “the Texas Medical Board voted to accept rules intended to give doctors ‘a 
reasonable and responsible degree of latitude’ in using experimental [adult] stem cell 
therapies” (Aldhous), Texans can now potentially visit their own doctor for non-Food and 
Drug Administration approved treatments—at the cost of several thousand dollars.  According 
to international expert in science policy and ethics, Douglas Sipp, this amounts to “Texas 
saying research can be done as treatment,” as long as patients are prepared to pay (Ackerman).  
Indeed, a large part of Governor Perry’s rationale in wanting to circumvent existing regulations 
with this new law is to provide “a potential boon to the Texan economy” (Cyranosky 377).  
Indeed, even before governments give their support to such medical practices, commercialism 
will exert its force: there is currently a worldwide industry in “stem cell tourism,” whereby 
patients travel to stem cell clinics in other countries to receive experimental therapies not 
approved at home; as of 2011, over 300 clinics in countries including Mexico, China and the 
Dominican Republic “‘offer what they claim to be stem-cell-based treatments for everything 
from autism to diabetes, from ALS to cancer’” (Conger).  Over the past decade, it is estimated 
that this industry has approached a market size of $US1 billion (Conger), evidencing the 
propensity of capital to spread even beyond State authorised science.  In this case, when the 
State trails capital, the State is providing capital a service: as D+G say, “[n]ever before has a 
State lost so much of its power in order to enter with so much force into the service of the 
signs of economic power” (AO 273-74). 
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Altogether, the area of science that encompasses stem cell research—molecular biology—can 
be seen to still support representational thought’s discourses of truth, but, as Rose suggests, an 
epistemological shift has occurred.  While the biology that had its origins in the nineteenth 
century “tried to discover the underlying laws that determined the functioning of closed living 
systems,” in contemporary molecular biology “the search is not for simplifying underlying laws 
but the reverse, for simulations of dynamic, complex, open systems, combining heterogeneous 
elements, to model future vital states” (Rose, “Molecular” 7).  Like complexity theory, though, 
microbiology still strives to represent a true picture of life, and, because it is based on “the 
metaphysical presuppositions” of the methods of “abstraction and generalisation,” it is a 
terribly “narrow” way of doing science (Williams, Interview).  The object of knowledge has 
shifted in another manner as well.  Physical life, or “vitality” as Rose calls it, is no longer 
conceived “at the scale of limbs, organs, tissues, flows of blood, hormones and so forth,” but, 
rather, “life is understood and acted upon at the molecular level” (“Molecular” 5-6).  Now, 
“tissues, cells, DNA fragments can be isolated, decomposed, stabili[s]ed, stored in ‘biobanks,’ 
commoditi[s]ed, transported around[, ... and] re-engineered by molecular manipulation” 
(Rose, “Molecular” 7).  Along with this “mobilisation of vitality” (Rose, “Molecular” 6) comes 
“economies of vitality” (Rose, Politics 38), whereby science’s knowledge, as already discussed, 
is exploited by capital.  At the same time, though, capital is instrumental in shaping these 
knowledges, as Rose makes clear: 
[W]here funds are required to generate potential truth in biomedicine, and where the 
allocation of such funds inescapably depends upon a calculation of financial return, 
commercial investment shapes the very direction, organi[s]ation, problem space and 
solution effects of biomedicine, and the basic biology that supports it.  This is less a 
matter of the manufacture and marketing of falsehoods than of the production and 
configuring of truths.  (“Molecular” 17) 
The capitalisation of human vitality becomes particularly evident in the way language is used 
in this realm of science: it is increasingly perfused with words such as “supply and demand, 
contracts, exchange, and compensation.  Body parts are extracted like a mineral, harvested like 
a crop, or mined like a resource” (Andrews and Nelkin 5).  But even though the human body is 
broken down and, in a sense, “post-humanised,” by the synergistic spheres of science and 
capital, vestiges of rational thought’s individualistic principles survive.  For one thing, as 
Braidotti points out, regardless of any posthuman turn, the “century-old” form of 
“anthropocentric arrogance” remains “miraculously unscathed” (“Posthuman” 76).  As well—
and this resonates with Elliott’s “new individualism”—there persists a focus on “self-
fashioning,” albeit at the level of molecular corporeality (Rose, Politics 39).  With the 
opportunities available through biotechnology, the “maintentance of health and the 
prolongation of earthly existence” remain paramount (capital suffused) individualistic ideals.   
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And what of the rational laws of morality as they apply to this new sphere of 
science/medicine?  Here, they are taken care of by the flourishing field of “bioethics,” 
comprising “national bioethical committees, local Institutional Review Boards and a whole 
apparatus of bioethical approved patient information and consent forms for any medical 
procedure or piece of biomedical research” (Rose, “Molecular” 15).  Corporations, for their part, 
include bioethicists on their boards and use a variety of techniques to present themselves as 
responsible and ethical (Rose, “Molecular” 16).  But is bioethics as it is practised in these arenas 
truly ethical, to the extent that it is concerned with enhancing life-giving practices per se?  
While there is tremendous emphasis on settling the bioethical matters of “rights” in 
capitalised biomedicine and biotechnology, we might ask, with Rose, the broader question—
“what determines the issues that ‘become’ bioethical?” (“Molecular” 16).  This brings us to the 
matter of what Giovanni Berlinguer calls “everyday bioethics,” whereby issues that concern the 
difficult and often tragic conditions of “most of the world’s population” receive scant 
“bioethical” attention (1086).  One such example relates to the practice of preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD)—a technique often used alongside in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) to test 
embyos for genetic disorders before implantation.  This technique also enables sex testing, 
and, although UNESCO’S International Bioethics Committee only recommends sex selection 
for medical reasons, it does occur simply for reasons of choice in many developed countries 
(Berlinguer 1086).  In the US, for instance, sex selection is legal in every state, and, in fact, “no 
binding rules deter a private clinic from offering a menus of traits“ to IVF parents with the 
right money (Mitchison; “Need”).  But because this practice is deemed “ethical,” it comes 
under heavy scrutiny by committees of bioethicists.  At the same time, though, sex selection 
occurs in daily life in Asia and Africa, where there are deep-seated cultural biases in favour of 
males: infanticide, selective abortion against female foetuses, discrimination in nutrition and 
“other barbarous methods” mean that there is a very high male to female ratio (Berlinguer 
1086), especially in China with its unsparing One Child Policy.
10
  It seems that while “bioethics” 
is an integral aspect of high-tech, market-based medicine, with its issues of “individual 
autonomy, confidentiality, right and protections,” the mundane global matter of premature 
female deaths offers little (economic) value (Rose, “Molecular” 16).  In fact, this cultural bias 





As we have said, “the three main dialectical axes that ... constitute otherness according to the 
unitary subject of classical humanism,” or according to dogmatic thought, are nature, gender 
and race (Braidotti, “Posthuman” 76).  We have considered some of the ways in which the 
Cartesian project of science treats nature as its object—through Royal science, and in 
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connection to its now-defining relationship with capitalism.  Taking off from the matter of sex 
selection discussed above, it is apt to now take account of how dogmatic thought, in the 
present day, deals with the notion of gender.  The ascendancy of the masculine subject has 
already been alluded to, but, in fact, as we shall see, this concept of the dominant subject can 
be extended to also include heterosexual predisposition.  To begin with, though, according to 
the dogmatic image “man has been taken as the universal ground of reason and good 
thinking” (Colebrook, Introduction 2).  The “right and power of man “ is assumed as a 
universal pregiven (D+G, ATP 291), and, as feminist scholars have established, the Western 
“Woman” is the “cultural and ideological composite Other constructed through diverse 
representational discourse[s:] scientific, literary, juridical, linguistic, cinematic, etc” (Mohanty 
19).  For D+G, the “great dualism machine” opposes masculine to feminine, positioning “man” 
as “majoritarian par excellence”—with majoritarian implying a “state of domination” (ATP 272, 
291).  In feminist Catharine MacKinnon’s view, one of the main sites of domination is the 
family, which she sees as “a unit of male dominance, a locale of male violence and 
reproductive exploitation, [and] hence a primary locus of the repression of women” (61).  
MacKinnon links capitalism to this sphere, pointing out that “capitalism expresses the same 
authority structure as does the family, through its organi[s]ation, distribution of wealth, and 
resource control” (61).  In Olkowski’s reading, the connective tissue between the family and 
capitalism as sources of oppression (as well as the oppressions of race, class and gender) is the 
“authority structure” of representation (Ruin 8).  Early feminist Simone de Beauvoir, too, 
couples representation with masculinity, as this quotation indicates: “[t]he representation of 
the world as the world itself is the work of men; they describe it from a point of view that is 
their own and that they confound with the absolute truth” (162).  Objectivity itself, then, the 
rational method of representational thought, which is assumed to be neutral, “is in fact the 
point of view of men, men with the authority and power to enforce it” (Olkowski, Ruin 9).  Put 
another way, the so-called objective standards and principles that structure life’s hierarchies 
are male-centric, or, as Jacques Derrida would have it, phallogocentric.
11
  As MacKinnon notes, 
this thought takes over the female: “[t]he perspective from the male standpoint enforces 
woman’s definition, encircles her body, circumlocutes her speech, and describes her life” (114).  
With the gains made by feminism, however, it might well be asked whether it is indeed 
accurate to claim phallogocentrism as a defining aspect of thought’s dogmatic image today; 
one only need probe statistics, though, to discover that the subjugation and oppression of 
women is alive and well.  For example, the International Violence Against Women Survey, 
covering some 30 countries from all continents (including over 6,000 women in Australia), 
reported in 2008 that “between 35-60% of women in the surveyed countries have experienced 
violence by a man during their lifetime,” and “[b]etween 22-40% have experienced intimate 
partner violence” (Johnson, Ollus and Nevala).  In the workplace, gender inequality remains 
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the norm, as this recent statement from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) indicates:  
[W]omen earn less than men (16% less at the last count), they earn less over their 
working lives, end up with smaller pensions and are more likely to end up living in 
poverty.  And the higher up the pay scale you go, the wider the gap.  In Europe, 
women hold just 12% of board seats in quoted companies.   
...  
And it should also perhaps be noted that women in general are doing a great deal 
more of the world’s unpaid work than men.  On average, women devote some two 
hours a day more than men to extra unpaid work such as housework, childcare, parent 
care.  And this is an issue not just for OECD countries—in the developing world, rural 
women spend far more time than men obtaining water and fuel, caring for children 
and the sick, and processing food.  The same is true for girls, making it more difficult 
for them to attend school and acquire the skills needed for jobs as adults.  (“Gender”) 
Moreover, as the OECD Secretary-General points out, “[w]omen are less likely than men to 
have access to credit, resources, and education,” and they are “more likely than men to be in 
vulnerable jobs in the informal sector, [or] to be underemployed or without a job” (Gurría).  
Taking a different approach, economic researcher Anna Aizer reports a causal link between 
the gender wage gap and domestic violence: using a model of household bargaining and a 
measure of hospital admissions, Aizer found that in the US state of California between 1990 
and 2003, “reductions in the gender wage gap explain nine percent of the decline in domestic 
violence” (1847-50).  In other words, the authority structures of capitalism and gender 
participate in one another: as a woman becomes more economically successful, her degree of 
male perpetrated corporal punishment will decrease. 
 
Does this mean that to redress gender inequality, we must simply strive to engage women 
more effectively in capitalism?  Even if this were to happen, we would not escape a situation of 
subjugation, since the authority structure of capitalism would only be strengthened.  The best 
possible response, according to Olkowski, is to effect “the ruin of representation”—break 
down the supreme authority structure that is associated with both male dominance and 
capitalism.  It is bound to male dominance because representation itself is a phallogocentric 
system (or, as Elizabeth Grosz puts it, Western reason is characterised by misogyny [Volatile 
3]), and to capitalism because this system “make[s] use of all the powers of representation for 
[its] own end” (Olkowski, Ruin 189).  The ruin of representation would entail “[a] change from 
a logic of identity to a logic of difference,” with difference here meaning difference in itself, as 
singularity, not the “representation” of difference as that which distinguishes things in terms 
of one another (Olkowski, Ruin 14, 16).  To do this, Olkowski suggests, “calls for a new 
ontology, an ontology of change as opposed to an ontology of static hierarchies and objectified 
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structures” (Ruin 14).  An ontology of change, stated another way, is an ontology of becoming 
(in D+G’s terms), rather than one of Being.  And because becoming can effect the ruin of 
representation, it presents a pathway to the beyond of gender inequality.  For this reason we 
now highlight the concept of becoming, which, for D+G, relates to Deleuze’s notion of 
difference-in-itself.  It also relates to a particular conception of time, as Todd May begins to 
explain: 
[Difference in itself] is not given to us in the form of identity. This means that an 
encounter with it must occur, not by means of the stable identities given to us in 
consciousness, but beneath or within those identities.  Difference in itself is founding 
for identity but does not appear as such (as difference in itself) within those identities.  
It is not phenomenologically accessible.  Thus, a search for difference in itself must 
abandon the project of investigating directly the givens of experience and turn toward 
a more hidden realm. Deleuze discovers that realm in the nature of time.  (“When” 
145) 
In due course we will return to Deleuze’s “nature of time,” which he develops from Bergson’s 
theory; for now, suffice to say that time, for Deleuze, “is not a container occupied by living 
things, but is immanent to what lives.  As such, for him, what lives is ceaselessly becoming or 
self-differentiating” (Cull).  Becoming, therefore, is “the unfolding of difference in time and as 
time” (T. May, “When” 147).  Time itself, as a virtuality (what Bergson calls “duration”), is 
“made” by the unfolding of being as difference—becoming.  As Braidotti puts it, “Deleuzian 
becoming is the affirmation of the positivity of difference, meant as a multiple and constant 
process of transformation” (Nomadic 246).  If the being of difference, becoming, is primary, 
the binarised identities established by representational thought are not fixed.  The “molar” 
identities of “man” and “woman” are better conceived in “molecular” terms, which is to break 
forms down to the fluxing “particles” from which they are actually composed (D+G, ATP 272).
12
 
From this position, there is no “dichotomous opposition” between “masculine and feminine 
subject positions, but rather a multiplicity of sexed subjectivities [whereby the] differences 
between them mark different lines of becoming, in a web of rhizomatic connections” 
(Braidotti, Nomadic 247).  As Laura Cull puts it, “[b]ecomings are processes of genuine 
transformation or change in which we come to perceive things differently.”  To become-other 
is not a process of imitation, but a “taking on” of the other, of the particles that the other 
emits, so as to enable the other to simultaneously become something else.  Becoming is a 
matter of proximity and relative speed, as Braidotti acknowledges:  
Starting from the form one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the 
functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes 
the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is 
becoming, through which one becomes.  The space of becoming is therefore a space of 
affinity and symbiosis between adjacent particles.  (Nomadic 249) 
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Patricia MacCormack’s summary is also helpful: “[b]ecoming involves entering into a filiation 
with another term where the parameters of each become fuzzy, where zones of being shift 
toward non-molar alliances.”  D+G specify an order for becoming, moving toward the total 
decomposition of identities, but, importantly, beginning with a passage through “becoming-
woman”; they explain: an “apparent progression can be established for the segments of 
becoming in which we find ourselves; becoming-woman, becoming-child; becoming-animal, -
vegetable, or -mineral; becomings-molecular of all kinds, becomings-particles” (ATP 272).  In 
specifying that becoming starts with becoming-woman, D+G emphasise that man is the 
majoritarian standard in the universe, and there can be no becoming-man because “all 
becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (ATP 291).
13
  Because women have a “special situation in 
relation to the man-standard,” which is to say they are its first figure of otherness, the first 
becoming is a becoming-woman (D+G, ATP 291).  The process of “becoming-woman,” which is 
not in any way to imitate a woman’s form, approaches a “microfemininity,” or a “molecular 
woman” (D+G, ATP 275), which effectively “releases sexuality from molar identity, from its 
repression in an organised and sexed body” (Cull).  As such, it also offers a way out of the 
epistemological authority structure of representation, with its oppressions of the female, 




But we have wandered away from representation’s dominant image of subjectivity and now 
return, for this image encompasses more than the quality that is “male”: it can be more closely 
defined as also incorporating the standard of heterosexuality (D+G, ATP 105).  Present, on-
going controversies around same-sex marriage attest to the fact that this standard persists in 
current times—that we live in a predominantly “heteronormative” world.  This condition can 
be explicated thus:   
Heteronormativity is the presumption that everyone is heterosexual, that only 
heterosexuality is normal or culturally intelligible, and it describes several 
intermeshing ideological state apparatuses which try to ensure that everyone is 
heterosexual in particular ways. Heteronormativity and heteropatriarchy are 
imbricated since only specific types of heterosexuality are considered normal, licit, or 
proper and the married, procreative, opposite-sex couple with children is valori[s]ed 
and reified as the normative sexual lifestyle.  (O’Rourke 111) 
In Deleuze-Guattarian terms, such a prescribed sexuality “is molar, sedentary, majoritarian, 
Oedipal, [and] despotic” (O’Rourke 111).  Through Foucault’s work on sexuality, however, we 
can come to see that this “very everyday notion of sexuality” is a “historically singular form of 
experience” (Foucault 333).  Foucault shows how sexuality is “the correlation of a domain of 
knowledge, a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self,” incorporating a 
“collection of rules” that “differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from 
monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, etc” (Foucault 333-34).  
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The seventeenth century, Foucault tells us, marks the beginning of this “age of repression,” 
prior to which sexual practices were openly discussed and regarded with a relatively laissez-
faire attitude (Will 3-5).  As Grosz makes clear, these emerging sexual norms centred on the 
heterosexual, monogamous couple, according to a twofold movement: 
On the one hand, there is a proliferation and dispersion of sexuality and sexual 
“types,” which are defined in terms of their deviation or departure from the 
heterosexual, marital norm.  In this movement there is an increasing specification and 
focus on the sexuality of children, the mad, the criminal, homosexuals, perverts, etc.  
On the other hand, there is an increasing discretion granted to the heterosexual 
couple, who, while remaining the pivot and frame of reference for the specification of 
these other sexualities, are less subject to scrutiny and intervention ... .  (Volatile 153) 
For Foucault, this change in thinking about sexuality can be tied to “the objectification of sex” 
brought about through the rational discourses ushered in by the Enlightenment (Will 33; 
Politics 59).  In other words, it is representational thought that turns sexuality into something 
that one could speak about “from the rarefied and neutral viewpoint of a science” (Will 53).  
The birth of capitalism is implicated in this shift, to the extent that the new sexual mores 
became “an integral part of the bourgeois order”: as Foucault explains, sex “is incompatible 
with a general and intensive work imperative” (Will 6-7).  In a more general sense, though, the 
discourses of modern knowledge, for Foucault, including those around sexuality, are crucial to 
the operations of biopower (Grosz, Volatile 152).  As Foucault puts it, “sexuality is tied to 
recent devices of power,” which work by way of “proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, 
and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an 
increasingly comprehensive way” (Will 107).  We can now take up the issue of same-sex 
marriage as an example through which to examine the continuing deployment of sexuality as a 
mode of control.    
 
Over the past two decades, in many national contexts, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) politics has “increasingly incorporated demands for the recognition of same-sex 
relationships” (M. Smith 2).  Even while many members of LGBT communities disagree on 
issues around rights, the entitlement to marry has come to be seen as something of the “holy 
grail” of LGBT politics (Josephson 269).  Other sexuality rights issues in the United States have 
included “the right to serve in the military” and “to experience fair treatment in employment 
and housing” (Fingerhut, Riggle, and Rostosky 227), but nothing has galvanised LGBTs more 
than the matter of marriage.  As one theorist puts it, the fight for marriage equalities puts 
“lesbians and gays in the position of oppressed minorities seeking equal access to core 
institutions, solid citizens who want only to be included” (Phelan 2).  In Jyl Josephson’s 
estimation, too, it is the issue of citizenship that underpins the importance of marriage rights 
to the LGBT movement: “marriage has a significant place in our understanding of responsible 
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citizenship in a democratic polity[; ]marriage is seen as a prerequisite to the provision of 
certain rights and material benefits” (269-70).  In the modern nation-state, Shane Phelan 
suggests that “citizenship is about recognition and participation” (3), making these the key 
goals at stake in the push towards same-sex marriage.  Of course, there are fervent opponents 
of marriage equality, who “question the normality and/or morality of persons who are involved 
in same-sex relationships or who identify as LGB[T], sometimes using religious arguments” 
(Fingerhut, Riggle, and Rostosky 226).  Such reasoning aligns perfectly with the tenets of 
representational thought, and with the domain of knowledge developed through modernity’s 
preference for heteronormativity. Nevertheless, highly publicised same-sex marriage debates 
are firmly on the worldwide, public agenda.  As of 2011, Macarena Sáez summarises the rights 
under law of same-sex couples: 
Forty years ago, same-sex couples were not legally accepted in any country.  In the last 
thirty years, however, around 20% of countries have granted some rights to same-sex 
couples, making them visible to society.  While there are still countries that 
criminali[s]e sexual relations among two consenting adults of the same-sex, other 
countries are allowing same-sex couples to marry and form a family.  Between those 
two poles, many countries have moved or are moving from total rejection of same-sex 
relationships to acceptance of some sort.  (2) 
But while it may be “undeniable that there is a movement towards the recognition of same-sex 
couples as family units” (Sáez 47), LGBTs may not end up with the release from oppression 
they seek.  In their drive for marriage equality, LGBTs will not escape the biopolitical regime of 
State control: even when they become “full citizens” through marriage, they will remain 
subject to the system of power that regulates this institution, especially to the extent that it is, 
according to the laws of arborescence, and the heterosexual model, a hierarchical 
arrangement.  Moreover, “[a]lthough there may be a common understanding of what marriage 
entails, in some countries, same-sex marriage has become a subcategory of marriage” with 
“restricted access to certain rights” (Sáez 2).  Not all marriages, it would seem, are created 
equal under representation. 
 
And what of D+G’s thought in relation to same-sex marriage?  We know that they promote 
minoritarian ways of being, but, as Verena Andermatt Conley observes, they would not 
endorse the direct integration of a gay population into present society’s status quo; as such, 
“[t]heir work escapes much of the present discussions in the Anglo-Saxon world that takes as 
its point of departure the division between a desire for rights to established values—such as 
marriage” (“Thirty-Six” 25).  For D+G, to start with any kind of identity, even a LGBT identity, 
“is to try to stabilise what has to be radically destabilised” (Conley, “Thirty-Six” 25).  Although 
D+G are “sensitive to suffering and subjugated lives,” for them, to “close off the future with 
categorical statements about orientation or identity is to lose sight of the evolving nature of 
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existence” (O’Donnell 219).  An individual, for D+G, is an “intensive and dynamic entity”—not 
“the emanation of an inner essence, nor ... the effect of biology” (Braidotti, “Teratologies” 159).  
A “body” is composed of intensities and encounters with all manner of other bodies, and to 
give it a label, such as “homosexual,” or even “bisexual,” is to fix it according to branching, 
binary categories and deny what else it might become—which is never knowable in advance.  
Sexuality, for D+G, is more accurately thought of in terms of desire, as MacCormack explains: 
“[o]ne of [D+G’s] great contributions to the philosophy of post-metaphysical humanist 
subjectivity is premised on the shift from sexuality to desire,” a move that catalyses 
“subjectivity to connective intensifications, opposition to relation, individuation to becoming” 
(“Encounters” 200).  MacCormack further points out how projects of becoming forge a 
sexuality “based not on knowledge, but as thought,” in the sense that “becomings create a 
sexuality of proximity [and produce] unthinkable relations with never quite apprehensible 
outside elements,” each enfolding the other “in a singular event of desire” (“Encounters” 201).  
Thought as difference, then, extends to the creation of the new through a kind of sexual or 
productive energy—the energy of desire.  As Bogue attests, this approach to sexuality takes it 
well beyond “genital excitation and the physiology of procreation,” which defines the 
normative heterosexual model (“Alien” 40).  Overall, D+G “argue for a pansexuality of 
universal desiring-production,” which they staunchly oppose to Oedipal notions of desire 
(Bogue, “Alien” 40).  While for Freud, sexuality is concerned with an individual psyche and 
Oedipal investments (Bogue, “Alien” 32), in D+G’s philosophy, the machinic force of 
sexuality/desire/production permeates the whole of life, including social and political 
institutions.  This statement from Anti-Oedipus makes the spread of libidinal energy quite 
clear: “[t]he truth is that sexuality is everywhere: the way a bureaucrat fondles his records; a 
judge administers justice; a businessman causes money to circulate; the way the bourgeoisie 
fucks the proletariat; and so on” (293).  The “large aggregates” of “nations, armies, [and] banks 
get a lot of people aroused,” they tell us, and when sexuality is seen to function only in 
particular, discrete units it is actually in a state of arrest: “it is through a restriction, a 
blockage, and a reduction that the libido is made to repress its flows in order to contain them 
in the narrow cells of the type ‘couple,’ ‘family,’ ‘person,’ ‘objects’” (D+G, AO 293).  
Sexuality/desire, then, extends beyond the human, not taking as its “object” particular things 
or persons, but, instead, “the entire surroundings that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of 
every sort to which it is joined” (D+G, ATP 292).  “We maintain that the social field is 
immediately invested by desire,” they say, so that when desire appears in any particular social 
machine, such as the family machine or the gender machine or even the capitalist machine, 
this is “purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions” (D+G, AO 
29; italics removed).  With this conception of sexuality D+G also seek to denounce the 
“anthropomorphic representation of sex,” which is “the idea that there are two sexes,” or, in 
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Freudian terms, “only one sex, the masculine, in relation to which the woman, the feminine, is 
defined as a lack, an absence” (AO 294).  Instead, D+G propose an infinity of sexes: 
[E]verywhere a microscopic transexuality, resulting in the woman containing as many 
men as the man, and the man as many women, all capable of entering—men with 
women, women with men—into relations of production of desire that overturn the 
statistical order of the sexes.  Making love is not just becoming as one, or even two, 
but becoming as a hundred thousand.  Desiring-machines or the nonhuman sex: not 
one or even two sexes, but n sexes.  (AO 295-96) 
Sexuality cannot be confined to the identities of representation, as it brings into play “too 
great a diversity of conjugated becomings” (D+G, ATP 278), too many surfaces rubbing against 
one another (Beckman 13).  Becomings occur through nonhuman, desiring connections “with 
economic, socio-historical and political surfaces” (Beckman 10), but also with the 
molecularities of animals, minerals and plants—through the particles, movements, intensities 
and vibrations that these other bodies emit (D+G, K 13; D+G ATP 274-75).   
 
Returning to human becomings, though, or the nonhuman sexuality that underlies human 
sex, we ought to acknowledge that when Deleuze does explicitly refer to homosexuality it is 
not in the terms of identity politics.  Rather, he is invoking the “micropolitics of desire” that 
homosexuality enacts in “escaping the heterosexual model” (DI 286).  Homosexuality is a 
particular means of “exploding the anthropomorphic, heterosexual, familial, and Oedipal 
organisation of sexuality,” and, for D+G, is “sometimes seen as a point of entrance to a larger 
breaking down of restricting structures of sexuality” (Beckman 16).  But the homosexual, 
Deleuze encourages, does not have to stay with the same sex: s/he can discover innumerable 
sexes (DI 285).  In other words, in living out the micropolitics of sexuality as desiring-
production, the homosexual—or the heterosexual, or the bisexual, or the transgendered—can 
open to many sexes: 
Far from closing in on “the same,” homosexuality is going to open itself up to all sorts 
of possible new relations, micrological or microphysic, essentially reversible, 
transversal relations, with as many sexes as there are assemblages, not even excluding 
new relations between men and women: the mobility of particular S&M relations, the 
potency of cross-dressing, Fourier’s thirty-six thousand forms of love, or the n-sexes 
(neither one nor two sexes).  It is no longer about being a man or woman but 
inventing sexes ... .  (DI 287)  
When sexuality becomes thought and creation there might be a “new homosexual” to oppose 
heterosexual man: this new homosexual “can finally say: nobody is homosexual, it doesn’t 
exist” (Deleuze, DI 287).  Just so, in the micropolitics of desire every sexual body can be un-
gendered, and have “the opportunity of escaping the dominant order and of entering into 
becoming” (Conley, “Thirty-Six” 33). 
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The (trans)nation-state  
 
As well as nature and gender, the dominant order of dogmatic, dialectical thought includes a 
third axis of otherness, race, which we will now investigate, along with its corollary, nation.  
The concept of race, as the “analysis and taxonomy of racial characteristics,” also arose in the 
nineteenth century, through the project of European imperialism and its associated 
Orientalism: the “scientific” confirmation of a hierarchy of physical characteristics supported 
Imperialism’s need to establish a distinction between superior and inferior peoples (Ashcroft, 
Griffiths, and Tiffin 199).  To this extent, racism can be regarded as existing prior to the 
concept of race (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 199).  As D+G indicate, “the constant or 
standard,” or dominant, world subject is the white, (heterosexual) European male (ATP 105), a 
notion that emerged through this Imperialist project: 
European coloni[s]ation of the rest of the globe, which accelerated in the eighteenth 
century and reached its apogee in the nineteenth, actively promoted or facilitated 
Euro-centrism through exploration, conquest and trade.  Imperial displays of power ... 
and assertions of intellectual authority ... established European systems and values as 
inherently superior to indigenous ones.  (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 91)    
Through Imperialism, therefore, “the idea of the colonial world became one of a people 
intrinsically inferior, and this inferiority was guaranteed by rationalist, scientistic ideologies as 
something ‘genetically pre-determined’” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 47).  As Edward Said 
shows in his treatise on Orientalism, Imperialism established the “White Man” as the “form of 
authority before which nonwhites, and even whites themselves” were expected to capitulate 
(227).  There arose an “irreducible distance separating white from colo[u]red, or Occidental 
from Oriental,” (that is, “West” from “East”), and the White Man’s “tradition of experience, 
learning and education ... kept the Oriental-colo[u]red to his position of object studied by the 
Occidental-white” (Said 228; italics removed).  In Said’s view, hierarchisation according to race 
continues in the contemporary world, when the “white middle-class Westerner believes it his 
human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by 
definition ‘it’ is not quite as human as ‘we’ are” (108).  Of course, the concept of the West 
spreads beyond Europe today, with former colonies such as Australia and especially—since 
World War Two—the United States developing as centres of power in their own right.  The 
notion of a Western identity opposed to an Eastern one has also deepened in recent decades, 
with West-East conflicts such as the Gulf and Iraq Wars; furthermore, the World Trade Centre 
attacks of September 11, 2001 served to reinforce the divide perhaps more than ever before.  As 
Said points out, though, “identity, whether of Orient or Occident, ... while obviously a 
repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction,” one that simultaneously 
“involves the construction of opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the 
continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’” (332).  Race, and 
 61 
national identity, “is a cultural rather than a biological phenomenon, the product of historical 
processes not of genetically determined physical differences” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 
205), and is connected to “the disposition of power and powerlessness” in society (Said 332).  
This exercise of representational thought in the present day has powerful ramifications, as Said 
stipulates: 
Debates today about [for example] Frenchness and Englishness in France and Britain 
respectively, or about Islam in countries like Egypt and Pakistan, are part of the same 
interpretative process, which involves the identities of different “others,” whether they 
be outsiders and refugees, or apostates and infidels.  It should be obvious in all cases 
that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such 
concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the 
constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimation of violence and/or insurrection, the 
character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very 
often has to do with the designation of official enemies.  (332) 
 
When understandings of race are articulated to the concept of nation several other 
implications of thought’s dogmatic image are brought to bear.  As Etienne Balibar makes 
known, the modern idea of race as a “racial community” became closely interlocked with the 
nation form in nineteenth century Europe, when the “frontiers of kinship” finally dissolved 
and became “imaginarily transferred to the threshold of nationality” (“Nation” 100).  With the 
birth of the modern state, civil codes (beginning with the Napoleonic code) officially marked 
the demise of relations of “‘extended’ kinship,” and at this point family relations became 
subject to “the intervention of the nation-state”—such interventions running from “legislation 
in respect of inheritance” to “the organi[s]ation of birth control” (Balibar, “Nation” 101).  The 
racial community of the nation-state came to be regarded as “one big family or the common 
envelope of family relations,” and, accordingly, the “family policy of the state” projected into 
the public sphere through new notions of population and the need to control it (Balibar, 
“Nation” 100, 101).  For Balibar, the idea of race, therefore, is always latent “in the reciprocal 
relation between the ‘bourgeois’ family and a society which takes the nation form,” since a line 
can be drawn from kinship (or blood) relations, to the modern family, and to the ”family” that 
is the nation—the latter two of which are constructed by the same (representational) codes 
(“Nation” 102).
15
  Writing in Homi Bhabha’s collection Nation and Narration, Timothy Brennan 
also connects the idea of family to the nation-state: “[a]s for the ‘nation,’ it is both historically 
determined and general.  As a term, it refers both to the modern nation-state and to 
something more ancient and nebulous—the ‘natio’—a local community, domicile, family, 
condition of belonging” (45).  This triangulation of family-nation-state constructs a nexus of 
both self-legitimation and power, especially when the concept of “tradition” is invoked: 
 62 
[T]he myth of a “national tradition” is employed not only to legitimi[s]e a general idea 
of a social group (“a people”) but also to construct a modern idea of a nation-state, in 
which all the instrumentalities of state power e.g. military and police agencies, 
judiciaries, religious hierarchies, educational systems and political assemblies or 
organi[s]ations) are subsumed and legitimi[s]ed as the “natural” expressions of a 
unified national history and culture.  (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 150) 
In the context of the expansion of capitalism—which, according to Balibar, occurred 
contemporaneously with Imperialism—the unified culture of the nation also took on the 
character of a “stable individuali[s]ed unit” in competition with other national contexts  
(“From” 175).  To this extent, Balibar argues that in the “capitalist ‘world-economy’” that 
developed with Imperialism, the state, the capitalist bourgeoisie and nationalism were 
entwined in a mutually complementary faction set against other politico-economic sectors 
(“From” 175).   
 
With the interrelated spread of colonisation and mercantilism, another important element 
came into play with regard to notions of nation and identity: that of a “territorial definition of 
power” (Herb 10), whereby the idea of territory became inextricably linked to national identity 
(Herb and Kaplan 2).  Thus a world economic system based on independent states developed 
alongside the state’s ability to control and maintain its territory/ies, either though 
representing them by way of mapping and census-taking, or through the development of 
weaponry (Herb 11).  International law came to be founded upon the territorial sovereignty of 
each nation-state.  The nation, then, as Bhabha puts it, developed around the notion of 
“totali[s]ing boundaries—both actual and conceptual,” beyond which were situated “the Other 
or Outside,” against whom aggressivity could be projected (300).  Overall, in Bhabha’s 
account, it is through such “ideological manoeuvres” as “representing the nation’s modern 
territoriality in the patriotic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism,” that the “’imagined 
communities’” of nations were given, and retain, the “essentialist identities” of dogmatic 
thinking (Bhabha 300).
16
  The predominance of these essentialist identities in the social 
consciousness lead to, or are fed by, the hierarchical practice of racism, which, more than 
mere prejudice, is, according to Balibar, a “mode of thought”; as such, it “combines intellectual, 
even sophisticated scientific or quasi-scientific hermeneutic models with affective complexes 
of sympathy and antipathy” (“Difference” 23-24).  In considering these essentialist identities 
and their bounded, nationalist territories, Dimitris Papadopoulis and Vassilis Tsianos offer an 
additional perspective, describing how a main focus of the nation-state has been to organise 
its people through the promise of “unrestricted rights and and extensive representation”—
what they call the “double R axiom” (232).  This double R axiom, they contend, 
“simultaneously defines the matrix of positive rights and representation within the national 
territory and the non-existence of rights and symbolic presence beyond its borders” (232).  But 
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importantly, according to Agamben’s articulation of the “state of exception,” national 
sovereignty also contains the means of its own negation; in other words, “[i]t can always deny 
its own foundations and withdraw from its function as the creditor of the double R axiom” 
(Papadopoulis and Tsianos 232).
17
  As Papadopoulis and Tsianos explain, modern national 
sovereignty thus conceived is “simultaneously, both the organi[s]ing agency which grants 
rights and secures access to symbolic power, as well as its antithesis: a power which 
systematically nullifies rights and restricts representation” (232).  It is through invoking the 
state of exception within its own territory that national sovereignty can ratify xenophobia, 
misogyny and homophobia, and ensure that the nation is not a society of equals (Papadopoulis 
and Tsianos 232).  In the politics of representation, then, equal rights do not guarantee the 
possession of “equal symbolic capital” (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 231). 
 
In a world conceptualised according to national territories and dialectical notions of “us” and 
“them,” the movement of people across borders is set to become problematical, as is the 
treatment of migrants once they have settled.  As Said’s earlier quotation indicates, 
immigration policy is, presently, an urgent socio-political issue, one that we will now take up 
as exemplifying some of the ways in which the representationally constructed concepts of race 
and nation function to diminish life and thought today.  As a starting point, Papadopoulis and 
Tsianos illustrate two ways in which the internal ambivalence of national sovereignty affected 
migrants in many European countries from the 1960s to the 1980s: first, where migration has 
been assimilated by way of “Gasterbeit” or temporary employment, migrants have been 
afforded the right to work at the national level, but have not been granted full and equal 
political rights (231).  Then, in countries actively promoting immigration, where migrants have 
been accepted “as an integral part of the national project” and granted political rights, they are 
still subject to racist practices (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 231).  While these migrants had been 
granted passage across the borders that surround the nation, they now found themselves 
enclosed by the state of exception: that power by which the nation-state erects borders within 
its own society, and suspends fair and equitable treatment therein (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 
232).  But let us focus now on the pressures current practices of migration place on national 
borders, and on the nation-state itself.
18
  Stephen Castles outlines the situation concerning 
world migration at the beginning of the 1990s: 
International migration suddenly became a key issue in international politics at the 
beginning of the 1990s, when the breakdown of the bi-polar power constellation of the 
Cold War seemed to have opened the floodgates for vast new population flows.  Right-
wing politicians and sensationalist media conjured up images of welfare states being 
“swamped” and national identities being undermined by mass movements of 
impoverished people from East to West and South to North.  Governments responded 
with tight border restrictions and international control measures ... .  (1143) 
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Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, accelerated globalisation and economic growth in Asia have 
also affected border-crossing mobility, with the numbers of countries involved in migration 
having grown to new levels (Garson and Salt 12).  As Castles notes, ”cross-border population 
mobility is inextricably linked to the other flows that constitute globali[s]ation,” these flows 
moving not only people, but also capital, goods, services, ideas and cultural products (1144, 
1146).  These flows are organised through a variety of transnational networks, including 
intergovernmental organisations, transnational corporations, Non-Governmental 
Organisations and global criminal syndicates (Castles 1146).  Under the conditions of 
globalisation it becomes easier for populations to move, especially since informal networks as 
modes of communication and organisation have increased (Castles 1146-47).  As migrants 
become more diverse, states “do their best to encourage certain types (skilled and 
entrepreneurial migration) and stop others (unskilled labour migration and asylum-seekers) 
but find it hard to make clear distinctions and to enforce rules” (Castles 1146).  The 
complexities of contemporary migration have led to the sense that there is an “immigration 
control crisis” occurring today in many highly developed countries (Sassen 41).  This “crisis” is 
often portrayed by the media as centring upon the issue of illegal immigration, particularly 
with regard to asylum seekers.  Refugee/asylum issues have been the subject of public policy 
debates in many Western countries since the mid-1980s, and have remained a major 
preoccupation up to the present day (Garson and Salt 10, 13).  This preoccupation has led to an 
even greater tightening of entry restrictions and closer policing of borders, which, as 
Papadopoulis and Tsianos note, work to suppress “the autonomy of migration” (234).   
 
The issue of asylum seeking deserves particular attention here, as it serves to augment 
representational thought in some key ways.  One of the more popular asylum countries is 
Australia (Hamlin 12), and we take this country as our focus, bearing in mind that its situation 
is comparable to the “logics of deterrence and border security” that prevail in many Western 
countries, including USA and Canada (Hamlin 12), as well as to the ways in which asylum 
seekers are figured in the United Kingdom (Tyler).  Since the mid-1970s with the first arrivals 
of Vietnamese “boat people,” Australia has experienced several “waves” of asylum seekers: 
approximately 3,000 from China, Vietnam and Cambodia from 1989 to 1993, approximately 
12,000 from predominately Afghanistan and Iraq between 1999 and 2001, and over 9,000 from 
Afghanistan and Sri Lanka between 2008 and 2010 (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114-25).  
Over this time, Australia has been “an extremely reluctant asylum destination,” with a strong 
ethic of control pervading its immigration policies (Hamlin 71).  Among the policies targeting 
asylum seekers is mandatory detention legislation, introduced in 1992 and strengthened in 
1994 to sanction prolonged detention, which includes the mandatory detention of children 
(Coghlan).
19
  Asylum seekers are detained in one offshore facility (on Christmas Island), and in 
several other detention centres around the country, many of which are in remote locations 
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(for example, Curtin in far north Western Australia and Scherger in far north Queensland).  
Australia’s strong stance against asylum seeking was perhaps most famously displayed by 
former Prime Minister John Howard in a situation known as the Tampa affair, when, in August 
2001, his government refused entry to 438 Afghani nationals who had been rescued by the 
Norwegian freighter the MV Tampa (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 115).  The incident caught 
international attention as neither Indonesia nor Norway would accept the refugees, and a 
standoff developed between the ship’s captain and the Australian government (G. Martin).  
Howard held firm, and, with polls showing he had extensive support, the vessel was eventually 
re-routed to an island off Papua New Guinea (G. Martin; Hamlin 75).  Following soon after, the 
Howard government was re-elected, and subsequently introduced a cluster of even more 
restrictive immigration legislation known as the Pacific Solution (Hamlin 75-76).  
Nevertheless, asylum seekers have continued to head toward Australia, with many losing their 
lives at sea and as they approach their destination.  Each time an event is reported concerning 
approaching asylum seekers, intense public, media and political debate arises relating to 
“border control,” and how best to manage the issue of asylum seeking (McKay, Thomas, and 
Kneebone 116).  The “correct” means by which individuals can be granted refugee status in 
Australia is through applying by way of the Australian Humanitarian Programme; if successful, 
applicants are granted refugee status before they arrive in Australia (McKay, Thomas, and 
Kneebone 114).  If individuals arrive without this status already granted, they are designated as 
asylum seekers, also commonly regarded as “queue jumpers,” “bogus, illegals, the unwelcome” 
(Tyler 190)—in other words, “other” to the dominant national identity.  In general, the public 
rhetoric implies that asylum seekers’ claims for refugee status are not legitimate, that they 
pose a threat to national security and that they are engaging in illegal behaviour by not 
following the correct process (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114).  Asylum seekers are placed 
in a detention centre until their case is dealt with, a process that can take several months or 
even years (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114).  During this period the asylum seeker is 
refused the status of “subject-citizen” (Tyler 187), and, within the borders of the detention 
centre (which are often privately run), is excluded from the nation-state’s zone of rights.  As 
the double R axiom of rights and representation is denied, Agamben’s state of exception is 
imposed, keeping the asylum seeker largely invisible to the nation.  The experience of 
indefinite detention in prison-like facilities, removed from the rest of the nation’s population, 
leaves many internees in extreme distress; this despair is often dealt with through the 
infliction of self-harm (Pagliaro), or through attention raising strategies such as riots and the 
burning of detention buildings (see Ralston).   
 
In terms of the underlying structures of representational thought involved in this issue, there 
are several points to be made.  First, as Imogen Tyler argues, identifying an individual as an 
asylum seeker, that is, refusing to recognise her/him as the “same” as us, effectively “shores up 
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the normative fantasy” of what it is to belong to our country (189).  In other words, asylum 
seekers, “by power of their very exceptionality[, allow us] to perceive the social totality of 
Australia as an organic whole” (Buchanan, “August”).  Moreover, it is in producing “the 
imaginary figure of the asylum seeker as an ‘illegal’ threat to ‘our’ sense of national belonging 
that ‘we’ learn to desire and demand ‘their’ exclusion” (Tyler 191).  It is in this representational 
framework, then, that the redefining of asylum seekers as “outside of the sphere of rights, that 
is, as less than human, has come to make ‘sense’” (Tyler 191).  Making sense in this way recalls 
Deleuze’s concept of “common sense,” what ‘everybody knows,” which is one of the linchpins 
of the dogmatic image of thought.  What “everybody knows” in this case is that asylum seekers 
are dangerous—that they pose a threat to our sense of national security.  On this point, 
Deleuzian scholar Ian Buchanan makes a notable argument: “What possible threat can a few 
hundred bedraggled refugees pose to the average Australian citizen?  They are hardly going to 
form a posse and march on Canberra (however much we might want them to)... ” (“August”).  
The possible threat, Buchanan suggests, especially following September 11, “is that there might 
be terrorists mixed in amongst the genuine asylum seekers, no matter how tactically illogical 
the idea is” (“August”).  Buchanan expands: 
If terrorists wanted to get into the country unnoticed they would simply fly in posing 
as rich tourists, or students; once here they might do something unobtrusive like 
flying lessons, or perhaps a short course in inorganic chemistry.  What they wouldn’t 
do is chance an extremely hazardous voyage on a leaky boat across the Indian Ocean, 
which not only risks sinking, but also faces interception either by pirates or the coast 
guard (Indonesian or Australian), and therefore offers what one would think to a 
military mind is an unacceptably low possibility of success.  (“August”) 
Nevertheless, according to the logic of representation, the detention of asylum seekers fixes 
them in place, so as to preclude their movement into “our” realm, a movement that might lead 
to the fearsome result of our own displacement.   
 
In Agamben’s view, though, when individuals are “stripped of every political status,” and are, 
therefore, reduced to what he calls “bare life,” the appropriate reaction is not to remain in 
debates circumscribed by notions of rights; rather, “[i]t would be more honest and, above all, 
more useful to investigate carefully [the] deployments of power by which human beings could 
so completely be deprived of their rights”  (Homo 171).  Put another way, inasmuch as it is the 
dogmatic image of thought that underpins the sovereign power structures figuring the asylum 
seeker as undeserving of rights, it is the image of thought itself that needs addressing.  This 
same image of thought also prefigures the character of ambivalence regarding asylum seeking 
that also occurs in public discourse today: as we have said, there is racism and xenophobia, but 
on the other hand, there are also plentiful humanitarian responses, which are much more 
sympathetic.  But while they may sometimes achieve small gains in terms of enhancing the 
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lives of those involved, humanitarian efforts, overall, are imprinted by the same thought 
structures as xenophobia.  Instead of characterising asylum seekers as “other” to us, 
humanitarian discourses identify them as “like” us, and thus invoke a structure of 
universalisation in speaking for them (Tyler 194-95).  Further, to seek to intervene on behalf of 
asylum seekers is to categorise them as human beings in need of aid, which, it has been 
argued, is a paternalistic approach that utilises a logic of victimisation (Papadopoulis and 
Tsianos 234).  As Tyler points out, “[t]he central paradox facing humanitarian appeals and 
interventions on behalf of asylum seekers is that they conform to the law by situating their 
appeals within the language of the law which they nevertheless contest” (196).  For instance, 
“they depend on the same categories of inclusion/exclusion, authentic/inauthentic, us/them, 
as xenophobic discourses” (Tyler 196).  Discussions or actions that are foreclosed by these 
dialectics fail altogether in disrupting the system that produces the asylum seeker, and leads 
Agamben to claim that “a secret solidarity” exists between humanitarian organisations and 
“the very powers they ought to fight” (Homo 133).  While representational thought’s habits of 
analogy, opposition and identification dominate approaches to asylum seeking, we will not 
experience the individuals involved as nodes of difference in themselves, as asylum seeking 
episodes as singular events calling for singular concepts.  Instead of principles based on rights 
and recognition, perhaps, as Papadopoulis and Tsianos suggest, we need principles of 
becoming in thinking about how migration might proceed (228), or in dismantling the 
categories of race.  If, for D+G, identity is a bereft concept, becoming-other in the context of 
race or migration would perhaps enable “gradual and careful, sometimes painful, 
transformations” of existing bodily constitutions, the realisation of productive desire through 
changes in “bodies, voices, accents, patois, hair, colo[u]r, height, gender, age, biographies” 
(Papadopoulis and Tsianos 228).  This kind of becoming-other offers a rich vein for thought, 




As acknowledged at the beginning of this thesis, it is Deleuze’s view that each historical era, 
including our own, is characterised by a dominant “image of thought” (Deleuze, N 147-48).  So 
far in Part 1 we have focused on demonstrating the continuing prevalence of what Deleuze 
calls the dogmatic image, which refers to the structures of representation that shape our 
understandings of, and habits in, many of life’s present domains.  Under this dogmatic image, 
thought is “the natural exercise of a faculty,” and, for Deleuze, any implicit presupposition that 
there is a “natural” way to think at all amounts to the most general form of representation (DR 
131).  But it is the position of this thesis that, with the complexities of modern society, what it 
means to think today goes beyond the orthodox image.  Certainly, as we have shown, this 
image persists; but it is augmented by another contemporary power process that works to 
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shape and restrict thought’s possibilities.  The force of capital, as we have acknowledged, 
exerts intense pressure in the realm of science, and, with globalisation, is increasingly affecting 
the form of the nation-state.  And, as we shall soon see, with information and digital 
technologies now pervading our procedures for living and thinking, capital becomes even 
more formidable.  Because of capitalism’s import, it is apposite that we now take account of 
how D+G conceptualise this machine.  And, in considering some ways in which capital has a 
direct impact on thought as engaged in by thinking subjects, we establish a segue into the 
second half of Part 1.  We begin with some repetitions.  For D+G, life is the creation of 
difference, or “the actualisation of tendencies to differ” (Colebrook, Understanding 101).  Again, 
as we have said, D+G’s specific term for life’s production of difference is “desire,” or “desiring-
production” (AO 1).  Life as desire, or as flows and productions of difference, occurs in a 
multiplicitous range of expressions: “the movement of people and traffic in a city, the flow of 
words … in a language, the flows of genetic code between generations of plants, and even the 
flow of matter itself (the movement of the ocean, electrons moving in metals, and so forth)” 
(Roffe, “Capitalism” 35).  As D+G put it, desiring-production “is at work everywhere,” and 
when it appears in the field of the social, producing selves, economic systems, or whole 
societies, this is only a particular determination of its overall productive power (D+G, AO 1, 29; 
Colebrook, Understanding 121).  
   
In Anti-Oedipus, D+G make a historical study of desire, and propose that social-production (as 
a determinate instance of desire) has resulted in three broad social formations: primitivism, 
despotism and capitalism.  D+G’s argument is that prior to capitalism, the general function of 
each socius (“socius” meaning “the abstract machine of society” [Massumi, “Users” 75]) has 
been to “codify” or structure the flows of desire: 
The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows of 
desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not 
properly damned up, channel[l]ed, regulated.  (AO 35)   
Primitive societies operate as social machines at the simplest level since bodies come together 
and connect into “tribes” (Colebrook, Understanding 123).  These tribes function by way of 
kinship codes, which are enforced through a codifying system of cruelty: the requirements of 
the socius are marked directly onto bodies.  As D+G explain, the “essence” of the primitive 
socius, insofar as it codifies the productive forces of desire, “resides in these operations: 
tattooing, excising, incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling, and initiating” (AO 
159).  In the history of desiring-production, though, this primitive regime is supplanted by the 
social formation of despotism.  Despotism marks the transition from an immanent to a 
transcendent form of law: “The full body as socius has ceased to be the earth, it has become 
the body of the despot, the despot himself or his God” (D+G, AO 212).  Rather than operating 
by way of a territorial chain of organisation, despotism involves “a power that organises that 
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territory from some position outside or above that territory” (Colebrook, Understanding 124).  
Colebrook explains that the despot rises to this position of higher power due to the production 
of a surplus value of enjoyment: “When the despot looks on and enjoys the marking of bodies, 
a position is generated from within force that seems to govern and order force.  This is the 
beginning of the State …” (Understanding 124).  It is not that primitive, coded flows disappear 
entirely in an externally powerful, despotic regime, but rather that they become “overcoded by 
the transcendent unity that appropriates surplus value” (D+G, AO 213).  For D+G, what counts 
in the transition to despotism is “not the person of the sovereign,” but the change in the social 
machine: 
[I]n place of the territorial machine , there is the “megamachine” of the State that has 
the despot at its apex … . … [This has] the effect of a deterritoriali[s]ation that divides 
the earth as an object and subjects men to the new imperial inscription, to the new 
full body, to the new socius.  (AO 212) 
 
Capitalism, however, in D+G’s account, operates in another way entirely: it is the first social 
machine that does not impose codification as a means of governing flows.  Indeed, capitalism 
rejects coding completely; instead, “it brings about the decoding of the flows that the other 
social formations coded and overcoded” (D+G, AO 267).  In other words, capitalism “liberates 
the flows of desire” (AO 153), and it does this by emptying flows of their specific meanings in 
particular coded contexts (Roffe, “Capitalism” 36).  For example, in a transcendental regime, 
sex is coded according to the laws of marriage, the church, the family, and so on; under (pure) 
capitalism, though, the flow of sexual relations is emptied of its institutional codings (Roffe, 
“Capitalism” 36).  Does this mean that under capitalism anything goes?  That capitalism 
amounts to an absolute decoding, so that flows are altogether free to connect, produce, 
proliferate?  Not necessarily.  For while capitalism “defines a field of immanence and never 
ceases to fully occupy this field[,]” it is also “determined by an axiomatic” (AO 271).  Rather 
than providing an external code that applies to the whole of the social field, capitalism relies 
upon “an axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money” (AO 36, 153); indeed, 
capitalism “[substitutes] money for the very notion of a code” (D+G, AO 36).
20
  Thus, every 
aspect of life under capital is rendered equivalent to the general value of capital, or, as Roffe 
puts it, capitalism is the “law of general equivalence in the form of monetary value” 
(“Capitalism” 36).  For D+G, then, capitalism “axiomati[s]es with one hand what it decodes 
with the other” (AO 267).  To return to the example cited above, capitalism is indifferent to 
the laws around sex that would be enforced by an external authority, but axiomatises sexual 
activity, so that the only thing that matters is its value for producing capital.  The “law” of 
capitalism is the flow of money.  Capitalism is, therefore, the limit of society in its restrictive 
forms, but it is not the absolute limit: “it is the relative limit of every society … because it 
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substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the 
flows in a bound state” (D+G, AO 267).  Colebrook puts it this way: 
Capitalism is a surplus value of flows; anything is allowable and permissible if it can be 
translated into capital flow.  It is not a transcendent State or ideology that subjects 
human life to some overarching code or belief.  It is the immanence of flow.  Any 
practice, technology, knowledge or “belief” can be adopted if it allows the flow of 
capital.  (Understanding 127)   
D+G’s conceptualisation of capital, therefore, provides us with a way of understanding how it 
can function alongside, or underneath, those aspects of thought’s dogmatic image that persist 
in current times.  Capitalism will not displace a system while it can profit from it, or at least 
while the system does not impede the flow of money.  And where a system facilitates this flow, 
as is the case with the network organisation of electronic and information technology culture 
(as we will see), that system will only flourish.  
 
The classical notion of thought as epistemology, as “man” producing knowledge, perseveres in 
contemporary culture—but, as we saw in our discussion of science, such coding tends to 
subsist to the extent that it serves the capitalist machine.  Thought thus conceived has become 
regulated by capital, its worth gauged according to its contribution to the flow of money.  
Reconceptualised as a valuable product, this kind of thought is what D+G call “thought-for-the 
market” (WP 107).  As Lyotard comments, in the late modern world, “[k]nowledge is and will 
be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valori[s]ed in a new 
production: in both cases, the goal is exchange” (4).  As thought/knowledge has become a 
highly valuable kind of property, the circulation and protection thereof have become an 
essential component of capitalism—which brings us to another salient aspect of thought-for-
the market.  The control of thought/knowledge by the regime of intellectual property (IP) is 
one of the primary concerns of the capitalist world today.  Although copyright laws were 
originally introduced in the late 18th century to protect the authors’ rights (Downing 58), 
current IP laws are designed to protect all manner of “intellectual products”—including music, 
inventions, a range of media material, and academic intellectual property.  Steve Cisler notes 
that it is industry and government in the United States that are “the driving forces for the 
strengthening of laws protecting media content, physical products and other intellectual 
property,” and since “technology began flowing out of the US,” the country’s international IP 
laws have become “as much a part of U.S. foreign policy as the war on terrorism” (377, 378).  
Fundamentally, IP laws aim to prevent “the duplication and sale of many counterfeited and 
pirated materials and of the sharing of copyrighted materials without a profit motive” (Cisler 
377), or with an expectation of lowered profit.  Copying and selling cheaply or, worse, giving 
away intellectual property in any form, curtails the flow of capital, which is, of course, 
unacceptable under this power form.  Where it concerns the channelling of (lowered) profits 
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away from larger corporations, intellectual piracy is of an extremely broad nature, as Cisler 
indicates:  
Apart from books, CDs and movies, consider these items: watches, apparel, sparkling 
wine, computer chips, fire extinguishers, guns, golf clubs, cell phones, radios, 
prescriptions drugs, sunglasses, handbags, soaps, snowboards, water pumps, 
cigarettes, perfumes, art and antiques, indigenous art and crafts, identification cards, 
camping gear, automobile and aircraft parts and the Chinese product seized more by 
U.S. Customs than any other: batteries.  Even shoe polish has been counterfeited, and 
in June 2004 the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau seized 12 tons of it in Kigale, 
Rwanda.  (377) 
Some of the time it is the rights of the “individual” creator whose ideas are protected, which 
upholds the tenets of representational thinking.  More often, though, it is the structures of 
capitalism that are safeguarded: under the US “work made for hire” policy, for example, 
copyright of “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” 
rests with the employer (United States).  Other Western countries have similarly restrictive 
policies, and, according to Steven Tepper, such “tight copyright protection” is generally “at 
odds with creativity” (164).  Indeed, creation with one precise goal—to produce profit—rules 
out the potential for thought to operate more positively as a power of difference. 
 
This contemporary cultural anxiety in relation to IP reaches also into the arena of the 
academy, a sphere traditionally related to a more pure form of thinking.  This shift is 
evidenced by former Stanford University president Donald Kennedy’s 1997 statement that 
“intellectual property management [is now] one of the principal duties of the academy” 
(McSherry 2).  Until relatively recently, the university was regarded as “a special site of 
disinterested inquiry, … [located] outside the realm of commodity production and circulation” 
(McSherry 4, 103).  As David Downing explains, “the pivotal function of higher education in 
modern society [was] the protection of a public domain where ideas could be openly 
expressed, shared, and circulated relatively free of capital interests and property laws” (57).  
Academic knowledge production, however, could not remain separate from the capitalist 
axiomatic.  In a general sense, the axiomatisation of academic thought has meant a shrinking 
of the public thought domain due to the pressures of capital (Downing (57); in a more specific 
sense, as “university-industry partnerships proliferate” (McSherry 2), researchers and research 
departments are fostered (or, rather, funded) primarily according to the criteria of commercial 
applicability.  There are at least two outcomes of this reconfiguration of academic work.  First, 
there has been an increase in the economic rationalisation of university faculties, leading to 
merges across departments and cutbacks in courses—especially in areas that are traditionally 
“arts” focused.  Tiziana Terranova and Marc Bousquet see such changes as due to today’s 
universities being subject to “the harsh realities of neoliberal economics: huge volumes of 
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students, extreme levels of performance-geared management, casualisation of employment, 
and the conversion of students into ‘consumers.’”  In such an environment, any truly creative 
thought will be hobbled by the “higher workloads, scarce resources and tighter managerial 
control” that must be maintained in order for the university to contribute to the dispersed 
“social factory” of culture (Terranova and Bosquet).  As Lyotard puts it, “[r]esearch sectors that 
are unable to argue that they contribute even indirectly to the optimi[s]ation of the system’s 
performance are abandoned by the flow of capital and doomed to senescence” (143).  In this 
age of the corporatisation of universities, “academics increasingly must perform on time and 
under budget” (Lash 77), and research will only be recognised if it “corroborates the interests 
of capital”  (Rossiter 170).  The other outcome of the changing definition of academic work 
relates to the notion of academic freedom.  Historically, academic freedom has been linked to 
the idea of an open community of respectful scholars, all working to contribute to a “shared 
knowledge base” (Downing 57, 58).  But as knowledge has become a valuable commodity, 
individual competition and battles over copyright have intensified throughout the academy.  
Indeed, intellectual property has become a question of power (Lash 75), even in the academy.  
This power can be related to academic freedom to the extent that such freedom is now elided 
with intellectual ownership: those “knowledge workers” who have the most academic freedom 
are those who have amassed the most intellectual property (Downing 58; McSherry 3).  In 
other words, the circuits of academic thinking are less about the openness of thought and the 
value of creating the new than they are about the competition to increase one’s intellectual 
property; this building of intellectual property both ensures the flow of capital for the 


















PROBLEM 2:  CONTROL—THOUGHT, INFORMATION, THE DIGITAL 
 
 
Information and networks of control 
 
We have considered representational thought’s epistemological project of building knowledge 
and its relationship to capital; however, it is increasingly the case today that the realm of 
knowledge is being supplemented (some say replaced) by the order of information.  In 
producing intellectual property, the “knowledge workers” referred to above utilise a range of 
electronic technologies, and, as Lyotard notes, in order to fit into these electronic channels, 
knowledge must be “translated into quantities of information” (4).  According to Shunya 
Yoshimi, the form of knowledge that is information has traditionally been regarded as more 
“superficial”: if knowledge is conceived as “stock,” information is more ephemeral “flow,” as in 
“something that circulates from one place to another, but is not necessarily stored anywhere” 
(Yoshimi 272).  From classical times, information has had relevance to knowledge, but was not 
as culturally meaningful as knowledge in the storage bank.  Since the development of 
capitalism, however, information has “assumed a central position in the world of human 
consciousness, rather than being left on the periphery of knowledge as before”  (Yoshimi 272).  
Capitalism’s “systemic requirements of efficiency and exchange” require that knowledge is 
instrumental (Malik 30), and, as Lyotard has emphasised, instrumentalised knowledge is 
information (125). The state of information today has generalised from its 1930s-1940s military 
usages (information as “intelligence”) to more diverse social applications over the latter half of 
the 20th century (Yoshimi 271).  Recently, the term has been understood in a variety of ways, 
depending on the specific context: “as an embodied and material cause (in some genetics), as a 
signal with a transmissible quotient without determinate location or material/embodied 
specificity (in cybertheory), as a statistical quantitative property of a system (in 
communication theory), [or] as an instruction” (Malik 30).  But while information may appear 
to be a somewhat “inconsistent category,” Suhail Malik argues that it is “not incoherent”: “each 
of these determinations of information proposes a rationali[s]ation of the system in question 
into … channels of control and transmission,” which  leads to it being characterised as “a type 
of instrumental rationality, both in its theory and practically” (30-31).  Information, then, 
regardless of the system in which it is functioning or the theoretical field that embraces it, is 
something that is essentially operational.   
 
In specifically cultural terms, the concept of information is connected to late capitalist 
“information societies”—those post-industrial societies that are “centred around services and 
knowledge work, trading and extracting value out of knowledge-as-information” (Terranova, 
“Concept” 287).  As Malik puts it, these are “societies in which information takes a leading role 
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in (de)structuring their economies, knowledges and cultures” (31).  Undoubtedly, 
“[c]ontemporary [Western] culture is manifestly more heavily information laden than any of 
its predecessors” (Webster, “Information Society” 448).  In this contemporary culture, where 
“knowledge society” means “information society,” the concept of information relates to a very 
broad range of areas and practices: 
One may think here of the growth of media technologies (video, cable, television, 
satellite), of advertising (campaigns, posters, placemats), of news and entertainment 
services (from CNN to Al-Jazeera, from DVD movies to computer games), of fashion, 
image, and style, of information-intensive occupations (teaching, accountancy, and 
design, for example), and of the development of education systems around the world.  
(Webster, “Information” 188) 
In Neil Postman’s description, information is “a commodity that can be bought and sold, or 
used as a form of entertainment, or worn like a garment to enhance one’s status.”  Moreover, 
information “comes indiscriminately, directed at no one in particular” (Postman).  The 
ineluctability of information causes Scott Lash to argue that the information society is, overall, 
“an order in which the principle of ‘society’ becomes displaced by the principle of 
‘information’” (75).  As a consequence, for him, information displaces sociality, to the extent 
even that “[s]ocial relations themselves are becoming less a question of sociality than 
informationality” (Lash 75).  In Lash’s view, information can be anything from “[f]ast-moving 
consumer goods and branded consumer products,” to “30-second TV ads[,] quickly 
decomposing installation art[,] database files, J-Pegs and attached text files and software” (3, 
75).  Regardless of what form a unit of information takes, however, several key attributes can 
be identified: “flow, disembeddedness, spatial compression, temporal compression, real-time 
relations,” as well as “quick obsolescence” and “regulation through intellectual property” (Lash 
2, 3).  As Lash observes, pre-informational societies may have revolved around such time-
involved communication-types as narrative, lyric poetry or discourse: discourse, for example, 
encompasses “conceptual frameworks, … serious speech acts, …propositional logic, [and] 
legitimating arguments” (2-3).  But one of information’s principal characteristics is its 
significant compression: information “must be produced pretty much in real time,” and it 
must be abbreviated and “byte-like” in format (Lash 3, 2).  Pre-informational communication-
types such as discourse were, of course, linked to the production of knowledge, but when 
knowledge is replaced by information the ramifications for conscious thought at least are 
significant: 
When knowledge is reduced to information, then consciousness is stripped of its lived 
connection to history, judgement and experience.  What results is the illusion of an 
expanded knowledge society, and the reality of a virtual [in its narrowed, “cybernetic” 
sense] knowledge.  Knowledge, that is, as a tightly controlled medium of cybernetic 
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exchange, where thought has a disease, and that disease is called information.  
(Kroker and Weinstein 23-24) 
 
The omnipresence of information in contemporary life, we are arguing, impacts upon and 
supplements our traditional, dogmatic image of thought.  In addition to representation’s 
limiting of thought, thought is also impacted by the structures and characteristics of 
information, affecting the way it is both conceptualised and engaged in.  Of course, this is not 
automatically a detrimental situation, but we will leave until Part 2 our consideration of some 
ways in which informational (or, better, digitised) thought may add to life’s potential.  For 
now, though, we focus on how this informational turn may influence thought obstructively.  
As noted, Lash points to the compressional aspects of information.  Virilio, too, critiques 
information as a medium of speed and immediacy, in specifying the generalised time of 
“instantaneity” (8).  When geographical distance is eradicated in favour of the screen, Virilio 
points out, so are the delays associated with journeys and the successivities of concrete 
experiences:  “in the age of the transmission revolution everything comes straight in, arrives 
immediately, [giving] a general absence of delay, instantaneity of information and the 
development of that interaction which surpasses any action, any concrete act” (127).  When 
information from anywhere is immediately accessible, when all interactions can take place 
instantly, time is compressed absolutely.  In Virilio’s words, “here no longer exists, everything 
is now” (116; italics removed), which also means we exist in a kind of “perpetual present” (125).  
This speeding up of reality has considerable consequences for time-as-duration, or our 
concrete experience of time as an open-ended becoming: “[t]he acceleration of real time … not 
only dispels geographical extension, … but, first and foremost, it dispels the importance of the 
longues durées of the local times of regions” (Virilio 118).  For Virilio, this defying of “the very 
truth of all durée” provokes “the acceleration of all reality; of things, living beings, [and] socio-
cultural phenomena” (117).  We can also look at this compression of time from a more 
Deleuzian perspective: as we have indicated, Deleuze’s notion of time draws upon the work of 
Bergson, who conceives of time “as a whole, as a pure duration, in which each instant has its 
place” (T. May, “When” 145).  For Bergson, the whole of the past exists in the present, and is 
connected to the future, in the totality he calls the virtual.  In Leen De Bolle’s explanation, the 
virtual past accompanies the present “as a character accompanies the person” (140), and the 
present interpenetrates the future.  If time is accelerated to the extent that it cannot be 
experienced as duration, there is no room for the impact of the virtual—no time for the vast 
potentiality of the whole of time-as-difference to reveal itself.  This is to restrict thinking to 
the realm of sameness.  In Virilio’s parlance, the speed of cybernetic interactivity “outstrips 
any time of thought” (124).  In other words, the kinds of thought that are related to duration 
and the virtual are disallowed—their time is gone; the kind of thought that can take place is 
limited to the instantaneous production and exchange of information.  Italian media theorist 
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Berardi puts forth a related view when he argues that because “we cannot replicate the insane 
speed of the hypercomplex digital machine,” we are now “tending to become the ruthless 
executors of decisions taken inattentively” (“Schizo-Economy” 83).  Moreover, because our 
attention is so besieged, neither do we have the time for “love, tenderness, nature, pleasure 
and compassion,” a state of affairs that, Berardi argues, is leading to an increase in “pathologies 
in the affective and emotional spheres” (“Schizo-Economy” 83, 78).  Berardi explains this 
problematic in the context of contemporary capitalism:  
If you want to survive you have to be competitive; if you want to be competitive you 
have to be connected—you have to continually receive and process an immense and 
growing mass of data.  This provokes constant attention stress and a reduction in the 
time available for affectivity.  These two closely linked tendencies spell devastation for 
the human psyche.  Depression, panic, anxiety, a sense of solitude, existential misery.  
(“Schizo-Economy” 84).   
Although the human psyche does not correspond exactly to Deleuze-Guattarian thought, it is 
certainly implicated in what thought can do.  Beradi’s concerns resonate, too, with Stiegler’s 
notion of a “disaffected” population, whereby he claims that “[o]ur epoch does not love itself.  
And a world which does not love itself is a world which does not believe in the world” 
(“Disaffected”).  Indeed, D+G pronounce the problem of “believing in this world, in this life” as 
“our most difficult task”; this is not the task of believing “in the existence of the world[,] but in 
its possibilities of movements and intensities” (WP 74).  True thought, as movements and 
intensities, is one way to approach this task, but there are many aspects of informationalism 
that will hold it back.   
 
Another salient issue in relation to information and thought concerns the role of meaning.  
Whilst lay opinion may suppose information to carry specific meanings, in the strict 
“information theory” terms of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, information “must not be 
confused with meaning” (Webster, “Information” 187).  For Shannon and Weaver, information 
is “a [mathematically tractable] quantity which is measured in ‘bits’ and defined in terms of 
the probabilities of occurrence of symbols” (Webster, “Information” 187).  Terranova explains, 
though, that while the Shannon-Weaver conception of information originally served the 
telecommunications industry and its military associations, information theory has broadened 
to refer generally to “communication as a material process that technological development 
latched onto and reinvented” (“Communication” 56).  The starting point of information 
theory, according to Terranova, is “that information can only be defined as a ratio of signal to 
noise” (“Communication” 56).  As Terranova notes, for information to flow (be communicated 
or transmitted), interference (noise) must be minimised: “[a] clear channel is the basic 
condition of the communication act inasmuch as the aim of communication is the creation of 
a contact that allows a message (regardless of its meaning) to get through” (“Communication” 
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56).  In an informational milieu, then, meaning—in the representational sense—loses 
significance.  Instead, “what counts is the preservation of the message/signal through all the 
different permutations that such a message/signal is liable to undergo” (Terranova, 
“Communication” 58).  Put another way, “what matters is the endurance of the information to 
be communicated, its power to survive, as signal or pattern, all possible corruptions by noise” 
(Terranova, “Communication” 58).  Significantly, Terranova further proposes that in the 
information age, “information managers” understand the dynamics of information, and utilise 
a “strategy of amplification,” in an “attempt to control the scene of communication by sheer 
power, by seizing control and monopoli[s]ing the infosphere” (60).  In this context, the public, 
as targets of information, are not expected to think through the information they receive, but, 
rather, to be affected/controlled by its abundance and force.  As Webster points out, such a 
milieu fosters “uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety,” since the sheer amount of (often 
conflicting) information leads to the abandonment of any hope of holding onto convictions 
(“Information” 187).  
 
In his filmed lecture, “What is the Creative Act?”, Deleuze also considers the limits to the 
semantic dimension of information in contemporary culture (TRM 312-24).  As Mark Bonta 
and John Protevi explain, while D+G may seem to regard information as the “content of 
messages,” information thus understood is not transported “from one consciousness to 
another,” and is of an extremely qualified nature (100).   For Deleuze, information has a 
strategic function in “the system of control”:  
What is information?  It is not very complicated, everyone knows what it is.  
Information is a set of imperatives, slogans, directions—order-words.  When you are 
informed, you are told what you are supposed to believe.  In other words, informing 
means circulating an order-word.  Police declarations are appropriately called 
communiqués.  Information is communicated to us, they tell us what we are supposed 
to be ready to, or have to, or be held to believe.  …  Let’s say that is what information 
is, the controlled system of the order-words used in a given society.  (Deleuze, TRM 
320-21) 
In D+G’s philosophy, the order-word is “the elementary unit of language” or, rather, “a 
function coextensive with language” (ATP 76).  Information as order-words contains a “strict 
minimum” of meaning, since it functions only “to [give] life orders” (D+G, ATP 76).  Therefore, 
as Mark Hansen puts it, paraphrasing Deleuze, in its purest theoretical form, information can 
only provide “a mechanical surrogate for thought” (“Cinema” 55).  Information hereby 
provides an “existential imperative” which leads to an “incorporeal transformation” (Massumi, 
User’s 33).  Massumi explains further this imperative function of information’s semantic 
content:   
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“Order” should be taken in both senses: the statement gives an order (commands) and 
establishes an order (positions bodies in a force field).  The order-word culminates 
transformations that place the concerned body or bodies in a position to carry out 
implicit obligations or follow a preset direction.  (User’s 31) 
For Deleuze, “information [as order-words] is exactly the system of control” in contemporary 
society (TRM 321).  And what, specifically, is the [limited] content of this information under 
capitalism?  What are we compelled to think, and, and therefore, to do?  If the “essence of 
capitalism functions or ‘speaks’ only in the language of signs imposed on it by merchant 
capital or by the axiomatic of the market” (D+G, AO 241), the answer is straightforward: buy, 
consume, compete, trade, produce, work, live: only to contribute to the flow of capital.  Marks 
offers “the ubiquity of the ‘mission statement’ in contemporary business and institutional 
culture” as one particular instance of this kind of informational control, to the extent that it 
equates to being told what to think by the corporation (“Information” 210).  The all-
pervasiveness of advertising and the circulation of brands and consumer goods can also be 
regarded as instances of order-word-style information.  In a specific comment upon Deleuze’s 
view of the practice of thought in the informational age, Rajchmann describes the current 
situation as “a retreat of thought back into transcendence, reformulated as ‘communication’ or 
‘information’” (141).  Further interpreting Deleuze, Rajchmann expresses this version of 
transcendence as “a new enemy of thought, more insolent and self-assured than those of the 
last century—a communicational stupidity” (11).  Information, in the form of the minimalistic 
order-word, as a kind of transcendence, then, suggests a newly emerged image of thought: 
informationalism.  As for the communication of this information, it is disseminated not from 
the top down, as in earlier, “sovereign,” or “disciplinary” social formations (Deleuze, N 177), but 
more by way of a sprawling, flexible network.  Rajchmann warns, however, “we shouldn’t 
believe that the new ideas of ‘flexibility’ (in contrast to ‘top-down’ organi[s]ation) are there to 
save us; on the contrary, we must identify the new kinds of ‘control’ … that they bring with 
them” (166n34).   
 
In taking up Rajchmann’s recommendation that we identify the new kinds of control 
associated with the societal structure within which thought-as-information flows, a useful 
starting point is Terranova’s description of the overall cartography of network culture.  She 
draws upon Hardt and Negri’s proposal that the new, open space of the communication 
network constitutes a new form of “Empire”: 
The communication topology of Empire is complex as it is woven together by 
aeroplanes, freight ships, television, cinema, computers and telephony, but what all 
these different systems seem to have in common is their convergence on the figure 
not simply of the network, but of a kind of hypernetwork, a meshwork potentially 
connecting every point to every other point.  As such, the network is becoming less a 
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description of a specific system, and more a catchword to describe the formation of a 
single and yet multidimensional information milieu—linked by the dynamics of 
information propagation and segmented by diverse modes and channels of 
circulation.  (Terranova, Network 41) 
In Hardt and Negri’s terms, this concept of Empire expresses the emergence of a “new form of 
sovereignty,” one that befits the global, informational age (xi).  The defining features of 
Empire sovereignty are its boundlessness and its inclusivity: “[Empire] is a decentred and 
deterritoriali[s]ing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm 
with its open, expanding frontiers” (Hardt and Negri, Empire xii).  Whereas previous forms of 
imperialist expansion may have operated by way of destruction, Hardt and Negri’s Empire is 
driven by the principle of incorporation: “when it expands, this new sovereignty does not 
annex or destroy the other powers it faces but on the contrary opens itself to them, including 
them in the network” (166).  There seems nothing beyond Empire’s powers of expansion or 
control, since the network effectively regulates all kinds of divergences.  Deleuze describes the 
control of the expansive network society as “snake”-like, since it “undulates” in a “continuous 
and unbounded” manner (N 180-81).  The particular mechanism of dispersive control, for 
Deleuze, is a constant, interactive system of checkpoints or “codes,” which indicate “whether 
access to some information should be allowed or denied” (N 180).  As Massumi puts it, “[h]ere 
the figure of power is no longer the billy club of the policeman, it’s the barcode or the PIN 
number” (“Navigating” 228).  Stating it another way, Massumi proposes that control society 
functions by way of a process of “gatekeeping”:  
It’s all about checkpoints.  At the grocery store counter, the barcode on what you’re 
buying checks the object out of the store.  At the automatic bank teller, the PIN 
number on your card checks you into your account.  [These checks] … lie in wait for 
you at key points.  … You’re free to move … [but to] continue on your way you have to 
pass the checkpoint.  …  [This is] a highly localised, partial exercise of power—a 
micro-power.  (“Navigating” 228-29) 
Continuous assessments in schools and never-ending performance reviews in workplaces 
(including the academy) are further examples of this execution of control through constant 
monitoring, as is the deployment of inescapable surveillance technologies.  On this last point, 
Virilio sees the information age as having brought about “a new type of panoptical control”: 
web-cams, “tele-surveillance,” and the interactivity of multi-media networks create a highly 
visible and transparent set of living conditions, so that we are currently subject to a “revolution 
of generali[s]ed snooping” (58-62).  In other terms, this cybernetic panopticon can be described 
as “the globali[s]ation of the gaze of the single eye” (Virilio 65; italics removed).  Similarly, 
Mark Poster coins the term “superpanopticon” to describe this cybernetic form of control, 
since it is “a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or guards” (Mode 93).  
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Coming back to Massumi’s reference to pin numbers and barcodes, though, we also return to 
the significance of capitalism in the functioning of informational, control societies.  In his 
essay “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze makes several key points in this regard, the 
strongest of which relates to the passage from nineteenth century factory-based capitalism to 
the age of business.  In Hardt and Negri’s terms, “the informationi[s]ation of industry” has led 
to “the assembly line [being] replaced by the network as the organi[s]ational model of 
production” (Empire 294, 295).  When structured in horizontal networks, production becomes 
effectively “deterritorialised,” meaning that the “manipulation of knowledge and information” 
is not restricted by any territorial or physical constraints (Hardt and Negri, Empire 294-95).  In 
this context, capitalism becomes even freer to flow: geographical proximity between workers is 
irrelevant, as is any distance between producer and consumer (Hardt and Negri, Empire 295-
96).  Moreover, for Hardt and Negri, when transactions become more immediate, the flow of 
information/capital is intensified, and when production nodes can be located anywhere, 
labouring populations become more insecure in their employment, and therefore more 
controllable (Empire 296-97).  In Deleuze’s view, these “labouring populations” are no longer 
focusing on early stage production, which is often relegated to the Third World, but, instead, 
on “metaproduction” (N 181).  He explains: 
[Capitalism] no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells finished products: it 
buys finished products or assembles them from parts.  What it seeks to sell is services, 
and what it seeks to buy, activities.  It’s a capitalism no longer directed toward 
production but toward products, that is, toward sales or markets.  (N 181) 
Deleuze further notes that in capitalism today a business’ sales department has becomes its 
centre or “soul”—an occurrence he finds “terrifying” (N 181).  With marketing at the helm of 
present day business, the accurate targeting of consumers is crucial.  Therefore, collecting 
“information on people’s patterns and tastes” becomes a primary goal, one that is taken care of 
by the system of checks we are subject to: 
The checkpoint system allows information to be gathered at every step you take.  
You’re providing a continuous feed, which comes back to you in advertising pushing 
new products, new bundlings of potential.  … Your everyday movements and leisure 
activities have become a form of value-producing labour.  …  Life movements, capital 
and power become one continuous operation—check, register, feed-in, processing, 
feedback, purchase, profit, around and around.  (Massumi, “Navigating” 229-30)  
As Berardi describes it, “[t]he human body and mind are caught in a permanent circuit of 
electrocution; they are now part of an integrated circuit of information” (“Technology” 63).  
     
The implications for thought of this circuitous checkpoint system is that it does not go beyond 
the information that is the system’s motor: information about ourselves that we plug into the 
system, and information such as pin numbers that we have to remember in order to function 
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in the system.  To think in such a network is to contribute and trade in information that will 
enhance the system, and to be aware that whenever we do not think in this way, we will block 
the flow of information/capital and be left out of the feedback loop.  The order-word is clear: 
feed the system that feeds you by processing and contributing compressed bits of/to the flow 
of information; let capitalism do the thinking.  In this system “the complexity of the socius” is 
simplified and made manageable “by compressing variations in tastes, timetables, and 
orientations” and making them move “to the rhythm of market expansions and contractions” 
(Terranova, Network 35).  There is no room for the thought of pure difference—such events 
are becomings too singular to be of interest to the market.  This phase of control, according to 
Berardi, is beyond formal and real capitalist subsumption: it is capitalism “imprinted on the 
collective intelligence, inside the techno-social interfaces, in the semiotic framework of social 
communications” (“Response”).  With the permeation of every social space by the networks of 
control it is increasingly difficult to find the ways and means to enter a creative, differing 
thought.  The typical family home, for instance, is now fully charged with informational 
technologies, making it a space heavily “populated by voices, by images, by sounds, by ideas, 
by games, by colo[u]rs, by news” (Castells, High 18).  Massumi further explains how such 
technologies work in/through the home: 
The around-the-clock access to the home by communication technologies (mail 
delivery, telephone and answering machine, fax, e-mail, radio, TV) opens wide its 
codings to high-volume and highly random passage, of signs if not of human bodies.  
In spite of the locks on the door, the event-space of the home must be seen as … a 
regime of openness to sign circulation—to the delivery, absorption, and relay of 
sounds, words, and visions … .  (Parables 85). 
All elements of society—individuals, families, workplaces, transport modes, leisure activities 
and spaces—are technologically enmeshed in the network, to the extent that we are rarely not 
taken up by the flows (of images, information, commodities, money) (Massumi, Parables 87).  
The network itself “can no longer be ignored as a global power formation in its own right,” and 
this power formation goes by the name of capitalism, since capital is the only flow-form that 
“traverses every event-space and piggy-backs every intervallic body without exception” 
(Massumi, Parables 88). 
 
The media: capitalist thought in transmission  
 
In dealing with networks of control and their impacts upon thought we simply cannot 
overlook the role of the media, a component of the information era that D+G view with great 
aversion.  Because of the hegemony of media systems in contemporary life, Lash proclaims 
that “the information society is just as much and perhaps more accurately labelled ‘the media 
society”” (65).  The concept of “media” has moved through several stages—from “a broad sense 
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of the middle” in the 16th century, to today’s commonplace notion that media encompasses 
“the process of dissemination, or circulation, of information by means of some particular 
channel of communication” (Morley 211, 212).  In recent decades the idea of media has come to 
refer chiefly to the “‘communication media’ and the institutions and organisations in which 
people work (the press, cinema, broadcasting, publishing and so on) and the cultural and 
material products of those institutions” (Lister et al 10).  As John Thompson puts it, “when we 
use the term ‘communication media’ we often think of a … specific set of institutions and 
products: we think of books, newspapers, television and radio programmes, films, tapes, 
compact discs and so on” (24).  Of these, newspapers, television, radio, and any form of widely 
published/broadcast journalism/opinion are typically categorised as “mass media,” a term 
which first gained usage in the 1930s (McQuail, “Origins” 13).  An agreed definition of the mass 
media is difficult to come by, but Janowitz’s early description remains useful: mass media is 
the system “by which speciali[s]ed … groups employ technological devices (press, radio, films, 
etc.) to disseminate symbolic content to large heterogeneous and widely dispersed audiences” 
(Janowitz 41).  The beginnings of the mass media as we know it can be traced to the early 
1800s, when, with technological developments in the printing industry and rising rates of 
urban population and literacy, the newspaper industry grew into a broad-scale commercial 
operation (J. Thompson 76-77).  That other stalwart of mass media, broadcasting, developed a 
little later—radio in the 1920s and television in the late 1940s (J. Thompson 79).  For John 
Thompson, the early stages of broadcasting occurred in a framework of power that involved, 
on the one hand, “the commercial interests of the media industries,” and, on the other, 
governmental attempts to “regulate, cultivate and control [this] new media” (79).  Of course, 
by now society is deeply capitalistic and, accordingly, capitalist systems and ideologies 
ultimately determine the content and processes of mass media activities.  James Curran 
suggests that it may be argued that media producers do this unconsciously (77); it is difficult 
to deny, though, that under neoliberalism the drive for capital is largely overt: 
In sum, the dominant media firms are quite large businesses; they are controlled by 
very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by owners 
and other market[/]profit-oriented forces; and they are closely interlocked, and have 
important common interests with other major corporations, banks, and government.  
This is [a] powerful filter that will affect news choices.  (Herman and Chomsky 14) 
In Ben Bagdikian’s view, the increased concentration of media ownership over the past few 
decades has led to a “[p]rivate [m]inistry of [i]nformation,” involving a corporate control of 
narrowed media content (1-9).  A key figure in this concentration of ownership is Rupert 
Murdoch, whose media control is so extensive that Daya Kishan Thissu calls the general 
process by which media power has shifted from the public to private/multinational/ 





Undoubtedly, the media of mass communication is currently undergoing revision with the 
growth of electronic and digital media technologies—technologies we will address forthwith.  
But radio, printed newspapers and television continue to assail public consciousness, 
generating abundant profits for media corporations, and so we remain, for now, with these 
formats.  In considering how these media affect thought today, we begin with the content 
presented by the mass media system, which is to say, the messages that are transmitted “from 
the few to the many” (Morley 212)—remembering, of course, that in an informational milieu 
this content will be of a limited nature.
22
  We have already noted Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky’s position that the commercial nature of the large media organisations will affect the 
content of information they present to viewers/readers/listeners—and this is in spite of the 
fact that, from a normative perspective at least, the media purport to offer “value-free, 
balanced and independent” reportage (Lowes 163).  Put simply, “it is not in the interests of a 
profit-seeking corporation to give a platform to people and ideas that represent its antithesis” 
(Lowes 163).  David Lowes offers the following examples of contemporary mass media bias 
towards the preferred meanings of capitalism: 
The state and corporately owned media have neither questioned the thesis that the 
process of globali[s]ation is pursued primarily on behalf of the poor, nor publici[s]ed 
the existence of viable alternatives and analyses.  The effects of free-trade agreements 
on national sovereignty, corporate profits and the living and working standards of 
those who sell their labour-power in developing countries receive similarly scant 
attention.  Media managers, editors and journalists present information about 
“celebrities,” stock markets and the activities of politicians as news, while protest and 
direct action are marginali[s]ed and distorted.  (163) 
In order to test Lowes’ claim in the final sentence above, we survey a 44 page, June 2007 issue 
of the Rupert Murdoch owned, national daily Australian broadsheet, The Australian.  Whilst 
the broadsheet newspaper format generally connotes a more serious, “intellectual”—and, by 
extension, less biased—level of reportage than that of a tabloid, an informal count of the 
number of pages containing any items relating to Lowes’ categories above reveals the 
following: 
        Category  Number    
of pages 
Celebrities (including  
sporting celebrities) 
  
  11 
Stock markets    9 
Politicians’ 
activities 
  13 
Protest      2 
Direct action     0 
 
Table 1 
Survey of content in The Australian, 8 June, 2007  
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We carry out this exercise, not as a rigorous piece of quantitative research, but as an informal 
spot-check of Lowes’ statement.  This particular newspaper issue provides a good test of his 
claim, since the 2007 world G8 (Group of 8 largest economies) Summit—usually accompanied 
by well-organised protests and direct action events—was in its third day at the resort of 
Heiligendamm, Germany.  In this issue of the Australian, the summit receives two favourable 
articles and one large, approbatory photograph—all placed top and centre on the page (11).  
The only item reporting G8 counter-activities is positioned to the side of the page and 
accompanied by a much smaller, decidedly neutral image.
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  The paper’s only other (small) 
article concerning any kind of protest relates to a new coalmine planned for Australia’s Hunter 
Valley region; here, too, the protest is neutralised, or even negated: first, by the article’s 
headline, “Coalmine Wins Approval Despite Protests,” and also by its final pro-economic 
position (6).  This issue of the paper reports no direct action activities, but, as the table shows, 
considerable space is allocated to political events and stockmarket matters.  Further, when 
pages that feature sporting stars are counted, the number of celebrity pages overall rivals what 
one might expect from a tabloid publication.  In general, then, it seems that this mini-survey 
upholds Lowes’ argument regarding the strict selection criteria.   
 
According to eminent mass communication theorist Denis McQuail, the skewing of content 
discussed by Lowes is easily explained by the logic of capital: 
The main imperative on the media institution, stemming mainly from commercial 
motives, is for each channel to maximi[s]e the attention it receives under conditions 
of relentless competition (for audience and advertising income).  The working 
assumption of media is that attention is best gained by appealing to sensation and 
human interest.  The grooming of media “stars” and “personalities,” on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the intense focus on prominent human beings and dramatic 
or exciting events and spectacles are the agreed means to gain attention.  (“Origins” 
13)   
As Arjen Mulder puts it, “[i]f an event is to appear in the media—to become infotainment—it 
must meet the criteria of topicality and entertainment” (“Media” 292-93).  The result is that 
the “[d]istinctions between entertainment and news [become] artificial because they are all 
part of the same media spectacle, interspersed with the same advertisements in a seamless, 
everpresent montage” (Gamson et al 387).
24
  It is also important to note also that the media’s 
emphasis on “commercial messages,” along with “the focus on entertainment,” amounts to a 
powerful kind of censorship:  
[I]nformation is controlled or mediated in a manner that influences the expectations 
of people, setting limits on what they see as possible and providing trivial subject 
matter as the basis for social interaction.  (Lowes 163) 
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In a commerce-based culture, media content tends toward entertainment, amusement and 
escapism, and, to a large extent, can be regarded as “superficial, undemanding and conformist, 
… derivative and standardi[s]ed” (McQuail, McQuail’s Mass 106).  This controlling of what 
matters is well illustrated through another 2007 example: the media coverage of celebrity hotel 
heiress Paris Hilton’s spell in and release from jail.  In June 2007, Hilton served a three-week 
jail sentence (reduced from forty-five days) for driving on a suspended licence, thus violating a 
parole relating to an earlier traffic conviction.  Hilton’s incarceration “ignited a worldwide 
media frenzy and debate about celebrity justice” (“Paris Hilton Leaves”), and when, a few days 
into her sentence, she was released into home detention—only to be sent straight back to jail 
by her sentencing judge—the item made the top five of all stories covered across five major 
sectors of the US media (including newspaper, internet, radio, network and cable TV outlets) 
for the entire week (Jerkowitz).  Significantly, this occurred in what Journalism.org (a non-
partisan research organisation providing on-going analysis of the US news agenda) described 
as “a very crowded news week,” with many “weighty events” (Jurkowitz).  The Hilton story 
took precedence over such issues as the war in Iraq, the G8 Summit, and congressional 
corruption matters (“PEJ”).  Hilton’s final release from prison also sparked high levels of 
reportage—although one US journalist did attempt to take an oppositional stance to the 
Hilton hysteria.  Mika Brzezinski, co-presenter of cable news channel MSNBC’s early news 
programme, simply refused to lead the bulletin with the Paris Hilton story, and so “screwed 
up, shredded and attempted to set fire to the script on air” (“Presenter”).  Her efforts to veto 
Hilton can be regarded as having been nullified, however, by the intervention of her two male 
co-hosts, who made good entertainment out of Brzezinski’s attempts by humorously goading 
her as she tried to make her point (“Mika”).  While the news item was not read, Hilton 
certainly received plenty of exposure through the antics of Brzezinski’s co-hosts, and Hilton’s 
release still received optimal coverage across other new sources.  Indeed, when Hilton gave her 
first post-jail interview on CNN’s “Larry King Live,” she drew 3.2 million viewers (three times 
the programme’s usual audience [“Paris Hilton Interview”]).  Such ratings provide evidence of 
the power of trivial subject matter in the media.  This example also points to the particular 
potency of television, a medium that “can count on the [wide] accessibility of the necessary 
technology (the TV set) and on the high impact of images and sounds broadcast in real time”  
(Terranova, Network 41).  As Terranova points out, “from local and national broadcasting 
channels to satellite TV such as CNN and Al-Jazeera,” television has the reach and power “to 
capture the passions of the global masses” (Terranova, Network 41).  But the spread of the 
televisual message amongst diverse audiences does not equate to the spread of a thought 
enabling of difference: even Marshall McLuhan, who privileges television as a medium that, 
above all, “demands a creatively participant response,” acknowledges that television is 
fundamentally homogenising, in the sense that it addresses a “homogenised consumer” (368, 
253).   
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For D+G, the entertainment and consumerist focus of media has grave ramifications for our 
ability to engage with real thought.  To begin with, although such media may have a high 
impact in terms of (spectacular) images and sounds, Deleuze points out that the full force of 
an event can never be relayed: 
I don’t think the media have much capacity or inclination to grasp an event.  In the 
first place, they often show a beginning or end, whereas even a short or instantaneous 
event is something going on.  And then, they want something spectacular, whereas 
events always involve periods when nothing happens.  (N 159-60) 
The media cannot capture D+G’s events since events always involve something incorporeal: 
“an event is not a particular … happening itself [, but rather] the potential immanent within a 
particular confluence of forces” (Stagoll, “Event” 87).  Events involve the virtual, and as such, 
“carry no determinate outcomes” (Stagoll, “Event” 88).  The media’s transmission of spectacles 
simply cannot access this positive dynamism.
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  Guattari adds that “information filtered 
through the massmedia industry […] retains only a description of events and never 
problemati[s]es what is at stake, in its full amplitude” (GR 263).  For D+G, there is a crucial 
relationship between thought, in terms of the creation of concepts, and events (as we will see 
in Part 2), which means that the media’s ignorance of the event is highly consequential.  As 
Patton explains, real engagement with the event “orient[s] political thought and action”; this 
“enables us to become conscious of processes and forces at work in the present, those we 
might seek to advance as well as those we might oppose” (“World” par. 2).  Rather than 
engaging with events, the media, for Deleuze, is simply full of “conversations”: it raises “no 
questions, no problems” (Gilles).  Television is particularly deleterious for thought: in 
Deleuze’s view, it is “an all-purpose medium that’s an offence to all thinking” (N 154).  He 
further explains: “If one sees the usual level [of] television, even in supposedly serious 
broadcasts,” it is replete with questions such as “‘what do you think of this?’ [which] does not 
constitute a problem, but a demand for one’s opinion” (Gilles).  Sociologist Sherry Turkle 
concurs, stating that in media culture people base their thoughts on “what everyone else 
thinks.  But we learn what everyone else thinks by reading [or viewing] highly polarised 
opinions that encourage choosing sides rather than thinking things through” (“I’ll Have” 49).  
For D+G, opinion bears little relationship to real thought, since the “essence of opinion is will 
to majority,” and, in contemporary life, this coincides with the “perceptions and affections of 
the capitalist himself [sic]” (WP 146).  Put another way, opinion is nothing more than 
reductive generalisation (Colebrook, Gilles 16).  In the words of Italian sociologist Franco 
Ferrarotti, television "defrauds us of real human knowledge and participation, one which is 
unpredictable and dramatic" (32), which is to say, television deprives us of the experience of 
thinking difference.  Of course, television’s (as well as other media’s) use of advertising is the 
most overtly restrictive media practice in this regard, inasmuch as it is specifically geared 
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towards producing capital.  In the regime of advertising even the audience is the product, to 
the extent that when advertisers’ funds pay for programmes, they demand a “quality” audience 
in terms of “buying power” (Herman and Chomsky 16).  The influence of advertisers also has a 
major impact on content: “[p]rojects unsuitable for corporate sponsorship tend to die on the 
vine.  … [S]tations have learned to be sympathetic to the most delicate sympathies of the 
corporations” (“Arts” 110).  For example, corporate advertisers will usually decline to sponsor 
programmes that include any “serious criticisms of corporate activities, such as the problem of 
environmental degradation, the workings of the military-industrial complex, or corporate 
support of and benefits from Third World tyrannies” (Herman and Chomsky 17).  So as to 
serve their advertisers, programmers strive to create and maintain a “buying mood” by 
offering, again, light and entertaining content (Herman and Chomsky 17). The directive to 
think in particular ways is clear: buy, consume, do not problematise, do not engage in thought 
outside of capital.
26
  And when advertisers promote their more earnest side in claiming it is 
they (not philosophers) who foster creative thinking through their invention of advertising 
“concepts,” Deleuze is aghast—disputing the contribution made to true thought by “the 
concept of a brand of noodles” (Gilles).  As we have already noted, in Stiegler’s estimation, 
such a “thought-less” society is also a society without love, for “to love” has become 
synonymous with “to buy” (“Disaffected”).  The effects of consumption-channelled thought 
upon familial love particularly disturb Stiegler, who sees that parents today are induced to buy 
for, rather than love, their children: 
[P]arents incited … to consume more and more by the combined power of television, 
radio, newspapers, advertising campaigns, junk mail, editorials, and political speeches, 
all speaking only of boosting levels of consumption … find themselves expelled from a 
position where they could love their children truly, practically, and socially.  
(“Disaffected”) 
Stiegler thus sees “the poison of hyperconsumption”—fuelled in particular by the “hard drug” 
of television—as responsible for much suffering today (“Disaffected” 2-3). When consumption 
becomes an addiction it also becomes pathological, the prevalence of which is a sure 
impediment to any positive movement of thought-as-creation. 
 
Approaching the issue from a different angle, media theorists David Altheide and Robert Snow 
claim that all media and formats are underpinned by a forceful kind of "media logic."  
Regardless of the specific format, all media utilise and promote a logic (way of 
communicating, way of seeing) that, due to the pervasiveness of media, has become the logic 
of "'normalised' social life" (Altheide and Snow 12).  Because "media logic is so incorporated 
into contemporary society … media professionals and the public take for granted that 'seeing' 
social phenomena through media logic is 'normal'" (236).  The result of adopting a media logic 
is that "people have effectively developed a [restrictiveness of] consciousness that affects how 
 88 
they perceive, define and deal with their environment" (Altheide and Snow 16).  This accounts 
for Herbert Schiller’s broad summation that the media are the key element in an “organic 
process by which the corporate ‘voice’ is generali[s]ed across the entire range of cultural 
expression” (44).  From Ferrarotti’s perspective, the mass media preclude any deep experience 
of the everyday because such a consciousness "requires time, a taste for details, sharpness of 
sight, … a nose for dark corners and byways, a sense of touch, openness and availability to 
what is new and unexpected" (2).  The "technological imperatives" and "mental habits" of a 
mass mediated culture mean that we are constantly subject to a logic based on the sameness 
of media imagery, and are simply "unable to cope with meaningful discontinuities" (Ferrarotti 
2).  Ferrarotti's summation of the impact of mass media forms—television in particular—is 
that it strips away singularity and difference (77-78).  He writes: 
In an age dominated by the mass media and their logic, [difference] slackens and 
clouds over.  …  [The mass media] have simply emptied out the problem of the 
relation between history and the everyday, power and the masses, by flattening 
everything; they have made it harder to distinguish, in the undifferentiated quantity 
of information, what counts and what is important from what is less so, or not at all.  
In this sense they have built a wall of apparent plausibility, … which scantifies and 
immortali[s]es existing social and political conditions.  (79)   
In his account, Lash describes the logic of television as an informational logic, and 
information, as a type of "material culture," is distinguishable "from other cultural contents 
through its duration, its temporality" (68-69).  As with all information, Lash contends that 
television's primary characteristic is its real time, instantaneous modality (69).  Since one 
corollary of information's immediacy is its short-lived-ness (information is only valid for a very 
short time [72-73]), the informational bits that are characteristic of television—"news, sporting 
events, soap operas, comedy—decline quickly in value after they are transmitted" (Lash 69).  
Newspapers, too, are informational to the extent that they present information, "bits"/"bytes" 
of culture, in real time, and because information-value does not endure, new information must 
be presented (never re-presented) in a rapidly turning cycle (Lash 69-73).  The mode of 
attention appropriate to consuming these informational media is not depth of thought, but 
"distraction" (Lash 71).  We flick through the paper, flick through the channels, often while 
simultaneously doing something else.  Such inattentive connection to media leads to, as 
Ferrarotti indicates, a lack of real connection to the lives of others (5), and a lack of 
involvement in any of thought’s virtual potential.  Ferrarotti’s overall contention is that 
mediatic deluges of imagery cancel out variation, circumstance and individual detail (2-3), 
and, from the informational viewpoint, Lash, points to the distrait manner of mind that is 
connected with such media (71).  For Guattari, the overall consequences of the mediatisation 
of thought are quite dire: “the banality of the world represented to us by the media … surround 
us with a reassuring atmosphere in which nothing is any longer of real consequence.  We 
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cover our eyes; we forbid ourselves to think about the turbulent passage of our times” (GR 
262).  Deleuze expresses his view succinctly: the lack of creation taking place today in the 
context of television, the press and such like amounts to “the submission of thought to the 
media” (TRM 147).  
 
New media: digitalisation and thought 
 
To refer to "new media" is already to invite controversy, since, as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun 
points out, much critical dispute has centred on such questions as, "What is/are new media?  
Is new media new?  What is new about new media?" (2).  Lister and associates also indicate 
the unsettled nature of the concept: "[a]t the very least we face, on the one hand, a rapidly 
changing set of formal and technological experiments and, on the other, a complex set of 
interactions between new and established media forms" (9-10).  Although new media is a 
"plural noun," it is treated as if it is a singular entity (Chun 1), a practice that belies the 
situation's complexity.  Many commentators, however, would agree with digital media theorist 
and practitioner Noah Wardrip-Fruin that new media generally refers to "the use of the digital 
computer as an expressive medium."  Lister and colleagues also note that new media is 
commonly understood as digital media, which "is a shorthand for 'media that use computers'" 
(14).  If traditional, analogue media (such as a typewriter or single-lens reflex camera) use 
physical processes to capture and store information in a physical (or electronic) form that is 
analogously related to the original, digital media processes convert all input information to 
numbers (Lister et al 14).  More specifically, "digital media are all media programmed using a 
basic code of zeros and ones" (Mulder, Understanding 169).  Many digital media types, 
including "texts, still images, moving images, sound," use digital representation, but it is the 
computer that is the primary display and distribution device for these media objects 
(Manovich 19, 49).   Thus, any process or cultural object that is produced and experienced by 
way of digital computer technologies can be regarded as new media, and this will include the 
internet, Virtual Reality, computer games, email, digital photography, CD-ROMs, MP3 music, 
and so on.  It might be said that a primary consequence of new media, because of the 
conversion to digitalisation, is the "convergence between all existing media forms in terms of 
their organi[s]ation, distribution, reception and regulation" (McQuail, McQuail's Mass 118)—
with the computer being the point of convergence.  Indeed, the historical significance of the 
computer has prompted German media theorist Friedrich Kittler to call it “the universal 
medium” (“On”).  Neil Postman remarks that this “quality of universality” is due not only to 
the “infinitely various uses” of the computer, but also to the fact that more and more, 
computers are ”integrated into the structures of other machines.”  The concept of new media 
may be further defined by several more specific principles: for example, modularity, 
automation, variability, transcoding (Manovich 30-48), or, from another perspective, 
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interactivity, hypertextuality, dispersal and virtuality (Lister et al 13-37).
27
  Broadly speaking, 
though, it is useful to conceive of new media as comprising a wide "set of computer data," 
which include all "graphics, moving images, sounds, shapes, spaces, and texts that have 
become computable" (Manovich 20). 
 
Of the various aspects of new media that will affect thought, perhaps the most important is 
digitality, since it is the digital that underpins all new media formats/technologies.  Before 
considering the implications of digitality for thought, though, we should first understand the 
digital media process itself.  Lister and partners explain it this way: 
In [such a] process the physical properties of the input data, light and sound waves, 
are converted not into another object but into numbers; that is, into abstract symbols 
rather than analogous objects and physical surfaces.  ...  Once coded numerically, the 
input data in a digital media production can immediately be subject to the 
mathematical processes of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division through 
algorithms contained in software.  (15) 
The computer, then, as media theorist Aden Evens tells us, is a digital instrument “in that 
everything it accepts as input, everything it stores, and everything it generates as output are, in 
effect, numbers,” with all manipulations of these numbers being reducible to “0 and 1, on and 
off” (“Concerning” 51).  Accordingly, anything that appears on a computer screen, or is stored 
within or processed by a computer, is reducible to the “possibilities of the binary” (Evens, 
“Concerning” 51-52).  This process of digitalisation has several significant effects: for example, 
texts of all kinds become "dematerialised," vast quantities of information become compressed, 
and data can be accessed and manipulated far more swiftly and efficiently than analogue types 
could (Lister et al 16).  Overall, Evens suggests that, due to its logic and numerical character, 
the digital brings a welcome order to technology: 
Digits provide a universal standard that is easily transportable, exactly duplicable, and 
broadly applicable.  Analysis of digital data allows the immediate detection and 
correction of variation across space and time.  Accurate predictions are possible in 
extraordinarily complicated circumstances: just crunch the numbers.  (“Concerning” 
53) 
According to this viewpoint, the great advantage of the digital derives from its formal nature: 
due to the exactness of the binary code interactions with the digital can be conducted with 
remarkable certainty, and yield the valuable results of measurability, verifiability, robustness 
and repeatability (Evens, “Concerning” 53, 56).  Thus, in ”representing the formal properties of 
an object independently of the object itself,” we establish a standard, which is easily replicable, 
and allows for analysis and comparison using standard statistical procedures—regardless of 
the origin or type of data (Evens, “Concerning” 59-60).  
 
 91 
Already, though, we can begin to see problems for thought in this digital system.  While its 
orderly functioning bears many practical advantages, in an ontological sense these processes 
have the effect of reducing difference to sameness, and of being controlled by procedures of 
reproducibility, in a manner reminiscent of D+G’s royal science.  Such precision of data 
management is, in other words, also a highly restrictive mechanism.  Because the binary code 
“determines what can be represented as digital data and what operations can alter those data,” 
and since “[f]orm and form alone” can be represented, duplicated and repeated, the digital will 
only capture that which is reducible to its formulae; what is left out, then, is “the singular, the 
unique, the immediate”  (Evens, “Concerning” 52, 53).  From an ethical perspective, this 
reduction of life to formal principles is problematical, since the creativity of the virtual, in 
Deleuze’s sense, far exceeds what can be extracted and manipulated according to a binary 
system.   As well as these limitations of the binary code, the absolute distinction between 0 
and 1 is exceptionable: “[b]etween 0 and 1 there is nothing, no mil-ieu, no remainder, so that a 
given bit asserts its blunt edge as the limit of its subtlety (Evens, “Concerning” 57).  As Evens 
points out, “between any two actual individuals, there is always something more, something 
fuzzy, something to be determined” (“Concerning” 57).  While digital forms are sharply 
divided, one from the other, actual beings are not so clearly demarcated.  Of course, this 
reference to the richness of the middle bespeaks Deleuze’s concept of becoming, which is 
based on the notion of the creative power of interstitial spaces: what matters “is always the 
middle, not the beginning or the end”; it is the “intermezzos, intermezzi” that are the “sources 
of creation,” says Deleuze (D 28).  For the purposes of digital representation, though, the 
fuzziness of actuality must be divided “into ranges of quality determined by endpoints or 
thresholds” (Evens, “Concerning” 57).  And while the range between two thresholds (the 
resolution) is actually a whole extent of quality, the digital imposes a fixed value on that 
range—thereby homogenising the actual heterogeneity (Evens, “Concerning” 58).  In this 
process, the qualitative richness of whatever falls outside of the digital resolution value is 
simply discarded.  Evens echoes Deleuze when he locates the differentiation between this 
actual and the digital in the actual being’s “haecceity, a ‘here-ness’ or singularity”—which is 
the actual’s generative power (“Concerning” 58).
28
  As Evens explains, actuality essentially 
includes “a force of productivity that sets it in motion” (“Concerning” 58)—this force being 
Deleuze’s virtual.  Again, we can invoke Deleuze's distinction between potentiality/virtuality 
and the realm of the possible, as Massumi reminds us: "[t]he medium of the digital is 
possibility, not virtuality, and not even potential" (Parables 137).  Indeed, for Massumi, 
"[n]othing is more destructive for the thinking and imaging of the virtual than equating it with 
the digital" (Parables 137).  In fact, digital technologies have a particularly "weak connection to 
the virtual," since they operate by systematising the possible (Massumi, Parables 137).  While 
the virtual produces actuality, the possible only enables the real, through the process of 
realisation—a temporal process that, as Grosz reminds us, does not allow creativity and the 
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new (“Thinking” 26): it is duration and the virtual that yield creative emergence.  Amongst the 
“reservoir of potentialities that have not yet been tapped,” which makes up the virtual 
(Shaviro, “Kant”), is thought that is different and new.  Thought is located in the “intelligence 
of the virtual” (Rajchmann, qtd. in Marks, “Information” 209), which means it is only in the 
virtual that we find “the capacity to distinguish between real and false problems and to resist 
doxa” (Marks, “Information” 209).  Thought thus conceived is not accessible in the static 
formality of the digital world’s binary possibilities. 
 
While on the face of it, then, it may seem that as digital consciousness moves outside the 
rigidity of the analogue, its associated thought prospects will be greatly potentiated, this can 
only constitute a kind of “pseudocreativity” (Evens “Concerning” 69).  As Turkle notes, 
“[d]espite the ever-increasing complexity of software, most computer environments put users 
in worlds based on constrained choices” (“How”).  Interacting with the world through the 
digital would mean thinking according to the terms provided by the digital, which is to say 
along the lines of generic standards and reproducible reductions.  Again, real thought taps 
into duration, whereas the digital only allows for time divided into bytes.  Users of computers 
must “organi[s]e their thoughts and goals” into files and their operations, think within the 
boundaries of software choices, and, in the case of audiovisual technology, conform to “time 
slots, linearity, succession, inputs and outputs” (Evens, “Concerning” 68).  To illustrate more 
broadly our experience in the digital world, it is worth quoting Evens again: 
Human beings, apprehended as digital, are nothing more than a sum of formal 
characteristics: a digital résumé, a set of statistics, usage habits, sites visited, target 
marketing groups, a digital voice print, a digital signature, a digital image, homepage, 
isp, ip address, screen name. ... The digital world does not offer a new experience each 
time, does not unfold itself to reveal unique forces gathered from the depths of history, 
for a digital object is static and without history; it offers instead the promise of generic 
and repeatable experience, measured by bandwidth, buyable by the byte.  (“Concerning” 
65) 
The “language of control,” Deleuze tells us, is digital (N 180).  To think in such an environment 
will not be a matter of, as Postman puts it, addressing any of the “fundamental questions we 
need to address [such as] why we fight each other or why decency eludes us so often, 
especially when we need it the most.”  Rather, the dominant message in the digital 
environment is that “through more and more information, more conveniently packaged, more 
swiftly delivered, we will find solutions to our problems” (Postman).  Postman wonders what 
might be achieved if the talents and energies of computer scientists—those masters of digital 
technology who are so richly rewarded by capital—are turned to the real questions of our age: 
“[w]ho knows what we could learn from such people—perhaps why there are wars, and 
hunger, and homelessness and mental illness and anger.”  Massumi, too, argues against any 
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notion that the digital is an essentially creative field: for him, the sets of "alternative routines" 
of digitisation amount to a process of "[s]tep after plodding step.  Machinic habit" (Parables 
137).   
 
According to Massumi, however, it is important to remember that the "digital age" has not 
rendered the analogue defunct (143).  Instead, Massumi argues that the analogue must be 
retained: it is superior to the digital since it is the very "process" of the virtual (Parables 135, 
142).  Moreover, it is only through the analogue that digital operations have any link at all to 
potential and the virtual (Parables 138).  Massumi uses analogue in its more "technical" sense, 
which is to say that it is not an analogue "of anything in particular," but, instead, is "a 
continuously variable impulse or momentum that can cross from one qualitatively different 
medium into another.  Like electricity into sound waves.  Or heat into pain.  Or light waves 
into vision" (Parables 135).  This is to use a topological approach to the virtual: to see the 
virtual as enfolded in the "continuity of transformation" that all visual, verbal or aural images 
undergo (Parables 133-35).
29
  In this approach, the analogue is referenced only to itself, but it is 
a constantly, qualitatively transforming self, through which the virtual can be processually 
sensed.  The digital is not related to the potentialities of the virtual through its own nature, 
but only through the process of the analogue (Parables 138).  To explain how this works 
Massumi uses the examples of word processing and hypertext.  The codes that contain the 
letters, words and images are digital, which is to say an "electronic nothingness, pure systemic 
possibility" (Parables 138).  Even when the words and sentences appear on the screen they 
remain code, until they are read, which is an analogue process: "[t]he analog[ue] process of 
reading translates ASCII code  into figures of speech enveloping figures of thought, taken in its 
restrictive sense of conscious reflection” (Parables 138).  In an analogical act, reading 
qualitatively and topologically transforms the digital code into something else—something 
that comes closer to thought than any digital code alone could.  For behind the conscious 
thought that occurs during the analogical process of reading is the felt thought—the sensation 
encompassing the thought—its virtual potential.  Such thought is not available in the 
possibilities of digital algorithms themselves: it must be activated by opening to the virtual, 
through analogical processes.  Presenting a similar argument in different terms, Evens states 
that in itself, the digital is sterile, unproductive and uncreative, but creative intervention is 
possible—at the interface where the human interacts with the digital: “It is the monitor, the 
digital-to-analog[ue] converter, the keyboard and mouse that determine the ways in which we 
accede to pure form when we interact with digital data.  By challenging the interface to offer a 
more human experience,” he argues, “we fend off, at least for a moment, the threat of digital 
reduction” (“Concerning” 68, 69).  Hansen’s work on the digital image also draws attention to 
the interface, in the sense that he argues for a more processual understanding: for him, the 
digital image is a process in which “the body, in conjunction with the various apparatuses for 
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tendering information perceptible, gives form to or in-forms information” (10).  In other words, 
“information is [only] made perceivable through embodied experience” (Hansen 10).  And he 
agrees with Massumi that this embodied experience connects to the virtual through analogical 
processes (161).   But again we have wandered, for the prospect of accessing the virtual in the 
digital world will be properly explored in Part 2.  Since Deleuze claims that “control societies 
function … with information technology and computers” (N 180), we remain for now in the 
analysis of how these technologies can be confining for thought. 
 
Other theorists propose alternative means of approaching the ways that digitalisation, 
information and computer technologies affect the way we think.  Mulder, for example, draws 
on McLuhan to suggest that the more digitised information we receive, the less we think; 
“information overload,” he argues, kills off both the imagination and the will to act (43).  But it 
is Berardi’s perspective on the implications of the digital that we finish with here, since he 
raises several critical issues.  One of Berardi’s focuses is the realm of sensibility, a thought-
realm corresponding to D+G’s affect, which Berardi describes as “the ability to detect, 
interpret, and understand signs that cannot be translated into words” (“I Want”).  According 
to Berardi, “[t]he digitali[s]ation of the communicative environment and even of the 
perceptive environment acts on the sensibility of human organisms, without a doubt” 
(“Biopolitics”).  To begin with, the “acceleration and information overload” of digital culture 
lead to an “impoverishment of experience,” in the sense that we cannot possibly absorb the 
flood of stimuli we are exposed to (“Biopolitics”).  Berardi calls this the “subsumption of the 
mind,” whereby the “conscious and sensitive organism is submitted to competitive pressure, to 
an acceleration of stimuli, to constant attentive stress” (“Schizo-Economy” 76).  As a result, our 
sensibility is corroded, and our reactions become automatic, or standardised, as prescribed by 
the “preformatted chain of actions and reactions of the homogeni[s]ed infosphere” 
(“Biopolitics”).   Elsewhere he calls this “a digital formatting of the mind” (“I Want”).   For 
Berardi, this automatism, with its accompanying desensitivity to the unpredictable or the non-
codified, has another disturbing effect.  Due to “the insertion of the electronic in the organic,” 
there has been a marked shift in the way that relationality occurs between conscious 
organisms (Berardi, “Sensitivity”).  One aspect of this shift is a diminution of empathy, or in 
the “affective and sensuous understanding of the other” (“I Want”).  Underpinning this shift in 
relationality is a mutation in the “paradigm of exchange” between humans: interpersonal 
exchange has moved from the realm of “conjunction” to that of “connection” (Berardi, 
“Sensitivity”).  In Berardi’s theory, conjunction and connection are two alternative modes of 
concatenation, or coming together.  Simply put, conjunction is “a becoming other” (a concept 
that reflects Berardi’s association with Guattari), while “in connection each element remains 
distinct and interacts only functionally” (Berardi, “Sensitivity”).  Connection, it seems clear, is 
the mode of exchange of digital culture.  Berardi explains further:  
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Conjunction is the meeting and fusion of round and irregular shapes that are 
continuously weaselling their way about with no precision, repetition or perfection. 
Connection is the punctual and repeatable interaction of algorithmic functions, 
straight lines and points that overlap perfectly, and plug in or out according to 
discrete modes of interaction that render the different parts compatible to a pre-
established standard.  (“Sensitivity”)   
The loss of conjunction as a mode of interaction involves other losses: newness, heterogeneity, 
ambiguity, empathy and becoming other.  Conjunction touches the virtual in its admittance of 
the other’s potential.  And since this becoming other is also largely material, there are also 
losses in flows of substance:  “Conjunction is the endless readiness of bodies, signs and events 
to form rhizomes: the concrete, carnal and erotic concatenation of each pulsating fragment 
with each other pulsating fragment” (“Sensitivity”).  For Berardi, the alternative world of 
connection is a posthuman one whose accelerated rhythms and nervous overloads have grave 
consequences, particularly for the younger generation.  Indeed, Berardi suggests that the 
increased turning to psychopharmacological substances (cocaine, heroin, anti-depressants) 
may be a means of dealing with the coldness, lack of contact and social contraction inherent in 
digital culture (“Biopolitics”).  And moreover, because capital today relies on the productive 
labour of our mental and psychic energies, it is all too ready to support the use of 
psychopharmaceuticals to alleviate our psychic suffering (“Schizo-Economy” 84). 
 
One final point Berardi makes pertains to the effect of digitalisation on memory, a faculty 
strongly related to the virtual, and, therefore, to thought.  As Berardi explains, the powers of 
memorisation “depend on the mind’s capacity to store information that has left a deep 
impression” (“Biopolitics”).  But, for him, memorisation is reshaped by the digital, in the 
following way: 
[W]hat happens to memory when the flow of information explodes, expands 
enormously, besieges perception, occupies the whole of available mental time, 
accelerates and reduces the mind’s time of exposure to the single informational 
impression? What happens here is that the memory of the past thins out and the mass 
of present information tends to occupy the whole space of attention. The greater the 
density of the infosphere, the scarcer is the time available for memori[s]ation. The 
briefer the mind’s lapse of exposure to a single piece of information, the more tenuous 
will be the trace left by this information. In this way, mental activity tends to be 
compressed into the present, the depth of memory is reduced and thus the perception 
of the historical past and even of existential diachrony tends to disappear.  
(“Biopolitics”) 
If the historical past disappears in the compressions of the digital, the outlook is troubling for 
the virtual past, where, for Bergson, the entirety of past experiences coheres with the present.  
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Lazzarato explains this memory as “the co-existence of all virtual remembrances,” and, 
accordingly, “[t]o remember something does not consist in looking for a remembrance in 
memory, as though one were rummaging through a drawer.  To remember something ... is to 
actualise a virtual, and this actualisation is a creation” (“Concepts” 184, 185).  Grosz, too, points 
out that memory is part of what life brings to the world: “the movement of actuali[s]ation of 
the virtual, expansiveness, opening up” (“Thinking” 25).  Therefore, if the digital focuses upon 
the “perpetual present” (Virilio 125), and reduces our access to our deep and extended 
memory, to the virtual past, thought cannot access its fullest potential.  If Berardi is correct, 
the consequences for thought of the impact of digital and computer technologies, are, at the 
least, extremely problematic.  From an ethical viewpoint, this closing down of thought, 
memory and relation by information technologies needs urgent addressing, and calls for, in 
Berardi’s view (drawing upon Guattari), the development of a “postmedia sensibility” 
(Goddard, “Felix”).  Again, we defer until Part 2 how this type of sensibility might take shape. 
 
The internet, thought and capital 
 
We cannot make a thorough investigation of the relationship between new media and thought 
without turning our attention more directly to what Terranova defines as “more than simply 
one medium among many” (Network 42).  We have discussed computer technologies in terms 
of digitisation, and addressed the networked structure of contemporary society.  However, in 
order to more fully understand the impact of new media forms, we must consider the role of 
the internet, that “network of networks” (Morris and Ogan 136).  A multifaceted 
communication system that includes the World Wide Web, the internet is, at base, “a network 
of internationally connected computers operating according to agreed protocols” (McQuail, 
McQuail’s Mass 29).  However, due to the exponential increase in its global usage over recent 
years (world internet usage increased by over 500% from 2000 to 2011, swelling from 360 
million to almost 7 billion users over that period [“Internet Usage”]), this particular network 
requires serious scrutiny with regard to its impact upon thought.  Such scrutiny is especially 
important since, as McQuail notes in 2000, “it is already apparent that the internet is being 
powerfully shaped more by the possibilities for economic exploitation than by the intrinsic 
capacities of the net or the dreams of its founders” (McQuail, “Origins” 10).  Since its 
development in 1969, when it connected only four computers in California, the internet has 
undergone incredible transformation (Wellman and Hogan, “Internet”).  Originally called the 
ARPANET, and established for military purposes, by the 1980s the Internet had expanded to 
serve a limited range of academic purposes (Golding 137).  The 1990s, however, heralded what 
Barry Wellman and Bernie Hogan call “the first age of the Internet”: the time “when the 
Internet moved from the arcane scholarly world to homes and offices” (“Immanent”).  With 
the development of the World Wide Web in 1989, and then “browsers” and user-friendly 
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software by 1993 (Golding 137), the Internet was proclaimed as “a technological marvel 
bringing a new Enlightenment to transform the world” (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 4).  
This was the Internet’s utopian era, offering such golden promises as unlimited connectivity, 
“free knowledge sharing and collaborative knowledge production, [and] more equality and 
liberty in a global social space” (Wenninger).  According to Wellman and Hogan, though, the 
stock market’s dot.com bust of 2000 marked the end of this era, the bust reining in the 
euphoric rhetoric, and bringing expectations for the internet down to a more ordinary level 
(“Immanent”).  And so the internet’s “second age” began, whereupon “the light that dazzled 
overheard [became] embedded in everyday things” (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 5).  The 
internet’s sphere shifted from “a world of Internet wizards” to “a world of ordinary people 
routinely using the internet as an embedded part of their lives” (Haythornthwaite and 
Wellman 6).  As Wellman and Hogan put it, “[t]he stand-alone capital-I ‘internet’ became the 
more widespread and complex small-i ‘internet’” (“Immanent”).  And a decade on from 2000, 
the internet as an “ordinary” system has subsumed most of our other daily technologies, 
having become “our map and our clock, our printing press and our typewriter, our calculator 




The “ordinary” internet is, of course, massively extensive: statistics relating to usage in 2011 
show that internet penetration has reached 78% of the North American population, 67% of 
Australia/Oceania and 61% of Europe (“Internet Usage”)—with these figures increasing by the 
day.  And while an internet “digital divide” between the “haves” and “have nots” still exists, 
populations in developing nations are rapidly becoming connected: the largest growth in 
internet usage between 2000 and 2011 occurred in regions such as Africa and Latin America 
(3,000% and 1200% growth respectively) (“Internet Usage”).  The United Nations (UN) regards 
spreading the internet throughout the whole world as such an urgent problem that they 
devoted their 2003 and 2005 World Summits to developing an ongoing action plan which 
would expedite a “global information society” (Drori 298, 297, 302).
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  So if the majority of the 
developed world and fast increasing numbers in developing nations are on-line, what kinds of 
internet practices are they generally engaged in?  According to the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project, a US-based research organisation, the most common online activities in America 
in 2011 were searching, emailing, shopping and social networking (Zickuhr and Smith 11-13).  
Other developed countries show similar trends: over 2010-2011 in Australia, email, searching, 
online banking and social networking were the most common actions (Australia, Australian), 
and in Britain, similar patterns are also evident (Dutton, Helsper, and Gerber 19-25).  The list 
of other internet activities in which users participate is long, and includes: blogging (online 
diarising); posting ideas/information onto or as web pages; accessing/contributing to social 
network sites such as Facebook; accessing and uploading media streams (video, such as on 
YouTube, and radio); participating in chatrooms and discussion forums; instant messaging 
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and voice telephony; and online gaming (including MUDs or multiuser domain games).  While 
many of these online activities may seem more related to the realms of, say, entertainment or 
social connectivity than commerce, many theorists are concerned about the “increasing 
corporate colonisation of cyberspace” (Marks, “Information” 195).  In fact, since the mid-1990s 
the internet has been a commercial operation, underpinned by “a fully commercial set of 
backbone systems” (Golding 137).  Internet service providers have always been (often large) 
public companies (Golding 137), and, in general, the principle of capital has driven the 
internet’s development and expansion (McChesney 39).  In other words, in the world of new 
media the old adage still applies: “whoever can make the most money wins” (McChesney 39).  
Even the giants of “old media,” such as Rupert Murdoch, Time Warner and Disney have 
incorporated internet media into their empires, thereby increasing their net worth and 
enhancing their capacity to cross promote products (McChesney 38-41).  Meanwhile, 
traditional media such as television and newspapers/magazines are being displaced onto the 
internet (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”), and, in their own media, are having to adapt to internet 
presentation styles—introducing “text crawls,” “pop-up ads,” and “easy-to-browse info-
snippets” (Carr).  Overall, it is fair to say that “the internet … has become fundamental to the 
global expansion of capitalist markets” (Coté 5). 
 
The correspondence between corporate concerns and internet use is exemplified no better 
than in the case of the search engine, Google.  As already noted, the internet’s search/research 
utility is its most used application (along with email).  Google, being by far the most popular 
search engine worldwide (with an 80% average global market share across 2011 to early 2012 
[“Google”]), is, then, the online function of choice for hundreds of millions of users around the 
world each day (Vise and Malseed 5).  Indeed, building on the notion that the internet is now 
“much more about searching than connecting,” Ian Buchanan claims that “Google is effectively 
the commonsense understanding of what using the internet actually means, both practically 
and theoretically” (“Deleuze and the Internet”).  As David Vise and Mark Malseed put it, 
Google and the internet can now be regarded “as one” (1).  A public company since 2004, 
Google is a vast multinational operation, attracting revenue in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2011 
of $US10.58 billion (a 25% increase from 2010’s Q4 revenue), and this includes a net profit of 
$US2.71 billion (Goodwin).  Google does not charge its users directly, so how does it generate 
such immense profits?  Vise and Malseed explain: “Google the search engine became Google 
the money machine” through advertising: advertisers pay to place “small, highly targeted text 
advertisements [AdWords] that searchers click on for information” (3).  As well as gaining 
income from the ads themselves, Google also gets a percentage of every click onto these ads 
(Battelle 143).  Google has been highly successful in generating income this way because, as 
Vise and Malseed note, they “figured out how to make advertising on the internet work 
effectively by targeting it to individuals at the moment they most need it: when searching for 
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information” (5).  And with the increasing influx of advertising dollars traditionally spent on 
other media—such as television and print—Google is set to become even more profitable 
(Vise and Malseed 5).
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  Not only does Google generate its own extraordinary profits, it is, by 
and large, one of the primary drivers of the commercial internet (Battelle 8)—which is to say, 
it is a key driver of capitalism under the digital.  The linkage of all kinds of search results to 
purchasing opportunities means that Google traffics both information and commodities, many 
of which can be bought in just a few more clicks.  As Ian Buchanan explains, “[t]he operating 
premise of Google searches may not be that whenever we are searching … we are actually 
looking for something to buy, but its results certainly appear to obey this code”  (“Deleuze and 
the Internet”).  Indeed, as a way of drawing attention to the fact that Google’s aim is quite 
simply to make money, not to provide a useful and comprehensive public archive, media 
theorist Geert Lovink suggests that we start naming Google as the advertising business that it 
is (Networks 156).  Further, if the internet now effectively equates to Google (or “Googling”), 
and Google is about “the facilitation of sales,” then the internet’s primary function can be seen 
in the same way (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”).  And any claims that Google is more concerned with 
“serving the best interests of [its] users” and offering a “higher-quality search experience” over 
and above making money (Vise and Malseed 6) can be challenged when we consider its 
involvement in the lucrative Chinese market.  While professing to be “a company that is 
trustworthy and interested in the public good,” Google’s founders collaborated with the 
Chinese government’s restrictive internet censorship laws in 2006, in setting up its subsidiary 
in China (C. Thompson).  Thus, in order to capture potentially the world’s richest market, 
Google effectively renounced its freedom of information principles, by agreeing “to purge its 
search results of any Web sites disapproved of by the Chinese government” (C. Thompson).  
These sites included any referencing Tibet, Tiananmen, Taiwan, Amnesty International, 
religious group Falun Gong (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”), as well as sites advocating free speech in 
China (C. Thompson).  Even when Google made a surprising about face in 2010, and 
(supposedly) ended its Chinese operations—a move that was lauded by human rights activists 
(Vaidhyanathan 119)—it failed to live up to its benevolent promises.  As Siva Vaidhyanathan 
explains, Google merely redirected its Chinese users to its Hong Kong based service, which is 
still censored by the Chinese government; as well, it maintained office facilities and other 
business interests in China: all of which amounts to shifting from an active to a passive 
partnership with Chinese censorship (119, 10).   
 
In a more general sense, the relationship between the internet and capitalism is quite clear: 
“where a free and open system of communicative networks (the internet) has developed 
within an economic system based on property and profits (capitalism) one has to come to an 
accommodation with the other” (Lister et al 186).  In such a dynamic, capitalism will not 
compromise: it will come to determine the internet’s mechanisms and capacities.  The 
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implications for thought, then, in the capitalistic sphere of the internet, are just as clear: it will 
be circumscribed within the logic of capital.  The way we think on the internet is to search—
click, click, from link to link—which both fosters the desire for more “by constantly rewarding 
us with the little satisfaction of the unexpected discovery,” and engenders a restlessness “to 
always see what’s just over the horizon, one click away” (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”).  John 
Battelle calls this “search” mode of thought the “universally understood method of navigating 
our information universe” (4), and claims that the multitudinous enquiries that pour through 
the internet every day make up “the aggregate thoughtstream of humankind—online” (4,6).  
(Of course, direct shopping sites such as eBay and Amazon use “search” as a business model, 
cementing the commerciality of this action.)  Thus, a kind of “consumptive,” rather than 
creative, thought mode corresponds to the internet, which has at least two, self-feeding 
consequences.  First, as Poster points out, our acts of browsing, window shopping and buying 
“are routinely recorded, stored, and made available for advertisers,” so that our profiles can be 
used to build an even stronger consumptive environment (Information 250).  Even our email 
inboxes are continually filled with messages from would-be sellers who match to our personal 
profiles.  Second, as Battelle argues, on the internet “all intent is commercial in one way or 
another, for your very attention is valuable to someone” (30).  No matter which sites you are 
visiting there is an economic promise in your attention, and, throughout your online 
movements, there is a good chance that “you’ll see plenty of advertisements on the way, and 
those links are the gold from which search companies spin their fabled profits” (Battelle 30).  It 
is not difficult to see, then, that the kind of thinking fostered by the internet is the kind that 
propogates money.  Ian Buchanan, therefore, proclaims the internet to be “just another ‘model 
of realisation,’ [which is] Deleuze and Guattari’s term for the institutions capitalism relies on 
to extract surplus value from a given economy” (“Deleuze”).  Moreover, the fact that the 
internet was not always so economically driven helps to disguise its current mercenary nature: 
That business couldn’t immediately figure out how to make money out of the internet 
… meant that in the early years of its existence the utopian image of it as an 
affirmative agent of cultural change was able to flourish, giving the internet a 
powerful rhetoric legacy it continues to draw on as it is moulded more and more 
firmly into a purely commercial enterprise.  (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”) 
For Lovink, the search logic that accompanies the commercial internet diminishes our ability 
to think in a critical way, since it encourages us to simply click away rather than engage deeply 
in any problem (Networks 157).  “Stop searching, start questioning,” Lovink enjoins (Networks 
157), but we leave the question of whether thought can find a way to use the internet as “an 
affirmative agent of change” (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”) to the thesis’ next part.  
 
As well as from the viewpoint of the institutional forces of capitalism, there are a number of 
other (albeit related) angles from which to approach the internet’s bearing on thought.  
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Rossiter, for example, acknowledges that “software design, virtual environments, games, and 
search engines all generate and naturalise certain ways of knowing and apprehending the 
world” (112).  Particular techniques that can be said to apply to the internet include “database 
retrieval over linear narrative,” and “editing, and selection rather than simple acquisition” 
(Rossiter 112).  This shift in technique is corroborated by a recent study reported by University 
College London, which investigates how users behave in virtual library environments.  Their 
longitudinal computer log trail analysis reveals that users “prefer visual information over text,” 
display “a strong tendency towards shallow, horizontal, ‘flicking’ behaviour in digital libraries,” 
and rely heavily upon cutting and pasting techniques (Centre).  Moreover, the researchers 
report that users spend very short amounts of time on e-book and e-journal sites, which leads 
to the conclusion that “new forms of ‘reading’ are emerging as users ‘power browse’ 
horizontally through titles, contents pages and abstracts going for quick wins” (Centre).  Other 
recent accounts make similar claims: internet commentator Nicholas Carr, for instance, sums 
up the personal impact of more than a decade of internet use in his statement “I’m not 
thinking the way I used to think.”  Carr admits that the web has been a “godsend” to him as a 
writer in terms of cutting research time, but states that the internet has diminished his 
concentration span: “[m]y mind now expects to take in information the way the Net 
distributes it: in a swiftly moving stream of particles.”
33
  Carr also quotes University of 
Michigan medical writer Bruce Friedman, who says his thinking “has taken on a staccato 
quality, reflecting the way he quickly scans short passages of text from many sources online” 
(Carr).  Friedman himself states that “I have now almost totally lost the ability to read and 
absorb a longish article on the web or in print” (“How)”), which he attributes to the internet 
“altering our ability to concentrate and read long articles” (“Is”).  In Lovink’s view, our overall 
“techno-cultural default is temporal intolerance” (Networks 157).  The question Carr asks is 
whether a different kind of thinking lies behind this different kind of reading.  His verdict is 
that it does: “deep reading” (as opposed to internet browsing) “is valuable not just for the 
knowledge we acquire from the author’s words, but for the intellectual vibrations those words 
set off within our own minds” (Carr).  Deep reading fosters ideas and is thus “indistinguishable 
from deep thinking,” while the internet will only “scatter our attention and diffuse our 
concentration” (Carr).  As for Google, Carr contends that it systematises thought: “[i]n 
Google’s world, the world we enter when we go online, there’s little place for fuzziness … .  
Ambiguity is not an opening for insight but a bug to be fixed.”  Inattentiveness and 
systematization may be the conditions of internet connectivity, but are not conditions for the 
real connectiveness and encounters required for a Deleuze-Guattarian thought.  “Skimming 




There are two final interconnected practices through which we will examine the internet’s 
relationship to thought: blogging and social networking.  Blogs, defined, are a genre of home 
pages, “but they are far more than that—they represent a new form of authoring on the Web, 
authoring that takes as its foundation the ability to quickly and easily link to anything else on 
the Web” (Battelle 266).  Again, we see the appearance of Deleuze’s “author-function,” which 
he describes as nothing more than “an empty and vain subject” (TRM 139).  If blogs are 
“personal statements about individuals, digital declarations of who they are and who they wish 
to be in the searchable world” (Battelle 267), they are indeed subjective.  Moreover, according 
to Andrew Keen’s definition, blogs could certainly be interpreted as empty and vain: “[w]e are 
blogging with monkeylike shamelessness about our private lives, our sex lives, our dream lives, 
our lack of lives, our Second Lives” (3).  Confirming the ubiquity of blogging, Lovink notes that 
as of 2010, 150 million blogs crowded the internet (Networks 95), and, regarding content, a 
2006 Pew/internet US national survey reported that “76% of bloggers say a reason they blog is 
to document their personal experiences and share them with others” (“Blogging”).  What is 
more, “[o]nly a small proportion focus their coverage on politics, media, government, or 
technology” (“Blogging”).  And when blogs do address such extra-personal matters, they 
generally offer mere opinion, a form of thought that is, again as D+G tell us, “a will to majority 
[that] already speaks in the name of majority” (WP 146).  In a sense, blogging constitutes a 
celebration of the representational staple of individualism, to the extent that it champions the 
personal and her/his self-focused ideas.  In Lovink’s estimation, though, blogs evidence a shift 
in “the status of the personal wherein the personal is both mobili[s]ed, and erased or flattened 
(erased insofar as blogging prioriti[s]es display over introspection)” (Networks 101).  In other 
words, blogging foregrounds an identity that is produced for display: “[w]hat matters is what 
appears” (Lovink, Networks 101)—scarcely a way into engagement with thought as creativity.  
In fact, we can extend this notion that blogging is predominantly self-reportage and display to 
much of the Web 2.0 phenomenon (the participatory internet).  As well as blogging, Web 2.0 
refers to media sharing sites such as YouTube—a site that, for Keen, is highly narcissistic: 
The tagline for YouTube is “Broadcast yourself.”  And broadcast ourselves we do, with 
all the shameless self-admiration of the mythical Narcissus.  As traditional 
mainstream media is replaced by a personali[s]ed one, the internet has become a 
mirror to ourselves.  Rather than using it to seek news, information, or culture, we use 
it to actually be the news, the information, the culture.  (7) 
Unfortunately, wanting to “be” the news or the culture bears little relationship to entering into 
a thought that might lead to a more affirmative cultural change. Furthermore, as Lovink 
points out, although blogs, YouTube and the like offer the opportunity for readers/viewers to 
post “comments,” comment software prescribes brevity, and comments are generally at the 
level of mundane public discourse rather than any real confrontation with ideas (Networks 19, 
51).  Again, this is thought at the level of majoritarian opinion.   
 103 
 
Turning to social networking sites such as Facebook, they are also, Keen argues, essentially 
self-advertisements, in which are advertised “everything from our favourite books and movies, 
to photos from our summer vacations, to ‘testimonials’ praising our more winsome qualities or 
recapping our latest drunken exploits” (7).  Lovink sees such a site as “a massive self-branding 
exercise” wherein “identity management” becomes an obsession (Networks 38).  In her 
extensive review of the movie The Social Network, Zadie Smith adds to this argument, claiming 
that the nature of Facebook (“falsely jolly, fake-friendly, self-promoting, slickly disingenuous”) 
is highly reductive of life itself: in the data set that makes up our Facebook life, “[e]verything 
shrinks.  Individual character.  Friendships.  Language.  Sensibility.  In a way it’s a 
transcendent experience: we lose our bodies, our messy feelings, our desires, our fears.”  This 
“denuding” of our network selves, though, does not lead to any greater freedom, she argues, 
since with Facebook people “just look more owned.”  On the one hand we are owned by the 
mind and preoccupations of Facebook’s founder Mark Zuckerberg, who was a Harvard 
sophomore when he designed the system (hence the “profile” emphases: What is your 
relationship status? Do you like the right things? Prove it: post pictures) (Z. Smith).  Thus, the 
potential for being is fully circumscribed by the software, or, as Lovink puts it, this is “[V]irtual 
[R]eality” penetrating and mapping out our lives and relationships (Networks 13).  On the 
other hand, we are also owned by capital.  Here, Zadie Smith ties together the contractiveness 
of Facebook and its partnership with advertising: 
With Facebook, Zuckerberg seems to be trying to create something like a Noosphere, 
an Internet with one mind, a uniform environment in which it genuinely doesn’t 
matter who you are, as long as you make “choices” (which means, finally, purchases).  
If the aim is to be liked by more and more people, whatever is unusual about a person 
gets flattened out. One nation under a format.  To ourselves, we are special people, 
documented in wonderful photos, and it also happens that we sometimes buy things.  
This latter fact is an incidental matter, to us. However, the advertising money that will 
rain down on Facebook—if and when Zuckerberg succeeds in encouraging 500 million 
people to take their Facebook identities onto the Internet at large—this money thinks 
of us the other way around.  To the advertisers, we are our capacity to buy, attached to 
a few personal, irrelevant photos. 
With the explosion of self-publication that is Web 2.0, perhaps the most disturbing element is 
the amount of “data” about ourselves that we are contributing to the digital machines of 
capital.  Turning back for a moment to search engines, Battelle points out that from the array 
of self-information we post, “intelligent engines will be able to discern patterns among them 
that will provide second- and third-order relevance inputs that will help refine and return far 
better search results” (267), and, therefore, far better purchasing matches.  Indeed, Lovink 
notes that “[i]n 2008, Google patented a technology that enhances its ability to ‘read the user’” 
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(Networks 152), which means it can direct his/her choices more precisely.  In our constant 
connectivity to Facebook, too, we are doing little more than “submitting private and 
professional data to the world” (Loving, Networks 41), which means to the marketplace.  
Perhaps, then, Web 2.0’s self-interested communication, which we might call net-based 
speech, is dangerous.  Perhaps Deleuze’s comment that “speech and communication have 
been corrupted” because they have been “thoroughly permeated by money” (N 175) applies 
more than ever in the age of Google and Facebook.  Perhaps we would do well to rethink how 
we use Web 2.0, heeding Deleuze’s advice that “[w]e’ve got to hijack speech.  Creating has 
always been something different from communication.  The key thing may be to create 
vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control” (N 175). 
 
Capitalism, affect, thought 
 
How we might “hijack speech” and break the self-confessional, capitalised circuits of the 
internet is a question to which we will return.  For now, we explore a final aspect of 
communication today, one relevant to both newer and “old” media forms.   We refer to affect, 
that key element of post-ideological power, considered briefly earlier on.  Recall, firstly, that 
affect as we use it here is neither a personal feeling nor an emotion but, rather, a “prepersonal 
intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another” 
(Massumi, “Notes” xvi).  Such an understanding draws from both William James’ contention 
that a “bodily disturbance” or “sensation” is our first response to the events we encounter with 
nameable emotions only following secondarily (“What”), and from Gilbert Simondon’s 
orienting of preconscious affect before conscious emotion (Shaviro, “Simondon”).  As Eric 
Shouse puts it, “affect is a non-conscious experience of intensity,” which can be described thus: 
At any moment hundreds, perhaps thousands of stimuli impinge on the human body 
and the body responds by infolding them all at once and registering them as an 
intensity.  Affect is this intensity.  In the infant it is pure expression; in the adult, it is 
pure potential (a measure of the body’s readiness to act in a given circumstance).  
To the extent that it is “unformed and unstructured,” affect is, therefore, an abstract force, and 
because this abstractivity is highly transmittable, affect has become tremendously powerful in 
terms of sociality (Shouse).  Of course, the power of affect has not escaped the reach of 
contemporary capitalism, for which affect’s potential has been a key component in its 
subsumption of life.  This usurpation of affect is actually part of a cluster of late capitalistic 
movements, all of which are connected to the control mechanisms of bio-power.  Amy 
Villarejo explains: 
Capital has been invested at an affective level.  This is not to isolate the terrain of 
economy from accompanying shifts: from discipline to control in politics, from 
representation and meaning to information in culture, from organic to nonorganic life 
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in biophilosophy, and so forth.  The labo[u]r of the production, circulation, and 
manipulation of affects, with its emphasis on the corporeal (not simply “the body” but 
subindividual bodily capacities and also machinic assemblages of bodies), becomes 
crucial in understanding contemporary networks of biopower; it compels a shift in 
thinking from the bounded, identitarian body to an intensification of the perception 
of the body, its capacities and assemblages.  (136) 
As we have seen, under bio-power every capacity of the body is captured by the capitalist 
machine, with the subindividual capacity of affect being particularly valuable since its 
abstractivity is directable toward any number of capital-enhancing endpoints.  Since post-
industrial, global capitalism is a turbulent environment of flows—“flows of money, flows of 
culture, flows of people”—control must adapt to a permanent state of turbulence (Parisi and 
Terranova), and one of capital’s key entry points for extracting value from this turbulence is at 
the micro-level of affect modulation.  
 
If affect is now integral to capitalism’s control, it is important to understand both the means 
by which it is managed/modulated, and, of most interest here, its relationship to thought.  For 
Clough, both of these issues involve “working out a line of thought about life, matter, 
information, and bodies,” in what she sees as the present “technoscientific” context (“Future” 
21-22). One of the principal focuses of technoscience, as we have noted, has been the 
development of information technologies, and, on their relationship to affect, Clough writes: 
[T]here has … been a development of information technologies, both entertainment 
and surveillance technologies, which are increasingly less about representation and 
the narrative construction of subject identities and more about affecting bodies, 
human and nonhuman, directly.  These technologies mean to control bodies of 
information and to treat bodies as information.  Even when appealing to the human 
subject, these technologies aim to affect the subject’s subindividual bodily capacities, 
that is, capacities to be moved, to shift focus, to attend, to take interest, to slow down, 
to speed up, and to mutate.  (“Future” 3) 
For Massumi, the technologies most linked to manipulating affectivity are mechanisms of the 
mass media: as he puts it, “the mass media are not mediating anymore—they become direct 
mechanisms of control by their ability to modulate the affective dimension” (“Navigating” 
232).  As mobilised by the media, affect modulation is an apparatus of capitalist power that is 
based on the channelling of attention and feeding into control systems on other levels 
(Massumi, “Requiem” 61).  And since affect “is an impersonal flow before it is a subjective 
content” (Massumi, “Requiem” 61), the media does not transmit a series of preformed 
meanings in its employment of affect.  Rather, it attaches affect to images and their associated 
content: “[technological media] have the capacity to intensify, alter or distort the affective 
dimensions of an image, sound, voice, face or gesture” (“Research”).  It is this intensive, 
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affective dimension to which the body responds.  Affect’s importance, then, as Shouse points 
out, comes from the fact that often “the message consciously received may be of less import to 
the receiver of that message than his or her non-conscious affective resonance with the source 
of the message.”  Furthermore, “[s]ince the meaning and intensity of an image are not 
necessarily congruent with each other, affect can be and is easily exploited for political or 
commercial use” (“Research”).  While other media technologies are undoubtedly important in 
the transmission of affect for control purposes, for Massumi television is, again, the prime 
offender: it is the “privileged channel for collective affect modulation” (“Fear” 33).  With its 
“real time” coverage of “socially critical turning points,” Massumi argues that television even 
surpasses the internet in its capacity to provide “a perceptual focal point for the spontaneous 
mass coordination of affect (“Fear” 33).  Visual culture theorist Nicholas Mirzoeff also writes of 
the significance of television, focusing on its affective role during the Iraq War: the constant 
feed of war images were “carefully and precisely targeted tools,” which were recognised as 
“friendly” by the “large screen, theatre TVs of American suburbia” (73, 74).   Similarly, 
Massumi speaks of the “Gulf War show,” and also contends that the broadcast of post-9/11’s 
“war on terror” indicates the yoking of “governmentality to television” in the following way: 
“Government gained signal access to the nervous systems and somatic expressions of the 
populace in a way that allowed it to bypass the discursive meditations on which it traditionally 
depended and to regularly produce effects with a directness never before seen” (Massumi, 
“Fear” 33-34).  Hence, television broadcasts following 9/11—most notably those connecting to 
the terror alert system—testify to “the habituation of the viewing population to affect 




In Melissa Gregg’s view, the mediatisation of affect is especially useful for both control and 
capitalism since it is particularly difficult to marshal resistance against:  
This is precisely the difficulty of forming any rational model of political opposition to 
apparently personable leaders like [former US President George] Bush, or concertedly 
“ordinary” leaders like [former Australian Prime Minister] John Howard: a diverse 
population will often interpret a manifest message through a quite different set of 
unconscious criteria.   
In the general case of the US president, for example, Massumi argues that s/he “is not a 
statesman anymore, like Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt were.  He’s [sic] a visible 
personification of that affective media loop.  He’s the face of mass affect” (“Navigating” 233).  
Thus George Bush’s September 2008 address to the nation, as the US subprime mortgage crisis 
unfolded, presents an affective image of confidence and strength while delivering a warning of 
financial disaster.
35
  The warning serves to pre-empt and, therefore, manage fear, but it is the 
affective charge of confidence that is most important here: it works to counterbalance the flow 
of anxiety-inducing images—financial indexes plummeting, stock exchanges in panic—which 
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had been circulating heavily through media outlets prior to the address.  The affectively 
delivered command, then, is clear: keep investing, spending, and borrowing, in order to keep 
capital flowing.  As Massumi notes, such affective manipulation “changes how people 
experience what potentials they have”: when we are impacted at an affective, intensive level by 
media images, we are barely even aware of the limits that are being set for our subsequent 
actions (“Navigating” 232).  In Terranova’s view, we are dealing here with “a dispositif of power 
that grasps knowledge not as the result of abstract logical games affecting the sphere of truth, 
but as the secondary result of a certain hold on the body” (“Futurepublic” 134).  For her part, 
Terranova considers the mediatisation of war, describing “a new relation between war and the 
media”: from the initial (negative) media treatment of Islam in the 1970s, through to the 
glorification of the Iraq War, Terranova illustrates how the media’s images of war do not lead 
to “an objective knowledge” that relates to “narratives and representations,” but, rather, 
function through “an active mobili[s]ation of the body’s immaterial capacities to think, feel 
and understand” (“Futurepublic” 132, 133).  And what we are affectively led to think and 
understand through the media’s new relation to war is that Islam is highly threatening 
(Terranova, “Futurepublic 133), and—because war “has become the new driving force behind 
US economic growth”—a state of “permanent war” is now “a fact of life” (Cooper 128, 129).  
 
In assessing how capitalism’s arrogation and restriction of affect impacts upon thought we can 
begin by recalling that, in D+G’s project, affect and sense are closely linked: “[s]ense is the 
potential to imagine [unrestricted] perceptions of the infinite,” and, correspondingly, 
“different perceptions [are] opened from different affective encounters” (Colebrook, “On” par. 
41).  If affect is the “risings and fallings—the becomings” of a body (O’Sullivan, Art 41), sense is 
the virtual “non-place” where these affects are expressed.  Put another way, sense is “the 
virtual milieu through which we live and become” (Colebrook, Gilles 111)—which means that 
sense, the affects it expresses, and the associated powers of thought are related to the full 
potentiality of life beyond any circumscribing instrument, including capital.  Colebrook 
further explains this connection to thought: 
Deleuze affirms the power of thought … to intuit life as the source of difference, folds, 
relations, and spaces.  Sense, philosophy, intuition, thinking and concepts all name 
the power to unleash other territories by imagining the given as an expression of a life 
that exceeds any of its fixed terms, and imagining the potential that can be unfolded 
from that expressive power.  (“On” par. 38)    
Under contemporary capitalist strategies of mediatisation, affect is manipulated, channelled 
and controlled: there is only one direction for the movement of affect.  But for Deleuze true 
thinking requires a background of (limitless) sense—the enablement of the fullest range of 
affects produced by all kinds of encounters.  True thinking is a process of pure creation that 
“realises itself or becomes through perceiving” (Colebrook, Understanding 69-70); and the 
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whole potentiality of this perceiving emanates from a virtual field accessed through affective 
encounters.  In Deleuze’s view, affect is a mode of thought, but one that is non-
representational, pure potential (“S”), since it is always connected to the virtual.  If thinking is 
a connection of life’s dynamic flows (Colebrook, Understanding 69-70), it will only be impeded 
if these flows are directed towards a specific end.  Affect that is regulated by an external force 
cannot pertain to thought.  To be clearer, for Deleuze thinking is created or generated when 
an encounter (experienced affectively) “forces thought to raise up”—in a form that is 
“imperceptible,” that “can only be sensed” (DR 139, 140).  This thought that “can only sensed ( 
… the being of the sensible), moves the soul, ‘perplexes’ it—in other words, forces it to pose a 
problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem—as though 
it were a problem” (Deleuze, DR 140).  Thought, then, as a “generative movement,” as 
something that is “felt” (Massumi, “Introduction” xxxi), problematises life, to the extent that it 
designates “the state of the world” or “the reality of the virtual” as essentially “problematic”  
(Deleuze, DR 280).  As Deleuze tells us, “[s]ense is located in the problem itself” (DR 157).  
Rajchman helps us to connect Deleuzian thought to problems by explaining that thought aims 
to “make new forces visible, formulating the problems they pose, and inciting a kind of 
experimental activity of thinking around them” (45).  Thought, then is “trespass and violence” 
(Deleuze, DR 139) to what is commonly accepted as standard ways of living and being.  When 
affect as a mode of thought is captured by capitalism and contemporary modes of governance, 
it sidesteps any problematisation of life, failing to challenge whether the status quo is actually 
life enhancing.  Instead, this version of an affect-thought dynamic falls in with and promotes 
established patterns of living as they are decreed by capital+state.  If the potentialities of life 
are only creatively maximised by submitting to Deleuze’s autonomous power of thought 
(Colebrook, Gilles 14), this taming of affect seriously forecloses what a life is capable of.  
 
Toward a movement of thought  
  
According to cultural/art critic and activist Brian Holmes the composite of “political-
economic-cultural situations” in which we find ourselves today, is a “damnably complex 
reality” (“Articulating”).  This complexity involves several dimensions, as we have explored in 
previous pages.  In terms of thought, we live, to a large extent, within the conditions of the 
dogmatic image and its associated structures of representation.  For D+G, the orderliness of 
the dogmatic image is most evident in doxa or opinion-based thought:  
We need … order to protect us from chaos.  … That is why we want to hang on to fixed 
opinions so much.  We ask only that our ideas are linked together according to a 
minimum of constant rules.  All that the association of ideas has ever meant is 
providing us with these protective rules—resemblance, contiguity, causality—which 
enable us to put some order into ideas, preventing our “fantasy” (delirium, madness) 
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from crossing the universe in an instant, producing winged horses and dragons 
breathing fire.  (WP 201-02) 
Thought under this rubric amounts to a narrow, media-driven, mass-based kind of opinion, 
which provides a kind of “umbrella” to protect us from the chaos of undisciplined thought 
(D+G, WP 202).  Such thought is shaped and perpetuated by a qualitative majority, yielding a 
limiting and anti-creative way of being in the world.  This mode of thought persists widely—
with just one example being the discipline of science, where “every proper thought [is] 
processed neatly and cleanly, within a defined and knowable technical system that [tidies] up 
the performance not only of communication, but of thought itself” (Murphie, “Clone” 15).  As 
we have also seen, the potential messinesses of sexuality and national identity are other areas 
that are kept sanitary through dogmatism’s strategies of categorisation and confinement.   
  
Of course, the overarching operative of such majoritarian thought is the current capitalist 
order, which rests upon a globalised economy that determines the world as an integrated 
marketplace.  Under neoliberalism, we live in a politico-economic state whose language is 
“composed of a single word”: money (Westbrook 51).  To be a subject in this context is to 
“understand[…] yourself, your accomplishments and your own creativity, indeed your own 
desire, as human capital, to be nourished and cherished in terms of its potential returns on the 
market, and to be used as a measurement of the value of any experience whatsoever” (Holmes, 
“Articulating”). Moreover, as Holmes (amongst others) notes, this stage of capitalism is 
“defined by permanent crisis,” a crisis linked to a globalised subjectivity that is always at the 
“ready to respond” (“Recapturing”).  As we have seen, this permanent crisis translates also into 
a state of indefinite/permanent warfare (Cooper 129), and, at the present time, a state of 
financial crisis.
36
  The power arrangement of the present globalised environment includes the 
remnants of sovereignty and Foucauldian discipline, but, as Deleuze brings into focus, it is 
largely defined by the “rapidly-shifting” type of control that spreads as intricately as a “snake’s 
coils” through daily life (Deleuze, N 181, 182).  Specific technologies and techniques 
disseminate this control, most predominantly those related to informationalised media.  
Control by way of media tends to operate at a subindividual, affective level—thereby 
channelling the subject’s readiness to respond into capital.   At this historical moment, media 
technologies and the information that is their currency saturate daily life, conquering our 
attention (Stiegler, “Within”), and leading also to the proposition that we are in such a state of 
“continuous excitation” by informational stimuli, the collapse of the individual and collective 
mind is nigh (Berardi, “City”).  Arguments for collapse aside, the informationalisation of 
culture has a profound impact on thought—perhaps even constructing for thought a new 
image.  Speed, compression and inattentiveness are some of the hallmarks of this image, as 
well as the homogenisation and static reproducibility that relates to the digital nature of 
information.  In general, though, information feeds capital, so, above all, this thought too is 
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connected to money.  Overall, thought, already constricted by information or dogma, is 
further constrained by economics: “capitalism has lost its mind” is how Stiegler puts it 
(“Spirit”).  The powerful drive to maintain and increase the flow of capital far surpasses any 
ethical inclination that thought might enhance the wider potentialities of life.   
 
At a time, then, when we are faced with such multiple constraints, it behoves us to look for 
ways to “live more fully, with augmented powers of existence” (Massumi, “Of 
Microperception” 18).  The central problem, for Deleuze, is to resist control, since this would 
equate to believing again in a world that “has been taken from us” (N 176).  One vital means of 
resistance is to find ways to return thought to creativity, for as Deleuze tells us, “[w]henever 
one creates one resists,” (ABC), and to think is nothing but to create (DR 147).  In Holmes’ 
phrasing, “the counter-urgency of our times” is to “seize the potential that is overcoded and 
channel[l]ed by the monetary sign, and to release it into freely ranging movement” (“Artistic”).  
With regard to thought, this would be “a movement of the mind” (Holmes, “Artistic”), or, in 
Deleuze’s words, “a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation” (DR 
8), and outside of all information.  Such thought would move across “intellectual, social, 
affective, sexual and psychic levels,” thereby helping us to “find [a] way to break through the 
soft consensus of normality and discover something worth living for” (Holmes “Financial”).  If 
we were to call this thought that moves “a moving mind,” what might it involve?  Gillian Fuller 
suggests the following: 
[The moving mind is] a complex thing—a series of connections and feedback loops 
differentially distributed across technical, biological, socialized, mediatised (and 
more) modes of perception and cognition.  Let’s therefore also take it as given that 
this moving mind is embodied, that its stability is formed through complex sensing 
across, and making sense of, the multiple worlds through which it lives—the 
industrial worlds of trains and past empires, the informational worlds of impending 
ones, through different people, histories, agendas, mother tongues. 
Erin Manning, perhaps more vividly, describes this moving thought as “experience’s complex 
instigator,” which is to say that thought pulls sensation from a world that is unfolding, that is 
also in motion (“Creative” 3-4).  Thought is, therefore, incipience, or becoming, or creativity, 
or, putting it yet another way, “[t]hinking is of potential” (Massumi, Shock xxxii).  It is the task 
of this work, now, to follow this potential, to explore more specifically some ways in which we 







PART 2:  ENTERING A THOUGHT THAT MOVES— 




Thinking on the move is a nebulous undertaking.  The well-worn pathway crumbles, 
multiplicities arrive.  So many potentials to follow it is unnerving.  We can understand what 
Massumi is getting at when he says that “[t]he wrackings of the thinking body mimic the 
excess of potential it hosts” (Shock xxxii): this thinking body is wracked by the potential of 
thought’s virtuality.  In attempting to shift into a thought that moves, though, perhaps we can 
start by remembering something that Massumi’s statement alludes to.  The “thinking body” is 
host to thought; thought is an independent movement that sweeps us along.  We will not, 
cannot, master it, since it always maintains its own momentum. If it seems that we have 
control, it is always incomplete.  Massumi explains: “[t]he thinking is not contained in the 
designations, manifestations, and significations of language, as owned by the subject.  These 
are only partial expressions of it, pale reflections of its flash” (“Shock” xxxi).  Thought is more 
than this, beyond these words.  Although it is difficult for a rational thinking subject to face 
this uncertainty, doing so is to open to much more of life.  To which othernesses can it lead?  
What futures can it open?  Uneasiness, unsettledness, the shock of thought: not states to be 
conquered, but flows toward emergences.  The lines of thought we are following are those that 
might take us to an experience of life beyond power constraints and thought control.  These 
lines are more concerned with affect than representation, with connectivity and relationality 
than identification or opposition.  And since it was an encounter with D+G that led us to this 
thought, we return to Deleuze, Guattari and D+G-friendly others in order to map a series of 




What we are engaged in here, is a kind of cartography, which is to say, making the beginnings 
of a map that might help us in orientating ourselves in thought.  We use “map” in the 
Deleuze-Guattarian sense: “[w]at we call a ‘map’ or sometimes a diagram is a set of various 
interacting lines … .  We think lines are the basic components of things and events.  So 
everything has its geography, its cartography, its diagram” (D, N 33).  As Bonta and Protevi 
point out, “making maps … establish[es] the contours of intensive processes” (67), and 
thought is indeed an intensive process.  Cartography, for D+G, is different to “tracing,” which 
is more a device of reproduction and representation.  “Make a map, not a tracing,” they 
declare, for only the map “is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the 
real” (ATP 12).  A map is a rhizome, and as such it “fosters connections between fields” and is, 
therefore, always unpredictable: “[t]he map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it 
is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification.  It can be torn, reversed, 
 112 
adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or social formation”  
(D+G, ATP 12).  We are attempting to map a thought that is on the move, which cannot be 
planned in advance, which is subject to what may not be expected, as well as to repetitions 
(the eternal return of difference), gaps, fissures and divergences.  This is thought on a plane of 
immanence, an endlessly varying topological field that can only ever be mapped provisionally 
(Frichot 68).  Such lines of thought are always in the process of composing themselves, always 
being affected by encounters with the teeming nature of everything there is.  It must be 
remembered, then, that the “map is not a contained model … of something larger, but is at all 
points inflecting that larger thing, so that the map is indistinguishable from the thing 
mapped” (Kaufman, “Introduction” 5).  The map and the thought that moves are interwoven.  
Moreover, “[n]ot only is the map constantly redrawn and reconnected, but its functions are 
multiple, intersecting at once the realms of politics, art, and philosophy” (Kaufman, 
“Introduction” 5).  For D+G, thought is heterogeneous: affect and concept, sense and 
difference, movement and creativity, ethics and aesthetics, politics and philosophy.  What 
follows are multiple lines that are not conclusive or certain, but that constitute an attempt to 
diagram some of the elements and practices of a more productive image of thought, or 
thought without an image.  Overall, these “mobile and non-hierarchical” (Kaufman, 
“Introduction” 5) lines aim to connect to ways of thinking that might move us outside the 
constrictive, life-diminishing forces of our dogmatic and informational milieu.  
 
In resisting the dogmatic image, this attempt to "find [our] bearings in thought" (D+G, WP 37) 
will clearly not follow the kind of “method” that has the aim of thinking “truthfully” and 
“ward[ing] off error” (Deleuze, NP 103).  Rather, this work is an expression of thought’s 
encounters, a “witch’s flight” (D+G, WP 41), unfolding and enfolding multifarious elements in 
its immanent field.  It may include elements that, at first glance, you would regard as error; to 
do so, however, would be to conceive of thought in terms of the “truth” model, for “error” is 
nothing but “false recognition” (Deleuze, DR 148).  For Deleuze, thought will always include 
“misadventures” (DR 149).  Such mishaps are not “external to thought,” but comprise “a 
necessary and constitutive background to thought itself” (Williams, Gilles 125).  Thought is a 
risky practice, as Patton points out: “it is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which 
should provide us with the paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which 
accompany our encounters with the unknown” (Deleuze 19).  Hesitant gestures, “a stumbling 
and stuttering thought,” a thought of “piecemeal fibres” (J. Martin 25, 27): in its contingency, a 
work of thought has the potential to take off in many directions, which means that Part 2 will 
not be a series of neat ties with points made in Part 1.  This is not to say that D+G promote an 
unsystematic kind of thought: indeed, Deleuze tells us that “[s]ystems have lost absolutely 
none of their power” (N 31).  The kind of system they advocate, though, is an open system, a 
rhizome, wherein “concepts relate to circumstances rather than essences” (D, N 32).  In such a 
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system, thought “functions along a model of dissemination, bifurcation and proliferation; it 
engenders polyvalence, asymmetry, heterogeneity and dynamism” (Zayani 96).  An open, 
nomadic system will traverse many realms and dimensions—the social, the pre-individual, 
biology, art, micropolitics—each offering something different for thought, each giving thought 
a fresh entryway.   
 
Of course, attempting to diagram the profusion of thought lines arising through a project such 
as this would be quite overwhelming, and would likely take us “close to chaos” (D+G, WP 127).  
As D+G tell us, though, at the same time as having the fortitude to approach this chaos, we 
also “require just a little order to protect us” (D+G, WP 201).  Therefore, in order to navigate 
thought’s multiplicities, it will be useful to invoke what Steigler calls "technicity": that system 
of memory by which individuals have come to select techniques through which to cultivate or 
enhance life ("Take").  While the term “technique” has a variety of theoretical inflections, we 
refer to Stiegler’s notion that techniques of life constitute "arts of living" ("Take").  Techniques 
of/for thought are, therefore, arts of living, and this is also to call upon the Greek techne that 
is both “an extension of life’s potential” and a “transformation of life” (Colebrook, Gilles 10).  In 
our mapping, we seek out particular techniques, since, as William Connolly tells us, to enter 
thought through techniques is to alter thought's "direction, speed, intensity, or sensibility" 
(Neuropolitics 100).  In other words, it is to position oneself within the "inventive and 
compositional dimensions of thinking" (Connolly, Neuropolitics 104).  We will return to 
Connolly’s specific conception of techniques shortly, but, in the meantime, let us be mindful 
that to invoke or develop techniques for thought is not to take ownership of thought or of 
thought’s becomings.  Rather, it is to participate in thinking the new through “the partial, 
always incomplete attempt at what used to be thought of as agency (now agency as 
participation and becoming) within worlding” (Murphie, “Clone” 2).  In this sense, technicity 
in relation to thought amounts to an ethic of negotiating the primary interactivity of life 
(Murphie, "Differential").  In what follows, then, techniques for/of thought are practices that, 
while enhancing the processes of thought and life, are always relational, contingent and 
















Let us begin where we are, in ordinary life; after all, it is always something in our experiential 
world that “forces us to think” (Deleuze, DR 139).  This something—the object of an 
encounter—may be anything: “Socrates, a temple or a demon” (Deleuze, DR 139).  In searching 
for our initial break-out-line, the object of our first encounter is Kathleen Stewart’s book 
Ordinary Affects, and her notion of “the ordinary” (Ordinary 1).  What is the ordinary?  For 
Stewart, it is the “reeling present” (Ordinary 4), which she depicts as “a shifting assemblage of 
practices and practical knowledges, a scene of both liveness and exhaustion” (Ordinary 1).  
Elsewhere, Stewart depicts the ordinary as the “ongoing present” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1028)—a 
“time and place” of here/now that is “an emergent assemblage made up of a wild mix of 
things—technologies, sensibilities, flows of power and money, daydreams, institutions, ways 
of experiencing time and space, battles, dramas, bodily states, and innumerable practices of 
everyday life” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1028).  Similarly, for cultural theorist Lauren Berlant, the 
ordinary is “the rise and fall of quotidian intensities” (“Thinking” 5).  Corresponding to this 
field of the ordinary, Stewart designates “ordinary affects” as the moving sensations, the 
sensory field, that underpin this plane.  Stewart further explains:    
Ordinary affects are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give 
everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and 
emergences.  They’re things that happen … in impulses, sensations, expectations, 
daydreams, encounters, and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms 
of persuasion, contagion and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, and 
agency, and in publics and social worlds of all kinds that catch people up in something 
that feels like something.  (Stewart, Ordinary 2) 
As Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth note, “affect emerges out of muddy, unmediated 
relatedness” (4), which is very much the processes of ordinary life.  Ordinary affects, as the 
intensities and vitalities that fill the quotidian, are experienced as “the promise, or threat, that 
something is happening—something capable of impact” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1041).  Something 
happening is what James calls “something doing”—the “experience of activity,” or the sense of 
event and change that amounts to life itself (Essays 73-74).  Something capable of impact: this 
is the intensity of affect, the multiple tendencies for action and expression that crowd and 
press and make themselves felt.  As D+G put it, affect is neither personal feeling nor 
characteristic, but, rather, an impact with difference—a prepersonal energy or force “that 
throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” (ATP 240).  The differential presence of affect 
is explained by Bergson, when he states that affections (affects) “always interpose themselves 
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between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements I am about to execute” 
(Matter 17).  In other words, as Olkowski explains, “[e]ach and every affection is situated at the 
‘interval’ between a multiplicity of excitations received from ‘without’ and the movements 
about to be executed”—which is to say that affects are “conditioned by a dual movement that 
itself contains a multiplicity” (93).  This “multiplicity” of affect refers to a “zone of 
indetermination” at the heart of the individual or organism, as she/he/it is affected, disturbed, 
disrupted by what happens (Olkowski, Gilles 97, 150).  We have seen how contemporary 
governance and the media capture and utilise affect; the question now is, how can we, in a 
sense, reclaim affect, and, more significantly, how do ordinary affects open to a difference in 
thought?  
 
As a technique for thought, attending to ordinary affects is not to attend to “‘meanings’ per se, 
but rather [to] the way they pick up density and texture as they move through bodies, dreams, 
dramas, and social worldings of all kinds” (Stewart, Ordinary 3).  Put another way, affect is “the 
place where meaning per se collapses and we are left with acts and gestures and immanent 
possibilities” (Stewart “Cultural” 1041).  The immanent potentialities of ordinary affect include, 
as Gregg and Seigworth state, movement, extension and, that which is of most interest here, 
the operation of thought (1).  In discussing Spinoza’s notion of ideas and affects, Deleuze 
describes affect as thought itself—“a non-representational mode of thought” (“S”).  Elsewhere, 
he tells us “it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us” (DR 144).  In 
Stewart’s explanation, ordinary affects are enabling of thought to the extent that they are 
connected to thought’s broader potentialities: 
Their significance lies in the intensities they build and in what thoughts and feelings 
they make possible.  The question they beg is not what they might mean in an order of 
representations, or whether they are good or bad in an overarching scheme of things, 
but where they might go and what potential modes of knowing, relating, and 
attending to things are already somehow present in them in a state of potentiality and 
resonance.  (Stewart, Ordinary 3) 
For Berlant, what we are talking about here is “stopping to think”: “[p]eople are always 
thinking in the sense of making sense of things, when they apprehend what fluctuates without 
challenging very much the procedures of living” (“Thinking” 6).  But stopping to think is 
thinking that “interrupts the flow of consciousness with a new demand for scanning and focus, 
not for any particular kind of cognitive processing” (Berlant, “Thinking” 5).   In other words, 
this kind of thought can be described as “the power of the brain to delay an active relation to 
images, where we select and move according to the needs of life,” so as to allow “the images in 
all their complexity, difference and potential to be thought” (Colebrook, Deleuze 7).  Such 
thinking defies the instantaneity of informationalism.  Such affect-related thought attends to 
“pressure points” (Stewart, Ordinary 5), to “the complex and uncertain objects that fascinate 
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because they literally hit us or exert a pull on us” (Stewart, Ordinary 4).  Such thought requires 
a certain attentiveness: it is “[t]he work of being sentient to the world [we’re] in” (Stewart, 
“Worlding” 353).  In Deleuzian terms, however, stopping to think and attending to affects are 
not acts of a conscious, unified subject who is at the centre of things.  We are not referring to 
“a subjective unity in the nature of an ‘I think’” (Deleuze, DR 145).  Rather, thinking infused by 
affect and intensity takes place across the “fragments of a dissolved self“ and “the borders of a 
fractured I” (Deleuze, DR 145).  This is already to think differently.  For Deleuze, before the self 
or the I there is a domain of individuation, which is the “chaotic and dissemblanced” field of 
indetermination or intensity that forms the “ground” of personhood or subjecthood (Lumsden 
150).   
 
To follow this line further, and to explain one way of “stopping to think,” it is useful to turn to 
the Deleuze-Bergson concept of duration, and its counterpart, intuition.  In general, Bergson 
conceives of the entire universe, all of materiality, in terms of “images that transmit [and 
influence one another through] movement” (Olkowski, Gilles 96).  As Olkowski explains, “the 
image of one’s own body occupies a central position, but only because everything else changes 
as the body moves” (Gilles 96).  Bergson’s images are not the idealist images of representation, 
nor are they what realists call ”things”; instead, they are somewhere between the two (Bergson, 
Matter xi-xii).  Images are quite simply all the phenomena that we perceive through our 
senses, but that also “exist independently” of our perceptions (Bergson, Matter xii).  Affects, to 
repeat differently, are those images that arise between the movement-images we receive from 
outside, and those movement-images we are going to effectuate.  For Bergson, this zone of 
indetermination of affectivity occurs within a larger zone of difference: duration.  In Anna 
Powell’s explanation, all the phenomena we receive through our senses amount to “intense 
sensory stimuli” that can “briefly dissolve our subjective personality” (142); this dissolution of 
personality, or—as Bergson puts it—“the melting of states of consciousness into one another” 
(Time 107), produces an experience of inner fluidity or flux, which is duration.  In order to 
reflect on and communicate this fluid process of inner consciousness, or duration, we usually 
“freeze its intensive flux into discrete thoughts” and structured words; but this is to introduce 
a spatialisation into time as pure intensity (Powell 142).  Before this, the experience of duration 
is “confused, ever changing, and inexpressible” (Bergson, Time 129)—a “perpetual motion of 
images” (Powell 143).  Duration, then, as we have already indicated, is related to time: not the 
time of the clock that is divisible into separate units, but the time of experiential change—
which also encompasses the whole of what has already happened.  Colebrook clarifies: 
Each creative change or difference in life opens a different time or “duration.”  …  
[E]ach perceiving person’s life [is] a constantly differing flow[.]  I am not the same as I 
was a few minutes ago, and the changes I will undergo depend on the specific and 
singular changes I have already undergone; my memory is a constantly altering and 
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opening whole, with each new experience also altering what counts as my past, but 
my past also altering the ways in which I change.  (Deleuze 17)  
Duration, therefore, expresses a non-linear continuity between the past that survives as the 
whole of memory and the absolutely new moment (Lawlor 81).  As Powell puts it, “duration is 
seamless, the continuum of past, present and future” (143): it is time as it is lived, an indivisible 
act of movement.  In Deleuze’s words, duration is “a way of being in time”; it is the “totality 
and multiplicity” of “differences in kind” as opposed to differences in degree (B 32).  Because 
change (lived time) is indivisible, any potential change (or becoming) that is to be undergone 
by a form of existence is always virtually present in duration.  In other words, “duration must 
coincide with the virtual as that which redefines substance in terms of self-alteration” 
(Moulard-Leonard 102). 
 
Life, then, for Deleuze-Bergson, consists of images, existing in different durations, affecting 
one another.  So how does this relate to Berlant’s idea of “stopping to think”?  Stopping to 
think has to do with Bergson’s notion of intuition, which is not the normative understanding 
of intuition as a sort of gut feeling or instinct.  For Bergson, “to think intuitively is to think in 
duration” (Creative Mind 34), which is to say to think from the viewpoint of movement.  
Bergson explains: “immediate intuition shows us motion within duration, and duration 
outside space” (Time 114).  The normative way of thinking (which Bergson call “intelligence”) 
takes a more static approach: 
Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it 
can with immobilities in juxtaposition.  Intuition starts from the movement, posits it, 
or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees immobility only an abstract moment, a 
snapshot taken by our mind … .  For intuition the essential is change … .  (Bergson, 
Creative Mind 34-35) 
Intuition is the means by which duration can be perceived: it “perceives in [duration] an 
uninterrupted continuity of foreseeable novelty” (Bergson, Creative Mind 35).  Put another 
way, if duration is the entire virtual multiplicity of an entity’s different ways of becoming, 
intuition is the mode of perception that can tune into this multiplicity.  Human beings may 
have habitually relied on an intellect that separates the fluidity of duration into discrete, static 
elements, so as to better organise experience into a common stock of ideas and feelings 
(Olkowski, Gilles 129), but the mode of thought that is intuition seeks to locate the fuller 
potential contained in duration—not only one’s own duration, but in the profusion of other 
different durations that abound.  As Deleuze puts it, “[i]ntuition is … the movement by which 
we emerge from our own duration, by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and 
immediately to recogni[s]e the existence of other durations, above or below us” (B 33).  
Thinking in this way is not easy, according to Bergson: the attention required of intuition is 
“arduous,” because thinking the “radically new” is to think our way down “obscure’ and 
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seemingly “incomprehensible” pathways (Creative Mind 35-36).  It takes great effort to “put my 
senses in continuity with one another” and turn away from the normative way of perceiving 
experience (Lawlor 70).  However, to think beyond one’s own usual perspective is to enact an 
“ethics” of thought, as Keith Ansell Pearson suggests (Germinal 33).  It is to establish a 
“sympathetic communication” between ourselves and other forms of life; it expands our 
consciousness to take us into “life’s own domain,” which is “endlessly continued creation” 
(Bergson, Creative Evolution 177-78).  Stopping to think, on this account, is to attend to the gap 
between perception and action—where affect resides.  Thinking intuitively is to employ a 
technique that expands perception and “puts it into immediate contact with sensation” (Thain 
3).  It is to more carefully attune to affect, so as to intuit durations beyond those of immediate 
self-interest (Colebrook, Deleuze 19); it is to turn away from pre-made ideas and the “traps of 
language” (A. E. Pilkington 17), and concentrate one’s focus on the pre-conceptual, pure 
qualities of what is actually happening or being experienced.  Valentine Moulard-Leonard calls 
it a “problemati[s]ing, differentiating and temporali[s]ing method,” which effects a “folding 
over of the psychological and the ontological, of the actual and the virtual” (103).  The 
experience of intuition is always singular, to the extent that its particular duration will always 
be brand new, and other to what has been thought before.   
 
To think in this way is not, Berlant reminds us, the duty of particular people, but is “a general 
opening for cultivating attentiveness and an ethics of mindfulness” (“Thinking” 5).  To enact 
an ethics and politics of affect-based, intuitive thought is to cultivate the technique of an acute 
attention to what’s going on and an intuitive sensing of where else this might carry us.  In 
other words, this is “a style of being present to the struggles of our time” (Gregg and Seigworth 
12).  Indeed, as Colebrook points out, D+G have dedicated much work to uncovering “the 
tendencies of forces from which [contemporary] ‘man’ arose,” and to attempting to intuit new 
ways of being/living—especially outside of capitalism (Deleuze 19).  She extrapolates:  
In their work on capitalism and schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari argue that their 
geology of life—their study of the forces and connections from which the social world 
has emerged—will allow for a reactivation of those forces beyond the restrictive image 
of humanity as a labouring, consuming and upright “man” of reason.  (Deleuze 19) 
In the realm of ordinary affects, then, thought is movement, to the extent that it is always 
encounter, or the sharp (or vague) questions that spin out of disparate things bumping into 
one another.  It is also movement in the sense of duration—the internal differentiation that 
every such question reaches into.  These questions can lead 
 to new ways of being, created in resistance to an unjust situation.  But, in our attentiveness, 
we must be keenly aware that affect will not necessarily move us toward a more ethical state of 
affairs: affect can lead to one thing—or another.  In other words, because of the multiplicity of 
duration, affect does not automatically lead to more life-enhancing thought.  The promise of 
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affect can also deliver something threatening, or painful, or simply more of the same.  “As 
much as we sometimes might want to believe that affect is highly invested in us and with 
somehow magically providing for a better tomorrow …—affect instead bears an intense and 
thoroughly immanent neutrality” (Gregg and Seigworth 10).  It is vital, therefore, to not only 
practise an ethics of affective attentiveness to the generativity embedded in things, but also, to 
actively seek affective encounters that will yield to thought’s highest potential.  One way to do 
this, according to Deleuze, is to follow Spinoza’s principle of endeavouring to avoid “bad” 
encounters, and of aiming for the “active joy” that will increase our powers of being/acting in 
the world (EPS 287-88).  This is to practise a Spinozan ethology of studying “the compositions 
of relations or capacities between different things” (Deleuze, SPP 126).  Will this affective 
encounter lead to an augmentation or diminishment of life?  To ask such a question is also to 
be open to experimentation, for, as Deleuze, interpreting Spinoza, tells us, we do not know in 
advance what a body or mind can do (Deleuze, SPP 125).  Therefore, in being prepared to 
“[l]odge [ourselves] on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an 
advantageous place on it” (D+G, ATP 161), we are practising another technique: “an art of 
organising ‘good encounters,’ or of constructing assemblages (social, political, artistic) in 
which powers of acting and the active affects that follow from them are increased” (Baugh 92).  
Such an ethos would also provide a means of countering what Berlant calls “cruel optimism”: 
that “affective attachment to what we call ‘the good life, which is for so many a bad life that 
wears out [its] subjects” (“Cruel” 97).  In Berlant’s view, one mode of ordinary life in relatively 
wealthy Western countries is the painful contexts of poverty and having-not they also 
encompass; “cruel optimism” defines “a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of 
possibility” (“Cruel” 94).  In other words, cruel optimism describes what binds peoples to 
problematic or deferred objects or scenes of desire.  The promise of the American Dream, for 
example, an optimistic attachment to a fantasy, facilitates a tolerance of and even support for 
the conditions of attrition of the present.  As Berlant puts it, “the ordinariness of suffering, … 
and the ‘technologies of patience’ … enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the 
cruelty of the now” (“Cruel” 97).  But, through acknowledging the contingency of the present, 
and “being open to an encounter that is potentially transformative”—for the better—of the 
habituated normal (Berlant, “Cruel” 113), it is possible to escape the grip of cruel optimism.  
Such an escape involves close attention to—intuiting—affectively imbued lines of flight, and a 
willingness to strive for new ways of thinking the conditions of the present, as well as thinking 
a more equitable future.    
 
Scene 1: The “Political” event of the global financial crisis 
 
As we have seen, oftentimes powerful social forces (such as capitalism and what may be called 
Politics with a capital P [Himada and Manning 5]) harness ordinary affects so that the creative, 
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potentialising thought is not possible.  Sometimes affects lead to a kind of thought that is 
merely representative of what has gone before, or to a thought that invokes optimism—but 
only as a (cruel) means of surviving a damaging ongoing ordinariness.  Before we deal with the 
promise of how affects can feed a more ethically imbued thought, we first explore an example 
of how thought in concert with affects can be channelled so that it proceeds in a more limited 
fashion.  Borrowing from Stewart, whose work often tries to map connective singularities 
across a series of ordinary “scenes” (Ordinary 4-5), we will focus on a particular scene of the 
here and now, attending closely to its affects.  The scene is a current global event, still 
unfolding.  While the here and now traverses a number of levels—the “economic blocs” of 
continents, the scale of global networks, the level of the nation with its mass representations 
and continuous red alerts, the “territorial” level of “daily mobilities,” and the more personal 
“scale of intimacy” (Holmes, “Affectivist”)—we will concentrate initially on the levels of 
economies and the nation.  We will attempt to see how the kind of public thought that is 
emerging on these scales is tightly controlled in comparison with the multiplicitous potentials 
that could be available. 
 
This scene takes place in a present that has become disoriented in terms of its economic 
moorings.  Some pages ago we described our long-running neoliberal milieu, but in late 2008 
the first flutterings of a global financial crisis signalled a possible turn of the politico-economic 
tide.  This crisis followed the sub-prime mortgage crisis that gripped the United States from 
late 2007, causing “widespread economic downturn, massive lay-offs, major exchange-rate 
volatility and a collapse in world gross product” (Elliott 45).  As noted, in September 2008, US 
President George Bush broadcast an “urgent address to the nation,” making a command-style 
bid to “rescue” the American people, and, by extension, the world, from impending economic 
doom.  By January 2009, however, the US had a new president and neo-liberalism was 
“officially” declared at the point of general disaster.  The crisis had become a global 
phenomenon, with some of the consequences being a “big freeze on credit; the disintegration 
of various national financial budgets, such as the Icelandic economy; and, the worldwide 
shrinking of consumer confidence and employment” (Elliott 46).  This excerpt from 2009 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s lengthy, public essay expresses some of the Politically-
charged affects of this scene: 
From time to time in human history there occur events of a truly seismic significance, 
events that mark a turning point between one epoch and the next, when one 
orthodoxy is overthrown and another takes its place.  
… 
There is a sense that we are now living through just such a time: barely a decade into 
the new millennium, …  and barely 30 years since the triumph of neo-liberalism—that 
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particular brand of free-market fundamentalism, extreme capitalism and excessive 
greed which became the economic orthodoxy of our time. 
… 
The agent for this change is what we now call the global financial crisis. In the space 
of just 18 months, this crisis has become one of the greatest assaults on global 
economic stability to have occurred in three-quarters of a century.   
Rudd continues his interpretation of the impacts and urgencies of this “crisis,” rendering an 
affective field that reverberates with fear, threat and tumult: 
The global financial crisis has demonstrated already that it is no respecter of persons, 
nor of particular industries, nor of national boundaries. It is a crisis which is 
simultaneously individual, national and global. It is a crisis of both the developed and 
the developing world. It is a crisis which is at once institutional, intellectual and 
ideological. It has called into question the prevailing neo-liberal economic orthodoxy 
of the past 30 years—the orthodoxy that has underpinned the national and global 
regulatory frameworks … .  
Rudd proceeds to lay the blame for the crisis at the foot of the “unregulated system of extreme 
capitalism” that is rampant neo-liberalism.  From his social democrat perspective, Rudd then 
pushes for a state-driven interventionist recovery programme, and, in his view, it is the newly 
elected US President Obama who should lead this recovery: 
[T]he international challenge for social democrats is to save capitalism from itself: to 
recognise the great strengths of open, competitive markets while rejecting the 
extreme capitalism and unrestrained greed that have perverted so much of the global 
financial system in recent times. … And so it now falls to President Obama's 
administration—and to those who will provide international support for his 
leadership—to support a global financial system that properly balances private 
incentive with public responsibility … .  
Rudd’s reference to President Obama bespeaks what Elliott and Lemert see as “the 
ideali[s]ation of a solitary political figure”—the expression of “the West’s long held belief that 
... an exceptional individual will restore the terms and conditions of a proper individualism” 
(xvii-xviii).  In other words, dogmatic thought’s structures should prevail.  Overall, reactions to 
Rudd’s polemic, published as response pieces, are varied.  Prominent Marxist historian Eric 
Hobsbawm, for example, argues that “market fundamentalism” is now beyond restoration, 
while economist Dean Baker claims that “the villains in the story” are not necessarily “free-
market ideologues,” since such agents were always happy to receive big-business directed 
government protection.  In terms of proposing a way out of the crisis, theorists also differ.  
Although Hobsbawm believes that Rudd does not go far enough in his estimation of “the 
scope and need for future state or other public action,” Rudd himself puts ultimate faith in the 
social democrat notion of the state’s “proper regulation of markets,” and Baker thinks that 
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recovery will come through massive spending programmes and more transparent financial 
regulation. 
 
Many commentators, including those just mentioned, joined political leaders in pointing to 
the “opportunities” engendered by the economic crisis.  Indeed, Baker sees these opportunities 
as hugely impressive—“if we have the courage to be creative and push the limits of the 
possible.”  Such proffering of hope, still within the confines of capitalism, exemplifies the way 
cruel optimism works as a technique of control in managing public affect.  From a Deleuzian 
perspective, though, we have to ask: what are the opportunities offered by the current crisis 
for pushing the boundaries—not of the possible—but into the virtual?  Opportunities of the 
possible may reach outside neo-liberalism, but they fail to stretch beyond the dominance of 
capitalism as a social order or capital as a framework for thought.  Western governments may 
not know “where we are in this depression,” nor “how long or deep it will turn out to be” 
(Hobsbawm), but they tend to agree that finance, economics and (more regulated) markets 
should prevail (Hobsbawn’s Marxist response notwithstanding).  Rudd’s aim, after all, is to 
“save capitalism” (italics added), so while he may strive toward a revision of capitalism, it 
remains … capitalism.  Perhaps even more disturbingly, the move toward stronger financial 
governance may be accompanied by a firmer partnership between governance and the markets 
of war, as Holmes warns (“Financial”).  Indeed, this warning rings in our ears when reading, in 
2009—while economies are crumbling—of US Army’s Chief of Staff General George Casey’s 
announcement that “the reality of permanent war” means that the US is ever ready to go to 
war against North Korea should that country attack South Korea (“US Ready”).   
 
In thinking about whatever opportunities are made possible within this scene of economic 
crisis, we could also remember that we will be restricted by what Tom Lundborg calls “a 
politics of the event.”  Such politics does not refer to the Deleuze-Guatttarian event, but “seeks 
to inscribe meaning on what has happened by making it into a seemingly coherent whole and 
by placing it in accordance with a particular narrative” (Lundborg).  The meaning of this 
particular crisis, produced according to a still dominant capitalist-political framework, is that 
capitalism “went too far,” by failing to restrain markets and by rewarding corporate greed, and 
now it needs to be reined in.  As the event’s narrative carries on unfolding, it continues to turn 
upon capitalism, with its steady cornerstones of finance, (more regulated) markets, and 
(permanent) war.  To meet this politics with thought would be to take up D+G’s call to 
“struggle against capitalism,” for the reason that it “prevents the becomings of subjected 
peoples” (WP 100, 108).  To struggle would be to “take the criticism of [our] own time to its 
highest point” (D+G, WP 99), by looking beyond the Political or historical actualisation of this 
event, and seeking to intuit the event’s virtuality and duration.  For D+G, the historically 
placed or actualised event—in this case as circumscribed by a capitalist framework—is 
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doubled by a more pure event: “[w]hat History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states 
of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its 
self-positing as concept, escapes History” (WP 110).  In other words, every event has both “the 
present moment of its actuali[s]ation, the moment when the event is embodied in a state of 
affairs, an individual, or a person,” as well as a side that is “purely expressed,” which is to say 
impersonal, incorporeal, infinitive—“free of the limitations of a state of affairs”  (D, LS 151, 149).  
Because of the virtuality of the pure event, any event can never be “fully determined”; rather, 
its potential “hides in the background as an unanswered question” (Lundborg).  There is 
always the potential, then, to reach a new understanding of this “crisis,” one that “breaks with 
the dominant way of framing the ‘event’ as this particular ‘thing’” (Lundborg).  Putting it 
differently, it is always possible to “counter-effectuate” an event such as the economic crisis, or 
think it anew.  Patton explains: 
To counter-effectuate events is to consider everyday events from the perspective of 
the “aternal,” as processes whose outcome is not yet determined.  It is to relate them 
back to the pure event or problem of which they appear only as one particular 
determination or solution.  It provides new means of description of the forces which 
shape our future and therefore new possibilities for action.  (“World” Par. 21) 
If we were to approach the event of the economic crisis in a way that strives to access what lies 
beyond the dominant capitalist narrative, we might stand a chance of entering a new milieu.  
What this future might be involve is something not specified by D+G: their philosophy is not 
utopian “in the sense that it posits an ideal … end state to be achieved as a result of this 
struggle” against capitalism (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 180).  Rather, we are urged to 
counter-actualise or counter-effectuate the event as it is predominantly conceived in order to 
follow an open-ended, creative train of thought that would allow us to “perceive the world 
differently” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 181).  This would enable us to think in the vicinity 
of “the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come” (D+G, WP 32-33). 
  
Finance, markets, war, capitalism.  Perhaps we can open to a way of thinking in which “life is 
not finance” (Holmes, “Financial”), or, rather, where there is more to life than finance.  At 
present, we certainly live in a society that celebrates money, and we may have a “(however 
contradictory) interest in the daily functioning and reproduction of financial capitalism” 
because of our “current dependence on it” (Panitch and Gindin 27).  But perhaps there are 
better ways of living.  Perhaps there are ways that break from the dominance of capital, that 
avoid war, and that “allow people to take care of each other” (Holmes, “Financial.”)  Perhaps 
such ways of thinking might more successfully arise out of other levels of life, such as the 
richly affective “scale of intimacy”: 
 And so finally we reach the scale of intimacy, of skin, of shared heartbeats and 
feelings, the scale that goes from families and lovers to people together on a street 
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corner, in a sauna, a living room or a cafe. It would seem that intimacy is irretrievably 
weighted down in our time, burdened with data and surveillance and seduction, 
crushed with the determining influence of all the other scales. But intimacy is still an 
unpredictable force, a space of gestation and therefore a wellspring of gesture, the 
biological spring from which affect drinks.  (Holmes, “Affectivist”) 
“Scales of intimacy” are where we experience the resonances and intensities that are Stewart’s 
ordinary affects.  At the global and national scales of the Politics of events, ordinary affects are 
subject to manipulation (cruel optimism) and regulation.  But affects are replete with sense: 
they harbour thought’s potential, to the extent that they register “not only points of 
breakdown in the system, but also lines of possible breakthrough” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1035).  
Let us return to the lived event of the financial crisis, then, but now as an event that resonates 
through and impacts upon actual and virtual bodies.  Let us see whether it can set off an event 
to come, one that Rudd, Obama and associates would not have us dream of. 
 
Alternative scene: The ordinary event of the global financial crisis 
 
It’s an event of watching and waiting.  Of attached and also detached attention.  Because it’s 
an event ungraspable no-one knows quite how bad or big it is, or not, or when it will, or won’t, 
end.  There is a sense of something going on but we can’t tell whether it’s moving up or down 
or whether it’s slowing to the point of nothing much happening at all.  Some of us are afraid, 
some wary, some of us only read about it in the paper.  The papers, all media, have a lot to say, 
to the point where we become buffeted by the opinions and then have no clue what else to 
think.  The media puts us in the middle of it, makes it real.  The media feeds us “[p]artial 
scenes saturated with expectations, impressions [that are] too easily gathered into a narrative 
of social decline” (Stewart, Ordinary 26-27).  You might still have the same job and the same 
life so the paper incites you to get excited about spending your government’s cash handout on 
a new TV or a new wardrobe.
38
  Or perhaps you’re watching the property market, hawk-like.  
You watch interest rates fall but still you delay selling and upscaling your home, even though 
you’ve outgrown this one and the kids have no space to do their homework or play outside 
and everyone’s at each other’s throats most of the time.  Or you get evicted because you can’t 
keep up with the rent and you sleep in the car while you wait for the call from public housing, 
and now you are afraid.  You might feel disconnected and wait for the news to change. You 
might get tired of it all, done in.  Or you watch, poised, ready for action, focused on the next, 
unknown scene.  All this waiting for the economy to lift, all this intensity, suddenly you start 
getting an irregular heartbeat for the first time, and a burning reflux that antacids won’t fix.  
The doctor says its stress.  The paper says the economic turndown is causing employers to 
worry that productivity will go down because their employees are so stressed about the 
economic turndown.  You might find yourself no longer an employee, which means that you 
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have to renege on your monthly payments to World Vision, which means that the poor will 
get poorer, which causes you more stress.   
 
“The drama melds to the ordinary” (Stewart, “Watching”).  Life goes on, as they say, which 
means that “[t]he ordinary throws itself together out of forms, flows, powers, pleasures, 
encounters, distractions, drudgery, denials, practical solutions, shape-shifting forms of 
violence, daydreams, and opportunities lost and found” (Stewart, Ordinary 29).  The ordinary 
pulls us along, through impacts and scenes and flat spots and ways of being that constantly 
develop, regardless of where we may have meant to go.  Things happen.  Like the financial 
crisis, which, at the scale of a Politically charged, global economic event is perceived quite 
homogenously, but which, at the level of daily mobilities and intimacies, is wildly 
heterogeneous.  The pure event of the economic crisis involves flashes of its own virtuality, as 
yet unactualised.  We sense these flashes.  We feel the potential shadowing the ordinary, there 
is more than this, more than we can read about or are experiencing now.  This is not being 
optimistic but, rather, sensing the surfeit of what is actually happening, attending to 
emergences that are barely present, but could be.  “A scene might appear of something that 
looks like ‘getting a life’” (Stewart, “Watching”).  Or finding another way.  You might start to 
notice pockets of life that reduce the power of finance.  A purity of tenderness, for example, in 
the way your aunt laughs (and cries) with the residents at the nursing home where she 
volunteers, and in the careful way your neighbour looks after his chickens and his vegetable 
garden.  You see generosity in his sharing with you the few eggs he gathers.  You experience 
the force of real connection at a local swap meet, where neighbours swap excess vegetables 
they have grown for something different—another friend’s excess fruit, a book on gardening, 
some seedlings, a promise of child-minding.  You find yourself thinking more about the 
negativising power of this massive free marketplace, whose crash is creating so many intimate 
hardships and heartaches.  Every day you are confronted by the market, that “extraordinary 
generator of both wealth and misery” (Deleuze, N 172), whose demand that the axiom of 
property security take precedence over—effectively suspend—any axiom relating to human 
rights (D+G, WP 107).  So, even as you are being urged by the state to spend up big so as to 
buoy the economy, you wonder if there is any potential for life outside the voracious world 
market.  You opt out of Facebook and stop watching YouTube for entertainment.  You read 
Judith Levine’s book Not Buying It: My Year Without Shopping, which describes her attempt to 
“withdraw from the marketplace” for one year (8).  Pondering whether “a person [can] have a 
social, community, or family life, a business, a connection to the culture, an identity, even a 
self outside the realm of purchased things and experiences,” Levine and her partner decide to 
live for twelve months buying “only necessities for sustenance, health, and [their home] 
business” (8, 7).  The insights and rewards of their year of non-consumption are numerous, 
but perhaps the most pertinent are, firstly, their “discovery that people like to help you,” and, 
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more crucially, their enjoyment of an overall exposure to a “wider range of small 
experiences”—an outcome that they regard as “embracing the ordinary” (251, 263).  There are 
other ways of resisting consumer culture, such as participating in one of the events promoted 
by Adbusters—an anti-consumerism activist group.  In trying to create a “world in which the 
economy and ecology resonate in balance,” Adbusters call for participation in their annual 
anti-consumption campaigns: the Buy Nothing Day, and TV Turnoff Week (“About 
Adbusters”).  Instead of watching television, you might finally start to learn the guitar, learn 
something you can play for others, or take the kids camping for the first time, or make that 
move to the countryside where the supply of information is not so excessive.  New actions and 
ways of thinking can open up when we pay attention—make the effort to follow affects into 
thoughts beyond finance and the market.  Apply a technique of intuition, an ethics of 
mindfulness.  New questions arise, such as what other durations are hiding in the scenes of the 
crisis?  The capitalist axiomatic may fully inhabit the social space, but capitalism “is also in 
motion, providing a space of becoming, of undecidability … of background that might become 
foreground” (Gibson-Graham 89-90).  The everyday life of the crisis “is a life lived on the level 
of surging affects, impacts suffered or barely avoided.  It takes everything we have.  But it also 
spawns a little series of something dreamed up in the course of things” (Stewart, Ordinary 9). 
 
Thinking concepts, or, doing philosophy 
 
Stewart’s reference to a “little series of something dreamed up in the course of things” may 
appear, at first glance, somewhat inconsequential in terms of the overall quest here to escape 
thought’s dominant images.  In fact, it is highly germane.  For if “the course of things” is the 
event, the “little series of something” might become the significant concepts that arise out of 
this event.  The notion that radically new, life-enhancing concepts can be generated by an 
event is crucial to D+G’s formulation of a more creative thought: indeed, for them, concept 
creation is the essence of philosophical thought—philosophy itself “is the art of forming, 
inventing, and fabricating concepts” (WP 2).  So here we move from nonphilosophical modes 
of thought to philosophy proper, as D+G conceive it.  This is not to denigrate 
nonphilosophical thought, which is necessary, experimental, productive—the “moving desert 
that concepts come to populate” (D+G, WP 41).  Indeed, as Massumi explains, the 
nonphilosophical is an essential component of thought: the “becomings of thought cours[e] in 
from the outside of non-philosophy, through philosophy, then back out again in potentialised 
overspill” (“What” 8).  For Deleuze, however, the concepts created in philosophical thought—
concepts that are “along the lines of the Singular, the Important, the New”—are “full of a 
critical, political force of freedom” (TRM 238; N 32).  Such concepts are not those that refer to 
pre-given essences or true forms (in this sense a concept would be merely "a container for 
cognitive content" [Penner 45]), but concepts that are singularly, processually created in 
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response to "problems without which they would have no meaning" (D+G, WP 16).   As Patton 
puts it, “[t]hey do not provide a truth which is independent of the plane of immanence upon 
which they are constructed” (Introduction 1).  While such thinking is of a philosophical nature, 
then, it is “never just a theoretical matter”; rather, it is "to do with vital problems … To do with 
life itself” (Deleuze, N 105).  To create concepts is to engage in the political or utopian practice 
of thought, addressing thought to “our problems, to our history,” and “connect[ing] up with 
what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism” (WP 27, 100).  According to 
Deleuze, “philosophical thinking has never been more important than it is today” (N 32), given 
the problems of our times.  The invention of concepts is crucial inasmuch as it takes the 
critique of the present “to its highest point” (D+G, WP 99).  In order to see how concept 
creation may be useful in responding to the financial crisis, then, let us delve a little more into 
this way of thought. 
 
As noted earlier, for D+G, the concept is the "act of thought" that "speaks the event" (WP 21).  
By "event" they do not mean a particular happening, but, rather, they are referring to the Stoic 
notion that incorporeal intensivities (virtually) underlie (or overlay) every actual occurrence or 
thing: "the event of the Other or of the face [or of] the bird" (D+G, WP 21)—or of the global 
financial crisis.  The event of each of these things is not the “visible state of affairs” but the 
excess or reserve beyond what is seeable/sayable: “the event is pure immanence of what is not 
actuali[s]ed or what remains indifferent to actuali[s]ation” (D+G, WP 36, 156).  Thinking 
philosophy—constructing concepts—is to express the event of a situation, it is to reach into 
the virtual and “counter-actualise” the way something has already been effectuated or 
conceived.  To this extent, “[e]very concept shapes and reshapes the event in its own [new] 
way” (D+G, WP 34).  To explain it another way, Patton invokes D+G’s geophilosophical 
notions of absolute as opposed to relative deterritorialisation: 
[R]elative deterritoriali[s]ation concerns the historical relationship of things to the 
territories into which they are organised, including the manner in which these 
territories break down and are transformed or reconstituted into new forms. Absolute 
deterritoriali[s]ation concerns the a-historical relationship of things and states of 
affairs to the virtual realm of becoming or pure events that is imperfectly or partially 
expressed in what happens.  (“Political” 8)  
Concepts are formed in the zone of absolute deterritorialisation, which means that through 
concept formation we can “[disassociate] the pure event from the particular form in which it 
has been actualised” (Patton, “Future” 26).  It is a new way of being, a new event, which 
concepts point toward: a new way of seeing the present so as to open a different future.  D+G 
elaborate: “the task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to extract an 
event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to give 
them a new event: space time, matter, thought, the possible as events” (WP 33).  Their 
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commitment to concept creation leads D+G to promote a “pedagogy of the concept,” which 
involves analysing “the conditions of creation of factors of always singular moments” (WP 12).  
As Stengers points out, “pedagogy means the creation of a habit,” the habit here being 
“learning the ‘taste’ of concepts and the way one can be modified by the encounter with 
concepts” (“Experimenting” 52).  In practising this pedagogy, we can aim to construct more 
ethical concepts of the events that befall us, and, therefore, strive to redirect the future from 
the strictures and injustices of the present. 
 
Having worked through some of the hallmarks of what a concept is, we now turn to the 
important matter of where concepts come from.  To be sure, they don’t “turn up ready-made, 
they don’t pre-exist”: they have to be invented, created (D, N 32).  One key aspect in the 
process of concept invention is the role of affect.  Concepts are made in response to specific, 
situated problems with all the flows of affects they involve, which means that, as D+G put it, 
there is a “rich tissue of correspondences” between the plane of affects and the plane of 
concepts (WP 199).  Stating it differently, thinking—as concept building—connects with an 
event through the intensity of its affects.  James Williams tells us that in Deleuze’s view, “we 
have intimations of significance prior to well-defined concepts and to knowledge, not the 
opposite.  What is more, these intimations are irreducible and critical elements of the 
concept” (Gilles 32).  These intimations are affects, the “felt force” of a situation, and, as 
Manning puts it: “felt force is a concept-in-waiting” (“Creative” 10).  The felt force of affect is a 
“pulsion to think,” a pulsion to create concepts (Manning, “Creative” 8).  To move the pulsion 
from feeling to thought Manning suggests attending carefully to all the relational elements of 
a situation (the evental aspects) so as to invite “thought’s virtual potential into the articulation 
of a concept” (“Creative” 22).  For Manning, other practices that move felt-thought towards 
concept-formation include the techniques of speculation, and of making propositions 
(“Creative” 15, 18).  Here, Manning is referring to ideas from process philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead, who promotes speculative thought, since it “always has the status of an hypothesis 
subject to revision” (Neville 93), and propositions, which indicate not only the way things are, 
but the felt potentialities of future actualisations (the way things might be), which can be 
expressed as proposals and suggestions (Durand 210).
39
  To put these Whiteheadean 
techniques simply, in striving to create new concepts out of affects, it is useful to adopt the 
stance of always being willing to make an attempt at new ideas, to experiment, without 
concern for judgement or truth/falsity.  To invoke Guattari, “it is sometimes necessary to … 
run the risk of being wrong, to give it a go, … [t]o respond to the event as the potential bearer 
of new constellations of Universes of references” (C 18).  After all, as Whitehead says, “[t]he 
vitality of thought is in adventure” (Dialogues 250).  Further, from D+G’s perspective, it is 
helpful to remember that, while concepts must be created, it is not necessary to reinvent the 
wheel: concepts “are never created from nothing” (D+G, WP 19).  All concepts have a history, 
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which is to say, “there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which 
corresponded to other problems and presupposed other planes” (D+G, WP 18).  As Patton 
explains, “[t]he history of concepts therefore includes the variations they undergo in their 
migration from one problem to another” (Deleuze 13).  At the same time, though, concepts are 
also connected to other concepts in their own milieu, at the convergence of related problems.  
D+G call this connection a concept’s “becoming” and describe it thus: “[h]ere concepts link up 
with each other, support one another, coordinate their contours, articulate their respective 
problems, and belong to the same philosophy, even if they have different histories” (WP 18).  
Concepts, overall then, are complex and living, “like invisible creatures” (D, TRM 238); in 
Massumi’s phrasing, their composition is always in process (“Deleuze” 565).  Since it is a 
mobile assemblage it is, therefore, not appropriate to judge a concept according to its 
semantic contents.  Rather, a concept “submits itself to judgement only to the extent to which 
it awakens concern, taking on ‘importance’ in the world” (Massumi, “What” 10).  As Alliez puts 
it, “the concept is valid only insofar as it enables” (“Questionnaire” 81), and it does this to the 
extent that “it is collectively felt to make a difference” (Massumi “What” 10).  The value of a 
concept, then, lies in what it does, what new affects it gives rise to, what new ways of feeling, 
thinking, living it inspires.  Hence, not only do affects feed into concepts, affects are also 
engendered by them.  Altogether, “[c]oncepts are inseparable from affects, i.e. from the 
powerful effects they have on our life,” but they are also indivisible from “percepts, i.e. the new 
ways of seeing or perceiving they provoke in us” (Deleuze, TRM 238).  Because affects are 
becomings (D+G, ATP 256), the ordinary affects of an event such as the financial crisis are 
open to becoming something else: new ways of thinking in the form of new concepts.  In turn, 
these new concepts have the capacity to beget new affects and percepts, new becomings, new 
forces for a people-to-come.  
 
Crises and concept creation 1: becoming-revolutionary  
 
The ordinary affects of an event, then, have immense potential.  They have the potential to 
become creatively political when they contribute to the development of concepts and ways of 
living that step outside the dominant language of capitalist crises and recovery programmes.  
The ordinary affects of this financial crisis are surely turning up new concepts right now, for, 
as D+G point out, thought advances by way of shocks and crises (WP 203).  The “strong 
sensory lives” of our ordinary experiences (Stewart, “Watching”) are encountering shocks and 
“micro-shocks” (Massumi, “Of Microperception”), which are opening to flashes of alternatives, 
new proposals, speculations about another future.  If we were to turn to D+G to direct us 
toward particular solutions, we would find, as noted earlier, no suggestion that any ideal state 
is the perfect alternative to capitalism and its problems.  However, D+G do proffer two 
concepts that may prove helpful if recast in response to the current circumstances.  These two 
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concepts, as Patton notes, appear later in D+G’s work, and signal an “awareness of normative 
political issues that were less prominent in earlier writings“ (Patton, “Utopian” 42).  The two 
concepts—“becoming-revolutionary” and “becoming-democratic”—are normatively inflected, 
since, like all concepts, they carry references to their earlier histories.  However, in D+G’s 
usage, they work to “express an open-ended and immanent utopianism” rather than any 
specific, determinate future (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 180).  The concept of becoming-
revolutionary, for example, alluded to in ATP and developed in Deleuze’s Dialogues and D+G’s 
What Is Philosophy?, does not refer to the history or future of bloody revolutions and their 
militants.  Rather, this is “a becoming-revolutionary that, according to Kant himself, is not the 
same as the past, present, or future of revolutions” (D+G, WP 112-13).  The latter kind of 
revolution is an “eternal impossibility” (Deleuze, D 147).  Indeed, in Deleuze’s view, “[t]he 
question of the future of the revolution is a bad question because … there are so many people 
who do not become revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question 
of the revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place” (D 147).  So what does 
the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of becoming-revolutionary refer to?  To a “new kind of 
revolution [that is] in the course of becoming possible” (Deleuze, D 147).  This new kind of 
revolution is both  “plane of immanence [and] infinite movement,” as the following elucidates: 
That the two great modern revolutions, American and Soviet, have turned out so 
badly does not prevent the concept from pursuing its immanent path.  As Kant 
showed, the concept of revolution exists not in the way in which revolution is 
undertaken in a necessarily relative social field but in the “enthusiasm” with which it 
is thought on an absolute plane of immanence … . …  As concept and as event, 
revolution is self-referential or enjoys a self-positing that enables it to be apprehended 
in an immanent enthusiasm without anything in states of affairs or lived experience 
being able to tone it down, not even the disappointments of reason.  Revolution is 
absolute deterritoriali[s]ation even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new 
people.  (D+G,WP 101) 
Becoming-revolutionary, then, is a manifestation of absolute deterritorialisation—it is “like a 
reserve of freedom or movement in reality” that ensures the “permanent possibility of 
movement beyond present limits to our individual and collective capacities” (Patton, “Future” 
25, 27).  Indeed, it could be seen as a way out of cruel optimism, that which tethers subjects to 
their present conditions: it is a concept that confirms the permanent potential for social 
change.  In practice, become-revolutionary may be said to “encompasses the myriad forms of 
minoritarian-becoming open to individuals and groups” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 182).  
While minority groups may seek to be accepted by the majority, the minoritarian-becoming of 
D+G’s revolution is the becoming-minor (becoming-impoverished, becoming-indigenous, 
becoming-woman) of everyone: it is an impetus that seeks to displace majority thinking by 
introducing uncontrollable difference or “continuous variation” into majoritarian notions of 
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social order (see D+G, ATP 105-06).  Open to all, becoming-revolutionary allows for “the 
possibility of transformation in [various] forms of social organisation” (Patton, Deleuze 83), 
inasmuch as it continuously displaces social boundaries.  Indeed, its success or “victory” is that 
it installs new bonds between people (D+G, WP 177).  It is even possible to conceive of 
becoming-revolutionary in terms of freedom, as Patton does: “Freedom is manifest in [the] 
moments of becoming-revolutionary, whether in a personal or social sense, but this is a 
different concept of freedom to that which underpins liberal or liberation theories alike” 
(Deleuze 83).  Becoming-revolutionary is the freedom to become the altogether new earth and 
people.   
 
The openings to take up and recreate the concept of becoming-revolutionary and in order to 
invent the new in the face of the global financial crisis environment are manifold.  One 
possible method of becoming-revolutionary, for example, relates to both the Levine and 
Adbuster projects as described above, which support the ecologically derived concept of 
“sustainability.”  The notion of sustainability, driven by the logic of “sufficiency” rather than by 
capitalism’s pivotal principle “efficiency” (Princen), is, of course, not a novel concept.  
Introduced to the political mainstream over twenty years ago by the UN’s Brundtland 
Commission (Bass 10), sustainability or “sustainable development” was defined as “a process of 
change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of 
technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well 
as present needs” (United Nations).  In other words, meeting the present needs of all groups of 
people (not just the wealthy), while also being responsible for future generations.  But while 
the “idea” of sustainability “has been pretty well absorbed” by now, most governments, 
businesses and individuals have not yet felt “the burn to act,” and practices of unsustainability 
have continued to prevail (Bass 11, 12).  To recreate the concept of becoming revolutionary in 
our time, then, might involve recognising that “[t]he root of our economic crisis and the root 
of our ecological and sustainability crises [is] the same”: that root being the “guiding principle” 
of expansion—of wealth, technology and power (J. Buchanan).  As Guattari points out, 
“[p]roduction for the sake of production—the obsession with the rate of growth, whether in 
the capitalist market or in planned economies—leads to monstrous absurdities” (C 21).  
Responding to this crisis in becoming-revolutionary, therefore, may involve “redefining our 
‘needs,’” changing our “patterns of hyper-consumption,” and “embark[ing] upon a more 
sustainable path forward—economically, communally and environmentally” (J. Buchanan).  It 
would involve promoting the understanding that “[t]he only acceptable finality of human 
activity is the production of a subjectivity that is auto-enriching its relation to the world in a 
continuous fashion” (Guattari, C 21).  A becoming-revolutionary response might mean 
radically challenging existing notions of progress; for example, the New Economic Foundation 
(NEF; a sustainable-economics “think-and-do tank”) has established “National Accounts of 
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Well-Being”: new measures of assessing “societal progress” that operate “[i]In contrast to the 
conventional narrow focus on economic indicators, [and] allow governments to directly and 
regularly measure people’s subjective well-being: their experiences, feelings and perceptions of 
how their lives are going” (National).  NEF executive director Stewart Wallis may well have 
been operating as a becoming-revolutionary when he took this message to the 2009 Davos 
World Economic Forum, speaking to “the assembled money-makers” about “the importance of 
‘gross domestic happiness,’ as opposed to gross domestic product” (Lewis).  Becoming-
revolutionary in the here-and-now provides no particular programme for us to follow.  
Instead, it simply calls for close attention to the minoritarian forms of resistance that are 
cropping up around us, attunement to and trying out of resistances that suggest lines of flight 
to the outside of present day capitalism’s inequalities, short-sightednesses and intolerabilities.  
As Patton notes, D+G “do not envisage global revolutionary change but rather a process of 
‘active experimentation’ which is played out in between economic and political institutions 
and the sub-institutional movements of desire and affect” (Deleuze 7).  This, then, is one of the 
conceptual pathways available to us, individually and collectively, out of the current crisis.   
 
Crises and concept creation 2: becoming-democratic 
 
The second Deleuze-Guattarian concept that might be called upon and redeveloped as a 
response to the current global crisis is “becoming-democratic.”  There is a relationship 
between this concept and the one just visited—a becoming between the two—as pointed out 
by Philippe Mengue: becoming-revolutionary is inseparable from becoming-democratic, since 
“[b]ecoming-revolutionary is immanent to the plane of thought that underlies the public space 
of democracies” (183).  Patton also sees a relationship, but for him “becoming-revolutionary as 
the path towards a new earth and a ‘people to come’ is modulated by the call for resistance to 
existing forms of democracy” (“Utopian” 44).  Existing forms of democracy have nothing to do 
with what D+G call becoming-democratic; indeed, D+G are quite scathing of prevailing 
democracies, telling us that the new earth and new people “will not be found in our 
democracies” (WP 108).  A becoming-democracy, they emphasise, “is not the same as what 
[democratic] States of law are,” since present day democracy is the Greek “society of friends” 
appropriated by capitalism (WP 113, 98).  As Jérémie Valentin notes, we may be “prone to think 
that the model of liberal democracy has prevailed, and that there is no point in critici[s]ing it,” 
but D+G refuse to accept this view (199).  Although D+G reject present manifestations of 
democracy, they imply that other actualisations of the concept are still possible, since 
becoming-democratic calls upon the “pure event of democracy” (Patton, “Utopian” 44).  As a 
more pure event, becoming-democratic may be said to “begin again at every moment” 
(Mengue 183), which is to say it expresses a virtual dimension that always offers its 
actualisations something creative and new.  Indeed, for Derrida, democracy is always-already 
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virtual: “we do not yet know what democracy will have meant nor what democracy is.  For 
democracy does not present itself; it has not yet presented itself, but that will come” (9).  But 
while Derrida’s democracy-to-come refers to a perpetually deferred, never actualisable future, 
D+G’s becoming-democracy offers the potential for new actualisation: it does not remain 
entirely in the realm of the virtual since new forms of the democratic are always available to be 
actualised and brought to life. 
 
While the economic crisis prompts us to think about what changes could be necessary to 
move beyond the present issues, we have the opportunity to engage in real thought by way of 
a concept such as becoming-democratic.  The prevailing concept of liberal democracy, as 
reterritorialised by capitalism, involves considerable contradiction and points of conflict, 
many of which may have contributed to the developing crisis.  The Deleuze-Guattarian 
concept of becoming-democratic offers “ways of criticising the workings of actual existing 
democracies,” and—because it calls upon the fullness of the concept (the event of 
democracy)—it does this “in the name of the egalitarian principles that are supposed to inform 
[current democracies’] institutions and political practices” (Patton, “Utopian” 50).  In bringing 
to bear this concept it is important to identify some of the contradictory elements of modern 
democratic states.  According to Patton, Deleuze (and Guattari) refer to several points of 
conflict, of which we will consider three.  First, there is the problem of the “coexistence of 
formally equal rights alongside enormous disparities of material condition” (“Utopian” 50).  
Although one of the charters of modern democracies may be  “to ensure that the basic rights 
of citizens have at least approximately equal value for all” (Patton, “Utopian” 50), such states 
ultimately submit to the “universal market” (D, N 172)—the axiomatic of global capitalism.  As 
Deleuze states, the market has no interest in equal rights, and every existing democratic state 
is “compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery” (N 173).  Not only are 
the rewards of market economies inequitably distributed, but any human rights laws are 
effectively suspended when substantial property ownership is involved (D+G, WP 107).  This 
has become especially evident during “foreclosure crisis” element of the financial crisis in the 
USA—whereby millions of people have lost their homes due to the often-illegal foreclosures of 
their mortgages.
40
  That poor, black and other minority communities have been the worst 
affected by the housing crisis was confirmed by a 2010 Princeton University study, which 
found that “the greater the degree of Hispanic and especially black segregation a metropolitan 
area exhibits, the higher the number and rate of foreclosures it experiences” (Rugh and Massey 
644).  Because predatory lending and subsequent foreclosures were concentrated in segregated 
poor, black communities, the authors conclude that America’s foreclosure crisis was racialised, 
and “occurred because of a systematic failure to enforce basic civil rights laws in the United 
States” (Rugh and Massey 646).   
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Further, as Patton suggests, when a financial benefit is on offer, democratic states will often 
overlook the oppressive actions of dictatorial states  (“Becoming-Democratic” 188).  We can 
think here of Vietnam, which, since the early 2000s, has become a significant trading partner 
for Australia: in 2009, Australia-Vietnam trade amounted to $AU6 billion, a substantial 
portion of Australia’s total trade with South East Asia (“Vietnam”).  At the same time, Vietnam 
maintains what amounts to a communist dictatorship: its one party government controls all 
media and its constitution disallows “any challenge to the party’s primacy, no matter how non-
violent” (F. Brown 329).  The human rights advocacy organisation Human Rights Watch 
regularly highlights cases of oppression and unjust imprisonment in Vietnam, condemning the 
government for its “lack of tolerance for dissent and denial of fundamental human rights to 
freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religious belief” (Colm).  During a recent 
visit to Vietnam, our tourist guide spoke of poverty, corruption, and his belief that ninety 
percent of South Vietnamese would leave the country if they were allowed.  Far from being 
free to speak this way, this guide’s anti-government pronouncements bordered on treason 
according to Vietnamese law.  Some do attempt to escape the regime, but only to encounter 
more problems in their country of arrival.  In March 2011, for example, a group of Vietnamese 
asylum seekers were found off the coast of Broome, Western Australia; this discovery caused 
an “immigration headache” for the Australian government: “The arrival foreshadows a 
diplomatic problem for Australia, which regards Vietnam as a friendly nation and an 
important trading partner.  Determining that Vietnamese nationals had been persecuted in 
their home country would open a rift with Hanoi” (B. Harvey).  Opening a rift with Hanoi is 
not desirable if trade profit will suffer, which means that these new arrivals are unlikely to be 
granted refugee status (their “jumping the queue” offers a likely justification for this refusal).  
A capitalist democracy will always put money before a democratic principal such as equality, 
especially in the shadow of a financial crisis.   
   
The second problematical aspect of existing democracies also relates to capitalism’s 
dominance, and concerns the kinds of opinions that circulate in society.  If “[d]emocratic 
politics is inseparable from the play of conflicting opinions in order to determine a collective 
will as the basis for laws and public policy” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 186), then such 
opinions need to be entirely immanent, without being subject to any overlying criteria.  Yet, as 
D+G proclaim, the play of opinion in contemporary democracies all too often strives toward 
the consensus of the “universal liberal opinion,” which simply expresses “the cynical 
perceptions and affections of the capitalist him[/her]self” (WP 146).  Putting it another way, 
D+G argue that the “values, ideals, and opinions of our time” are founded upon the “vulgarity 
of existence that haunt democracies” (WP 107).  The role of the media in disseminating the 
capitalist line rather than an authentic problematisation of states of affairs is, as we have seen, 
particularly disturbing.  In addition to the flow of this kind of everyday opinion, D+G discuss 
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the role of a society’s more “philosophical” opinions.  These kinds of public opinions are 
“nationalitarianisms,” because they are “marked by the national characteristics” of a people 
(D+G, WP 104).  This is dogmatic thought at work.  As Patton explains, such opinions are 
embedded in a people’s national “conceptions of right and their practical philosophy as this is 
expressed in political and legal institutions” (“Utopian” 55).  Particular forms of democracy, 
then, will not only be qualified by capitalistic constraints, but also by nationalistic, 
transcendental notions of rights; for example, “[o]pinions about the natural hierarchies of race, 
sex and class have long influenced … basic political and civil rights in otherwise democratic 
societies” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 187).  When former Prime Minister Rudd spoke of 
and for “the Australian people,” for example, in his responses to the financial crisis, it is 
unlikely he was recognising the countless indigenous Australians who do not share in 
capitalism’s rewards.    
 
The third incongruity of present democracies is linked to this operation of opinion, to the 
extent that opinion is a particularly narrow form of thought (D+G, WP 146).  The opinion that 
matters in a democracy is that of the majority, and this does not only apply to a quantitative 
majority.  There is also a qualitative majority at work in democracies, a majority that relates to 
the prior question—always settled in advance—“majority of whom?” (Patton, “Becoming-
Democratic” 191).  As we discovered in Part 1, the majority refers to those who are fit to be 
counted (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 191), or who match the “model you have to conform 
to: the average adult male city-dweller, for example” (D, N 173).  In light of the financial crisis, 
we should add “white” and “wealthy” to that description.  The strength of majority opinion is 
evidenced by the resilience of capitalism during this crisis: one year into the height of the 
crisis the Carnegie Endowment, a “Global Think Tank” based in Washington, declared 
capitalist democracy intact: 
[C]oncerns that the discrediting of U.S.-style capitalism would lead to a guilt-by-
association discrediting of democracy have proven unfounded.  Indeed, despite early 
bluster, alternatives to capitalism have not gained much traction.  Many countries are 
trying to strengthen their regulatory systems, but are not throwing out capitalism 
[read: democracy] altogether.  (Davis and Carothers) 
As a concept of resistance, becoming-democratic strives “to broaden the base of those who 
count as citizens,” again through the vector of minoritarian-becoming (Patton, “Becoming-
Democratic” 191).  As such, the majority subject is challenged by efforts to secure the legal and 
political equivalence of a whole range of minorities—those outside the majority according to 
“sexual preference, physical and mental abilities, and cultural and religious backgrounds” 
(Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 191), as well as according to race and financial status.  Of 
course, as we have seen, the concept of becoming(-imperceptible) can undo these categories 
altogether, but as a first step towards this, the concept of becoming-democratic is one surely 
 136 
worth developing.  If “[d]emocracies are majorities,” and “a becoming is by nature that which 
eludes the majority” (D+G, WP 108), becoming-democratic is a concept of resistance. 
 
How, then, might we move to recreate the concept of becoming-democratic in the here and 
now?  In Patton’s submission, this will involve working through several related issues.  For 
example, in response to the problem of existing democracies’ material inequality, the 
normative question might be asked: “what principles of distribution should apply in a just 
democratic society?” (Patton, “Utopian” 50).  In terms of current democracies’ opinions—both 
everyday and more “philosophical”—regarding what is fair and justifiable, becoming-
democratic brings us to the idea “that more genuinely democratic forms of public political 
reason are both possible and desirable” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 189), and should be 
negotiated.  And concerning the notion of the majority subject, becoming-democratic 
demands attention to minoritarian-becomings, which will have at least two effects: altering 
“the affects, beliefs and political sensibilities of a population in ways that amount to the advent 
of a new people” (Patton, “Utopian” 52), and permanently destabilising the fact of a majority 
subject with the force of difference.  Overall, in Patton’s estimation, the concept of becoming-
democratic can be seen as “a means to counter-actualise what passes for democratic society in 
the present,” to the extent that “it challenges existing opinions about what is acceptable, right 
or just” (“Becoming-Democratic” 190).  Taking the concept of becoming-democratic through a 
different vector, though, we might turn to Manning’s consideration of the meeting between 
democracy, politics and touch.  Through her concept of the “politics of touch,” Manning 
strives toward an alternative to the kind of democracy sanctioned by state Politics—with its 
reliance of representation, signification and the foreclosure of meaning (Politics 111).  
Underpinned by D+G’s espousal of “expression”—as opposed to communication or 
representation—Manning’s suggestions toward a concept of democracy start with “the sensing 
body in movement” (Politics 111).  For D+G, expression is the self-moving, impersonal agency 
(Massumi, “Introduction” xxi) that expresses all the coming-into-beings of the world, or, to 
state it another way, the process of autopoietic, “self-organi[s]ing emergence” that is the 
world’s becoming (Massumi, “Deleuze” 756, 777).  (As Deleuze tells us, the world “does not 
exist outside of its expressions” [FL, 132].)  In Manning’s account, “expression leads us to the 
body, to touch, to skin,” and the “expressivity of touch is political” to the extent that—in its 
“reaching toward”—it “provides an opening for an event” (Politics 111, 110).  A concept of 
democracy that invokes a politics of touch assumes that “there is a body to reach toward” 
(Manning, Politics 112).  Not the body as signified and foreclosed by existing systems of 
governance (racialised, genderised, accountable bodies), but a moving, sensing, open body 
that can “know differently” and that can even be created again into something not foreseeable 
(Manning, Politics 113-14, 131).  As Manning puts it,”[d]emocracy as a sensing politics is a 
movement toward making sense(s), towards new orientations of experience” (Politics 131).  
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This is politics not as something to be solved (which is policy or policing) but as an event: the 
event-ness of democracy as opening the way for “disagreement, for choice, for accidents” 
(Manning, Politics 131).  To conceptualise democracy from a perspective of sense is to 
foreground relationality and to resist dominant teleological versions of “identity, territory 
[and] history” (Manning, Politics 132).  Once again, the kind of democracy/ies this might lead 
to is an open question, but, certainly, there is potential for new becomings of people, people 
not discountable or punishable by reason of identity or economics. 
  
Counter-actualising the concept of democracy as a response to the current economic crisis is 
surely an ethical act of thought, as is developing the concept of becoming-revolutionary.  If the 
crisis is an outcome of capitalism, and if “[c]apitalism prevents the becoming of subjected 
peoples” (D+G, WP 108), any concept that works to undo capitalism’s stranglehold is 
potentially life-enhancing.  Overall, the entire process of concept creation is an expansive 
enterprise.  It introduces something new, something previously unseen, which will increase 
the potential for living.  The flow of ordinary affects, in and through both the small events of 
daily life and large events like a financial crisis, strikes us, offering us the opportunity to draw 
connections, develop ideas, create/recreate concepts.  To think.  As Berlant puts it, “[u]nder 
duress from changes in the conditions of life, thinking jams the machinery that makes the 
ordinary appear as a flow that we shape mildly, often absentmindedly” (“Thinking” 6).  
Thought as concept creation is quite rare, according to Deleuze; there are people, he tells us, 
“who go through life without ever having an idea” (ABC).  Indeed, this kind of thought can be 
something of a shock: “[t]he concept …  creates a crack in the skull …, it's a habit of thought 
that is completely new, and people aren't used to thinking like that, not used to having their 
skulls cracked, since a concept twists our nerves” (ABC).  One must be prepared to be moved 
by the impacts of everyday affects, to stop to think other durations, and to make the effort of 
extending to the concepts they engender.  Again, this kind of thought is movement, in the 
sense that it is difference and change, and in the sense that it activates “the openness of 
concepts and their a-systematic relations with other concepts” (Patton, “Utopian” 41).  To open 
to the concepts of becoming-revolutionary or becoming-democratic is to admit difference into 
capitalism, to find an excess beyond this force that only ever deterritorialises toward one strict 
end.  There are undoubtedly countless other concepts enfolded in the current situation, 
concepts that will bring forth events and have the potential to lead to real moments of social 
change.  The crisis has the capacity to reveal a people who “no longer fit the managers’ 
models,” and a future that “doesn’t turn out the way it’s expected” (Holmes, “Financial”).  If we 
are willing to remember that we are not simply subjects of capitalism but affective intensities 
capable of accessing creative thought, if we apply ourselves to developing the techniques of 
affective attention and intuition, if we adopt a pedagogy of the concept, we may find more life-
affirming ways of being in the world other than those wholly prescribed by capital. 
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Micropolitics of bare life  
 
What we have started to map, then, is the image of a thought that is sensory, affective, and 
that, when practised as philosophy, is concerned with the creation of concepts.  Through such 
techniques as affective attention, Bergsonian intuition, and Whiteheadean speculation we can 
move toward the realm of concept creation, “not through any external determinism but 
through a becoming that carries the problems themselves along with it” (Deleuze, N 149).  We 
have explored the potential of two concepts for our time, becoming-revolutionary and 
becoming-democratic, and, no doubt, we will return to these and other fruitful concepts as we 
proceed.  But let us make a return to the space of everyday affect, the “scale of intimacy,” in 
Holmes words: that “space of gestation” where sense resides (“Affectivist”).  Let us spend a 
moment mapping it from a different perspective, to see if any other techniques for thought 
can become available.  We begin by utilising Nigel Thrift’s taking up of Agamben’s concept of 
“bare life” (“Bare” 147), which Agamben, in his turn, actually takes from Aristotle’s notion of 
zoé: this “bare life” refers to the “natural sweetness” of the “simple fact of living” that lies 
outside both the common laws of bios and the practices of the polis (Agamben, Homo 1-2).
41
  In 
Thrift’s reworking of Agamben’s bare life, it becomes a realm of “pure, ‘real’ experience” and 
“potentiality,” as well as being “concerned with ‘everydayness’ as a common ‘place’ and an 
excess” (“Bare” 147).  In other words, bare life is the constant flow of variation that 
backgrounds life, as well as the “seemingly ephemeral, transient, incorporeal, and inorganic 
aspects” of the everyday (Seigworth, “Banality” 257).  Bare life, as the full pulse of what is going 
on, is certainly not bare: “[i]t is most of what there is” (Thrift, “Still” 35).  Bare life, then, 
resonates with Stewart’s concept of ordinary affects.  For Agamben, though, as Thrift notes, 
the potentialities of bare life—in terms of any kind of positive politics for life—are yet to be 
realised, so powerful are the imperatives of state rule (“Still” 48).  Thrift takes a more 
optimistic, and argues that “an emancipatory politics of bare life” is already underway (“Still” 
48).  In probing this notion of bare life, and asking how it might implicate a positive politics, 
we seek to further uncover features of our map for thought. 
 
Bare life, Thrift tells us, is focused “by the contours of the simple living body” (“Bare” 148).  
This “simple living body” is identified quite specifically, as a being located in the “small space 
and time—what is often called the half-second delay—between action and consciousness” 
(“Bare” 148).  Thrift acknowledges the rich affectivity of this small space of time, when he 
nominates it as the space “upon which affect thrives and out of which it is often constituted” 
(Thrift, Non-Representational 185).  Setting aside momentarily the notion of the “half-second 
delay,” we turn to Thrift’s contention that in recent times a “new structure of attention” has 
emerged, one that “involves the inhabitation of much smaller spaces and times than before”; 
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in these spaces actions take place that “involve qualities like “anticipation, improvisation, and 
intuition” (“Bare” 150).  Through this structure of attention, “[p]erception is both stretched and 
intensified, widened and condensed” (Thrift, “Bare” 150).  In terms of what has contributed to 
the development of this structure of attention, Thrift proposes the “advent of a whole series of 
technologies,” which include the following: 
First, there is the ability to sense the small spaces of the body through a whole array of new 
scientific instruments which have, in turn, made it possible to think of the body as a set of 
micro-geographies. Then, there is the related ability to sense small bodily movements. 
Beginning with the photographic work of Marey, Muybridge and others and moving into 
our current age in which the camera can impose its own politics of time and space, we can 
now think of time as minutely segmented frames, able to be speeded up, slowed down, 
even frozen for a while. Next, numerous body practices have come into existence which 
rely on and manage such knowledge of small times and spaces, most especially those 
connected with the performing arts, including … much modern dance … .  Then, finally, a 
series of discourses concerning the slightest gesture and utterance of the body have been 
developed, … from the analysis of gesture to the mapping of ‘body language’.  (Non-
Representational 185-86) 
Perhaps Thrift’s point regarding this sharpening of attention can be further illuminated 
through a particular, recent example, one also concerning modern dance: the use of video 
technology in Veridiana Zurita’s video dance piece, Das Partes.  In this work, the videography 
captures and intensifies the dancer’s movements at a micro-level, effectively making the 
movements “stutter”: this stutter “allows both the imagery and the music to open up to an 
oblique four-dimensionality in which hesitation, fear, desire, chance and power are produced 
through a returning pleat creating non-chronological steams” (Dolphijn 169).  These micro-
movements, folding forwards and backwards, constitute, and allow us to perceive, the space 
of affect.   What is normally imperceptible becomes visible, as Rick Dolphijn explains: “the 
smallest gestures that the camera reveals to us present us with the fractal nature of space 
that, in magnifying even the infinitesimal, creates new forms of expression, new blocks of 
sensation ad infinitum” (172).  For Manning, there is tremendous potential when digital 
technology begins to operate in this way: “[i]f technology can recompose a body beyond the 
level of sensuous perception,” as has occurred, it would seem, in Zurita’s work, then 
“technology becomes technogenesis”—by which she means technology “bring[s] to the fore 
movement’s incipiency” (Relationscapes 74, 71).  The experience for the viewer is an affective 
one “that does not end with the [viewing]: the affective tone’s residue lingers, provoking 
adjacent forms of experience, many of which remain virtual” (Manning, Relationscapes 74).  
Because technogenesis foregrounds the durations of the moving, sensing body, Manning calls 
for a greater development of this practice: ”[t]echniques for technogenetic emergence must 
become part of [digital] technology’s interface: we must develop techniques that create new 
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associated milieus never distinct from the ontogenetic body” (Relationscapes 75).  Here, we 
begin to get a sense of how—instead of compressing time and movement—digital 
technologies can also be used to access duration and affect.  Practices of technogenesis 
provide an example of the digital becoming techniques of/for thought, to the extent that they 
enable access to the simultaneously present potentialities of other ways of moving, of being in 
the world. 
   
But we have digressed, and will leave any further foray into the potentialities of digital 
technology until Line of Flight 2.  We return now to the small time and space at the cusp 
between the virtual and the actual, the “bare life” of affect, which Zurita’s video works to bring 
into perception.  While Bergson-Deleuze might call this duration, for Thrift, it is “the 
undiscovered country” of the “the half-second delay” (Non-Representational 186).  The half-
second delay has long history in terms of research:      
This is the period of bodily anticipation originally discovered by Wilhelm Wundt in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Wundt was able to show that consciousness takes time to 
construct … . That insight was subsequently formali[s]ed in the 1960s by Libet using new 
body recording technologies. He was able to show decisively that an action is set in motion 
before we decide to perform it: the “average readiness potential” is about 0.8 seconds, 
although cases as long as 1.5 seconds have been recorded.  
… To summari[s]e, what we are able to see is that the space of embodiment is expanded by 
a fleeting but crucial moment, a constantly moving preconscious frontier.  (Thrift, Non-
Representational 186)  
Massumi calls this delay “the missing half second,” and explains it as the body “absorbing 
impulses quicker than they can be perceived,” with the “entire vibratory event [being] 
unconscious, out of mind” (Parables 29).  Although the half-second is “missed” it is not empty, 
but “is overfull, in excess of the actually-performed action and of its ascribed meaning” 
(Massumi, Parables 29).  What this means is that “[w]ill and consciousness are subtractive.  
They are limitative, derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally 
expressed” (Massumi, Parables 29; italics removed).  Again, there are parallels here with 
Bergson’s notion that the intellect is ineffective in taking in the fullness of duration.  The 
complexity of unconscious thought taking place in the half-second delay is situated at the level 
of the body, to such an extent that cognitive scientists have estimated that 95 per cent of all 
thought is of this kind—“and that may be a serious underestimate” (Lakoff and Johnson 13).  In 
other words, there is a world of thought taking place in the missing half second, one that is 
present to the body as stirrings, anticipations, affect, and one that is virtually present as the 
whole of duration.  And because new structures of attention are making more and more visible 
this fleeting moment of potential, it has become a time that is “highly political” (Thrift, Non-
Representational 186).  As discussed earlier, the control mechanisms of bio-power work 
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powerfully at the affective level—in the time/space of the half-second delay.  The mass media 
and especially television are potent mechanisms by which affect is transmitted and modulated 
for political and commercial purposes.  As Thrift states, the half-second delay “becomes 
explicitly political through practices [that] are aimed at it specifically,” and, for him, the 
practice that is the strongest and “most astute” in this respect is capitalist business  (“Bare” 
153).  Thrift proposes several ways in which capitalist business attempts to reach into and 
exploit the half-second delay.  For example, through the employment of brands, which work at 
a preconscious level through “signs understood as immediate response” (Thrift, “Bare” 156).  
Another such application is the “experience economy,” which uses object-experiences to 
propagate capital, for instance in the “explicit sensoriali[s]ing of goods,” and in “the use of 
nonconscious cues to add ambience to retail environments so as to produce impulse 
purchases”  (Thrift, “Bare” 156-58).  Thus, in the bio-politicisation of the half-second interval, 
“[o]ur anticipation is being anticipated” and “[o]ur perceptions are increasingly becoming 
instrumentali[s]ed” (Thrift, “Bare” 161).  All is not lost, however, in Thrift’s view: “[t]here are 
still a number of ways in which the essential multiplicity and virtuality of bare life can be 
restated; what has been transposed can be recomposed” (Thrift, “Bare” 161).  What Thrift calls 
for is a “microbiopolitics of the subliminal,” one that “understands the kind of biological-cum-
cultural gymnastics that takes place in this realm” (Thrift, Non-Representational 192).  In order 
to reclaim the half-second delay for life, then, we need to develop such a microbiopolitics, and, 
in doing so, discover and apply techniques that may release a new, life-enhancing kind of 
thought.  For Massumi, micro[bio]politics involves “returning to the generative moment of 
experience,” or, to “the conditions of emergence of the situations [in which] you live” (“Of 
Microperception”).  The question before us is how this might be done. 
 
Although Thrift proposes a number of ways of engaging in such a micro[bio]politics, we will 
consider the two that are perhaps most apropos here.  The first suggestion we take up is his 
use of Deleuze’s notion of “mediator” (N 121-34), which Massumi translates as “intercessor” 
(Parables 255).  The idea of mediator/intercessor assumes that life—“the expanded empirical 
field”—is filled with “mutually modulating, battling, negotiating, process lines” that are 
“affectively engaged” (Massumi, Parables 255).  In other words, the affectively charged half-
second delay is always-already a zone of in-betweenness, of “processually unique and 
divergent forms of life” (Massumi, Parables 255).  One way of approaching bare life 
micropolitically is through taking an approach of “tending” this zone (Thrift, Non-
Representational 191).  This tending cultivates the “interplay” between the various lines (D, N 
125) that make up the affective field, so as not to limit the potential for the living out of 
difference. When Deleuze writes that mediators are concerned with the “capacities of falsity to 
produce truth” (N 126), he is describing the process of intercession/mediation as “a form of 
positive dissonance, made possible through an openness to interferences that disturb one’s 
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regular harmonic vibrations” (Bogue, Deleuze’s 14).  In other words, it is helpful to invite 
difference and disturbances to one’s usual way of thought.  Tending to this process means 
ensuring one is always exposed to the interference that mediators offer, for “[c]reation’s all 
about mediators.  Without them nothing happens.  They can be people …—but things too, 
even plants or animals … .  Whether they’re real or imaginary, animate or inanimate, you have 
to form your mediators” (D, N 125).  As Thrift puts it, “the simple political imperative is to 
widen the potential number of interactions a living thing can enter into, to widen the margin 
of ‘play’” (Non-Representational 191).  Widening this margin means opening oneself to the 
discomfort of the half-second delay—to submitting oneself to, and being able to withstand, 
the violence of uncommon encounters, encounters with mediators that “falsify” what you 
think you know.  It means “always working in a group, even when you seem to be on your 
own” (D, N 125).  It means being open to encountering and absorbing divergent lines of affect, 
and to actively tending their symbiosis (Massumi, Parables 255).  This tending also enacts a 
kind of “political ecology,” as Massumi points out: supporting the “coming-together or 
belonging-together” of disparate affective forces requires a non-self-interested commitment to 
a process of “reciprocal readjustment” (Massumi, Parables 255).  Such a process recognises the 
value of every self-creating form of life, and accepts the responsibility of constantly adjusting 
to one another.  From a micropolitical perspective, therefore, the generative moment of 
experience could be approached by way of a technique of mediation: negotiating and 
expanding—tending—dissonant interactions, so as to sustain an ethos that maximises the 
potential for difference.   
 
The second mode of engaging in this micropolitics utilises the work of William Connolly, who 
draws upon a range of fields—including neuroscience and philosophy—to explore the affective 
richness of the “inscrutable domain” of the half-second delay (Neuropolitics 86).  One of 
Connolly’s chief aims is to argue for “the critical significance of technique in thinking, ethics, 
and politics” (Neuropolitics xiii).  In general terms, Connolly develops a theory around an 
“ethic of cultivation,” making use of several related philosophical concepts: “‘self-artistry’ 
(Nietzsche), ‘tactics of the self’ (Foucault), ‘techniques’ (Hampshire), and ‘micropolitics’ 
(Deleuze)” (Neuropolitics 107).  It is English philosopher Stuart Hampshire, though, who 
provides Connolly with the grounds for “technique,” by way of the following: 
First, Hampshire contends that while substance is one, we humans have two irreducible 
perspectives on it, what he sometimes calls the first-person and the third-person 
perspectives. Second, he says that a change in either body or thought is always correlated 
with some change in the other … . Third, he emphasi[s]es how new findings in 
neuroscience can, once reviewed by the human objects of inquiry, be folded into their own 
thinking, informing future capacities of thought and action. Fourth, he asserts that coming 
to terms with such external knowledge can also prompt the invention of techniques and 
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technologies to act upon the body/brain network, so as to alter, in turn, future patterns of 
thought, feeling, and action. (Connolly, “Experience” 69)  
Thus, while the “immanent field” of the half-second delay is “unsusceptible to full explanation 
and unsusceptible in principle to precise representation,” it retains amenability to both 
“cultural inscription” (as we have seen in the influence of Politics and capital), and also, more 
positively, to “experimental tactics of intervention” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 86).  It is possible, 
then, to “apply techniques to yourself experimentally to ascertain what new possibilities 
become discernible in your thinking” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 89).  A technique of thought, 
thus conceived, is “an exercise or other intervention that alters the direction of thinking or the 
mood in which it is set” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 88).  Accordingly, “[a]n electrical probe 
becomes a technique of thought when applied purposively to a patch of the brain; clearing 
your mind of everyday concerns while going on a long, slow run in the woods is another” 
(Connolly, Neuropolitics 88).  Other examples include going dancing “to music that inspires 
you … after hearing very disappointing news,” or listening to classical music “while reading a 
philosophical text in order to relax your mind and sharpen its acuity of reception” (Connolly, 
Neuropolitics 102, 101).  Such techniques of the self “aim at unconscious processes below the 
reliable reach of conscious regulation” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 90).  Connolly’s reason for 
advocating the relationship between thinking and technique thus conceived is that thinking is 
more than “knowing, explaining, representing …”; at its highest it is “expressive, creative and 
compositional”; or, to put it another way, “[t]o think is to move something” (Neuropolitics 103-
04) (as we have seen, it is often to move toward new concepts in response to problematical 
states of affairs).  Technique as a micropolitical self-intervention is connected to ethics: it is 
“the hinge that links thought (as corporeally stored thinking) to ethical sensibility” (Connolly, 
Neuropolitics 107).  Connolly explains this connection:       
In a world in which institutional discipline has become extensive and intensive, such 
tactics can function as counter-measures to build more independence and thoughtful 
responsiveness into ethico-political sensibilities.  You might, thus, act tactically and 
experimentally upon yourself to fold more presumptive receptivity and forbearance into 
your responses to plurali[s]ing movements … . (Neuropolitics 107) 
In other words, these micropolitical techniques of the self dip into the half-second delay and 
stretch the potential for thinking and tending difference in the world.  Just so, such techniques 
might amount to a kind of practice that also aids the technique of tending mediation as 
described above. 
 
Finally, here, let us draw a line between Berlant’s “stopping to think,” Bergson’s intuition, and 
the micropolitics of the half-second delay that corresponds to bare life.  Leonard Lawlor’s 
discussion of Bergson’s intuition would seem, actually, to also encapsulate elements of each of 
these concepts: in stopping to think, intuiting, and attending to the half-second delay, we 
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“listen carefully” to life, and enlarge our consciousnesses “to include unconscious memory” 
(70).  Lawler further explains how to obtain intuition:  
I must turn away from the fragmented and discontinuous experience of social life and 
inhabit a, so to speak, ‘world without others.’  [Here] I am in the grey zone between the day 
of practical action and the night of dreaming.  Here, in the middle, I try to see the infinitely 
small differences in which experience consists and I try to reconstitute the whole curve of 
experience. In this attempted reconstitution, I return to social life, or action, or language. 
(70) 
Stopping to think is tuning into the grey zone of affect, as well as to the whole curve of 
experience that is duration.  The half-second delay of bare life is also the zone of the middle, 
the experience of infinitely small differences.  From attending to this zone, from enlarging, 
tending and even intervening in it, we can produce a “germ for thought,” which is to say 
”invit[e] thought’s virtual potential into the articulation  of a concept” (Manning, “Creative” 
22).  We can return to the world of language and action, armed with the raw materials for 
creating concepts that open out to a new, “possible world” (D+G, WP 17).  And as we have 
indicated, such tuning in to affect, duration and bare life is a matter of urgency under the 























LINE OF FLIGHT 2: THINKING THROUGH ART 
 
 
In diagramming a Deleuzian thought without an image that might help us chip away at some 
of the problems of our time, we have so far mapped lines through affect, intuition, concept 
creation and micro(bio)political techniques.  We have engaged a kind of philosophical/ 
nonphilosophical/political thought, to the extent that, by way of affect, we have reached 
towards concepts through which we might move closer to a people to come.  According to 
D+G, though, thought is heterogeneous (WP 199): there are still other ways to participate in 
thought.  The notion of thinking in terms of “having an idea” extrapolates to creative planes 
other than philosophy, with one of the most critical of these being the sphere of art.  In 
Deleuze’s view, philosophy and art are “separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one 
another” (N 125).  As Bogue points out, while “Deleuze often describes philosophy as the 
invention of concepts,” he parallels this enterprise with “the creative activity of the artist” 
(Deleuze on Music 2).  Art is a neighbouring thought form to philosophy (Patton, Deleuze 24).  
Indeed, as Massumi puts it, “[a]rt, as ‘composition,’ is enacted philosophical thought” 
(Parables 176).  “Art, like philosophy, looks past ‘what’ things are, to how they become. … This 
is a speculative act, a conceptual gesture, in much the same way that philosophical thinking is” 
(Massumi, “What” 13).  For Deleuze, the power of art is immense, emanating as it does from 
art’s inherent “secret pressures”—the “signs” that a work of art emits and generates (PS 98, 97).  
Such signs are not concerned with the material world in the sense of evoking recognition—
this means that, or even, this could mean that.  Rather, the signs of art are entirely 
dematerialised, meaning that they open out to the virtual, or to what Deleuze, in Proust and 
Signs, also calls “ideal essence” or an essential “Idea” (PS 13, 39).  Therefore, while on the plane 
of philosophy ideas occur in the form of concepts, on the plane of art, thought proceeds 
differently: in its emission of signs, art thinks by way of intensities and sensations (Grosz, 
Chaos 1).  The heterogeneous and moving nature of thought means that its different planes not 
only parallel but also interpenetrate one another, without any one plane being any “better 
than another, or more fully, completely, or synthetically ‘thought’” (D+G, WP 198).  Daniel 
Smith explains art’s specificity for Deleuze, and further clarifies the interpenetration of art and 
concept creation: 
Great artists are also great thinkers, but they think in terms of percepts and affects 
rather than concepts: painters think in terms of lines and colo[u]rs, just as musicians 
think in sounds, filmmakers think in images, writers think in words, and so on.  None 
of these activities has any priority over the others.  Creating a concept is neither more 
difficult nor more abstract than creating new visual, sonorous, or verbal combinations 
in art; conversely, it is no easier to read an image, painting or novel than it is to 
comprehend a concept.  Philosophy, for Deleuze, can never be undertaken 
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independently of art (or science); it always enters into relations of mutual resonance 
and exchange with these other domains … .  (“Deleuze” viii) 
In other words, art and philosophy run side-by-side and through one another to “slow down, 
decompose, harness, and develop” the forces of chaos that life rolls out (Grosz, Chaos 5).  Of 
course, we should acknowledge, as Grosz does, that by “art,” we mean “all forms of creativity 
or production that generate intensity, sensation, or affect: music, painting, sculpture, 
literature, architecture, design, landscape, dance, performance, and so on” (Chaos 4), as well as 
new digital art forms.  Before we follow any one of these modes, though, let us repeat that 
“[a]rt is thinking, a specific style of thinking” that produces difference through sensation 
(Colebrook, Deleuze 114). 
 
As we have seen, thought in the modes of everyday affects, concept-creation and micropolitics 
has tremendous potential for mounting resistance to the present.  Holmes also argues that, 
while it might not have always been the case, there is presently a similar role for art.  While art 
in the twentieth century was primarily concerned with broadening and rupturing its own 
aesthetic, Holmes contends that its function has now changed:  
The backdrop against which art now stands out is a particular state of society. What 
an installation, a performance, a concept or a mediated image can do is to mark a 
possible or real shift with respect to the laws, the customs, the measures, the mores, 
the technical and organi[s]ational devices that define how we must behave and how 
we may relate to each other at a given time and in a given place. What we look for in 
art is a different way to live, a fresh chance at coexistence.  (“Affectivist”) 
A wellhead for thought, art offers a real opportunity to break with dogma and disrupt the lines 
of control that run through contemporary life.  Our concern now, in this project, is to map 
some resisting lines of art-as-thought, with the aim of ascertaining how they might expand our 
capacities for living.  In Guattari’s terms, we are striving to discover how this aesthetic 
dimension of thought might bring us to a “new art of living in society” (Guattari, C 20).  And 
simultaneously, we are interested in how art might comprise a technicity, in the sense of 
offering up particular art/thought techniques by which our potential to live more fully is 
enhanced. 
 
Thought as art’s sensations 
 
Across his oeuvre, Deleuze’s theory of art develops through a range of concepts, with the 
overall premise remaining consistent: that art is “a force that transforms inner and outer 
experience” (Bogue, Deleuze on Music 2).  In his early book on Proust, Deleuze focuses on the 
notion of the essences of art—the qualitative, singular expressions of the essential difference-
in-itself of things.  Again, this is not an empirical difference but “the absolute and ultimate 
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Difference” that “constitutes being” (PS 41).  In other words, these essences are the irreducible 
differentness of each of art’s substances: this colour, this musical line, this combination of 
words.  And, as Colebrook explains, when signs lead to these essences there are implications 
beyond art: 
[O]nce we have experienced art in this essential way we see the truth of experience in 
all its difference.  This is not a truth tied to an object, opinion or state of affairs; it is 
the truth of the whole or possibility of experience: experience as an impersonal and 
differential flow beyond any of our actual or finite perceptions.  …  Essences for 
Deleuze are not general categories or meanings that lie behind experience; they are 
unique possibilities which are actualised in any experience.  (Understanding 91).   
These unique possibilities are connected to a kind of purity of thought, as Jay Conway affirms: 
the “essence or absolute difference in things is the object of pure thought” (175).  From 
Deleuze’s perspective, as we encounter the signs of art—an encounter that does violence to 
our habitual, conscious, “intelligent” modes of thinking—we are forced to apprehend essences, 
which is to say “pure thought” is entered into (Marks, Gilles 133).  When Deleuze says we are 
forced to think beyond conventional truths by what is outside of (conscious) thought, he also 
means we are forced to think by the signs of art: “they release within thought …  the act of 
thinking itself” (PS 98).  The signs emitted by a work of art provide an invitation to—an entry 
into—pure thought, to the extent that they force us into a realm of singularities that are 
nothing but pure difference.  This realm provides the raw materials for creation—for thought, 
which is “the only true creation” (Deleuze, PS 97).  Therefore, to think through art is to taken 
up by the raw force of thought.     
 
By his penultimate book, What is Philosophy, Deleuze, with Guattari, has come to characterise 
art not so much as signs, but as a composite of sensations, complete in itself, not tied to any 
artist who might retain control over it.  Here, D+G present a work of art as “a bloc of 
sensations,” or “a compound of percepts and affects,” that exists independently of both artist 
and art-experiencer (WP 164).  Sensations, in the form of percepts (perceptions freed from the 
perceiver) and affects are not of the subject, but of the art itself: the work of art is 
“independent of the creator” since it is self-posited and “preserved in itself” (D+G, WP 164).  
D+G further explain:  
Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who 
experience them.  Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them.  Sensations, percepts, affects are beings whose 
validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived.  They could be said to exist in the 
absence of man [sic]… .  The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it 
exists in itself.  (WP 164) 
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Grosz’s explanation is also useful to explain art’s independence: “[t]he work of art, whether 
pictorial, tactile, or sonorous, is a block of intensities, a compound of sensations and affects, of 
intensities that have gone beyond a subject to become entities themselves” (Chaos 59).  The 
artist, therefore, may create “blocs of percepts and affects,” but inherent in the process of 
creation is the principle that “the compound must stand up on its own” (D+G, WP 164).  In 
fact, to create something that stands up on its own is an artist’s greatest challenge (D+G, WP 
164).  The true artist does not depict his/her own perceptions, affections and memories, but 
instead glimpses something beyond what is representable.  In making compounds of sounds, 
colours, textures and so on, the artist releases or sets free sensations that are independent of 
the materials made.  For D+G, in launching these qualitative sensations, “[t]he artist is a seer, a 
becomer,” who “has seen something in life that is too great, too unbearable also” (WP 171).  
The role of the artist, then, is to “accede to a vision” that “shatters lived perceptions” into an 
autonomous composition: a composition that frees life from its forms of imprisonment (D+G, 
WP 171).  Putting it yet another way, the artist is someone who has “seen the force of life—the 
world of inorganic forces—underlying the world as it is typically experienced and [then] 
through artistic method, is able to give this experience to us through a bloc of percepts and 
affects” (O’Sullivan 55).  It is through the artist’s style—syntax, modes and rhythms, lines and 
colours—that these blocs of percepts and affects are constructed (D+G, WP 170).  In creating 
these blocs, which are becomings rather than representations, the artist takes that which is 
material into a zone of indetermination—a zone that can only be specified as the experience of 
“something passing from one to the other” (D+G, WP 172)—sensation.  Again, these are not 
the bodily sensations of a subject (Grosz, Chaos 60), but, rather, the sensation that refers only 
to the material itself: “the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of metal” (D+G, WP 
166).  Art, therefore, as “a lightning rod to sensations” (M. Fuller 48), carries great power.  In 
D+G’s estimation, it has “the power of a ground that can dissolve forms,” and, because “the 
beings of sensation are varieties,” the artist continually increases the varieties that are in the 
world (WP 173, 175).  
 
In order to grasp the greater importance of art, however, we must look beyond sensation per se 
to the way sensation couples with composition (M. Fuller 49).  After all, as Grosz remarks, art 
gives life to sensation through throwing “the plane of composition” over chaos—the plane of 
composition being “the collective condition of art-making” (Chaos 8, 70).  Art creates many 
compounds and syntheses of sensations, including such “spatial and sensual forces of 
arrangement” (M. Fuller 49) as movement and rhythm, which also draw us into the compound 
(D+G, WP 175).  According to D+G, the various of compounds of sensations include the 
“simple sensation” of vibration, the “coupling sensation” of “the embrace or the clinch” of 
“energies,” and the “opening or splitting, hollowing out” that releases sensation (WP 168).  
Here, then, art is understood as a bloc of shifting “movements” created by the artist—rhythms 
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and melodies of sensations—that comprise a kind of monument to the future.  D+G express it 
thus: 
[T]he task of all art [is to] extract new harmonies, new plastic or melodic landscapes, 
and new rhythmic characters that raise them to the height of the earth’s song and the 
cry of humanity: that which constitutes tone, health, becoming, a visual and sonorous 
bloc.  A monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that happened but 
confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event … .   
(WP 176) 
In Grosz’s account, “artistic production” is different to “other forms of cultural production” 
because it “merges with, intensifies and eternali[s]es or monumentali[s]es sensation” (Chaos 
4).  Because art’s expressivity does not come from the artist’s own interiority but from the 
expressions of the matter itself (D+G, WP 196), art as monument has the power to take us 
beyond what is actual and already experienced, into the virtual.  Art, therefore, unleashes us 
from life as it is lived at the level of efficiency and productivity, and opens life to other 
potentials (Colebrook, Deleuze 99).  Indeed, because it generates intense, compound and 
autonomous sensations that “directly impact living bodies, organs, [and] nervous systems” 
(Grosz, Chaos 4), art affords us the capacity to “become universes” (D+G, WP 169).  This 
notion of art’s becoming also, as Colebrook explains, connects with D+G’s idea of the 
externality of relations: 
Life is not properly reali[s]ed in human perception, for our “world” is only one of the 
ways in which life might be actuali[s]ed or lived.  The power of the artist is to take an 
actuali[s]ed set of relations—the lived—and open the potential of other relations.  … 
Art presents life as a power to vary, as the potential for colour, light or line to produce 
sensations other than those already lived … .  (Deleuze 99) 
Because art’s sensations stand alone from a subject, and sensations do not require 
consciousness’s slowing down to decide how to act, Colebrook contends further that “art is 
one of the ways in which thought approaches infinite speed” (Deleuze 100).  Sensation 
sidesteps consciousness and strikes the body directly, at infinite speed, though impacting “on 
the body’s own internal forces, on cells, organs, the nervous system” (Grosz, Chaos 73).  This is 
to enact a politics of art by way of sensation.  In Rajchmann’s words, artworks “complicate 
things,” creating “more complex nervous systems no longer subservient to the debilitating 
effects of clichés, [so as] to show and release the possibilities of a life” (138). 
   
Indeed, there is a correlation between art thus understood and the concept of becoming 
revolutionary.  When D+G declare that “the success of a revolution resides … precisely in the 
vibrations, clinches, and openings it [gives] to men and women at the moment of its making 
and that composes itself in a monument that is always in the process of becoming” (WP 177), 
they could be describing monument-making art-thought as a form of becoming revolutionary.  
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This kind of becoming is particularly joyful: there is a “necessary joy” in art as creation, 
Deleuze tells us, in the sense that “art is necessarily a liberation that explodes everything” (DI 
134; see also GF 77).   This is to say that art’s shocks and resonances displays a “catalytic power” 
(Colman, “Affective” 68) that disrupts, disturbs and displaces, meaning that art follows an 
“outward trajectory” that transposes into other forms of life (M. Fuller 49).  Therefore, we are 
not concerned with artist, work and ownership, but with art’s power to vibrate sensations 
across and through life forms, opening up minor ways of being.  Herein lies art’s political 
potential: if “[s]ensation is that which is transmitted from the force of an event to the nervous 
system of a living being and from the actions of this being back onto the world itself” (Grosz, 
Chaos 71), art has the power to ameliorate the constrictions of our milieu.  Artworks carry 
force: their power is not in what they signify or represent, but in the fact that “they assemble, 
they make, they do, they produce” (Grosz, Chaos 75, 79).  In Grosz’ interpretation, art is 
acutely political since it is where matter most proliferates, which is to say “where becoming is 
most directly in force” (Chaos 76).  In other words, because sensation is “an incorporeal 
threshold of emergence,” it gives us a sense of the inhuman power to become (Grosz, Chaos 
77).  In subverting the privilege of the intelligible over the sensible, art enriches our capacity to 
experience ever-new sensations—the world’s othernesses (Grosz, Chaos 79).  And the 
mechanism through which art brings other possible futures into the present moment, as Grosz 
explains, is sensation’s vibratory nature: sensation thus touches the living body with a 
vibratory wave that resonates as well into/out to the world as yet unknown—the being 
otherwise of the virtual (Chaos 80-81).  
 
Our challenge with art, therefore, is to embrace and mobilise sensation’s potential to invent 
new ways of being in the world, as a way of responding to the problems we face today.  We 
have considered Deleuze’s art in a broad sense, but we now focus on some examples that 
might aid us in this challenge.  In doing so, however, we should remember that each of the 
arts carry portions of the others, since the aim of each is to capture  “a kind of foundation or 
unity, the unity in difference of the universe itself, … of universal forces that impinge on all 
forms of life” (Grosz, Chaos 81).  In other words, although we might address specific art forms, 
we are still operating within a “post-medium notion of art practice,” to the extent that we are 
more interested in what the art object can do than the particularities of any medium 
(O’Sullivan 52).  As Deleuze makes clear, art is not so much concerned with the creation or 
autonomy of forms, as with “capturing forces” or making forces visible (FB 48).  With this in 
mind, we begin with an example from the art that Deleuze regards as most related to material 
forces, as connecting to “the material reality of bodies” (FB 47): painting.  As Bogue explains, 
for Deleuze painting “is the most carnal of the arts, the art that most directly engages percepts 
and affects as they arise in human bodies (Deleuze on Music 189).  In Deleuze’s estimation, 
painting can be considered “the paradigmatic art of sensation,” since it is concerned wholly 
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with expressing the logic of sensation (Bogue, Deleuze on Music 2).  As he explains, “[w]hat is 
painted on the canvas is the body [any kind of body], not insofar as it is represented as an 




While Deleuze’s ideas about painting are developed primarily in relation to the works of Paul 
Cézanne and Francis Bacon, the painting practice we will bring together with Deleuze’s 
thought arises out of a specifically Australian context.  First, though, we consider some general 
components of Deleuze’s notion of painting, components that will prove useful to our 
example.  Essentially, for Deleuze, through “its line-colo[u]r systems and its polyvalent organ, 
the eye,” painting’s task is to “render visible forces that are not themselves visible” (FB 47, 48).  
In taking on the problem of making invisible forces visible, painting connects to sensation, 
since painting also “make[s] us sense … insensible forces” (Deleuze, FB 41, 40).  Cézanne, for 
instance, displays the genius of “rendering visible the folding force of mountains, the 
germinative force of a seed, the thermic force of a landscape, and so on” (Deleuze, FB 49).  
Cézanne, for Deleuze, tackles “the problem of [W]estern painting, the problem of the figure 
and its relation to figuration” (Colebrook, Rev. 737).  As Daniel Smith explicates, “‘figuration’ 
refers to a form that is related to an object it is supposed to represent (recognition), [whereas] 
the figure is the form that is connected to sensation, and that conveys the violence of this 
sensation directly to the nervous system” (“Deleuze’s” 44).  Figurative painting is 
representational, illustrative and narrational, while the figural is a violent kind of break from 
figuration—a mode that works to get behind all the clichés and “givens” that already crowd 
the canvas before the painter begins  (Deleuze, FB xxxii, 10, 71-72).  For Deleuze, who draws 
this notion of the figural from Lyotard, “[t]he Figure is the sensible form related to sensation; 
it acts immediately upon the nervous system, which is of the flesh,” and has no need to pass 
through the intermediary of conscious thought (FB 31).  Cézanne’s general approach to 
rendering the figure is “to connect sensations with some act of framing that will allow the 
sensation to endure in itself,” while his particular focus is on varying colour internally, so as to 
“give form to modulation and difference” (Colebrook, Rev. 738). 
 
As Daniel Smith notes, the sensation of the figure is not to be found in the air but in the body, 
and, while for Cézanne the body may be the body of an apple, it is, for Bacon, the human body 
(“Deleuze’s” 45).  In Deleuze’s appraisal, Bacon’s contribution to developing a figural style was 
hugely significant.  In his attempt to paint sensation directly, Bacon paints the human body 
“deformed by a plurality of forces: the violent force of a hiccup, a scream, the need to vomit or 
defecate” (D. Smith, “Deleuze’s” 44).  This is not a relationship of form and matter, then, but of 
forces and materials (Deleuze, FB xxix).  So when Bacon wishes to “paint the scream,” he 
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means not to paint the “visible spectacle before which one screams,” or to represent pain or 
horror; rather, he means to capture the imperceptible, “invisible and insensible forces” that 
cause the scream, that “scramble” the body of the figure (Deleuze, FB 51).  As rendered by 
Bacon, the figural elevates the lines and colours of painting to the state of an analogical 
language, “which consists of expressive movements, paralinguistic signs, breaths and screams, 
and so on” (Deleuze, FB 92-93).  These expressive movements come from the “vital power” of 
painting: its rhythm (Deleuze, FB 37).  Sensation is vibration and resonance, and each painting 
encompasses a rhythm that is, in fact, its essence (Deleuze, FB xxxii).  In Bacon’s work Deleuze 
identifies “three basic rhythms”: “one steady or ‘witness’ rhythm,” one of crescendo 
(expanding, diastolic), and one of diminuendo (contracting, systolic) (Deleuze, FB xxxiii).  
From a figurative viewpoint Bacon’s figures may appear to be “monsters,” but from the 
viewpoint of the figures themselves they are simply a distribution of rhythms, or figures 
separating and uniting, resonating, in a field that makes them “of a piece” (Deleuze, FB xxxiii).  
This is the same rhythm of the world, “the world that seizes me by closing in around me, the 
self that opens to the world and opens the world itself” (Deleuze, FB 37).  Overall, through 
Bacon and Cézanne, Deleuze sees that painting releases another world: sensation, which is 
irrational, nonrepresentative, and free (Deleuze, FB 82).  
   
The art to which we now turn had barely begun at the time Deleuze published his treatise on 
Bacon and Cézanne (Grosz, Chaos 89).  Our focus here is the contemporary Aboriginal art of 
dot painting using canvas and acrylics, a movement that emerged in the early 1970s in the 
Western and Central desert regions of Australia (Grosz, Chaos 89).  By now, of course, this 
movement has become a substantial one, having gained strong worldwide acceptance.  In 
terms of figural painting, there are definite indications that art from Western/Central desert 
regions demonstrate this concept.  However, these paintings are perhaps more complex, as 
Grosz acknowledges; she posits that this art straddles abstractionism, expressionism, as well as 
the figural:   
These arts share an obsession with a mystical code (or many) and a fascination with 
the geometrical forms and with abstraction.  They are also concerned with the direct 
expression of rhythm and force, movement and embodiment that characteri[s]es 
expressionism.  But no less concerned with the figure than in the works of Cézanne or 
Bacon, the figure, alone, coupled, boxed in, deformed, subject to invisible forces, is as 
explicitly the object of sensation in these various works; in addition, while figural, they 
must also be understood as landscapes, … spatiali[s]ations of lived space that 
nevertheless can also be mapped and coordinated, can function also geographically.  
(Chaos 90) 
For our purposes, the key point here is that this is an art of the sensible, an art that evokes 
sensations which “must be felt as well as thought” (Biddle 11).  Most significantly, as 
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anthropologist Jennifer Biddle notes, this art “produces radical political possibilities” insofar as 
it “enables a ‘thinking’ not otherwise available in official historical accounts” (11).  In other 
words, this is a minoritarian movement, one that carries the potential to disrupt and dislodge 
majority thinking about indigenous peoples, culture, land, the body, and more.  We will return 
soon to the political and thought prospects of this Aboriginal art, but first it is fitting that we 
consider, through two paintings, some elements that make this art one of sensation.   
 
Evaluations of contemporary Aboriginal art from a classical perspective will typically tell about 
us the subject matter of these paintings—that this art is “about Ancestors, Dreamings, sites” 
(Biddle 14).  Furthermore, as Biddle tells us, the exhibition and marketing of these works in 
worlds outside of the desert communities “not only provide us with information about these 
paintings—site locations, botanic terms, kinship—but they tell us that these works are this 
kind of information” (14).  In Biddle’s view, though, the more appropriate way to approach 
these works is by way of “affective reading,” which, she posits, is the only way “[t]o do justice 
to the force and effect of these paintings in the material terms they themselves enact” (22).  
These paintings are, essentially, haptic, affective, sensate: situated at the level of the body 
(Biddle 79).  As Biddle explains, “[t]his bodily imperative is not a result of the icon’s capacity to 
represent but is rather the force and effect of an imprint” (79).  These works are material and 
sensible, “experienced by us corporeally because they are expressions of a profoundly 
corporeal, incarnate relationship between bodies Ancestral and Aboriginal” (79).  This 
relationship between Aboriginal and Ancestor forms part of the Aboriginal cosmology that is 
the Dreaming or Dreamtime.  Fundamentally, Dreamtime expresses the Aboriginal experience 
of space and time, which is far removed from the homogenous, Euclidian space-time 
knowledge of the Westerner.  As Manning puts it, Dreamings are “many overlapping space-
times of experience” (Relationscapes 168).  Moreover, this is a cosmology heavily imbued with 
spirituality: 
The Aboriginal sensitivity to cosmological forces is well known.  They seemingly 
inhabit the substance of the cosmos, as if inside its elemental currents of space and 
time or, more accurately, its spacetime continuum … .  These elemental currents are 
the lifeblood of Aboriginal spirituality and spoken of in a literal sense.  Everyday life 
and its duration are never experienced autonomously, as we Western moderns seem 
to, but in conjunction with spirits who move back and forth through time and space 
as if networked into the structure of the cosmos.  (McLean “Dreamtime” 16) 
The “spirit world” of each person’s Dreaming is made up of a complex relationship that 
encompasses that person’s birthplace, the animals, foods and trails that link to that birthplace, 
the original “Dreaming Beings” (or mythical ancestors) of that site, as well as the human 
ancestors associated with the place (Manning, Relationscapes 163; McLean, “Dreaming”).  As 
Grosz notes, Dreaming incorporates the dreaming country, as well as “the animal beings that 
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link to the artist’s own bodily and clan history” (Chaos 92).  Dreamings, therefore, are 
“mythological and cosmogenic tales” that are both stories of creation and stories of the 
“creation of the future-present” (Manning, Relationscapes 159).  They tell and retell, through 
art that “animates time in space (Manning, Relationscapes 159, 160).  It is also important to 
acknowledge that Dreaming is highly relational, in the sense that all living things that connect 
to a particular place are forever mutually related (McLean, “Dreaming”).  This is how Manning 
describes the relationality and dynamism of Dreaming: 
To think of Dreamings as representing discrete spaces or particular laws is both to 
underestimate the ways in which Dreamings challenge linear space-time and to forget 
the relational aspect of ownership within Aboriginal culture.  The Dreamings no more 
belong to the land than they do to the people.  The people and the Dreamings are 
coextensive: they are ontogenetic networks of reciprocal exchange.  A Dreaming … is a 
movement, a song and a dance, a practice of mark-making that does not represent a 
space-time but creates it, again and again.  (Relationscapes 163)  
As Ian McLean sums up, “[t]o know Dreaming, then, is to open one’s being to the life force of 
its sites and from this knowledge, form a culture or expression that communicates with it” 
(“Dreaming” np).  Making paintings is one form of this expression.   
 
Until relatively recently, Central/Western desert painting as an expression of relationship to 
Dreaming was packaged in a very particular way for Western audiences.  It was commonplace, 
for example, that each painting entering the Western art market be accompanied by its 
“Dreaming story,” which had the purpose of “completing” the painting for the Western viewer 
(Stratton 112).  For Biddle, though, such supplementary stories tend to point the viewer toward 
“a strictly narrative reading,” and also to promote a “‘decoding’ interpretation” that focuses on 
the relationship between the painting’s “icons” and their real “referents” (38, 34).  Additionally, 
this story text has the function of exoticising the work, “[signalling] the Otherness of the 
object from ‘our,’ apparently homogenously known, culture” (Stratton 112).  However, Biddle 
notes that in recent times aboriginal artists often resist providing extra documentation, with 
the aim that any viewing will attend entirely to the painting itself (39).  Indeed, Biddle 
acknowledges that desert artists themselves do not discuss the meaning or content of one 
another’s paintings, since “authority to speak about another’s painting or Dreaming is highly 
restricted and regulated” (35).  Instead, their discussions will tend to focus on style or form.  
Due to their sensate nature, and their proclivity for bodily engagement, it seems that these 
paintings call for an awareness not of what they mean, but more of what they do (Biddle 39).  
These paintings, for example, speak to the relations they incorporate through “the pulsations 
of the dots, in the rhythms of the layered surfaces at play, of intensities interweaving” 
(Manning, Relationscapes 161).  As we now turn to two examples of Aboriginal art, then, we 
make no attempt to “read” their meanings or decode their Dreamtime stories.  Rather, we try 
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to follow the paintings’ forces, attend to their affects and sensations, in order to map some 
elements of what these paintings are capable of. 
 
Nancy Kunoth Petyarre’s Mountain Devil Lizard Dreaming is a painting one metre forty 
squared, which manifests the movements of the mountain or thorny devil lizard.  She shares 
this Dreaming with a number of her well-known artist siblings, the most renowned of whom is 
perhaps her sister Kathleen Petyarre.  This family’s “country” is in and near Utopia in 
Australia’s Northern Territory (Biddle 80), a community that was one of the first to practise 
the contemporary Desert art style in the mid-1980s (Stratton 95).  This painting did come with 
an accompanying statement from the gallery.  The text explains that the painting is “Nancy’s 
depiction” of the mountain devil lizard, that the “coloured arc shapes … represent the 
markings that are on the back of the lizard which change colour throughout the day as the sun 
moves across the sky,” and that “[t]he pale line in the centre of the painting shows the 
ancestral trail of the mountain devil lizard” (United Galleries).  Of course, such a 
representational, narrativistic interpretation reveals little of what the painting does, actually or 
virtually.  Grosz, in commenting upon one of Kathleen Petyarre’s works, comes closer to a 
more enlivening affective response: 
Petyarre and her sisters each produce mountain devil Dreaming in a series of 
remarkable paintings, each varying minutely, each taking a different element or aspect 
of the same Dreaming and extracting from it a vibrating series of dots, which resonate, 
op-art style, not just with optical but above all with haptic effects that reproduce while 
transforming the devil-movement through linking it to the becoming of the terrain or 
landscape.  (Chaos 94)  
Nancy Petyarre’s painting is not so much a likeness of the lizard, but more a figural rendering, 
the sensation of the lizard contracting and expanding on the canvas.  Just as Grosz remarks of 
one of Kathleen’s works, there is something of “a becoming-devil of the paint itself, the 
coming alive of the corrugations and patterns of its skin, of its tracks, the arcs of its 
movements as well as the projection of the skin onto the terrain” (Grosz, Chaos 94).  The 
immediate energy of the piece comes from its sense of movement, across several space-times.  
First, there is the shimmering in place effected by the tiny dot work, achieving a vibrant 
pulsation of movements that creates an immanent materiality, holding the painting both here 
and not-here, in “real” time and in Dreamtime.  As well, there are the arc-like movements, the 
swirling semi-circles of the becoming-lizard, rhythms repeating here-there, back-forth, 
drawing us into the s(w)inging resonances of relational spaces.  This is a ritual of appearance 
and disappearance, of the actual meeting the virtual in a “cycle of continuous regeneration” 
(Manning, Relationscapes 164).  Then, there is the diagonal movement across the canvas, from 
corner to corner, building a force that resists the boundaries of the square and liberates 
sensation to the painting’s outside.  Overall, the work has the feel of a spatial transformation, a 
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becoming of movement in the lines and dots that is not achieved figuratively.  Again, the work 
calls forth Manning’s “politics of touch” (Relationscapes 157), which is generated through the 
haptic pull of the animated textures, the intensities of the dotted whites and arcs of darkness.  
The painting demands more than viewing—it calls for a “reaching-toward” that shifts the field 
of energy from the optic to the depths of the haptic.  For Manning, a painting such as 
Petyarre’s is a prehension of Dreaming (prehension is the Whiteheadean operation through 
which an actual entity relates itself positively to some other entity [Christian 33]); as Manning 
explains, to prehend the Dreaming is not to simply narrate one of its instances (Relationscapes 
160).  Instead, it is to bring forth, through painting, the “land’s eventfulness,” which is also to 
bring forth “a new actual occasion—a becoming-world” (Manning, Relationscapes 160).  In 
prehending Dreaming, such a painting feels the Dreaming’s resonance and paints this into the 
canvas (Manning, Relationscapes 160).  This has a distinct political impact, as Manning 
explains: such artworks “call forth a new way of feeling-seeing, a seeing-with that moves the 
body.  This elicited movement-with is affective: its tonality (its modalities, its resonances, its 
textures) alters both what a body can do and how the world can be experienced” 
(Relationscapes 160).     




Nancy Kunoth Petyarre, Mountain Devil Lizard Dreaming, owned by the 




Shane Pickett’s Aboriginal heritage is quite different to Nancy Petyarre’s.  Born in the 
wheatbelt town of Quairading in 1957, Pickett belonged to the Noongar (or Noongyar) people 
of the southwest corner of Western Australia (McLean, “Dreaming”; Tapper 6).  Pickett, then, 
was not strictly a desert artist; but, as Judith Ryan tells us, “[t]he success of the movement is 
not confined to a small group of artists throughout the Central and Western deserts, but has 
had a big bang effect on other forms of Aboriginal art made in widely different contexts.”  
Pickett was, by his own account, “a painter of the Noongyar lands,” having “learnt to read the 
songlines that journey through all living things across the entire landscape.”  Just as the desert 
artists attempt to “map out … the geography of their Dreaming country” (Grosz, Chaos 92), so 
too does Pickett, with close attention also to the relationality of Dreaming components: “Every 
river, every tree, every rock is important, as the Dreaming runs through them connecting all 
things, including mankind.  These are the energy paths of the Dreaming” (Pickett, Artist).  
Pickett’s painting, Hunting Grounds and the Men’s Stories (153cm x 123cm), was not 
accompanied by any explanatory text; the viewer is simply left with a dynamic work, whose 
subject seems to be the energy and vitality of the paint’s movement around and in the surface 
of the canvas.  Pickett’s works have been called “gestural abstractions” (“Current”), and may 
well be to the extent that they “display the sweeping gestural brush strokes and energetic 
application of pigment” typical of that style (Gardner and Kleiner 973).  However, such a 
classification fails to convey fully the affective force and materiality of this work.  The deep 
black background, strong swathes of creams, and bold trails of ochre do not map the land in a 
simply “gestural” sense.  Nor do they “present a bird’s eye view of the landscape operating 
according to preestablished [Cartesian] coordinates of space-time” (Manning, Relationscapes 
166).  Instead, this is landscape by felt force, a topological mapping of “Dreaming’s intensive 
movement” (Manning, Relationscapes 166).  The vigorous strokes of colour, as they fold and 
swirl and layer, create an embodied experience of landscape as the overlapping space-times of 
the Dreaming.  Manning’s comments about Clifford Possum’s map painting could equally 
apply to Pickett’s work here: 
Space here is performed, folding into durations that become part of the materiality of 
the painterly event.  Be it the land “itself” or acrylic, the point of the Dreaming is that 
it is not a location or a representation.  It cannot “exist” in a Euclidian space-time, but 
must always move, resituating itself in relays that are changeable, depending on 
seasons and tribal conjunctions.  (Relationscapes 169) 
If Pickett’s painting is a map of hunting grounds, it is an experiential map: one that “performs 
a kind of active reading of the land” using Dreamings as position-makers (Manning, 
Relationscapes 168).  As McLean points out, Pickett’s rendering of the landscape “is no 
picturesque reverie but a persistent searching for the energies though which Dreaming reveals 
itself (“Dreaming”).  In this work Dreaming reveals itself through the vibrancy, texture and 
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depth of the colours, and through the intense ebbing and flowing of the textured rhythms of 
the brush strokes.  In “mapping” these hunting grounds, Pickett is the “skilled hunter” who 
“carefully scans the whole scene, looking beyond the appearance of individual things to what 
is between them”—elements such as “scents and sounds, … patterns and rhythms of shapes 
and colour tones, variations in light” (McLean, “Dreaming”).  His gently curving lines of fine 
white dots add a further affective dimension, providing pathways into the rhythms, pulling us 
securely along the trails, immersing us into the very immanence of the work.  Whether these 
“dancing skeins” of dots represent “the paths travelled by generations of ancestors, or “the 
paths of stars” (Tapper 7) is moot, in terms of the immediate force they impart.  To the extent 
that they are always-already steadily moving, they admit another, different layer of 
experience—of space-time—to the various felt pulsations of the paint through which they 
travel.  Overall, as Biddle might put it, this canvas breathes “with a life-force not reducible to 
the cold flat geometry of map, compass or grid” (82).  Rather than offering a “perspective” of 
the land, it produces “an immersion in a movement that touches and transforms as it crosses 
surface (country [and] canvas)” (Biddle 82).  Altogether, it might be said to comprise a figural 
rendering of the land as movement, as a plurality of sub-conscious rhythms.  
                
 
            
Figure 2 
Shane Pickett, Hunting Grounds and the Men’s Stories, owned by the 
author, © the artist, licensed by Aboriginal Artists Agency 2009  
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Through these two examples, we can begin to see how contemporary Aboriginal art operates 
primarily through the bodily levels of sensation and affect, rather than via strategies of 
representation.  To respond appropriately to these paintings is not to search for codes or 
narratives or direct translations, but to approach them affectively.  To do so is to “open to a 
way of seeing which engages our bodies and our senses in order to make something—else, 
more, different—happen” (Biddle 22).  The importance of an affective reading is made more 
clear in Biddle’s statement that it “allows for the possibilities of not just seeing but inhabiting 
ways of being that are not easily assimilated, that fundamentally destabilise and defamiliarise 
our taken-for-granted ways of being and doing in the world” (22).  And so we come to the 
political efficacy of this kind of Aboriginal art.  To begin with, this efficacy involves the same 
potential as all art forms: to “produce a break with habitual formations and dominant 
signifying regimes”—a break that also carries with it “the concomitant affirmation of 
something new” (O’Sullivan 69).  On a more specific note, the pertinent questions regarding 
the political potency of desert-style paintings might be: what, in particular, do they work to 
resist, and how do they constitute a thinking that opens up “other possible worlds” (O’Sullivan 
96)?  In terms of resistance, we should remember that these paintings have emerged in an 
Australian context in which indigenous people continue to experience the “ongoing assailing 
effects of colonialism—dispossession, displacement, land rights, native title” (Biddle 39).  
Indeed, this style first arose around the same time as the first Aboriginal land rights 
legislation, and the accompanying development of “Aboriginal self-determination and self-
management politics” (Biddle 31).  As Biddle suggests, these paintings were (are) part of an 
attempt to “rewrite the eurocentric version of Australia’s occupation” (31).  As Aboriginal 
activist Galarrwuy Yunupingu writes: 
When we paint—whether it is on our bodies for ceremony or on bark or canvas for the 
market—we are not just painting for fun or profit.  We are painting, as we have always 
done, to demonstrate our continuing link with our country and the rights and 
responsibilities we have to it.  We paint to show the rest of the world that we own this 
country and that the land owns us.  Our painting is a political act.  (65-66)
42
 
Yunupingu also argues for Aboriginal painting as a form of writing: “[o]ur form of writing, 
writing for land, is in the form of a painting” (65), a point with which Biddle concurs.  In her 
view desert-style paintings “are an intercultural form of writing: a recently developed and in-
process form of materiality designed to communicate directly between Desert artists and the 
European reader” (37-38).  Similarly, Stephanie Radok notes that “all Aboriginal art is … about 
communication across and between cultures, that possibility, and that achievement” (19).  In 
more political terms, we might say that this art is a method of “writing back to an 
institutionalised incapacity of Europeans to ‘recognise’ Aboriginal ways of being” (Biddle 39).  
What they are working to resist, therefore, is their positioning by a dominant culture—formed 
according to the dogmatic image of thought— whose oppressions they have been subject to 
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for over three hundred years.  To the extent that it works to deterritorialise majoritarian rule, 
this is a minor art practice, which is also, as O’Sullivan points out, a revolution “yet-to-come” 
(80).  This is again to mobilise the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of becoming-revolutionary—
revolution “as that moment which allows all of us to form new alliances, new relations and 
produce new joyful subjectivities” (O’Sullivan 80).  This is a minor practice that “joins forth 
with philosophy, calling forth new earth, new peoples”—which is also to say this (politically 
charged) art movement involves “a collective enunciation, the production of collaborations 
and indeed the calling forth of new kinds of collectivities” (O’Sullivan 74).  These new kinds of 
collectivities could involve rethinking democracy, as Deleuze’s concept of becoming-
democratic asks us to do.  But because this art movement engages with capitalism—creates 
works for the market—some might argue that it is actually in the process of becoming-major.  
O’Sullivan contends, however, that a practice can still become-minor “even if it is located 
within a major institution”: indeed, a minor art is best positioned “at an oblique angle” to the 
major—both inside and outside of it (73).  In terms of this art’s relationship to post-colonial 
capitalism, Jon Stratton even asserts that we must “recogni[s]e not only the modes of 
appropriation which Western society imposes on [Aboriginal artists] but also the ways in 
which the peoples who produce the paintings mobili[s]e those modes of appropriation for 
their own purposes” (125).  What this suggests is that while resisting the dominant power 
structure, these artists can be “using elements of that system to their own advantage” (Stratton 
125).  Capitalism aside, it is still the case that the desert art style disturbs the major, not only 
politically, but simply at the level of art itself.  As Radock notes, “[i]t challenges conventional 
approaches to contemporary art by standing simultaneously both outside and inside it; and it 
charges that category with its narrowness, forcing confronting political perspectives into 
Eurocentric visions” (19).  
 
According to thinkers such as Biddle and Manning, the foremost purpose of this art is not to 
engage with capitalism anyway, but to enact (rather than represent) the Dreaming: to “bring 
the country into being again” (Biddle 54).  As Biddle writes, “Aboriginal painting is not art in 
the strictly Western sense of an object designed solely for aesthetic purposes, contemplation, 
display or sale” (13-14).  Its purpose is more to “make [Aboriginal] culture into an experience: a 
culturally distinct way of doing and being in the world” (Biddle 14).  As we have noted, a large 
component of Aboriginality is relationship to land, which this art directly enacts: this art 
“expresses the possibility of human intimacy with landscapes. This is the key to its power: it 
makes available a rich tradition of human ethics and relationships with place and other species 
to a worldwide audience” (Langton 16).  This indigenous art, therefore, opens up, amongst 
other things, a new way of thinking (a new concept of) landscape, one that is outside the 
dominant Western view: 
This is not a geographically bound, naturally given forensic landscape of flora, fauna, 
 161 
species, but a country which is animated and made by the fleshly, bodily remains of 
Ancestral animal parts, excrement and traces.  To put that in concrete terms, canvas 
becomes … the same stuff as country, and thus productive of the same effects.  (Biddle 
56) 
These artworks bring to life a world heretofore hidden, that of the corporeal relationship 
between Ancestors, species, land and people.  And they do so through the affective means of 
sensation: through the force of a painting directly impacting the nervous system.  In Biddle’s 
words, these works are “a writing of sensation, of texture as feeling, operating at an irreducibly 
bodily level” (84).  Deterritorialising the major will, after all, involve “the foregrounding of art’s 
intensive, affective quality” (O’Sullivan 73), and the language of affect has become especially 
important at a global moment replete with “genocide, disparity, abuse” (Biddle 22).  As a mode 
of thought, this art “has transformative potential—intellectual, emotional, political—because 
it incites immediacy and intensities; somatic sensibilities evoke response” (Biddle 84).  As an 
enactment of Aboriginal ways of being, this art creates “a movement of thought … that is … at 
once painting, song, dance, sacred object, and power word” (Manning, Relationscapes 183).  
This thought movement evokes change at both artistic and political levels, “asking us to 
rethink the map, the landmark we presumed we could locate, the direction we thought we 
knew how to follow” (Manning, Relationscapes 183).  In our mapping of thought, then, we 
would do well to open to this kind of art-thought, since it has the capacity to unearth much 
otherness.  Through its topological approach to art, this thought moves “beyond preexistent 
coordinates, be they for a body, a territory, a landscape, a law” (Manning, Relationscapes 166).  
To invoke Bergson, this art/thought also opens to other durations, ones “that eventfully alter 
how experience can unfold” (Relationscapes 183). While we may not be able to participate in 
this art/thought as the artist, we can enter it by relation, through a “technique of relation”— a 
“thinking-with” as Manning puts it (Relationscapes 226).  We are “relationally activated” by the 
artwork’s virtual movement, especially since art itself is the technique of “experiencing the 
virtuality of [life] more intensely” (Massumi, Semblance 43, 45).  To this extent, Massumi calls 
art a “technique of existence,” in that it composes “potentials of existence” (Semblance 45, 73).  
Aboriginal desert art, as a form of powerful sensate thought, is, therefore, an immensely 
productive technique in terms of resisting the dominant subjectivities and ways of seeing of 
our time.  
 
Art, thought, movement 
 
In many lines of this thought-map so far—including in the last paragraph—we have made 
reference to thought as movement.  As we have implied, thought, for D+G, is fundamentally 
related to movement.  Thought as intuition, for example, is that mode of thinking connected 
to the movement of internal difference: not movement in space or degree, but the continuous, 
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qualitative change of continuous self-variation (Bryant 55).  The thought of painting, too, is 
one involving movement—the “immobile movement” of sensation (Damkjær107), as well as 
the rhythms, resonances and vibrations of a work’s material forces.  Movement is also the 
character of thought itself—there is movement in thought as it gropes around for concepts: 
“one does not think without becoming something else, something that does not think—an 
animal, a molecule, a particle—and that comes back to thought and revives it,” D+G tell us 
(WP 42).  Moreover, thought, in Deleuze’s view, “must produce movements,” in terms of 
“bursts of extraordinary speeds and slowness” (NP xiii).
43
  Thought as movement occurs in the 
qualitative dimension of affect, which links to the virtual, where any/all potential connections 
can be thought, where thought can move anywhere.  But as well as thought as movement in 
these senses, Deleuze also refers to the inverse relation, which is to say movement itself as 
capable of affecting thought.  In discussing the “new means of expression” brought to 
philosophy by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for instance, Deleuze tells how their works are 
enlivened by “a movement capable of affecting the mind,” and claims that “it is a question of 
making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate 
representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps 
which directly touch the mind” (Deleuze, DR 8).  Although Deleuze is alluding to movement 
in a work of thought that can effect more thought, it is possible to interpret this statement 
differently.  Making movement itself a work, creating dances that “directly touch the mind”: 
couldn’t these be invitations to return to the body, to Manning’s sensing body in movement, 
one of the lodestones of Deleuze’s theory of expression?  After all, in terms of thought, 
Deleuze’s work on Spinoza tells us that the powers of the body are parallel to the powers of the 
mind (PP 18). Therefore, thought moves also at the level of the body, and if we are striving for 
techniques through which to enter a more creative thought, the zone of bodily, physical 
movement may turn up new ideas.  Perhaps there is a movement-thinking that offers a way 
out of thought as representation or functionalism, an art/thought that can enhance ordinary 
or political life.  The first question, though, concerns the kind of bodily movement we might 
turn to for this exploration, since, of course, there are countless from which to choose.  
Deleuze speaks of “dances … which directly touch the mind” (DR 8), so, taking this cue, we 
now turn to the art of dance, prompted also by Thrift’s concern that dance has been “all but 
ignored in the social sciences and humanities,” even while it harbours potential as a means of 
resistance to power and control (“Still Point” 145, 150).  Although Deleuze may not deal with 
the art of dance “with any real importance” (Ellis 2), preferring to focus on music, painting and 
literature, his work offers many fecund ways through which to explore this art form.  We will 
settle for one particular dance-related route to Deleuze, by way of two examples.  Our 
question, overall, is two-fold: first of all, what might it mean to “think dancerly”?  And further, 
if thought is connected to physical movement, what could it mean to have an idea in dance?  
 163 
In approaching these concerns, it is useful to first consider how we might broadly 
conceptualise dance from a Deleuzian perspective. 
 
In general terms, Western theatrical (and social) dance has regarded the body as 
fundamentally a “means of expression and representation” (H. Thomas 1).  This is dance as 
understood to express human emotions and meanings, as well as representing events and 
situations in the actual world.  Dance, here, can be considered “a choreographic version of a 
simple correspondence theory of truth …—in dance the gestural mirroring of a prior meaning” 
(Wyschogrod 146).  Further, from an Aristotelian standpoint, dance can be deemed an “image 
of self-creation through realisation,” to the extent that in dancing, the dancer properly realises 
her/his potential to dance (Colebrook, “How Can” 7).  Since Deleuze’s project is to liberate 
thought from representation, such an image will not suffice to explain what is happening in 
dance.  For him, dance will not be concerned with signification or with self-creation, but will 
be connected to life as “a power to become, a potential for multiple creations in any number of 
styles” (Colebrook, Gilles 86).  Dance, then, is a power to create: it is not just about this body 
dancing here and now but is an expression of the power to dance (Colebrook, Gilles 86).  In 
other words, dance is not an act carried out by a body toward some particular end, but is, 
rather, an act in and of itself—an act that expresses life’s creativity or differentiation in the 
style of dance.  To dance is to express the world’s becoming, the essential power to always 
become something new.  What is true for dance “is true of all the arts”: it unleashes “strange 
becomings” across “melodic landscapes” and “rhythmic characters” (D+G, WP 169).  Deleuze 
does explicitly refer to the figure of a dancer in a discussion of actualisation and counter-
actualisation; he gives the art of dance (as well as acting) the role of opening the “crack” or 
pain that occurs when the body opens to the pure virtuality of what it has the potential to do: 
[T]o be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actuali[s]ation with a 
counter-actuali[s]ation, the identification with a distance, like the true actor and 
dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with 
its inevitable actuali[s]ation.  It is to give the crack the chance of flying over its own 
incorporeal surface area, without stopping at the bursting within each body; it is, 
finally, to give us the chance to go farther than we would have believed possible.  (LS 
161) 
Thus, dance involves both the corporeal at the level of the body, and the incorporeal, 
inasmuch as it expresses the “sense of the body as potentiality” (Colebrook, “How Can” 11).  
After all, “[t]he work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else” (DG, WP 165).  This notion 
that dance can stand alone—be stripped of representational conventions and express only 
itself—is not without application in the world of dance; the well-known American 
dancer/choreographer Merce Cunningham has perhaps advocated it most famously.  Although 
Cunningham does not specifically reference Deleuze, or even philosophy in general (Damkjær 
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11), his work does, in José Gil’s estimation, “resonate” with Deleuzian theory (118).  
Cunningham was not interested in the “layers of meaning” with which dance is normally 
encumbered, instead seeking to bring into focus “movement’s particularity and specificity” so 
as to reveal it “as an event on its own” (Foster 8).  Cunningham’s goal was to unveil an 
autonomy of movement, to disallow dance its conventional expressivity and mimetic function 
(Gil 117), in order to reveal a new kind of expressivity—that of movement itself unfolding.  As 
Gil states, “[t]o dance is to create immanence through movement,” and, accordingly, 
“Cunningham wills immanence: for him, meaning does not transcend movement and life” 
(125).  Cunningham himself proclaims, “[w]hen I dance, it means: this is what I am doing” (qtd. 
in Vaughan 86).  Such an approach, for Massumi, brings dance “most intensely into its own,” 
since it breaks open movement so that it becomes “a pure expression of bodily power” 
(Semblance 145).  Our intention here is not to provide a thoroughgoing investigation of any 
particular dance professional, but, in our quest to uncover what it might mean, in Deleuzian 
terms, to have an idea in dance, we use as a starting point some aspects of a work by 
Cunningham.  In fact, Cunningham’s work, Beach Birds for Camera, links—by way of 
Deleuze—to another performance, Wish, staged in 2011 at the Blue Room Theatre in Perth, 
Western Australia.  Therefore, on the way to exploring the Deleuzian connection, we outline 
the salient elements of each of these works.  
 
Beach Birds for Camera is a 1992 film version of Cunningham’s 1991 stage work Beach Birds.  
The filmed work involves eleven dancers, dressed in “identical white and black leotards and 
tights making a direct reference to bird figures” (Ivarez 11).  The dancers, facing and moving in 
various directions, are spread across a large floor space. While there is a score accompanying 
the piece (the spare sounds of John Cage’s “Four
3
”), the music operates autonomously: neither 
music nor any kind of narrative structure organise the dance’s movements (Brandstetter 8).  
The dancers do not acknowledge the camera and make no attempt to convey emotion: rather, 
as is typical of Cunningham, expressivity is carried only through the dancers’ movements.  
These movements include arm waves, jumps and shakes, balances on one leg, as well as more 
classic dance moves:   
Out of slightly vibrating movements of the outstretched arms accompanied by demi-
pliés, various more complex spatial relations crystalli[s]e into new steps and arm 
combinations, … becoming turns and small leaps. At the same time the hands, which 
are covered in black gloves, are never relaxed; they maintain the conduct of the arm as 
associated with the image of the tips of wings.  (Brandstetter 8) 
The group’s movements are somewhat uncoordinated, although there are repetitions.  As 
Gabriele Brandstetter puts it, “the impression is created of a self-regulating system of 
movements on the flocking model” (8).  Cunningham’s own explanation is that “[i]t is all 
based on physical phrasing.  The dancers don’t have to be exactly together.  They can dance 
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like a flock of birds, when they suddenly take off.  They are not really together; they just do it 
at the same time” (qtd. in Vaughan 258).  The second work, Wish, is a stage adaptation of the 
eponymous novel by Peter Goldsworthy.  Adapted, directed and performed by Humphrey 
Bower, the work is essentially a play that includes a key movement component.  That 
component is performed by dancer/choreographer Daniele Micich, who won the West 
Australian 2011 Most Outstanding Female Dancer Award for her role.  The narrative centres on 
the relationship between “JJ” (Bower) and his sign language student, Eliza, a young female 
gorilla (Micich).  In playing the gorilla, Micich wears a costume that is not an animal suit but 
simply a singlet, long dance pants and half-gloves—all black.  While she communicates 
meaning to JJ (and the audience) in sign language, Micich expresses “gorilla-ness” through her 
movements.  Perhaps most striking of these is her knuckle-walking, the quadripedal 
movement pattern of gorillas, “in which the hands are formed into fists and the weight is 
borne on the middle bones of all the fingers” (Noble and Davidson 29).  With her legs 
shortened and folded under, her body tilted forward and her arms rounded and in-turned, 
Micich pulls herself along in light, large, jerky steps—expressing both speed and slowness.  
Her sometimes quick, instinctive reactions to JJ’s actions are offset by periods of heavy rest, 
during which she hangs her head forward, or faces the audience and moves only her eyes.  
Micich also makes numerous hand/arm gestures, such as extending her hand toward JJ, 
hugging him, or patting the floor.  The narrative develops a romantic love relationship 
between JJ and Eliza, and, in a climactic mating scene, Micich and Bower roll and tumble, their 





What these two performances have in common is a rendering of D+G’s concept of becoming-
animal through the art of dance.  Not through the costumes, which are minimalistically 
animal-like and therefore representational, but purely through movement, Cunningham’s 
dancers and Micich each enter a zone of proximity to birds, and to the gorilla, respectively.  In 
discussing whether or not Beach Birds for Camera functions through resemblance, dance 
theorist Gabriele Brandstetter finds that “[t]he movement and the relationships between the 
movements of the dancers evade explicitness, … relegating … interpretation to the realm of 
aesthetic experience”; further, the work is “[n]ot expression (in the sense of mimesis) but a 
‘showing’ … in the physical-gesticulatory-material sense” (9).  The bird movements in 
Cunningham’s work, then, are not easily classifiable, carrying an intensity of experience that 
does not fit conventional models of dance as mimesis, representation or expression (as does, 
for example, classical ballet’s figure of the graceful swan).  Micich as the gorilla also took her 
“performance” to a level beyond mere mimicry—one critic reporting her to be “mesmerising as 
… the gorilla, [having] hands that ‘were a different instrument, a different voice”; another 
writing that Micich “embodied the gorilla so well I was shocked by the climax of the piece” (G. 
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Clark; Knight).  Rather than performing like a gorilla, then, Micich approaches a kind of bodily 
proximity to the qualities of a gorilla—a qualitative state of different-ness beyond 
resemblance.  Such is the essence of becoming—“one does not imitate; one constitutes a block 
of becoming.  Imitation enters in only as an adjustment of the block, like a finishing touch, a 
wink, a signature.  But everything of importance happens elsewhere: in the becoming-[animal] 
of the dance” (D+G, ATP 305).  D+G’s block of becoming is of a different order to imitation: it 
is a milieu of alliance between two terms—a human and a gorilla, a group of dancers and a 
flock of birds—whereby something unique is created, something “’between’ the terms in play 
and beneath assignable relations” (D+G, ATP 239).  This uniqueness is not a particular entity, 
stable and identifiable, but “the very dynamism of the change situated between two 
heterogeneous terms” (Stagoll, “Becoming” 21).  Put another way, becoming is “involution,” 
which is the opposite of the evolution of molar identities such as the self: in D+G’s words, “the 
self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities. … A fib[re] stretches 
from a human to an animal, from a human or an animal to molecules, from molecules to 
particles, and so on to the imperceptible” (ATP 238).  In terms of the body of the dancer, 
“[f]lesh is only the developer which disappears in what it develops: the compound of 
sensation” (D+G, WP 183).  There is, too, an ethical element to becoming, as Patty Sotirin 
suggests in her statement that “becomings are about passages, propogations and expansions” 
(99), but before we treat this element let us come back to the two dance pieces and consider 
how they bring about their becomings-animal.  When the Cunningham company dances bird 
rhythms and movements they are not emulating birds: their arbitrary twitches, leg shakes, 
head tilts, arm flaps and singular, balanced stillnesses, as well as their balletic steps, take them 
into a zone that fuses the bird with the human, moving between the two, destabilising each.  
Movements are not regulated by music, audience or stage space, instead affecting and being 
affected by the intensities of the bird motions themselves—to the extent that even the 
slightest shift in bearing or demeanor registers across the whole flock-assemblage.  Here, as 
movement becomes art, “the material passes into sensation,” and a ground is reached “that can 
dissolve forms and impose the existence of a zone in which we no longer know which is 
animal and which is human” (D+G, WP 173).  Just so, the Micich-gorilla assemblage is not 
brought about by way of costuming, set or narrative, but, rather, through the singularity of the 
movements.  The slowness of a gorilla pose that is moving at infinite speed, the economy of 
eye movement and intensity of gaze, the heaviness of the body pulled by the foreknuckles, and 
the muscular lightness of instinctual darts towards or away from a stimulus, all bring about a 
block of becoming between human and animal—an emission of particles “that enter the 
relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity” (D+G, ATP 275) of becoming-gorilla.  
Micich’s gorilla is “not representative but affective” (D+G, ATP 257), since both becoming and 
art are a “rejection of the metaphysics of identity and representation in favour of ‘affects’ and 
‘intensities’” (Urpeth 107).  Even though the dancers do not in reality become birds or a gorilla, 
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D+G insist that “there is a reality of becoming-animal” (ATP 103), by which they mean 
“becoming is more real than being” (Urpeth 103).  This is to invoke an ontology that, as James 
Urpeth points out, is centred upon “the theme of ‘immanence’—a reality that contains no 
negations or boundaries, but only differences and ‘thresholds,’ in which everything is 
implicated in everything else” (103).  Thus, the “category” of the human is immanent to that of 
the bird or the gorilla, and the movements of the dance open to this reality.  D+G put it 
eloquently: 
To become animal is to participate in movement, to stake out the path of escape in all 
its positivity, to cross a threshold, to reach a continuum of intensities where all form 
comes undone, as do all the significations, signifiers and signifieds, to the benefit of an 
unformed matter of deterritoriali[s]ed flux, of non-signifying signs.  (K 13) 
 
In terms of what this means for thought, we might now see that becoming-bird and becoming-
gorilla in these dance works are effected by engaging in certain movement-ideas: the 
subtensive, micro-movements that express particles and intensities in the zone of a “bird” or a 
“gorilla”—each of which is already becoming something else.  To think dancerly is to enter 
into an affect-based form of movement that undoes discrete step-by-stepness and reaches 
even into the excess of choreography, so that new processes and becomings may emerge.  
Becoming-animal in movement is, first of all, to make a map of intensities—a “constellation of 
affects” (Deleuze, ECC 64)—relating to the image of the animal in question (this is image in 
Bergson’s terms—where everything in the material world is an image that transmits 
movement [Massumi, User’s 185]).  To be more specific, this map of animal intensities attains a 
zone of proximity with the dancer’s image of her/his own body, altering this image by way of 
affects, making it a becoming.  Deleuze explains: “it is the map of intensity that distributes the 
affects, and it is their links and valences that constitute the image of the body in each case—an 
image that can always be modified or transformed depending on the affective constellations 
that determine it” (ECC 64).  D+G make this more clear through this example:   
The actor Robert De Niro walks “like” a crab in a certain film sequence; but, he says, it 
is not a question of his imitating a crab; it is a matter of making something that has to 
do with the crab enter into composition with the image, with the speed of the image.  
That is the essential point for us: you become-animal only if, by whatever means or 
elements, you emit corpuscles that enter the relation of movement and rest of the 
animal particles, or what amounts to the same thing, that enter the zone of proximity 
of the animal molecule.  You become animal only molecularly.  You do not become a 
barking molar dog, but by barking, if it is done with enough feeling, with enough 
necessity and composition, you emit a molecular dog.  (ATP 274-75) 
To emit a molecular bird or gorilla in dance, then, is to commit to taking on, becoming, the 
affects and intensities of bird and gorilla images.  Movement, in dance or otherwise, is a 
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mixture of a “certain degree of improvisation” and a “certain degree of habit” (Manning, 
Relationscapes 19).  As Manning explains, “habits hold our [movements] to a practiced 
repetition: a choreography of sorts” (Relationscapes 19).  But before the actual movements of 
these habits, Manning proposes that there is an interval of “preacceleration”—the virtuality of 
movement at its stage of incipiency, the interval where “different durations coexist” 
(Relationscapes 18).  In a movement of becoming-animal, these durations are populated by the 
forces and intensities of the animal qualities, which, through the improvising of them, are 
further released.  This is not to think about becoming an animal, but to become animal 
through directly taking on the animal’s affects.  Interrupting habitual movements through 
expressing the intense movements and poses of the birds and of the gorilla is to express the 
durations of these animals directly through the body.  Stamatia Portanova would put it this 
way:    
The “becoming” (aiming at, tendency, a sensation of movement or a movement-idea) 
of the dancing body is generated by the [affective constellation of the animal image] 
and is actualised in a step.  In other words, movement is generated in the body 
through an affective passage of ideas between different … orders of expression: [the 
image of the animal and that of the] dancer.    
This is to think in movement, which, in turn, affects a movement of thought.  Most 
significantly, the movement ideas expressed in becoming provoke a movement away from 
thinking the world in terms of identity and representation.  As Sotorin points out, “becoming 
offers a radical conception of what a life does” (99).  This shift is an ethical one, to the extent 
that it “explodes the ideas about what we are and what we can be beyond the categories that 
seem to contain us: beyond the boundaries separating human being from animal, man from 
woman, child from adult, micro from macro, and even perceptible and understandable from 
imperceptible and incomprehensible” (Sotorin 99).  If art is “always a question of freeing life 
wherever it is imprisoned” (D+G, WP 171), danced becomings such as these “animate the 
possibilities of life, constantly moving through what we know to be real or true and running 
beyond the limits, boundaries and constraints that make those realities and truths what they 
seem to be” (Sotorin 99).  In the specific terms of becoming-animal, to release this concept 
through dance/movement is also to call forth a new way of thinking the animal, one that 
rejects anthropocentrism and that can open to a more ethical way of relating to animals.  
Jennifer Parker-Starbuck suggests that a performance of becoming-animal leaves a trace or 
imprint upon the audience (through the technique of relation), which might lead to a more 
balanced, reciprocal alliance between the animal and the human (662-63).  Perhaps such a 
trace may result in a granting of greater respect to those animals held in slaughterhouses and 
laboratories (Parker-Starbuck 668) at the service of capitalism.  This result would, finally, 
speak to becoming as a political practice, in which social actors overturn normalised 
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representations “and reconstitute themselves in the course of participating, and changing, the 
conditions of their material existence” (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 223).          
 
The movement ideas in the becoming-animal comprise just one example of how dance 
constitutes a mode of bodily thinking that is also a movement of thought; there are countless 
others. We could, for instance, consider dance, as D+G do, to be a kind of territorialisation: 
“the [way] in which space is produced by relations amongst bodies, bodies marking a distance 
from each other [in order] to negotiate the chaos that always threatens to introduce too much 
difference” (Colebrook, “How Can” 12).  A space becomes a territory when the dancing 
body/ies produce a rhythm that is not merely functional, but is expressive of qualities (D+G, 
ATP 315)—whether animal qualities or the qualities of a storm or a love affair.  The rhythm and 
qualities mark the dancing space, making it into a quasi-stable territory.  Territorialisation, 
though, also involves deterritorialisation, which is when a danced refrain of movements begins 
to become autonomous, so that the expressive forces open to the outside of this particular 
dance—“budding, producing” its rhythms to affect other assemblages (D+G, ATP 325).  As 
such, through deterritorialisation, dance becomes a power that can transform the more 
seemingly stable, functional movements of life into “rhythmic expressions that divert from 
striving and function” (Colebrook, “How Can” 13), and open to new, more affirmative ways of 
being.  Dance, then, is an “inhuman” art, in the sense that it is “movement as such” (Colebrook, 
“How Can” 13), having the power to move beyond the territory of the dancing space.  But let us 
return to the movement ideas at play in becoming-animal, and consider them as techniques 
for thought.  To take up these techniques would be to think dancerly: to keenly attend—
relate—to the qualities and affects of other becomings and move, bodily, into them; to intuit 
the gap of preacceleration and micro-move into another duration: with the overall aim of 
destabilising the range of practices that follow from ontologies of identity and representation, 
and from capital-suffused thought. 
 
Art and the digital 
 
In our mapping of thought as movement and movement affecting thought the following 
phrase would not be ill-fitting: “[o]pen spaces, smooth spaces, absence of boundaries, speed, 
the firing of electrons, blurrings of sexual or species boundaries, rhizomatic connectivities and 
the creation of hybrids” (Conley, “Space” 259).  As Conley notes, “all of these descriptives 
abound in Deleuze’s writings” (“Space” 259), and, in fact, this serves to connect him (and 
Guattari) to another, highly contemporary mode of art.  It is because of Deleuze’s predilection 
for rhizomatic thinking, Conley suggests, that he is “a favourite of digital artists” (“Space” 259).  
If this is the case, and given the ubiquity of electronic media technologies today, it is fitting 
that we now consider the potentialities of art in this realm.  This is especially of interest in 
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light of our earlier questioning of the prospects of the digital for thought.  As a starting point 
in considering art in the age of digitalisation, let us further consider Conley’s link between 
rhizomatics and “digital art”: 
Rhizomatic thinking makes its way into the virtual spaces of computers and digital 
art.  It sets out to undo limits and to collapse boundaries—nature versus culture, 
human versus machine, human versus animal, or human versus cyborg—and creates 
new spaces.  On their computers, network digital artists experiment with connections 
between different species to create hybrids and becomings.  Like philosophers, many 
digital artists question limits in order to destabilise the self that is defined by the 
position it occupies or owns in the world.  Working with Spinozist questions—“What 
can a body do?” and “Where do the senses end?”—digital artists undo the barriers 
used to fix and define the ”Self.”  (“Space” 259)       
Conley’s nomination of “digital art” rather than “new media” art points to the difficulty of 
categorising art made using electronic media technologies.  Indeed, art curators have grappled 
with this issue, claiming that such art is, by nature, a field of “gnarly diversity” (Graham and 
Cook 1).  Just a few of the terms used to describe this art are computer art, digital art, 
interactive art, immersive art, digital media, multimedia (Graham and Cook 4), as well as 
software art (Parikka, “Ethologies” 116).  According to US art scholar and curator Christiane 
Paul, digital/new media art “resists ‘objectification,’” and has “introduced a shift from the 
object to process: [it is] an inherently time-based, dynamic, interactive, collaborative, 
customi[s]able and variable art form” that makes use of digital technologies “as a medium” (1). 
Before exploring the potential of digital art for thought, however, we revisit our earlier 
investigation of the digital, wherein we presented a somewhat pessimistic view of new media 
technologies with regard to thought.  In returning to that particular ontology of the digital, we 




To recapitulate, in Part 1 we put forward several objections to the realm of the digital and new 
media technologies.  We raised such issues as the corporate colonisation of cyberspace, 
information overload, the “pseudocreativity” of the digital due to the restrictiveness of binary 
code, and the concomitant superiority of the analogue.  In our attempt to see whether there is 
anything to be salvaged for thought from this realm, let us return to the positions of Deleuze, 
and Guattari, both of whom, we should remember, “were writing at the threshold of the digital 
age” (Conley, “Space” 260).  We have already seen how Deleuze links information to control; 
he further addresses the impact of new media on cinema and on traditional power structures 
in Cinema 2, concluding that, at that stage, the full effect of the new “electronic image” was 
“yet to be determined” (265).  In terms of art specifically, Deleuze’s stance is that the actual 
media of new technologies is secondary to aesthetic force, and that the technologies can make 
art go either way—that is, be potentialising or be severely limiting (C2 267).  “The new 
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automatism” he writes, “is worthless in itself if it is not put to the service of a powerful, 
obscure, condensed will to art, aspiring to deploy itself through involuntary movements which 
none the less do not restrict it” (C2 266).  As we shall see in Line of Flight 3, Guattari, too, sees 
potential in the new media, but is also cautionary regarding its deployment.  Conley gives an 
apt summary of both theorists’ attitude to this new development: 
If [D+G] see possibilities of becoming through connections between humans and 
machines or the creation of new spaces, they also flatly condemn the political abuses 
through the world of the digital media and the internet.  Technology, they argue, can 
be liberating.  It can help create and recreate a world that no longer exists to be 
represented.  … [But] information science … is also constructed around order-words.  
It extracts constants and discourages true becomings.  Computers and the internet are 
presently under the spell of finance capitalism, the latter deploys its order-words to 
build barriers and arrest movements that it would otherwise be unable to channel for 
its own ends.  It extracts constants and helps consolidate a society of control.  (“Space” 
260)   
In D+G’s estimation, then, there is promise that the new information technologies might open 
to “infinite becomings” (Conley, “Space” 260), but there is also the real possibility that they 
might remain captive to the flows of capital.  Deleuze, however, indicates a way to oppose the 
information and control aspects of digital technologies: for him, there is a “fundamental 
affinity between a work of art and an act of resistance,” and there is also a related potential 
that technologies of “information and communication” can work to become “an act of 
resistance” (TRM 322-23).  To bring the two together would be to make art-as-resistance with 
these new media—technologies of the digital.  As D.N. Rodowick explains, “[t]he special task 
of the simulacral arts and a philosophy of resistance is to … invent alternative ways of thinking 
and modes of existence immanent in, yet alternative to, late capitalism and liberal 
democracies” (205).
46
  The prospect of digital art as resistance, though, would require a 
different ontology to that hermetic digital outlined in Part 1, one that is directly in touch with 
creativity and that is capable of accessing the true realm of the virtual (the virtual that is 
beyond that hype word often associated with network culture) (Parikka, “Ethologies” 119).  It 
remains for us to now explore what this more potentialising ontology of the digital might 
entail.   
 
In fact, in recent times several researchers have taken up this very question.  Evens, for 
example, as noted earlier, begins by laying out a thorough contrast between Deleuze’s 
virtual—a realm of pure creativity—and the unproductiveness of the digital.  To summarise: 
In Deleuze, the virtual is fecund or genital, an autochthonous source of novelty; it has 
no being but the becoming of the new.  Every event in the virtual generates not just a 
new object (one more) but a whole new dimension, a new kind.  Virtual production … 
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produces what was inconceivable hitherto, a new thought in every moment.  By 
contrast, the digital, working from only the neutered difference of 0 and 1, produces 
nothing outside if itself.  Indifferent and pliable, lacking a will of its own, the digital is 
effectively sterile.  (Evens, “Digital” 154)   
However, Evens also acknowledges that this particular ontology of the digital “fails to explain 
(and indeed outright denies) the manifest creativity of digital technologies” (“Digital” 158).  
The digital is evidently a site of tremendous “creative production” (Evens, “Programming”), 
but is this solely pseudo-creativity, or does the digital “overlap at some point with the virtual”? 
(Evens, “Digital” 158).  In the end, Evens concludes that it does, and searches for a means by 
which this occurs: 
It is not enough to point to the materiality of the digital, even though this materiality 
is essential; for digital materiality is overcoded, dominated by the abstraction that 
squeezes out creativity. It is also inadequate to note that the digital is employed by 
human beings who are themselves seized by the virtual; the question of creativity 
stands … .  (“Digital” 158) 
For Evens, it is by way of a specific “ontological structure” that “the digital reaches beyond 
itself” and comes into contact with the actual/virtual: “[i]f the digital in isolation is … 
laminated onto a plane that renders everything level, then the structure that describes its 
contact with the actual would be a fold or pleat in that plane (“Digital” 158).  Elsewhere, Evens 
labels this structure an “edge” (“Programming”).  Evens explains his fold/edge though detailing 
it at work in two examples: object-oriented programming (“Programming”) and the “interrupt” 
(or “force quit”) command on computers (“Digital” 159-68)—both of which are examples of 
largely human-directed actions directing/overriding code.  Such actions activate particular 
effects within the digital itself, effects by which Evens sees that the digital makes an 
ontological escape from its own “flatness” (“Digital” 162).  These effects include increasing the 
number of dimensions of the computing plane, instating hierarchical distinctions between 
these dimensions, introducing a topological inside/outside distinction between layers of the 
computing environment, and the enfolding and intermixing of temporally, logically and 
spatially distinct spheres (“Programming”; “Digital” 163-65).  There is not the room here to 
detail Even’s two examples, but suffice to say that the fold or edge, integral to the processes of 
both object-oriented programming and the interrupt command, is, for Evens, “the mechanism” 
that connects “the pure form of the digital to the material, actual, and human worlds” 
(“Digital” 167).  In order to overturn “the aesthetic and political homogeneity” that links to a 
delimiting ontology of the digital, Evens calls for our cultivation of another ontology, one that 




In bringing together the digital and the virtual/actual, Evens relies upon a specific mechanism, 
brought to life at the computer interface.  Other theorists, however, have taken a more 
process-based, perhaps more overtly Deleuze-Guattarian approach.  It is this latter approach 
we will foreground, since, as will become evident, it allows a more fruitful foray into the 
potentialities of the digital to access both the aesthetic and the political effects of art.  This 
approach is informed by reworkings of ethology and ecology (fields that are conceptually 
related: indeed, in the late nineteenth century, they were often considered to overlap [Ansell 
Pearson, Germinal 237n19]).  We will begin here with a consideration of D+G’s particular 
notion of ethology, in order to conceive of the digital as a complexity of “intensive relations 
and dimensions” (Parikka, “Ethologies” 117).   In their reappraisal of evolution in the terms of 
ethology (Ansell Pearson, Germinal 170), D+G are especially influenced by the writings of 
biosemiotican Jakob von Uexhüll, who proposed that “objects are not autonomous or 
independent sets of qualities and quantities, but opportunities for engagement” (Grosz, Chaos 
41).  Such a conception shifts the definition of individuals away from being understood as 
separate entities, towards being construed as coextensive with other entities and life worlds.  
This reforms evolution into a more open, creative process, as Ansell Pearson makes clear: 
[In this] major reconfiguration of ethology … behaviour can no longer be locali[s]ed in 
individuals conceived as preformed homunculi, but has to be treated epigenetically as 
a function of complex material systems which cut across individuals (assemblages) 
and which traverse phyletic lineages and organismic boundaries (rhizomes).  This 
requires the articulation of a distributed conception of agency.  The challenge is to 
show that “nature” consists of a field of multiplicities, assemblages of heterogeneous 
components (human, animal, viral, molecular, etc.), in which “creative evolution” can 
be shown to involve blocks of becoming.  (Germinal 171)  
Transposing such an ethology to the functioning of digital technology means letting go of 
dualistic notions of independent, mechanistic marchings of code, or of unaffected human 
controllers.  Instead, it means focusing on the whole assemblage, understanding that its 
organic and inorganic components are cutting across and affecting one other in complex, 
topological ways.  This ethology can be seen to also relate to Rossiter’s processual media 
theory, which “describes situations as they are constituted within and across spatio-temporal 
networks of relations, of which the communications medium is but one part, or actor.”  For 
Rossiter, these systems of relations make up an “aesthetic regime,” which involves reflexivity 
and change, “transformative iterations” and “sensory affect.”  Such an ethological approach can 
be linked to the idea of ecology, to the extent that “it is based on connectionism, self-
reproduction, and couplings of heterogeneous elements” (Parikka, “Universal”).  As Jussi 
Parikka points out, this also resonates with the “Spinozian understanding of life as affectivity: 
relations of varying velocities, decelerations and accelerations between connected particles” 
(“Universal”).  Luciana Parisi, too, conceives of the digital environment in terms of ecology: 
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putting it eloquently in her essay “Technoecologies of Sensation,” she writes that “media have 
ceased to be instruments of communication and have become part of an atmospheric grid of 
connections where distinct milieus adapt together as microclimates in complex weather 
systems” (182).  Both Parikka and Parisi invoke D+G’s machinism to define this ecology; again, 
for D+G, the machine (as distinct from the technology itself) is “an ontology of flow” that 
refers to the “production of consistencies between heterogeneous elements” (Parikka, 
“Universal”).  There is no sense of humans either using or being determined by technology in 
machinism (Parikka, “Universal”); rather, as Parisi notes, “[t]o think machinically is to engage 
with technical machines in terms of semi-concatenations of partial objects running through 
strata” (“Technoecologies” 183). 
 
From this ethological/ecological approach to the digital we can return to the question of 
Deleuze’s virtual through the notion of machinism.  As with all machines, the machinic 
ecologies of digital culture are by no means “homeostatic grids or rigid structures” (Parikka, 
“Universal”).  Parisi explains: “[f]ar from being a matrix of combinatorial codes, a machine is 
always already traversed by internal, external and associated milieus, regions of supra-action 
ready to give way to new protomachines: machines in potential, futurity machines” 
(“Technoecologies” 183).  In this sense, each of the partial objects involved in the assemblage is 
a vector of becoming, meaning that the digital ecology is overflowing with potential 
connections and interactions; this is to say, of course, that it is fully engaged with the plane of 
the virtual (Parikka, “Universal”).  As Parikka notes, “[digital] ecologies are not mere systems 
of empty repetition, but affecting and living entities looking for and testing their borders and 
thresholds” (“Universal”).  This moving beyond borders and thresholds implicates an open 
system, and, as Ansell Pearson reminds us, the virtual is “the open system par excellence 
(Germinal 28).  Therefore, while an ontology of the digital based on the binary code of 0s and 
1s may not offer much in the way of creativity, D+G’s notions of machinism and 
ethology/ecology offer a means of connecting the digital to the openness of the virtual.  This 
virtual of machinic ethology/ecologies is accessed by way of sensation and affect, as Parisi 
explains: we are “rethink[ing] new media technologies neither in terms of form (technical 
medium) nor content (the code, the signifier), but as technoecologies of sensation intersecting 
energetic, cognitive, affective capacities of feeling” (“Technoecologies” 184).  Furthermore, as 
Parikka points out, when D+G address codes they do so from the position that codes always 
have surplus values (“Ethologies” 122).  In their own words: 
Every code is affected by a margin of decoding due to these supplements and surplus 
values—supplements in the order of a multiplicity, surplus values in the order of a 
rhizome.  Forms … far from [being] immobile … are part of a machinic interlock: they 
relate to populations, populations imply codes, and codes fundamentally include 
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phenomena of relative decoding that are all the more usable, composable, and 
addable by virtue of being relative, always “beside.” (D+G, ATP 53)          
This prompts Parikka to call for us to “bypass the cliché of reducing new media to a binary 
mode of coding” and focus on the potential set off by the processuality and relationality of the 
whole assemblage (“Ethologies” 121).  In her analysis of bioinformatics (“the application of 
cybernetics to biology”), Parisi also shifts the discussion away from binary coding: rather than 
reducing genetic data to 0s and 1s, in bioinformatics the biological data itself is preserved in 
combination with digital material substrates (“Technoecologies” 186-87).  Bioinformatics, then, 
involves “an amodal activity inciting the biological and digital into a new machinic 
arrangement” (Parisi, “Technoecologies” 187).  For Parisi, the field of bioinformatics defuses 
Massumi’s argument, referred to earlier, that the analogue is superior to the digital, since in 
this process “there is no dialectical quarrel between these modes of transmission, only a viral 
transduction able to spin out microvariations during the transfer” (Parisi, “Technoecologies” 
187).  Breaking down this analogue-digital opposition, Parisi reveals how the virtual, a realm 
not of binaries but of continuous variation, animates the digital machine.  “If there is a 
superiority of the analog[ue],” she suggests, “it will privilege neither phenomena of subjective 
perception nor those of objective transportation of the bio-logic to a digital level” (Parisi, 
“Technoecologies” 187).  Instead, “it will affirm the tendency of binary systems to code drift, of 
numbered numbers to enter the fuzziness of numbering numbers, of atoms and molecules to 
unleash their own micropercepts, where information transmission coincides with rarified 
areas of vague sensations, with the velocities of felt-thought” (“Technoecologies” 187). 
 
Having now found ways in which the digital does open to the virtual, we can turn to the 
matter of the potentialities of digital art.  The “felt-thought” just referred to in Parisi’s 
statement provides a good starting point.  Let us try to define what felt-thought is: “a virtual 
affective event” (Massumi, Semblance 65), the intensivity of duration (Frichot 71-72), or, as 
Massumi elaborates, “[n]ot feeling something. Feeling thought—as such, in its movement, as 
process, on arrival, as yet unthought-out and un-enacted … . … The mutual envelopment of 
thought and sensation” (Parables 134).  Similarly, Sher Doruff sees felt thought in terms of 
sensation: as the “non-representational, a-syntactic, non-linear movements of thought.  This 
kind of felt thought [is] charged by the chaotic force(s) of the unthought” (157).  Felt thought, 
then, equates to sensation, which, as we have seen, has a central role in art: “the work of art is 
a being of sensation and nothing else” (D+G, WP 164).  Grosz explains further: “[s]ensation 
draws us, living beings of all kinds, into the artwork in a strange becoming in which the living 
being empties itself of its interior to be filled with the sensation of that work alone” (Chaos 
73).  There is, therefore, sensation and the virtual available in the workings of the digital, and 
also, fundamentally, in art.  How, then, can we bring the two together in order to find the 
aesthetic in the digital, one that is productive of the “radical sensations” that can “contest the 
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territorialisations of late capitalist life”? (Zepke, “Concept” 163, 162).  Putting it another way, 
how can we “recast the digital as an aesthetic force capable of producing new kinds of 
sensations and affective responses”? (Munster 94).  Again, we map a path through by way of a 
specific example.  This example is not selected according to any criteria of form or medium; 
for a start, the media are hugely diverse, and, as already noted, for Deleuze the medium is 
secondary to the issue of aesthetic force.  Instead, we use ethico-aesthetic criteria that focus on 
the affective force of the art work/event, and that give “shape to digitality as a virtual ecology 
of bodies, technologies and socialities” (Munster 155).  
 
Much has been written about Mexican-Canadian artist Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s large scale, 
public art works, Relational Architectures, a series of digital, interactive projects that use 
“custom-made technologies to transform urban space” (Bullivant 37).  In demonumentalising 
the identity of public buildings/spaces (Bullivant 37), Lozano-Hemmer’s projects set up “an 
active field of relations that require[s] negotiation between body, building and imaging 
technologies” (Munster 147).  To take a less worn path, though, we now turn to a more 
intimate Lozano-Hemmer project: a gallery-based exhibition made up of twelve artworks, each 
of which also functions as an active set of relations.  Recorders, presented in 2011 at the 
Museum of Contemporary Art in Sydney, consists of interactive art pieces that “hear, see or 
feel the public; they exhibit awareness and record and replay memories entirely obtained 
during the show” (“Rafael Lozano-Hemmer: Recorders””).  Overall, the show is dependent 
upon the participation of its visitors, with all content being collected by way of such digital 
technologies as “heart rate sensors, motion detectors, fingerprint scanners, microphones and 
face recognition software” (“Exhibition”).  As the Sydney Morning Herald puts it, in Recorders, 
“people's intimate biometric details—their heartbeat, fingerprints, voices—are sampled via 
live surveillance cameras, recorders and digital technology and transformed to poetic effect” 
(Lobley).  It is not feasible here to consider each of the twelve pieces, but, in highlighting three 
of them, we aim to build some understanding of how this “poetic effect” translates to what 
Massumi calls the “thinking-feeling” of the art: its “sense of relational aliveness,” its “vitality 
affect” (Semblance 44-45).  To begin with, “Pulse Room” consists of a large darkened room 
with one hundred twinkling incandescent light bulbs suspended from the ceiling in a uniform 
grid.  Upon gripping a sensor, a globe in front of the participant begins flashing in time with 
and to the strength of his/her heartbeat; the room darkens and the participant’s heartbeat 
transfers to a bulb in the overall array; when the room re-lights the participant’s heartbeat has 
joined the grid, knocking off the heartbeat that has been flashing the longest.  There is then a 
room filled with both shadows and flickering lights, each lighting at different intervals, so that 
“at any given time, as you walk around that room, you are surrounded by the vital signs, by the 
electrical activity of the hearts of … one hundred people” (“Rafael Lozano-Hemmer—
Recorders”).  From an aesthetic viewpoint, the work offers a “poetics of mortality” (Herbert), 
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the ineffable sense of the flickering fragility of life.  The experience of seeing one’s heartbeat as 
pulses of light in relationship with the heartbeats of ninety-nine others creates an affective 
impact that exceeds the technological materiality of the situation, moving the participant into 
a qualitative dimension where the “relational aliveness” of the event is intuited.  Moreover, a 
becoming-other is sensed, as the flickerings interweave with one another, and move along the 
grid to take one another’s place.  The second work we will consider, “Tape Recorders,” relies 
on motion detectors to pick up the movements of visitors.  The installation comprises of a 
room lined with two rows of measuring tapes, each row fixed to two opposite walls.  As a 
visitor moves through the room, measuring tapes project upwards, each one recording the 
amount of time the person stays in front of that tape.  When a tape has reached a height of 
three metres it collapses, crashes to the ground and recoils.  This installation evokes a strong 
sense of the uncanny, with the measuring tapes moving in strong connection with the visitor, 
almost as if in a strange dance.  This creates “an uncanny experience that questions who is the 
observer and who is the observed” (“Eye”).  Moreover, there is a powerful experience of 
relationality, which has the effect of blurring “distinctions between human and nonhuman 
actions and interactions,” and bypassing the “false dichotom[y]” between “technology and the 
human” (Ravetto-Biagioli 123).  The third piece, “People on People,” can be described as a large 
shadow play, created by “high resolution surveillance cameras with face recognition and 3D 
tracking” (“Works”).  When people enter the room they “see their shadow cast onto the wall, 
and inside of their shadows they trigger and animate … portraits of people who look back at 
them” (Sheerin).  The portraits inside the shadows are “the live and recorded image of other 
visitors, while their own image is recorded for live or delayed playback inside the shadow of 
someone else” (“People”).  Lozano-Hemmer sees the installation as being a “phantasmagorical 
project,” that also questions the status of observer and observed (Sheerin).  As Kriss Ravetto-
Biagioli notes, such shadow play creates “the illusion of confrontation, contact, and 
engagement” that often seems to “disturb audiences”: “[b]eing coupled with an ephemeral 
double implies a form of intimacy” that, again, produces an “uncanny experience” (127-28).  
 
This feeling of uncanniness is exactly what Massumi means by “vitality affect” (Semblance 44).  
Putting it differently, Massumi draws on Susanne Langer’s concept of semblance when he 
writes “[t]he perception of an object involves the thinking-feeling of a semblance” (Semblance 
44).  Langer’s semblance refers to the virtuality involved in any artwork (see Langer 47-50), 
and, indeed, these Lozano-Hemmer works—though digitally-constructed—are both real and 
virtual.  The ephemeral doubling of the shadow play opens the participant’s own (digital) 
image to a virtual otherness, destabilising the identity of the Self.  As well, there is an opening 
of the present to the virtual by filling real-time images (shadows) with images from the past, 
just as the virtual past remains in Bergson’s duration.  Just so, the past co-exists with the 
present in “Pulse Room” (the heartbeats of past visitors continue to flicker in the present), and 
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in “Tape Recorders” (earlier movements remain suspended in tapes that are not currently 
activated).  These works constitute, to quote Rossiter again, an “aesthetic regime” made up of 
“spatio-temporal networks of relations.”  In a machinic or ethological flow, the human-digital-
technological assemblage autopoetically creates itself: the artist sets up the conditions of 
relations but thereafter each element of the assemblage is a vector of becoming, making un-
programmable outcomes.  As Lozano-Hemmer explains, “[w]ith ‘relational’ work I [am 
referring to] this emergence of ad hoc connections that [are] not intended by the artist 
him[/her]self” (Ponzini).  As digital ecologies these artworks distribute agency, and, through 
affect, become open systems—in touch with the virtual.  As such, they connect participants to 
others and to otherness, to the sense of difference, to an uncanny, disconcerting thinking-
feeling that senses another reality (virtuality).  In Massumi’s words, this kind of art “pries open 
existing practices … in a way that makes their potential reappear at a self-abstracting and self-
differing distance from routine functioning, in a potentiali[s]ed semblance of themselves” 
(Semblance 53).  The sense of aliveness produced through the relationality central to these 
works serve to remind us that nothing in life is of fixed form and therefore unchangeable, that 
the form of all life is dynamic.  As one critic puts it, Lozano-Hemmmer’s work makes us aware 
that we are always “networked, subject to other realities and memories” (Clayton).  And when 
Massumi states that this is “what makes art political, in its own way,” he points to another 
level of Lozano-Hemmer’s work (Semblance 53).  In Massumi’s view, the political in art makes 
it “push further to the indeterminate but relationally potentiali[s]ed fringes of existing 
situations, beyond the limits of current framings or regulatory principles” (Semblance 53).  
Clearly, Lozano-Hemmer’s work pushes beyond the dominant, transcendentalist  
conceptualisation of Being towards the concept and ontology of becoming.  The “existing 
situation” that Lozano-Hemmer specifically means to draw attention to, though, is the issue of 
control by surveillance, which is, as we know, a practice ubiquitous in contemporary culture.  
As Richard Clayton puts it, “[h]is primary concern is with ‘materialising’ or ‘making tangible’ 
the various surveillance systems that surround us in daily life.”  In Lozano-Hemmer’s words, 
“we live in a society that is now completely functioning through those mechanisms of control 
… .  Globalisation …, politics, everything, is based on the idea of metrics, of tracking. … These 
kinds of cameras or surveillance mechanisms are at work at all levels” (Lozano-Hemmer, 
“Artwriter”).  Lozano-Hemmer is acutely aware that “[t]he same surveillance technologies that 
read us as an index of potential criminal intent see us as potential consumers” (Ravetto-
Biagioli 127).  And although he says he is not happy having to make works that explore cultures 
of predatoriness and paranoia, Lozano-Hemmer believes it extremely important to do so, in 
order to “confront these technologies of the panoptic and post-optic gaze” (Lozano-Hemmer, 
Interview).  In the first instance, he wishes to make the technologies “more visually tangible, 
so you [can] get a sense of the observation” (Ponzini).  Further, though, he seeks to push 
beyond current framings of advanced surveillance technologies, and introduce new ways of 
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experiencing them: “[w]e are extending them and making them work for our purposes, custom 
modifying them, and then creating what we consider is a project that is connective [and] that 
is quite playful” (Sheerin).  In “misus[ing] these technologies,” Lozano-Hemmer aims to open 
them to the “whole range of different experiences” they can effect—beyond their control 
function: an aim, he points out, consistent with “what art has always done” (Lozano-Hemmer, 
“Artwriter”).  As Ravetto-Biagioli notes, the (political) point of Lozano-Hemmer’s work is not 
to “declare victims and victimi[s]ers or to return to the bounded individual of disciplinary 
societies”; instead, it is “to visuali[s]e and animate how positions, bodies, and identities are 
themselves in flux, activated, deformed, and transmuted by the flows of capital, media, 
surveillance, and information technologies” (136).  Through providing opportunities for 
participation in a digital-human machinic assemblage that opens to virtual becomings, 
Lozano-Hemmer offers ways to resist and deterritorialise the control mechanisms of digital 
society.  Ravetto-Biagioli expresses Lozano-Hemmer’s achievements in terms of Deleuze’s call 
for “new weapons” against control: “[p]ossible new weapons may be found in the proliferation 
of responses, relations, interactions, indeterminate or plainly dubious activities, and the 
doubling and redoubling of bodily images and gestures that produce new groupings, new 
constructive forces” (140). 
 
There are numerous other examples that show how digital art can produce “new constructive 
forces” in the face of contemporary capitalism.  Parikka, for instance, demonstrates some of 
the ways in which software and net art work “to find cracks in the majoritarian language 
operating as the cultural relay of power and control” (“Ethologies” 124).  Leaving aside for now 
the potentialities of software and the internet, we conclude here by applying some of Parikka’s 
comments to digital art in general.  As stated earlier, against the argument that the digital is 
merely pseudo-creative, we have taken the Deleuze-Guattarian, ethological approach to an 
ontology of the digital.  This is to conceive of digital art as a realm of relationality, a dynamic 
of all kinds of bodies-in-relation (Parikka, “Ethologies” 125)—bodies of code, human bodies, 
material environments and so on.  As Parikka points out, such “[e]thological cartographies 
look for experiments and mutations” and, therefore, are open to the virtuality inherent in 
becoming.  In thinking the potentiality of digital art, it is useful, finally, to invoke (as Deleuze 
often does) Simondon’s work on individuation.  For Simondon, each “individual” is an “open-
ended construct,” a process of “ongoing individuation” that is always determined in relation to 
its “material and immaterial environment” (Brunner and Fritsch 122).  Parikka explains: 
For Simondon, potentiality, or metastability, is practically a definition of a living 
system.  Life here does not have to be thought according to the biological paradigm 
where “living” is a characteristic stratified according to the mode of organisation of 
animals, plants, etc.  Instead, we can talk of the non-organic life of various systems—
or life as individuation and intensity inherent in matter.  Practices in [digital] art and 
 180 
related fields are exemplary social and critical interventions that tap into this logic of 
the non-organic and function as (re)modulations of what is real.  (“Ethologies” 125)   
As such, relational or connective projects such as Lozano-Hemmer’s “tap into the very logics of 
power that are increasingly asignifying: algorithms, computational processes, protocols and 
diagrams of how bodies, social practices and codes are connected” (Parikka, “Ethologies” 125).  
In doing so, such art effects a disruption of majoritarian (transcendental and capitalistic) 
modes of seeing/being in the world.  Digital art as a technique for thought traverses the layers 
of digital materials and processes, non-human sense and preconscious affect, to engender a 
movement in thought—a difference in conceptualising the way things are/can be.  Such re-
conceptualising affirms art as ethics, as bio-politics, as “a mechanism to increase our power” 
(Zepke, Art 9).  Indeed, this power of art leads Guattari to see it as “the paradigm for every 




























LINE OF FLIGHT 3: THOUGHT IN AN AESTHETIC PARADIGM 
 
 
In the previous section, we mapped the lines of thought through art, attending to the affective 
and transformative power of several specific works.  We saw that art as composition is, in fact, 
thought in action, to the extent that the affectivity of these works enact and realise 
“conceptual newness” (Massumi, Parables 176).  In their writings, both Deleuze and Guattari 
also refer to certain artists and art objects—Deleuze in particular, in his extensive treatment of 
Bacon, Proust, Jean-Luc Godard, and many others.  Guattari, however, in his later work, takes 
the power of art to a different level, when he extends this power to artistry or aesthetics in a 
more general sense.  In Chaosmosis, Guattari develops what he calls an “aesthetic paradigm,” 
one that “creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new 
forms from the palette” (7).  As O’Sullivan suggests, this extended paradigm of art could be 
regarded as “an expanded field of creative life practices” (“Guattari’s” 259), since it carries art’s 
creative force into broader realms of life.  This paradigm turns around “creation in a nascent 
state” (Guattari, C 102): it takes art’s ethic of experimentation and moves it across the 
spectrum of spheres impacting subjectivity—philosophy, science, economics, ecology, and so 
on.
 
 Guattari explains:  
The incessant clash of the movement of art against established boundaries … , its 
propensity to renew its materials of expression and the ontological texture of the 
percepts and affects it promotes brings about if not a direct contamination of other 
domains then at least a highlighting and re-evaluation of the creative dimensions that 
traverse all of them.  Patently, art does not have a monopoly on creation, but it takes its 
capacity to invent mutant coordinates to extremes: it engenders unprecedented, 
unforeseen and unthinkable qualities of being.  (C 106) 
In other words, for Guattari, the aesthetic modes of art bear “an autonomous, catalytic” 
function that bleeds into all realms of life, thus having the exceptional capacity to “change the 
very social group from which it may have sprung” (Colman, “Affective” 68).  Indeed, Guattari 
proposes that artistry, or aesthetics, is “on the verge of occupying a privileged position” in our 
milieu, to the degree that it holds the potential to guide us through the “immense crisis 
sweeping the planet” (C 101, 132).  As Stephen Zagala notes, the aesthetic paradigm’s power lies 
in art’s ethic of the “creative production of the new” (20), and is concerned generally with new 
constructions of subjectivity and new futures.  The potentialities of Guattari’s aesthetic 
paradigm for our mapping of thought as resistance can, therefore, take us along another, 
highly productive line.  For this reason we follow Deleuze’s friend’s particular ethological-
ecological thinking to chart this project’s final Line of Flight. 
 
As indicated above, at the base of the aesthetic paradigm is Guattari’s concept of subjectivity.  
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In this concept, subjectivity is not “given as in-itself,” but is “the product of individuals, groups 
and institutions” (C 7, 1).  There is no one dominant factor that produces subjectivity, but a 
blend of elements, making it a “polyphonic and heterogenetic” assemblage (Guattari, C 6), or, 
in O’Sullivan’s interpretation, “a complex aggregate of heterogeneous elements” (Art 90).  It is 
important to note that when Guattari speaks of “subjectivities” he means both “personal 
territories—the body, the self—but also, at the same time, … collective territories—the family, 
the community, the ethnic group” (GR 267).  Either way, Guattari is concerned with departing 
from scientific paradigms of subjectivity, a move that he sees as ethical: “[w]e are faced with an 
important ethical choice,” he tells us;  “either we objectify, reify, ‘scientifise’ subjectivity, or, on 
the contrary, we try to grasp it in the dimension of its processual creativity” (C 13).  To grasp 
the processuality of subjectivity is to admit the potential of difference into the concept, to 
undo the traditional notion of the subject as “the ultimate essence of individuation” or “the 
unifier of states of consciousness” (Guattari, C 22), and to redress “a social field devastated by 
capitalist subjectivity” (Guattari, C 15).  It is also to imply “a kind of self-construction or self 
organisation, a certain auto-cohesiveness, … an autopoiesis” of subjectivity, which invites us 
“to move from passive spectators to become active participants” in creating the conditions of 
our lives (O’Sullivan, Art 91).  To the extent that art is a “pragmatics of assemblage and 
composition” (Stengers, “Experimenting” 52), so the aesthetic paradigm is concerned with 
(re)assembling and (re)composing subjectivities, utilising “the aptitude of [aesthetic] 
processes of creation to auto-affirm themselves as existential nuclei, autopoietic machines” (C 
106).  It is our aim, now, to map more specifically how contemporary subjectivities can be 
remade in this ethical way, and, importantly for this project, how we can conceptualise here 
the role for thought.   
 
Thought and the art of living 
 
If art helps societies and individuals access thought (Colman, “Affective” 78), this thought 
arises through art’s connection to sensation or the sensible.  As we have indicated, by 
aesthetics, Guattari, and Deleuze, mean “the dynamics of sensible assemblages” (Zagala 36).  
Within the aesthetic paradigm, thought always begins with “blocks of sensations”—the 
sensations that precede “significations, … trivial perceptions, … opinions, and common 
sentiments” (Guattari, C 89).  Thought is, first of all, the power of accessing these blocks of the 
sensible—percepts and affects—and recreating subjectivities.  Guattari explains: 
This extraction of deterritorialised percepts and affects from banal perceptions and 
states of mind takes us from the voice of interior discourse and from self-presence—
and from what is most standardised about them—on paths leading to radically 
mutant forms of subjectivity.  A subjectivity of the outside and of wide-open spaces … .  
(C 89) 
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The kind of thought that enables us to “get to know” these blocks of mutant percepts and 
affects is not representation, but “affective contamination”: “[t]hey start to exist in you, in spite 
of you.  And not only as crude, undifferentiated affects, but as “hyper-complex compositions” 
(Guattari, C 92-93).  In turn, these compositions engender multiplicitous potentials for 
thought, primarily because they are an encounter with something as yet unthought (Zagala 
22), in any kind of domain—economic, social, religious, political, ontological.  In an aesthetic 
paradigm, then, thought, drawn by affect (or the aesthetic power of feeling), moves out from 
the “nuclei of differentiation” that is both “at the heart of” and “between” the different spheres 
(Guattari, C 101, 92).  At this point the assemblage of percepts and affects can, as Zagala 
suggests, “link up to all manner of things” (36).      
 
We have established that thought, in this paradigm, begins at the level of affect.  But thought 
here, too, can be characterised in relation to the driving concept of movement, and its 
corollary, difference.  The movement mode of aesthetics, as outlined by Guattari, is, once 
again, machinic, a concept Guattari takes up and extends through biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Franciso Varela’s definition of “living systems”: “their notion of autopoiesis—as 
the auto-reproductive capacity of a structure or ecosystem—could be usefully enlarged to 
include social machines, economic machines and … the incorporeal machines of language, 
theory and aesthetic creation” (C 93).  As we have already noted, the movement of the 
machinic is none other that “the flow of matter,” the “material vitalism” of life (D+G, ATP 410, 
411): the entirely immanent “vital mechanism of a world always emerging anew” (Zepke, Art 2).  
Putting it another way, there is a “machinic essence” that incarnates itself in the various 
assemblages of life—social groups, bodies, works of art, political entities and so on; overall, the 
“abstract” machine “passes through all these heterogeneous components [and, in turn,] it 
heterogenises them, beyond any unifying trait” (Guattari, C 39).  Through machinic 
autopoiesis, then, living be(com)ings as collective entities “maintain diverse types of relations 
of alterity, rather than being implacably closed in on themselves” (Guattari, C 39).  Difference 
and creation is at the core of machinic movement, therefore, since only variation can arise 
from such heterogeneous dynamism.  Variation, the shock of the new, is machinically induced 
by affective thought, and also serves to induce new ideas, new thinking.  And when Guattari 
points to the crucial “double process” of machinism, we gain an added sense of how thought is 
involved.  This double process refers to both the “autopoietic-creative” element of machinism, 
as we have just discussed, as well as the “ethical-ontological” aspect, an aspect that implies 
“the existence of a material of choice” (Guattari, C 108).  The ethical aspect is further 
unravelled: 
The new aesthetic paradigm has ethico-political implications because to speak of 
creation is to speak of the responsibility of the creative instance with regard to the 
thing created, inflection of the state of things, bifurcation beyond pre-established 
 184 
schemas, once again taking into account the fate of alterity in its extreme modalities.  
But this ethical choice no longer emanates from a transcendent enunciation, a code of 
law or a unique and all-powerful god.  (Guattari, C 107) 
Instead, this ethical choice belongs to thought, to a thought that is, like a work of art, “an 
activity of unframing, of rupturing sense, of baroque proliferation or extreme impoverishment, 
which leads to a recreation and reinvention of the subject itself” (Guattari, C 131).  The wider 
implication of this ethical thought comes from the notion that “the immense machinic 
interconnectedness” that is the world today “finds itself in an autofoundational position of its 
own bringing into being” (Guattari, C 108).  As O’Sullivan phrases it, “[i]n this aesthetic 
paradigm we become the authors of our own subjectivities” (“Guattari’s” 263).  Therefore, as all 
the traditional economic, political and social bearings break down, it behooves us to shift “the 
axes of values, the fundamental finalities of human relations and productive activity” 
(Guattari, C 91).  Rather than valorising capital ad infinitum, which only “smashes all other 
modes of valorisation,” we can make a more ethical choice, in favour of “an ethics and politics 
of the virtual” (Guattari, C 29).  Thought, to this end—as an ethico-aesthetic enterprise—
brings about “a new art of living in society” (Guattari, C 20).  In being guided by the mode of 
the sensible that constitutes aesthetic thought, we can work to bring about “changes in 
production, ways of living and axes of value,“ and may thus experience the joys of “a new taste 
for life” (Guattari, C 134, 92).  Under this paradigm, those who engage in thought might be 
conceptualised as “cartographers of subjectivity,” who understand that “perpetual reinvention” 
at each and every opportunity evades entrapment in sameness (Guattari, “TE” 133).  As 
Guattari urges, “with each concrete performance [we should seek] to develop and innovate, to 
create new perspectives, without prior recourse to assured theoretical foundations or the 
authority of a group, school, conservatory, or academy” (Guattari, “TE” 133).  But since 
capitalism is the authority that straddles all others, our greatest efforts should be directed 
against its gross inequities.  In Guattari’s estimation, “[i]f social and political practices are to be 
set back on their feet, we need to work for humanity, rather than simply for a permanent re-
equilibration of the capitalist semiotic universe” (Guattari, “TE” 139). 
 
Dissensual thought in a post-media era  
 
To repeat, the movement of life under Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm is machinic, which, in 
turn, is a heterogenising process.  In his appeal that we work for humanity by putting social 
and political processes back on their feet, Guattari again stresses the importance of 
heterogeneity: he claims that that an aesthetic approach to social and political practices makes 
it essential “not to homogeni[s]e the various levels of practice—not to join them under the 
aegis of some transcendent instance” (Guattari, “TE” 139).  Instead, we should engage these 
practices in “processes of heterogenesis” (Guattari, “TE” 139).  To actively seek heterogenesis 
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would be one way of resisting capitalist control, since, as Guattari points out, capitalism strives 
for power “by controlling and neutrali[s]ing the maximum possible number of subjectivity’s 
existential refrains” (Guattari, “TE” 139).  In other words, capitalism evades and appropriates 
the myriads of potential singularities available to subjectivity, by forming “massive subjective 
aggregates” which connect to such ideas as “race, nation, profession, sporting competition, 
dominating virility, [and] mass media stardom” (Guattari, “TE” 139).  Therefore, if we are to 
withstand such appropriation, we must nurture atypical, rare and singular subjectivities. 
Guattari puts it this way: “[t]he task facing us in the future is not that of seeking a mind-
numbing and infantali[s]ing consensus, but of cultivating dissensus and the singular 
production of existence” (Guattari, “TE” 138).  Guattari’s concept of dissensus finds resonance 
both with Deleuze’s notion of the mediator, discussed in Line of Flight 1, whereby we are 
called to cultivate lines of dissonance at the level of the affective individual, and with the 
concepts of becoming-minor and becoming revolutionary.  The point is not to think alike, but 
to actively cultivate differences in thought, and the accompanying differences in modes of 
becoming.  As Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton explain, “Guattari’s finely nuanced, radically 
dissensual approach to social ecology requires the collective production of unpredictable and 
untamed ‘dissident subjectivities’ rather than a mass movement of like-minded people” (9).  
Guattari’s “dissensual approach” derives from his belief in the “fundamentally pluralist, multi-
centred, and heterogeneous character of contemporary subjectivity” (GR 266), which is, of 
course, at the heart of the possibility of new, creative and positive forms of subjectivity.  In a 
general sense, Guattari rejects “consensual agreement” in favour of an overall “dissensual 
metamodeli[s]ation” (GR 272), since he regards consensus as threatening to the extent that it 
becomes fixed orthodoxy (Genosko 37).  Dissensual metamodelisation, on the other hand, 
“escapes every attempt to reduce it to established modeli[s]ations (historical materialism and 
liberal economics alike)” (Genosko 37).  For Guattari, the most sinister driver of consensus is 
the mass media, which is, in turn, the primary carrier of capitalistic subjectivity (“the 
subjectivity of generali[s]ed equivalence” [C 22]).  His assessment of the mass media is that it is 
deadening, stupefying, homogenising (C 5, 97; GR 266), and that it creates mass consensus “in 
terms of responses to commercial media messages” (Genosko 38).  As Guattari puts it, “there is 
a weakening of true debate, and an avoidance of authentically dissensual problematics” (qtd. 
in Genosko 39). In this mass mediated, capitalist milieu genuine dissensus is only ever 
“simulated,” due to the following reasons: 
short-sighted use of new information technologies for the gain of multi-nationals; 
production and distribution is controlled either by private or public interests; a 
situation in which relations between producers are of concern only after a product has 
been brought to market; absence of effective bodies, nationally and internationally, to 
investigate mediatic manipulation.  (Genosko 39) 
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Since the mass media industry “never problemati[s]es what is at stake,” and induces alienated 
spectators “stripped of any awareness of responsibility,” Guattari calls for us to move into a 
“post-media” world  (GR 263, 262).  In other words, his predilection for dissensus runs hand-
in-hand with his desire for “a revolutionary shift from a consensual mass media to a dissensual 
post-mass media era” (37). This new era would involve intertwined changes in mentalities and 
in social and material environments, amounting to a complex aesthetic reshaping that 
Guattari calls “ecosophy,” since it links “environmental ecology to social ecology to mental 
ecology” (GR 264).  Such reshaping comprises a “plan for the planet that challenges rather 
than ‘capitali[s]es’ on the globali[s]ation of capitalism” (Genosko 40).  One of Guattari’s 
specific objectives in this plan is for a “refoundation of politics,” a rebirth he believes should 
move through the aesthetic dimensions involved in what he calls “the three ecologies” referred 
to above: “the environment, the socius and the psyche” (Guattari, C 20).  Once again, as 
Guattari explains, it is the honouring of difference (dissonance) that underpins this rebirth of 
political thought: “[w]e cannot conceive of a collective recomposition of the socius, correlative 
to a resingularisation of subjectivity, without a new way of conceiving political and economic 
democracies that respect cultural difference—without multiple molecular revolutions” (C 20-
21).  Again, we find links to the concepts of becoming-democracy and becoming-revolutionary, 
both of which figure in Guattari’s dissensual metamodelisation.  Guattari further develops the 
concept of becoming-democracy, in insisting that “[e]cosophic democracy would not give itself 
up to the facility for consensual agreement” (GR 272); instead, it would seek new forms of 
collective accord.  This is how Guattari sees that collective consistencies can allow for 
singularity: 
The goal is no longer to reach a working consensus on several general statements 
covering the range of current political problems but, on the contrary, to further what 
we call a culture of dissensus, working to deepen particular positions toward a 
resingulari[s]ation of individuals and groups.  What must be envisaged is not a 
programmatic accord that erases differences but a collective diagram permitting the 
articulation of individual practices to the benefit of each, without one imposing itself 
on the other.  (Guattari and Cohn-Bendit, qtd. in Genosko 40) 
It is not that collectivity should not occur, then, but that blind consensus would be replaced 
by a collective commitment to “an authentic hearing of the other” (GR 271).  As Guattari 
elaborates, “[a] hearing of disparity, singularity, marginality, even of madness, … could 
overturn or restore direction to [any collective] structures, by recharging them with 
potentiality, by deploying, through them, new lines of creative flow” (GR 271).  Moreover, in 
Guattari’s account, a post-mediatic reinvention of democracy ought to take a pluralist 
approach to managing its machinic components, and should seek to rebalance current systems 
of valorisation (Guattari, GR 268).  Machinic elements such as legislature and the judiciary 
could construct new ties with technology and research, and commissions could be created to 
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deal with ethical issues relating to the media, education, urbanism and so on (Guattari, GR 
268).  With regard to a readjustment of valorisation, it should be recognised that developing 
“clean, livable, lively” cities, humane medicine, and “enriching education” is as (if not more) 
valuable as developing “a production-line of automobiles, or high-performance electronic 
equipment” (Guattari, GR 268).  In more ethical phrasing, the capitalist valorisation of 
economic profit must be replaced by an endorsement of “[t]he joy of living, solidarity, and 
compassion with regard to others,” as well as a taking of responsibility for future generations 
(Guattari, GR 266, 271).  Such a politics would constitute, according to Guattari, “a politics and 
ethics of singularity, breaking with consensus [and] the infantile ‘reassurance’ distilled by 
dominant subjectivity” (C 117). 
 
Post-media, technology, thought 
 
In light of Guattari’s vision of a post-media era, we might now wonder: what kind of social and 
technical mechanism could facilitate the living out of this ethico-aesthetic paradigm?  Should 
we reject contemporary media of all kinds?  As noted earlier, D+G were writing at the very 
early stage of the digital era, and Deleuze, especially, is ambivalent about its potential for 
enhancing life in an ethical sense.  Guattari, on the other hand, is rather more hopeful: while 
he acknowledges that new technologies “produce an ever increasing alienation and 
atomisation,” he also sees them as having “the potentiality to produce new forms of life—and 
subjectivity—that go beyond the latter” (O’Sullivan, “Guattari’s” 258).  In particular, Guattari 
sees promise in early forms of networked media, and, therefore, in our quest to map new ways 
for thought, it is to this kind of new media that we here return.  While it is clear that Guattari 
renounces the mass media for the way its “bombardment of social attention produces brutal 
effects on sensibility” (Berardi, Félix 32), he also advances the view that “[t]echnological 
evolution will introduce new possibilities for interaction between the medium and its user, 
and between users themselves” (GR 263).  So while Guattari’s post-mediatic civilisation 
involves a destructuring of the mass media system, it allows for, even advocates, “the diffusion 
of electronic communication technologies” (Berardi, Félix 31).  This new era, as Berardi 
suggests, would be one in which “communication flows are no longer directed from above 
toward a passive public [but] instead function as the densest framework for rhizomatic 
exchange through emitters situated on the same plane” (Félix 31).  Perhaps Guattari’s earliest 
involvement in such a framework was his 1970s-80s work in the free radio movement(s) in 
Italy and France, a movement he called “an experimentation, a new mode of expression” (qtd. 
in Stivale, Two-Fold 200).  These free radio stations were clandestine, outside government 
control, and played music, poetry and “information about police manoeuvres” (Plant 1107).  
Open to anyone, they aimed to resist the centralised mass media, or, as Sadie Plant puts it, 
“interrupt the conventions of communication and the monopolisation of the airwaves and 
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broadcast technology” (1107).  Overall, these early pirate radio networks worked to produce 
“new forms of sensibility and sociability,” and comprised a significant “auto-referential 
feedback loop between rhizomatic thought and media subversion” (Goddard, “Felix”).   
 
For many theorists, including Guattari’s colleague Berardi, the early free radio networks were 
an anticipation of today’s internet model (Berardi, Félix 31).  In Berardi’s view, Guattari foresaw 
the potential of the “Net” simply through the somewhat primitive French Minitel experience of 
the early 1980s—a time “before the World Wide Web existed and the internet started making 
newspaper headlines” (Félix 31, 30).  Furthermore, for Berardi, Guattari already thought in 
terms of a net, a system that Berardi terms Guattari’s “lookout post” (Félix 30).  As Goddard 
notes, “Guattari had no fear of new technologies but rather embraced their potentials even 
when these had barely been developed” (“Felix”).  In the development of electronic 
technologies, Guattari saw the prospect of a kind of collective thought: 
The junction of the audiovisual screen, the telematic screen and the computer screen 
could lead to a real activation of a collective sensibility and intelligence.  The current 
equation (media=passivity) will perhaps disappear more quickly than one would 
think.  Obviously, we cannot expect a miracle from these technologies: it will depend, 
ultimately, on the capacity of groups of people to take hold of them, and apply them 
to appropriate ends.  (GR 263) 
The “appropriate ends” Guattari refers to has nothing to do with a capitalist agenda, which, as 
we explored in Part 1, the internet continues to be seized by.  Nor does it have to do with the 
superficial skimming of websites that constitutes much internet use.  Rather, “[t]he key 
element in any media or post-media assemblage is that of the production of subjectivity, 
which for Guattari is a directly political or micropolitical phenomenon” (Goddard, “Felix”).  
While the mass media homogenises, Guattari emphasises the “fundamentally pluralist, multi-
centred, and heterogeneous character of contemporary subjectivity” (GR 266).  In a 1985 essay 
that rejects the disengagements of postmodernism, Guattari sets out his vision for how 
processes of subjectivation might work through technological means; this statement is worth 
quoting in its entirety:    
 The emergence of these new practices of subjectivation of a post-media era will be 
greatly facilitated by a concerted reappropriation of communicational and information 
technology, assuming that they increasingly allow for: 
1) The formation of innovative forms of dialogue and collective interactivity, 
and eventually, a reinvention of democracy; 
2) By means of the miniaturi[s]ation and personali[s]ation of equipments, a 
resingulari[s]ation of the machinic mediati[s]ed means of expression; we 
can presume, on this subject, that it is the connection, through 
networking, of banks of data which will offer us the most surprising view; 
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3) The multiplication to infinity of “existential operators,” permitting access 
to mutant creative universes.  (SS 299-300) 
 
Guattari’s hope for a “libertarian cyberculture” (Berardi, Félix 31), then, is more specified than 
any broad-based notion of “the coming culture of digital networks” (Goddard, “Felix”).
47
  As 
Goddard explains, “if the postmediatic era means the era of mass networks this is not in itself a 
positive development but one that holds as many catastrophic potentials as liberating ones,” 
since “the spheres of both neoliberal economics and infinite warfare have also become 
rhizomatic and post-mediatic in their own way” (“Felix”).  To counter such developments, 
Guattari spells out his hope that technological interactivity and networking become a means 
for mobilising a becoming-democracy and a people to come.  To begin with, using these 
technologies in an ethical, life-enhancing manner requires the reappropriation of capitalism’s 
channelling and gatekeeping of internet usage for profit and control.  If these networks are to 
be an open mode of creativity and self-organisation, we must also resist “neo-liberal economic 
and military networks and their associated deadening of relationality, affect and desire in the 
direction of pure functionality and aggressivity” (Goddard, “Felix”).  Rather than the limited 
subjectivities of capitalism, Guattari is interested in machinic networks that promote 
subjectivities “engaged in developing material and moral well-being, in social and mental 
ecology” (GR 268).  Moreover, these networks should encourage new kinds of collective 
thought, reached through dissensual rather than consensual means.  Guattari is especially 
keen that collective engagement occur with minority groups, since, for him, they are the only 
ones who understand “the mortal risk, for humanity, of problems such as: the race to stockpile 
nuclear weapons[;] world hunger[;] irreversible ecological damage[; and] mass-mediatic 
pollution of collective subjectivity” (SS 300).  Finally, electronic interactive media offer “a 
multitude of vectors of resingularisation, attractors of social creativity” (Guattari, C 117), since 
they have the potential to connect us to innumerable lines of flight from current 
circumstances.  For Guattari, these media can be more than mere “technical machines”: they 
have the potential to be “machines of thought, sensation, and consultation,” which “can 
become a crucial instrument for subjective resingularisation [or liberation] and can generate 
other ways of perceiving the world, a new face on things, and even a different turn of events” 
(C 97).  Although Guattari did not survive to witness it, it is fair to say that the post-mediatic 
internet, as well as other information and communication technologies (ICTs), has developed 
to the point that today they are certainly “the privileged plane of social self-organisation” 
(Berardi, Félix 31).  Therefore, we now turn to ICT’s potentialities in terms of Guattari’s post-
mediatic, ethico-aesthetic vision, following three particular lines of thought.  A foreword: 
although the sub-headings below set apart “becoming-revolutionary” and “becoming-
democratic,” these concepts are, of course, overlapping; becoming-revolutionary is equally a 
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call for a more democratic way of life—which is also to say a call for the reinvention of existing 
forms of democracy.  
 
Libertarian cyberculture 1: becoming-revolutionary 
 
Over the past decade or so the world has seen numerous revolutionary uprisings across a 
range of locations—Eastern Europe, Asia, the Arab sphere, for instance.  A phase of “colour” 
revolutions took place in many Soviet-style Eastern European countries following the Soviet 
Union’s 1991 collapse (in Serbia and Georgia for example—2000 and 2003 respectively), with 
this same wave perhaps extending to Lebanon in 2005 and Burma in 2007 (Cheterian).  Each 
country’s uprising became identified with a particular colour or flower worn by the protesters, 
with non-violent techniques being the key mode of resistance (Hirst).  The colour emblem and 
model was again taken up during the Iranian uprising in 2009, and by a more recent series of 
Arab revolutions triggered by Tunisia in late 2010.  According to various commentators, the 
internet and several other ICTs have played a critical role in many of these revolts, especially 
as its functions have expanded year by year.  In Holmes view, for example, “[e]xperimentation 
with the internet [over the last decade] has been inseparable from an upsurge of radical 
democracy, this time on a transnational scale” (“Games”).  Overall, however, the exact part 
played by the internet and other networked digital devices (such as mobile phones) in these 
revolutionary moments is still a much-debated issue.  In order to pursue Guattari’s notion of 
ethico-aesthetic, post-mediatic thought, let us now explore the extent to which ICTs are 
implicated in some of these revolutions, especially in the sense of their becoming-
revolutionary nature. 
 
First, we turn to Iran, where, in response to the events of its tenth presidential election, the 
country experienced its so-named “Green Revolution” in mid-2009.  In the lead-up to the 
election voters were confronted with the decision of “whether to keep hard-line president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power for four more years, or to replace him with [Mir Hossein 
Mousavi,] a reformist more open to loosening the country's Islamic restrictions” (Taylor, 
“Iran’s Presidential”).  The election drew a record 85 per cent voter turnout (Worth and Fathi).  
The result was hugely controversial, with both candidates claiming immediate victory, until 
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Ali Khamenei, declared a "divine victory” for his preferred 
candidate Ahmadinejad (“Iran”).  This declaration was made despite only two-thirds of the 
vote being counted (Afshari and Underwood 7).  Large-scale protests ensued throughout Iran: 
supporting Mousavi’s claim that the election had been fraudulent, hundreds of thousands of 
protestors took to the streets marching under Mousavi’s green campaign colour and “where is 
my vote?” banners (Kamrava 409).  To begin with, demonstrations were largely noisy but 
peaceful (“Ahmadinejad”); however, protests became violent when security forces and militia 
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attempted to stifle the uprising (Taylor, “Iran’s Disputed”).  Indeed, as Mehran Kamrava notes, 
“just as the magnitude of the street protests took everyone by surprise, so did the brutality of 
the violent crackdown that followed” (409).  One particular young unarmed protestor, Neda 
Agha Soltan, became the public face and symbol of the intense repression, when the last 
moments of her violent death were captured on a witness’s mobile phone camera, and 
uploaded onto YouTube (Kraidy and Mourad 7).
48
  The video soon spread rapidly (became 
“viral”), being picked up by other social media, as well as by mainstream media such as the 
BBC and CNN (Kraidy and Mourad 7).  Within about twelve hours of Neda’s death, she was 
“the fifth most commented topic on Twitter” (Putz). 
 
Following the Iranian uprisings, one of the most discussed aspects of the election aftermath in 
mainstream media circles was the use of new technologies.  Australia’s ABC TV programme 
Foreign Correspondent, for instance, focused on the power of “digital dissent” versus “bullets 
and batons”: 
 In 2009, post-election Iran has seen the unveiling of a bold and angry, highly mobile 
rebellion that’s challenging Iran’s old guard with new-media—filming protests and 
government aggression with mobile phones, uploading the sometimes bloody and 
confronting images to global net transmitters like YouTube, messaging instant 
observations to Twitter and keeping a concerned outside world up to the minute on 
the state of a secretive nation.  (“Rebellion”) 
Such accounts propagated the notion of a “Twitter revolution,” the idea that social networking 
sites such as Twitter and Facebook were being used to organise the protests (Mishra).  Other 
commentators—more informed according to Lovink (“True”)—see the role of the internet in 
the Iranian protests slightly differently: “[p]rotests are organi[s]ed centrally by the campaigns 
of reformist candidates and then that information is disseminated both online and off.  The 
role of citizens with regard to social media is as citizen journalists” (Tehrani).  Social media 
researcher Gaurav Mishra agrees that Twitter did not play an organising role, but, 
nevertheless, was extremely important in “fixing the world’s attention on the crisis, both in 
terms of getting individuals like you and me to focus on the crisis, and also in getting the 
attention of the international media and making sure this crisis gets the amount of coverage it 
deserves to get.”  Indeed, Twitter became a primary source of information about the turmoil 
when Iranian authorities restricted mobile phone networks, blocked foreign TV and radio 
broadcasts (“Iran”), and clamped down on foreign journalists by severely curtailing their 
reporting of events (Plunkett) and expelling them from the country (Guthrie).  But as Marisa 
Guthrie notes, “[d]espite the violent crackdown by state-sponsored militias, Iranians 
continued to document the unrest in their country,” demonstrating the difficulty of imposing 
a media blackout when internet-linked media are involved.  As far as the result of the protests, 
George Lawson’s comment that “successful revolutions are … rare“ is apposite, especially in 
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circumstances where armed forces are willing to fire upon their own people.   Ultimately, 
Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution failed to oust the corrupt regime due to the authority’s 
willingness to use bloodshed, and, since 2009, the regime has continued to maintain 
dominance by way of “force, torture, executions, and house-arrests of key opposition figures” 
(Jahanbegloo).  Nevertheless, the revolutionaries’ success at bringing the injustices of the 
Iranian situation to international attention provides one strong example of how web-linked 
technologies can be well utilised by dissident or, rather, dissensual, groups, in working 
towards creating a singular democracy.  Using ICTs as an effective “channel of dissent” (Alavi, 
“Iran’s”) effectively counters the censorship of an authoritarian state (Solow-Niederman 30), 
and can also “diminish a dictator’s monopoly of ‘truth’” (Alavi, Interview).  At the same time, 
such a post-media permeated challenge to an oppressive state is a machinic mobilisation of 
dissensual subjectivity in general, as well as of the kind of heterogeneous thought relating to a 
paradigm of ethico-aesthetic emergence.  The aesthetic remaking of the Iranian political 
landscape—from a becoming-revolutionary point of view—remains an autopoietic becoming.  
In response to another phase of revolts—December 2010-January 2011’s regime-changing 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt—14 February 2011 saw “tens of thousands of [Iranian] protestors 
gathered in the streets of Tehran and other cities … to rally in solidarity with the ‘freedom 
fighters of [Cairo’s] Tahrir Square’” (Alavi, “Iran’s”).  Oppressed Iranians, the becoming-
revolutionaries, remain creative and resilient, “capable of using technology as a channel of 
defiance, and of mobilising large numbers of people” (Alavi, “Iran’s”).  These revolutionaries 
are, in Guattari’s terms, cartographers of subjectivity.  Post-media technologies such as the 
internet are part of an ethological assemblage that includes the event of the uprisings, giving 
rise to mutant sensations that destabilise dominant subject-forms.  Through affective 
contagion, collective thought and engagement, effects of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
Revolutions (the Jasmine wave), have seeped into other Arab nations—Libya and Bahrain as 
well as Iran—galvanising them to “become firmer and more outspoken in [their] demands for 
democratisation” (Jahanbegloo).  With new political and social ecologies in emergence, these 
network media spread images and effect ideas of other ways of being in the Arab world, ways 
that remain open to a democracy-becoming, a democracy perhaps not modeled on Western 
varieties.  In doing so, these post-media machines answer Guattari’s call for innovative forms 
of “collective interactivity,” and move towards his hope for “a reinvention of democracy” (SS 
299).              
 
There are other examples wherein the potentialities of the internet and cyberactivism become 
apparent as aesthetically-derived means of becoming-revolutionary.  The second we consider 
here is a situation in Burma (Myanmar), a country under rigid military dictatorship (junta) for 
five decades—from 1962, until a measure of democratic reform began to be introduced in 2012.  
The situation we are concerned with occurred in September 2007, when protests arose 
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challenging a steep rise in fuel prices; these protests spawned a campaign subsequently called 
the Saffron Revolution.  This 100,000 strong protest movement “caught global attention as 
bloggers and digital activists flooded cyberspace with grainy images and videos of saffron-
robed monks leading large, peaceful demonstrations against the government” (Chowdhury 4).  
As the government moved quickly to crush the demonstrations, bloggers subsequently spread 
graphic images of and information about the “violent repression” of the protests (Alfaro 2), 
whereby up to 200 monks, civilians and journalists were killed (Wang and Nagaraja 2; 
Chowdhury 4).  In response to the widespread internet dissemination of such images, the 
junta acted again, taking the extreme step of shutting down the country’s access to the 
internet altogether, as well as disabling the majority of its international mobile phone 
connectivity (Chowdhury 4).  The blockade lasted a fortnight, during which time the 
government was “monitoring (even raiding) internet cafes and their users, confiscating 
equipment, limiting media licensing and controlling ICT companies” (Alfaro 23).  Prior to the 
shutdown, Burma already had extremely heavy internet censorship, especially in relation to 
political reform, independent media and locally-focused human rights sites (Wang and 
Nagaraja 3).  This complete shutdown of access, however, was unprecedented, causing the 
New York Times to wonder “whether the vaunted role of the internet in undermining 
repression can stand up to [such] a determined and ruthless government” (Mydans).  Prior to 
the shutdown much was accomplished, however: despite less than one per cent of the 
population having internet access, a “relatively small group of Burmese citizens achieved a 
disproportionate impact on the global awareness and understanding of [the] crisis, despite 
operating in a very limited online space where information [was] severely controlled” (Wang 
and Nagaraja 3).  The images and words surreptitiously sent through cell phone messages, and 
(anonymously, from internet cafes) through emails, blogs, Facebook posts and e-cards alerted 
the outside world to the brutal crushing of the protests, and led to “international 
condemnation of the Burmese military rulers’ violations of human rights” (Alfaro 23).  
Responses ranged from an online-organised Global Day of Action for Burma on 6 October 
2007, comprising peaceful protest rallies in almost one hundred cities (Chowdhury 11), to 5,000 
bloggers joining a blog blackout called International Bloggers' Day for Burma (Stirland).  
Several governments also condemned the junta’s actions: the French President advised French 
oil giant Total Oil “to restrain itself from making any new investments in Burma,” and then 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced “financial sanctions against the military 
rulers of Burma” (Chowdhury 11).  In this situation, then, the internet added a powerful 
dimension to political activism, or to becoming-revolutionary.  It can be regarded here as a 
significant component in an abstract machine of production, a concatenating becoming-other 
(-revolutionary, -world, -democracy) through a mode of aesthetic autopoeisis. The fact that 
the Burmese government reacted as strongly as to close down the internet indicates its 
recognition of the real potential of online activism to threaten its status quo.  Internet-driven 
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international attention may even have affected the government’s actions during the Saffron 
Revolution: as Mridul Chowdhury suggests, “[i]t is plausible that the military felt it was under 
greater scrutiny because of the internet, and that it was therefore more restrained in its use of 
force.”
49
  Although there are countless occasions when such surveillance techniques work for 
the military (or capital), this example demonstrates the reappropriation of such technologies 
for ethical purposes.   
 
In terms of Burmese developments subsequent to the 2007 internet shutdown—when the 
junta worked even harder to restrict online connectivity—we might ask if the internet 
continued to be an important instrument in the Burmese people’s striving for becoming-
democracy.  As the New York Times points out, “[t]echnology is making it harder for dictators 
and juntas to draw a curtain of secrecy” (Mydans), and internet users in Burma are steadily 
increasing year by year (Aung).  These users have made good use of censorship circumvention 
technologies, with internet cafes and private homes downloading free anti-censorship 
software, as well as installing state-evading foreign-hosted proxy sites and hyper-encrypted 
email services (Chowdhury 13).  Breakthrough internet usage both during and since the 
crackdown have, it has been suggested, led to “some irreversible gains”: “[m]ultiple 
generations of Burmese living locally and abroad have found linkages to each other as 
blogging became increasingly recogni[s]ed as a valuable source of information” (Wang and 
Nagaraja 13).  Indeed, the role of the internet again became evident in direct response to the 
Arab world’s 2010-11 Jasmine Revolution uprisings: in February 2011 “Burmese activists 
operating both inside and outside of the country … began a social media campaign against 
military rule in Burma[, launching] a Facebook page called ‘Just Do It’” (Moe).  The junta’s 
nervous reaction—to expand intelligence services by reviving its National Intelligence 
Bureau—is indicative of the “fear of revolutionary contagion” apparent among a number of 
autocratic regimes across Asia, the Middle East and Africa: moves to tighten control have 
occurred in several countries, most markedly in China (Gershman).  Of course, “revolutionary 
contagion” is an affective phenomenon, an errant block of sensations that serves to unsettle 
majoritarian subjectivity.  Overall, the Burmese situation provides another example of “how 
the development of cyberactivism can be related to an expansion of the democratic 
capabilities of social movements” (Alfaro 3).  Moreover, as Alfaro notes, the practices of citizen 
journalism via internet technology take place at the level of everyday life, which is to say “at a 
distance from the sphere of official politics” (Alfaro 26).  This distance is enabling of Deleuze-
Guattarian difference in the form of minoritarian-becomings, and in the sense of allowing 
“[t]he formation of innovative forms of dialogue … and eventually, a reinvention of democracy” 
(Guattari, SS 299).  And the “collective sensibility and intelligence” (Guattari, GR 263) that 
such new communicational technologies activate are ethico-aesthetically constituted modes of 
thought that may be increasingly difficult to put down, as Gershman affirms: 
 195 
Autocratic regimes will employ all means at their disposal to prevent the use of the 
internet by their opponents.  But they cannot change the underlying reality, which is 
that there is a sharpening contradiction between closed and repressive states and 
increasingly networked, informed and awakened populations, which is in itself 
creating a revolutionary crisis of the political order.  
Indeed, though not considered here, it would be worthwhile to investigate the part played by 
ICTs in the 2010 release of high profile, long term, pro-democracy political prisoner Aung San 
Suu Kyi, and in her subsequent election to the Burmese parliament. 
 
The “revolutionary crisis” referred to in the above quotation from Gershman is one way of 
conceptualising the Jasmine uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, referred to briefly earlier.  To 
finish this section we address these countries’ uprisings more specifically, especially since 
these uprisings actually resulted in the ejection of longstanding autocratic regimes.  The role 
of digital activism in these revolutions has, again, been broadly debated, but it is safe to say 
that most commentators think it irrefutable that the internet and mobile devices have played 
a highly consequential part (Coll).  The Tunisian insurgence commenced in December 2010 
when a fruit and vegetable seller, after being harassed by police for not having an appropriate 
merchant’s permit, set himself alight, and subsequently died, in front of his local government 
headquarters (“Tunisian”).  This event sparked protests in the town, and videos of the protests 
and violence towards protestors were quickly posted on the internet—onto Facebook by 
private citizens such as the man’s cousin (Oram), and onto the Tunisian blog Nawaat.org 
(Charlton) by activists.  The images soon spread extensively, and demonstrations against 
widespread unemployment and corruption broke out across Tunisia; protests were so potent 
that by 14th January 2011 long-term dictatorial President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had 
surrendered power and fled the country (Levinson).  The Tunisian events, then, led to “the 
first successful popular uprising in the Arab world” (Walt), a result which would not be 
without repercussions in the region.  As journalist Alexis Levinson observes, the Tunisian 
uprising “seemed to spread to Egypt like contagion,” with large-scale protests commencing in 
that country on 25th January 2011.  Again, ICTs were pivotal: one of the key instruments in the 
Egyptian protests was a Facebook page honouring an Egyptian businessman, Khaled Said, who 
had been beaten to death by police in June 2010 (Quinn).  The web page “became a rallying 
point for a campaign against police brutality” (“Profile”), and the activist-organiser of the 
Facebook page, Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim, “emerged as a leader of the Egyptian 
revolution as it metastasi[s]ed and forced President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation of February 
11” (Coll).  The internet’s function is described by Ghonim: “[w]e would post a video on 
Facebook and it would be shared by 50,000 people on their walls in hours” (Sifry).  In Micah L. 
Sifry’s explanation, “”[w]ithout the relatively free arena of online social networking sites and 
tools like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, young Egyptians like Ghonin could not have built 
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the resilient and creative force that finally toppled Hosni Mubarak” (Sifry).  Even when the 
Egyptian government took the rare and extreme step (as in Burma) of shutting down the 
internet, connectivity was not lost and the revolution proceeded: hackers came up with several 
ways to sidestep the censorship (“How”), and protest numbers actually grew—“many of the 
[Egyptian] people who wanted to follow events remotely decided to go to [the main protest 
site] Tahrir Square, just to keep their connection with the historic events of the day” (Oram).  
While Wael Ghonim may have been something of a figurehead, his status a leader, from a 
Deleuze-Guattarian perspective, is improbable.  As Hardt and Negri affirm, the organisation of 
the revolts was in the mode of “a horizontal network that has no single, central leader” 
(“Arabs”).  This network structure is, for them, the very strength of the becoming-
revolutionary process, with social network tools such as Facebook and Twitter being simply 
“modes of expression of an intelligent population capable of using the instruments at hand to 
organise autonomously” (“Arabs”).  For Hardt and Negri, the Arab revolts are an experiment in 
freedom and democracy—an aesthetically invented experiment, in Guattari’s terms—aimed 
toward a new form of democracy that is adequate to the “forms of expression” and 
“experiences of network relations” that make up contemporary life (“Arabs”).  Moreover, to the 
extent that this is an ethical experiment calling for the management of natural resources, 
social production, and economic governance, it involves “a threshold through which 
neoliberalism cannot pass and capitalism is put into question” (Hardt and Negri, “Arabs”).  In 
Guattari’s parlance, this is a “refoundation of politics” passing through “the aesthetic and 
analytical dimensions implied in the three ecologies—the environment, the socius and the 
psyche” (C 20).  Such a politics of experimentation is governed by a logic different to that of 
discursivity or signification: Guattari’s aesthetically composing “eco-logic, … concerned only 
with the movement and intensity of evolutive processes” (TE 30).  As an “ecological praxis,” 
such revolts express “subsets that have broken out of their totali[s]ing frame and have begun 
to work on their own account, overcoming their referential sets and manifesting themselves as 
their own existential indices, processual lines of flight” (Guattari, TE 30).  Again, these lines of 
flight commence as intensities, as the blocks of affects that course through revolutionary 
moments, aesthetically composing new forms of subjectivity.  Such revolutionary moments do 
not relate to the history or future of Revolutions, but to the notion of revolution as immanent 
and libertarian, as connecting up with “what is real here and now,” and “relaunching new 
struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed” (D+G, WP 100).   
 
There are, certainly, those who challenge the role of the internet in regard to its contribution 
to such becoming-revolutionary impulses.  Popular writer Malcolm Gladwell, for instance, 
maintains that the internet fosters weak social ties, when only strong ties will lead to 
revolutions, while Evgeny Morozov argues that “cyber-utopians” see the internet as inherently 
democratic when authoritarian regimes are also adept at using the it for their own repressive 
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purposes.  The internet (and its related technologies), however, is but one element in a 
processual assemblage, a revolution-making assemblage in this instance.  It is a powerful 
component in this machinic becoming, and the fact that it may also present opportunities for 
surveillance and censorship does not preclude it from being a highly potent mechanism in 
processes undoing “normal” political landscapes.  Indeed, as Tom Glaisyer points out, “to date, 
digital activism has not been completely eliminated in any state where it has been able to gain 
a foothold” (97).  As part of an overall network structuration, or autopoeitic machinic 
assemblage, that also includes such “old” revolutionary methods as demonstrations, rallies and 
in-person meetings, it may help provide unprecedented becoming-revolutionary potential.  
And although capital R “Revolutions” may fail in the face of violent authoritarianism and 
savage repression, the micropolitical, minoritarian potentials of becoming-revolutionary will 
not, especially with the self-constructing movements of such networked assemblages.  As 
Hardt and Negri note, “what will not die are the political demands and desires that have been 
unleashed, the expressions of an intelligent young generation for a different life in which they 
can put their capacities to use” (“Arabs”).  These expressions open the way for D+G’s called-for 
“new earth and people that do not yet exist” (WP 108).            
   
Libertarian cyberculture 2: becoming-democratic 
 
In considering the becoming-revolutionary potential of digital activism as a pathway toward 
D+G’s new earth and people, let us remember Patton’s statement regarding the relationship 
between becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic: becoming-revolutionary, he 
explains, “is modulated by the call for resistance to existing forms of democracy” (Deleuzian 
154).  It is now worth revisiting this related concept of becoming-democratic, to the extent that 
there is also promise that ICTS might play a role, by enabling new and creative 
implementations of democratic processes and forms.  There are several perspectives from 
which to view the potential of digital networks in relation to the activation of a “more 
democratic” or more pure form of democracy.  To begin with, although D+G tell us that this 
new “people and earth will not be found in our [existing] democracies” (WP 108), there may be 
some hope that the internet can aid the development and improvement of democracy within 
the current system.  To this end, as Glaisyer indicates, digital activism can play a strong role in 
electoral politics, in terms of the election of governments, as well as in “policy formation, 
execution, and monitoring” (90).  With respect to the election of governments, the 2008 
Barack Obama US presidential campaign is perhaps the most notable instance to date of the 
ways in which the internet can influence democratic politics; as Ariana Huffington puts it, 
“[w]ere it not for the internet, Barack Obama would not be president[, nor even] the nominee” 
(qtd. in Miller).  Obama used the internet in unprecedented ways to reach and mobilise 
countless grassroots supporters, leading some to conclude that “[b]y using interactive Web 2.0 
 198 
tools, Mr Obama’s campaign changed the way politicians organi[s]e supporters, advertise to 
voters, defend against attacks and communicate with constituents” (Miller).  This is not at all 
to argue that Obama has, by using the internet, brought about a more pure democracy; 
however, his example demonstrates that there is great potential for any new vision of 
democracy to reach innumerable voters by way of internet technology.  In terms of change 
within the current system, however, perhaps of more interest is “the opening of government to 
the digital activist” (Glaisyer 92).  Glaisyer outlines several recent initiatives in the United 
States, United Kingdom, South America and Africa whereby governments have become more 
transparent and accountable due to their utilisation of digital technology to open their data 
and processes to the public.  Indeed, the Obama administration, in one of its first initiatives, 
introduced an extensive scheme to compel its governmental agencies and departments to 
become “more transparent, publicly accessible, and collaborative than they [had] historically 
been” (Ginsberg 1).  One of the primary edicts of this Open Government Initiative was to direct 
key agencies “to post ‘high-value’ data-sets to Data.gov, a national Web portal, in formats that 
allow the public to download, search and reuse the information without restriction” (Vogel).  
While this initiative may well have been politically motivated—a move to reverse his 
predecessor George W. Bush’s predilection for secrecy (Coglianese 529-30)—some 
commentators regard this Obama directive as a step towards greater democratisation of 
government.  Government analyst Wendy Ginsberg, for instance, concludes that the initiative 
“attempts to create new spaces for the public to communicate and affect federal government” 
(1).  And because the directive instructs officials to reply to all citizens’ comments, there is the 
prospect that public ideas may be incorporated into policy (Ginsberg 1).  As Glaisyer notes, not 
everyone may have the time or inclination to analyse government data, but the important fact 
is that it is available for such analysis (93).  In terms of the British experience, Andy 
Williamson observes that democracy research organisation the Hansard Society’s Digital 
Dialogues project (a three year evaluation in the mid-2000s of numerous online government 
programmes designed to engage with citizens) reaches the significant finding that there are 
important benefits “when citizens and governments do talk online[, and that] there is a need 
for a more sustained public deliberation with government” (307).  Initiatives in other parts of 
the world include Vota Intelligente in Chile, which “aims to use technology to provide Chilean 
citizens with more information about their elected officials” (Sasaki), and Mzalendo in Kenya, 
a parliament watch project that strives to demand accountability from the Kenyan parliament 
(Glaisyer 95).   
 
Accountability, transparency and negotiatory initiatives such as those outlined above may, 
through digital means, go some way toward bringing about more democratic representation 
by elected governments.  However, as we have noted, D+G are more interested in aspects of 
becoming-democratic that have not yet been seen, which is to say that are outside the 
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capitalistic, representative system Western citizens are bound by.  Indeed, Ismael Peña-López 
argues that there is still a “democracy gap” between citizens and capitalist-framed governance, 
since while citizens may be more empowered by ICTs, it is only within this same system (5-7).  
The question, then, is do ICTs admit any forms of becoming-democratic that might present 
pathways to the outside of current capital-defined Western democracy?  As a starting point, 
we can consider the tension between an open government’s purported transparency and the 
business of secrecy/security.  Returning to the US context, let us revisit Glaisyer’s comment 
that whether or not government data is analysed by the public, it is important that this data be 
openly available.  But, in a “neo-liberal societ[y] of security” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 173), which 
data is the crucial question.  While Obama’s open government policy may have offered the 
prospect of a more democratic turn in governance, it seems that, overall, this has not 
eventuated.  In March 2010, long-time Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigator and open 
government advocate David Sobel testified to the US Government Reform Committee that 
“[w]hile the President and other top officials have said the right things and attempted to 
convey the right message, implementation of their stated objectives [regarding openness] 
remains unfulfilled,” and, furthermore, that “bureaucratic resistance to transparency in 
general” persists (“Administration” 2).  Sobel points to a number of instances in which the 
Obama government has been even “less transparent than many of its predecessors” 
(“Administration” 8).  While it may have opened some of its data and processes to the public 
(such as disclosing the names of official White House visitors), the administration refuses to 
reverse a key George W. Bush ruling that exempts the White House Office of Administration 
from FOIA—even though administrations prior to Bush had complied with FOIA requests 
(Sobel, “Urge” 32).  Such withholding of information leads Sobel to conclude that Obama’s 
“rhetoric of transparency” has not become reality, and that a culture of secrecy remains 
ingrained in many government agencies (“Administration” 10, 6).  In Sobel’s view, the stifling 
of significant official information is, in fact, “counter-productive,” to the extent that it “invites 
and encourages unauthorised leaks” (“Urge” 30, 31).  Indeed, in May 2011, the US National 
Public Radio network reported an aggressive and broad crackdown on leaks of government 
secrets: evidently, “[n]ational security experts say they can’t remember a time when the Justice 
Department has pursued so many cases” against leakers (C. Johnson).  Foremost amongst 
these cases, of course, is the one against Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks.  Because 
Wikileaks holds particular interest for any exploration of the potentialities of becoming-
democratic enabled by the internet, we explore the case in some detail.  
 
Wikileaks is a not-for-profit media website whose stated purpose is to uphold Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” 
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(“About: What Is WikiLeaks?”).
50
  In other words, Wikileaks is based on “the rights of human 
beings to communicate freely with each other without the intervention of governments,” and 
it is particularly focused on exposing the secret workings of authoritarian governments—
which also include “the increasingly authoritarian tendencies seen in the recent trajectory of 
Western democracies, and the authoritarian nature of contemporary business corporations” 
(Manne).  The Wikileaks website operates as an outlet for anonymous whistleblowers 
(protected by several layers of internet security) who wish to leak sensitive material, and it 
publishes this material without censorship or editing, but with an accompanying “news” story.  
As such, Wikileaks seeks to offer a “new model of journalism” based on the notion that 
publishing original documents improves the transparency and scrutiny of leading institutions, 
with this scrutiny leading to “reduced corruption and stronger democracies in all society’s 
institutions, including government, corporations and other organisations” (WikiLeaks).  From 
its first year, 2007, to mid-2011, Wikileaks had published 20,000 files of information, including 
“documents alleging corruption by the family of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, secret 
Church of Scientology manuals[,] and an operations manual from the US detention centre at 
Guantánamo Bay revealing a determination to hide prisoners from the International 
Committee for the Red Cross” (Calabresi).  It also exposed numerous other secrecy issues from 
around the world, such as evidence of “tax avoidance by the largest Swiss bank, Julius Baer; an 
oil spill in Peru; a nuclear accident in Iran and toxic chemical dumping by the trafigura 
corporation off the Ivory Coast” (Manne).  Many of these Wikileaks stories achieved minimal 
attention in a worldwide context, but, in 2010, Wikileaks’ profile soared: Wikileaks and its 
Australian founder, Julian Assange, attained international fame/infamy for, first, releasing 
Collateral Murder, “a US video shot in 2007 from an Apache helicopter, showing the 
unprovoked killing of a dozen Iraqi civilians, including two Reuters news staff,” then 
publishing the War Diaries—“hundreds of thousands of secret reports from 2004 through 
2009 from US soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Hanley).  Then, in late 2010, Wikileaks gained 
the full attention of the US government with Cablegate, its staggered release of over 250,000 
US State Department cables—“the largest unauthori[s]ed release of contemporary classified 
information in history” (Calabresi).  Its aim was to “give people around the world an 
unprecedented insight into the US Government’s foreign activities” (“What”), a goal it 
certainly achieved.  Several of the leaked memos were a cause of embarrassment to US and 
foreign leaders, with US officials’ comments about other leaders proving revealing: “Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is compared to Adolf Hitler, while Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev fare slightly better as ‘Batman and Robin’ 
respectively[;] Italy's scandal-plagued Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi [is] called ‘feckless, vain 
and ineffective as a modern European leader,’ while French President Nicolas Sarkozy is ‘an 
emperor with no clothes’” (Wong).  While such personality attacks were largely “shrugged off” 
by the targeted leaders (“Wikileaks Documents”), it is perhaps still too soon to understand the 
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full effects of the more substantial disclosures of Cablegate.  Here is a small sample of the 
revelations: several Middle Eastern nations, most notably Saudi Arabia, have urged the US to 
bring force against Iran to disarm its nuclear capacities; Iran may have been supplied with 
missiles by North Korea; for several years the US has been trying, unsuccessfully, to remove 
uranium from a Pakistani reactor in order to circumvent nuclear arms development; China has 
launched cyberattacks against Google, US interests and the Dalai Lama; the US Secretary of 
State directed diplomats to secretly gather identifying information, such as credit card 
numbers, from United Nations leaders; and the US offered cash and inducements to other 
nations to take Guantanamo Bay prisoners in order to bring about an accelerated emptying of 
the detention centre (“Wikileaks’ ‘Cablegate’”).  The US government’s immediate reactions to 
this enormous breach of secrecy were fierce: the White House condemned it as “a life-
threatening ‘criminal’ act”; Hillary Clinton declared it an “attack on the international 
community”; congressman Peter King proclaimed it “an act of terrorism”; Sarah Palin 
demanded that Julian Assange “be hunted down as an ‘an anti-American operative with blood 
on his hands’”; and “former presidential candidate Mike Huckabee … demanded that whoever 
leaked the files should be executed for treason” (Milne).  However, in an effects analysis of 
Wikileaks in March 2011, Mark Fenster notes that while initial government reaction was 
extreme in predicting dire consequences for US diplomacy and national security, “open 
sources [now] provide no clear evidence that Wikileaks caused significant damage to the 
Departments of Defense and State” (51).   Nevertheless, in May 2011, the US grand jury 
commenced a hearing to determine what charges could be brought against Assange 
(espionage being the preferred indictment), and in February 2012 it was reported that US 
prosecutors had, in fact, drawn up a “secret indictment” against Assange twelve months earlier 
(Dorling).   At the time of writing this thesis, Assange also faces possible extradition from the 
UK to Sweden on controversial sexual assault charges (see McVeigh and Townsend), a move 
that could smooth the way for his Wikileaks-based extradition to the US to face whatever 
retribution is in store for him.  Meanwhile Bradley Manning, the US soldier who actually 
leaked the state secrets, is undergoing court martial and possibly faces the death penalty (E. 
Pilkington, “Wikileaks”; E. Pilkington, “Bradley”).   
 
Calls for prosecution and punishment are not, however, the only reactions to Wikileaks: many 
others have had a quite different response.  In December 2010 and January 2011, for instance, 
support rallies for Assange and Wikileaks took place across Australia, as well as in cities in the 
US, UK, Canada and Europe (“Upcoming”).  A Sydney rally was addressed by prominent 
Australian broadcaster Phillip Adams, who pledged “unswerving support” for the project: 
“Democracy is being democratised, tyrannies exposed and millions who’ve been fed bullshit 
for generations are now able to confirm their suspicions,” he told the crowd.  The Australian 
Walkley Foundation, comprising key figures in the Australian media, wrote to Australian 
 202 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard in support of Wikileaks and Assange (Walkleys), and an open 
letter addressed to Gillard urging her to support Assange was signed by linguist/activist Noam 
Chomsky as well as by dozens of prominent Australians, including Senator Bob Brown, author 
Helen Garner and philosopher Peter Singer (Sparrow and O’Shea).  In February 2010, Sydney 
University’s Sydney Peace Foundation awarded Assange its rarely bestowed Gold Medal, for 
the “seismic effect” Wikileaks has had on “freedom of expression” and the “world order” 
(Aikman).  Moreover, Assange and Manning were nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, 
and Manning again in 2012.  While Assange’s model of “massive, vigilante disclosure” (Fenster 
50) may be largely a function of his own “cyberphunk,” anarchist, revolutionary politics (see 
Manne for a full discussion of Assange’s political influences), there’s no question that 
Wikileaks has generated enormous debate about the nature of democracy.  A democratising of 
democracy, as Phillip Adams sees it.  A becoming-democracy, D+G would call it.  The pure 
event of democracy is reached into by the event of Wikileaks, calling forth other actualisations 
of the concept.  Wikileaks effects a convergence with the virtual and a debating here and now, 
at this time, of how democracy might otherwise be manifested.  As the New Statesman reports, 
“[t]he presumption that governments can conduct their business with one another in secret, 
away from the prying eyes of the public, died when the leaks started to emerge on 28 
November” (C. Ross).  The gap between citizens and state narrows, and the potentialities of a 
fuller notion of democracy appear before us.  As Guardian journalist Seumas Milne puts it, 
“[b]y making available Washington’s own account of its international dealings Wikileaks has 
opened some of the institutions of global power to scrutiny and performed a democratic 
service in the process.”  And, it would seem, there is some spillover from Wikileaks’ 
democratic resonances into the field of becoming-revolutionary, specifically in relation to the 
Tunisian situation.  As Fenster explains, WikiLeaks cables concerning Tunisia drew attention 
to President Ben Ali’s “‘system without checks’ in a government whose kleptomania apparently 
began with the first family.  The Tunisia-related cables were in turn made available to 
Tunisians via a locally produced website, TuniLeaks” (48).  Although protestors in Tunisia 
were well aware of the regime’s corruption before Wikileaks/Tunileaks, the leaked cables had 
prefund effects for both revolution and democracy:  
[T]he cables’ influence may have come from informing Tunisians of others’ perceptions 
of and knowledge about their corrupt government—information that enlightened and 
further energi[s]ed protestors about the righteousness and likely success of their cause.  
If, as has been widely reported, the Tunisian revolt in turn inspired other popular 
uprisings in the region, and WikiLeaks in fact played some role in inspiring the Tunisian 
protestors, then the disclosures had quite significant direct and indirect effects, to 
whatever small degree, in setting potentially democratic change in motion.  (Fenster 47-
49)   
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Through Wikileaks, then, becoming-democratic interweaves with becoming-revolutionary, 
bringing together two concepts that, as they develop in the historical present, make D+G’s 
new earth and people more accessible.  Beyond Tunisia, journalist John Pilger claims that 
Wikileaks activates another mobilisation of becoming-revolutionary and becoming-
democracy, in the domain of journalism and the media.  In an interview dealing with his 
documentary “The War You Don’t See,” which covers the Wikileaks phenomenon, Pilger 
lambasts the embedded mindset “that only authority can really determine the ‘truth’ of the 
news” (Collett-White).  The achievement of the Wikileaks reports, Pilger states elsewhere, is to 
“shame the dominant section of journalism, devoted to merely taking down what cynical and 
malign power tells it.  This is state stenography, not journalism” (“Why”).  Wikileaks, he 
maintains, is a kind of journalism “that is telling people how the world works. … It’s not 
framing it in how governments or other vested interests want us to think about something” 
(Collett-White).  Rather, it gives us the raw story, an approach that, for Pilger, is a “revolution 
in journalism” (Collett-White).  From another perspective, Lovink sees that the “transparency, 
democracy and openness” promoted by Wikileaks goes some way toward remedying the “glut 
of dislocatable information” that is a feature of information culture (Networks 185).  
 
Overall, Wikileaks’ dissensual orientation moves well in the direction of Guattari’s post-
mediatic culture, in several important senses.  In the first instance, we can understand 
Wikileaks as a machinic assemblage, a dynamic “functional ensemble” of various components, 
that is auto-constructive (Guattari, C 35).  Each component is also an articulated, interfacing 
machine, with these articulations traversing the technological, human, media, code, 
government, socius and so on.  Wikileaks, in Guattari’s terms, might be called a “heterogenetic 
machinic imbrication” (“Vertigo” 37).  From an aesthetic standpoint, such an assemblage is in 
the process of assembling itself, of experimentally constructing a new machinic object in the 
world.  The human-hacker/leaker function of this assemblage is, firstly, to disrupt a 
technological system that is based on security, but also to effect a line of dissonance with the 
authority of that system.  Assange’s particular aim, in setting up Wikileaks, was to address the 
injustices of “modern communications states” through exposing those “conspiratorial 
interactions among the political elite” that maintain and strengthen “authoritarian power” 
(Assange 1, 2).  As such, he connects to an abstract machine of resistance.  From a purely 
technological perspective, the authoritarian security of computer networks can be disrupted 
simply because the possibility of hacking is built into the system; as Alexander Galloway notes, 
computer protocols contain plentiful “exploits,” those “preexisting bugs that are leveraged by 
the hacker to gain access to a computer” (167).  This, he argues, makes protocol “synonymous 
with possibility, “ and hackers “machines for the identification of this possibility” (167, 169).  
Therefore, at the level of the technological machine, with its inherent susceptibility to 
disruption, experimentation is enabled and is, therefore, an aesthetic line of flight that can be 
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followed by any cartographer of resistance.  Of course, we know that malicious hackers 
abound, intent on destruction for its own sake; these are examples of computers being used 
for inappropriate ends, or when computer use “subtract[s] from thinking” (Guattari, C 36), 
which also occurs in the self-focused employment of blogs and social media.  Wikileaks, 
however, with its programme of challenging the tenets of contemporary power, exemplifies 
Guattari’s more productive computer-linked form of thought: “[t]he forms of thought assisted 
by computer are mutant, relating to other … Universes of reference” (C 36).  The techniques of 
the computer-thought in Wikileaks are “the strictly aesthetic techniques of rupture and 
suture.  Something is detached and starts to work for itself” (Guattari, C 132).  In this case, 
information is detached from the information-controlling machine of the capitalist state, and 
placed into a broader domain of flow “in order to produce a situation, in order to organise as 
resistance” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 182).  This “situation” is experienced, fundamentally, by way 
of affects that “go beyond the limits maintained by individual persons and identities” 
(Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 177).  The reactions of the US government, media, and Wikileaks 
supporters are not conveyed through perfectly formulated linguistic phrasing, but, rather, 
affectively; Lazzarato explains: “[t]he ‘message’ is not passed on by means of a linguistic series, 
but rather through the body, postures, noises and images, gestures [and] intensities” 
(“Aesthetic” 177).  These intensities carry the force of the situation, before it can be 
reformulated as language or knowledge (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 179).   Thus, the aesthetic 
paradigm that underpins Wikileaks “invites us to shift our point of view, moving it to the 
widening interval between the pathic and the discursive, between a molar and a molecular 
system of signs” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 179).  Aesthetic practices such as these are always 
risky, according to Guattari.  The risks include “the risk of madness, the risk of nonsense, the 
risk of a break with the dominant subjectifications, with others, such as they are organi[s]ed” 
(“V” 34).  The risk of incarceration, too, in the case of Wikileaks’ Assange and Bradley.  But the 
process of auto-constructing subjectivity is a complex one, involving “praxial crossroads” and 
“ethical choice,” as Guattari tells us:  
This ethical choice of the always possible reimmersion in questions like “what am I 
doing here?” “what am I doing right here?” “do I have a responsibility for what I am at 
the moment?”, but also, for what will come afterwards, not just for me but for the 
other, for the entirety of universes of sense that are concerned?  (“V” 32) 
To take on such questions, as we are arguing Wikileaks does, is to enter thought aesthetically, 
from the vector of constructing other ways of being in the world, other ways of be(com)-ing 
democratic, of finding more life-enhancing ways to live. 
 
Wikileaks is but one example of how internet technology can, in an aesthetic paradigm, 
further the development of becoming-democracy.  We also acknowledge that the related, 
wider movement of citizen journalism in general is a more egalitarian means for us to learn 
 205 
what is happening in the world—to be affected by it so that it might draw us into thought.  As 
internet researcher Axel Bruns points out, the phenomenon of citizen journalism has 
generated considerable research over the past few years, with the relatively recent emergence 
of news blogs and citizen journalism websites prompting him to coin the term “produsage”; 
produsage describes the “hybrid producer/user” character of the internet’s media 
possibilities—a situation Bruns describes as more equitable than the conventional top-down 
news dissemination model (“Citizen”; “News).  There are many instances of citizen journalism, 
in the form of blogs and collaborative news networks (wikis), which strategically bypass 
corporate mass media avenues to create oppositional news mechanisms.  Mark Glaser explains 
the phenomenon:  
The idea behind citizen journalism is that people without professional journalism 
training can use the tools of modern technology and the global distribution of the 
internet to create, augment or fact-check media on their own or in collaboration with 
others.  For example, you might write about a city council meeting on your blog or in 
an online forum. Or you could fact-check a newspaper article from the mainstream 
media and point out factual errors or bias on your blog.  Or you might snap a digital 
photo of a newsworthy event happening in your town and post it online.  Or you 
might videotape a similar event and post it on a site such as YouTube. … 
As Glaser notes, one early example of citizen journalism was Iraqi blogger “Salam Pax,” who 
gave “stunningly detailed early accounts of the [Iraq] war.”  Another key example is the group 
blog http://tsunamihelp.blogspot.com, developed in response to the major tsunami that 
affected several countries in Southeast Asia in 2004.  Originally created by a small group of 
bloggers in India, this site comprised “entries from people on the ground who could report 
what they saw happening, of information on who needed help, [and] how best to [provide 
that] help” (Wu 17).  When traditional media had not yet reached the area, and governments 
and aid agencies were still getting organised, those who wanted information about loved ones 
or who wanted to help in some way had access to pivotal information, in real time, straight 
from the source (Wu).  So successful was the blog that, within a week, it became one of the top 
ten humanitarian websites in the world (Wu 17).  A third example of a seminal citizen 
journalism site is the Indymedia (“Independent Media”) network, whose genesis occurred 
during the 1999 anti-World Trade Organisation protests in Seattle (the “Battle of Seattle.”  
These protests, planned and organised largely via the internet, railed against “the excesses of 
corporate capitalism,” while also advocating “democrati[s[ation” and “social justice” (Kahn and 
Kellner 305, 306).  Indymedia emerged as a site where activists and citizen journalists could 
upload their on-the-spot “text, audio, and video files” as the protests occurred (Juris 270).  
Before long, as Jeffrey Juris notes, “the network quickly expanded on a global scale” to 
numerous world cities (270).  These cities received “web portals in which [they could] 
document, organise and proliferate information that would not otherwise be readily available 
 206 
through the major media” (Kahn and Kellner 306).  Today, the network continues to operate 
as a broad series of locally-operated sites, whose overall modus operandi is as follows: 
“Indymedia is a collective of grassroots media-makers providing a platform for the creation of 
radical, accurate, and passionate coverage of struggles and movements working for social, 
environmental and economic justice” (“About Indymedia”).  As Richard Kahn and Douglas 
Kellner point out, since the development of Indymedia, “[c]ountless other organi[s]ations and 
sites have developed similar Web sites and networks …, turning the internet from a valuable 
tool in the anti-globali[s]ation struggle into the driving engine for a new global cultural vision” 
(306).   
 
While mainstream media organisations are hierarchically structured and based on such values 
as productivity, profitability and editorial stringency, citizen journalist sites are egalitarian, 
informal and subjective (Lasica).  Their decentralised, consensus-based, horizontal operation 
correlate such ventures with a kind of “direct democracy” (Juris 270-71) not possible in 
mainstream media.  Moreover, such alternative agencies can be said to forge real political 
power at grassroots level, due to “the connections [they make] between local, amateur news 
gatherers,” connections that would not occur under “normal, centralised, broadcast news 
coverage” (Sutton and Martin-Jones 34).  These connections demonstrate the “pragmatics of 
assemblage and composition” at the heart of an aesthetic construction of life (Stengers, 
“Experimenting” 52).  The political power unleashed is the force of becoming-democracy, a 
new way of being democratic, a sociopolitical machine produced by a resistant, collective 
subjectivity.  And while this citizen journalism offers alternative views to the corporate and 
political mainstream on “high-stakes, global-impact politics,” it also provides penetrative 
coverage of content disregarded by mainstream media (Bruns, “News”).  For example, Bruns 
cites the rise of  “a variety of hyperlocal citizen journalism projects, covering neighbourhood 
news[,] which may be of interest only to strictly limited local communities” (“News”).  For 
traditional media there is little economic sense in focusing journalistic resources on the 
hyperlocal, which may only occasionally produce stories of broad interest (Bruns, “News).  
However, the availability of hyperlocal as well as global stories means that there is a greater 
depth and breadth of information accessible, giving citizens a kind of independence from the 
gatekeeping of mainstream media and other related social forces (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 
197).  Such elements of internet journalism suggest there is an evolving “democrati[s]ation of 
the creation, dissemination, and consumption of news and information” (Tewksbury and 
Rittenberg 197).  But more than that, sharing the journalistic load amongst on-the-ground 
contributors allows non-profit-driven attention to be paid to a huge array of community-
based, alternative and marginalised issues, which in turn allows for a Guattarian development 
of “subjective resingularisation,” or the configuration of rare and atypical subjectivities (C 97).  
Not only does this admit everyday affect into the aesthetics of subject-creation, but also it is 
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also a playing out of Guattari’s hope for capitalist societies to advance to a post-media age, “in 
which the media will be reappropriated by a multitude of subject-groups capable of directing 
its resingulari[s]ation” (TE 40).  This becoming-democracy, with its new, accompanying 
subjectivities, advanced by an aesthetically constructed, alternative journalism, ethologically 
develops through open, inclusive and minoritarian practices.  Such practices apprehend “a 
force that expresses a change in the manner of feeling, in the affects, in existence,” before this 
becomes captured by the majoritarian languages of mainstream media (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 
180). 
 
Libertarian-cyberculture 3: collective thought 
 
As Simon O’Sullivan affirms, “the emergence of the Web is not without its problems, not least 
in its utilisation for profit and control” (Art 13).  In spite of these “moments of capture,” 
though, “the Web remains a space of creativity, invention and expression.  It allows for a 
certain amount of individual freedom, or simply self-organisation” (O’Sullivan, Art 13).  In 
O’Sullivan’s view, another worthwhile example with regard to the self-organisation (or 
autopoeitic subjectivity) that the internet enables is the practice of open source software 
production (Art 13).  Bruns agrees, citing the development of open source software as similar 
in some ways to the community-based model of “open news,” as discussed above (“News”).  
Open source software development involves the creation and sharing of “quality software for 
applications … deemed to be financially unviable by the mainstream industry” (“News”).  
While the term “open source” does refer to a range of often complex and powerful software 
systems (such as operating system Linux and web server Apache), it more points to a 
development methodology.  The key methodology is that “the core code of such software can 
be easily studied by other programmers and improved upon—the only proviso being that such 
improvements must also be revealed publicly and distributed freely in a process that 
encourages continual innovation” (N. Newman).  There are several overlaps between open 
source and the open news model as outlined above—for instance, the removal of hierarchical 
editorial control, the acceptance of content as essentially unfinished, and the overall 
commitment to collaborative principles (Bruns, “From Reader” 123).  In terms of genealogy, 
however, open news/publishing is, in fact, underpinned by the open source movement, since 
this is where both its technical and philosophical foundations are located (Meikle 105, 108).  
Therefore, to further explore Guattari’s idea that “technical” or digital machines are potentially 
also “machines of thought, sensation and consultation” (C 97), we now investigate the case of 
open source, seeing whether we can map some aesthetic lines through a kind of “collective 
thought.”  First, though, we survey this movement somewhat, so as to outline the nuances of 
“Free” and “Open Source” software. 
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Prior to the 1970s, when computers were used primarily for research purposes, a collaborative 
and non-proprietary model constituted software development, meaning that source code was 
available to be freely used by any interested parties (C. May, 369; Schütz 85).  With the taking 
up of computers by commercial enterprises, software development became more proprietary-
based, with companies seeking to “‘own’ code as a means of profiting from it” (C. May 369).  It 
was in resistance to the closed nature of this ownership model that the open source 
programme first arose, beginning in the early 1980s with Richard Stallman’s “Free Software 
Foundation” (Lawton).  Graham Lawton explains Stallman’s motivation: “Stallman’s beef was 
with commercial companies that smother their software with patents and copyrights and keep 
the source code … a closely guarded secret.  Stallman saw this as damaging.  It generated poor-
quality, bug-ridden software.  And worse, it choked off the free flow of ideas.”  Indeed, rather 
than focusing on the practical issues of how to improve software, Stallman’s movement 
specifically stands for “users’ essential freedoms: the freedom to run [open source software], to 
study and change it, and to redistribute copies with or without changes” (Stallman 31).  
Stallman sees Free Software as equating to “freedom in general”: software freedoms are crucial, 
“not just for the individual user’s sake, but because they promote social solidarity—that is, 
sharing and cooperation” (31).  As an alternative to the individualistic and market-based 
concept of copyright, Stallman developed the GNU General Public License, also known as 
“copyleft,” which guarantees the freedom of a program to be changed, as well as the ongoing 
freedom of any subsequent versions (C. May 369-70).  As Lovink points out, this “locks 
software into a form of communal ownership” (My First 195).  Stallman’s GNU Project worked 
on developing, from scratch, a free software operating system (Schütz 85), but when another 
programmer, Linus Torvalds, completed this project in the early 1990s and named it Linux, a 
division emerged in the movement (Lovink, My First 195-96).  This division was, in a sense, 
formalised in 1998 when free software developer Eric Raymond initiated the term (and notion) 
of Open Source—a model that allowed free software to also be open to the possibility of 
commercial profiteering (Lovink, My First 195).  Christopher Kelty makes clear the agenda of 
Raymond’s Open Source: 
Prior to 1998, Free Software referred either to the Free Software Foundation (and the 
watchful, micromanaging eye of Stallman) or to one of thousands of different 
commercial, avocational, or university-research projects, processes, licenses, and 
ideologies that had a variety of names: sourceware, freeware, shareware, open 
software, public domain software, and so on.  The term Open Source, by contrast, 
sought to encompass them all in one movement.  (99) 
Stallman’s Free Software remains devoted to an ethic of overall freedom, which means that 
any business-driven restrictions are not tolerated, while Raymond’s Open Source model allows 
that while the original source code might remain free, Open Source companies are able to 
make a profit from such services/products as regular upgrades, installation software, technical 
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support and so on (Terranova, Network 92).  Further, with Open Source, commercial users of 
original free code may impose copyright restrictions on their own redeveloped versions.  Thus, 
a company such as Microsoft, which is non-Open Source, utilises innovations drawn from 
Open Source browsers such as Firefox, and IBM mixes Open Source and proprietary 
information (Samuelson).  As Steven Weber notes, though, while Open Source is “a productive 
movement ultimately linked to the mainstream economy,” it is, overall, still working out 
exactly “how it relates to commerce and the capitalist economy that embeds it” (Weber 7, 15).  
Setting aside for a moment the question of capitalism’s reach, some theorists prefer to focus 
more on the principle of “open source” (rather than “Open Source”).  As Weber explains, “[t]he 
essence of open source is not the software.  It is the process by which the software is created” 
(56).  Christopher May puts it this way: “[w]hile there are philosophical differences between 
the ‘free software’ and ‘open source’ software’ movements, both are based on what I term a 
‘logic of openness’” (370).  The newer terms FOSS (free/open source software) or FLOSS 
(free/libre/open source software) perhaps better express this commitment to a logic or 
principle of openness (C. May 370; Schütz 89)—one that attempts to see beyond issues of 
moralisation or commercialisation.  The stance of this thesis is that “open source” offers a 
model or methodology that can access a way of thinking and a politics outside of capital; as 
Lovink puts it, we can the term “primarily as a metaphor” (My First 196).  In endorsement of 
this model/principle of openness, we adopt the lower case term “open source.” 
   
Returning to the question of capitalism’s involvement in this movement, though, we first 
acknowledge cultural theorist Olga Goriunova’s refutation that open source is still working out 
how it relates to capitalism; instead, she claims that the economic success of the “FLOSS 
development model” has led to it being regarded as a supreme business model (“Towards”).  
For Goriunova, open source alone will not provide the “ultimate revolutionary technique … to 
defeat capitalism” since FLOSS is very much a capitalist target (“Towards”).  To this end, it is 
“unable to provide a model of a better constitution of … society” (Goriunova, “Towards”).  
Terranova, in her book Network Culture, goes even further, when she addresses the question of 
open source from an Italian Marxist autonomist viewpoint.  From this perspective, Terranova 
dismisses the possibility that any kind of work can take place outside of capitalism—the “free 
labour” of open source processes included.  She writes: “the open-source question 
demonstrates the overreliance of the digital economy as such on free labour, free both in the 
sense of ‘not financially rewarded’ and of ‘willingly given’” (Network 93-94).  This reliance “is 
part of larger mechanisms of capitalist extraction of value which are fundamental to late 
capitalism as a whole” (Terranova, Network 94).  By this she means that “such processes are 
not created outside capital and then reappropriated by capital, but are the results of a complex 
history where the relation between labour and capital are mutually constitutive” (Network 94).  
In other words, for Terranova, it is “technically impossible” to disconnect the free labour that 
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underlies open source from late capitalism, since this free labour is immanent to the advanced 
capitalist economy (Terranova, Network 94).  The “collective intelligence” at work in 
networked processes, she maintains, is, in fact, a manifestation of the autonomists’ notion of 
the “general intellect” or “mass intellectuality”—the ensemble of living labour and machines 
articulating productive knowledge (Network 86-88).  Although Goriunova also believes that 
open source is tied to capital, she actually takes issue with Terranova’s analysis, regarding it as 
too pessimistic: for her, Terranova’s argument does not allow for any creative practice to be 
emancipatory—that is, “truly creative”—under late capitalism (“Towards”).  Goriunova asks: 
If the development of capitalism is a monolithic process, and experiments in digital 
production were always born within capitalist systems with no potential for liberation, 
even unrealised, if no contradictions and no ruptures, no potentials and struggles, no 
excess, no gaps, no “liberating” in “free[,]” then what kind of action and practice is 
possible today? (“Towards”) 
Indeed, Goriunova contends that the very the process of creativity is “undervalued” in 
autonomist theory, since, for her, it is this very process that enables an escape from the logic 
of capital (“Towards”).  Creativity in the digital world, according to Goriunova, is an 
unpredictable, dynamic, explosive process that occurs at an intersection between humans, 
technology and network systems.  Goriunova draws on Braidotti, who in turn draws on 
Jacques Lacan, to theorise that the explosive process of creativity is “essentially excessive,” to 
the extent that it creates something that is driven neither by need nor possession; it is neither 
functional, nor utilitarian (“Towards).  The “self-unfolding explosion of creativity … spreads 
out an extra space, a dimension where construction of value is enabled within a different logic” 
(Goriunova, (“Towards”).  Rather than being pre-subsumed, Goriunova holds that “[c]apital 
needs to keep creativity free in order to survive,” and creativity remains free due to its essential 
excessivity—its “existence in ruptures, in events, in intensification, in uncontrolled 
catastrophes” (“Towards).  Of course, Goriunova’s assessment of the intensive excesses of 
creativity pertains to the Deleuze-Guattarian ontology of difference, with its foregrounding of 
affect. 
 
What we have above, then, are two separate arguments—from Goriunova and Terranova 
respectively—claiming that the open source model will not offer any escape for thought from 
capital.  However, it is the position of this thesis that each of these writers, in fact, offers a 
means to think the effectivity of the principle of open source, in terms of its potential for 
thought.  From Goriunova, it is her notion of creativity.  If the concept of open source, 
extrapolated beyond its software programming roots, describes a collaborative, networked, 
autonomous, free-flowing, experimental process, then surely we may understand Goriunova’s 
force of creativity to also be one of its fundamental mechanisms.  Elsewhere, Goriunova 
designates creativity as “autocreativity,” in order to characterise it as self-organising, as well as 
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to conceptualise it “outside of the dominant, capturing, redundancies currently at work” 
(“Autocreativity” 24).  This self-organising/self-generating quality of creativity is also a key 
feature of the open source development process (Juris 16-17), with “autopoietic [and] 
autonomous” creativity (Goriunova, “Autocreativity” 25) underlying its generation.  In other 
words, the creativity of open source is not simply reliant on human creativity; rather, it is 
propelled by “a force of aesthetic desiring production” that plays out dynamically at the 
juncture between the human and the technical (Goriunova, “Autocreativity” 25).  As a 
“machinic creativity,” autocreativity is “something to be joined in with, discovered, followed 
and worked with in order to become” (Goriunova, “Autocreativity” 25).  Just so, the creativity 
of a self-generating open source project is a machinic ethology to become conjoined with, 
which proceeds through its creative flow.  To follow Goriunova’s logic, the self-organising 
process of something coming into being—of an open source project autopoietically and 
ethologically becoming—will necessarily escape the imperativeness of notions of labour.  This 
concept of autocreativity, therefore, offers a way of conceptualising open source as beyond 
capital.  Returning to Terranova’s argument against a liberating role for open source, it seems 
that she, too, perhaps unwittingly, offers a contradictory view.  In a chapter further on from 
her “free labour” argument, Terranova pronounces open-source software to be recent example 
of the intrinsically vital “bottom-up, piecemeal, parallel approach to organisation” of network 
culture (120).  This kind of “spontaneous productivity” involves the decentralised organisation 
of large numbers of peers interacting with one another with/in technical systems, with the 
significant result of “an excessive production of cooperation and interaction” (120).  This excess 
may well relate to Goriunova’s notion of the excess of creativity, but Terranova approaches it 
from a different standpoint.  Drawing on the results of “cellular automata” experiments from 
the field of biological computing, Terranova argues that the self-organising, innovative 
systems of network culture call forth new techniques of control—a kind of self-modulating 
“soft control,” which applies a “minimum amount of force”: only managing a system’s initial 
conditions, and thereafter allowing unpredictability, open-endedness, and incomplete 
knowledge of the whole (Network 115; 119).  This “abstract machine of soft control” takes as its 
focal point “the productivity of an ascentred and leaderless multitude” (123).  Here Terranova 
invokes the idea of the “networked multitude” (Network 135), building on Hardt and Negri’s 
sense of a multitude as “a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations, which 
is not homogenous or identical with itself and bears an indistinct, inclusive relation to those 
outside of it” (Empire 103).  Therefore, while the interconnected internet culture is “an 
industry—and hence a mode of labour” (Terranova, Network 129) that can/will be valorised by 
capital, it is also potentially a self-organising “networked multitude,” which offers a means of 
escape.  Escape from economic and political capture is possible due to the multitude’s “active 
power of differentiation,” which brings with it “a potential for transformation and even 
catastrophe” (Terranova, Network 153-54, 128).  Such transformation, differentiation, even 
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catastrophe amounts to an “excessive value” of life over and above the “logic of exchange and 
equivalence” (Terranova, Network 129)—the very logic that the principle of open source seeks 
to escape.  Indeed, as Terranova notes, the concept of the multitude defines a kind of “political 
mode of engagement that is located outside the majoritarian and representative model of 
modern democracies” (Network 129-30).  Just so, open source movements that seek to resist 
majoritarian mores such as ownership, hierarchical structuration and profit building can be 
characterised as multitudes on the basis of, amongst other things, their self-modulation, 
patterns of emergence, and their drive toward a new logic of the political.  As we shall see, 
significant activist movements, movements whom Terranova has characterised in terms of the 
multitude, have adopted the principle of open source.  It seems, then, that her summary 
statement about the networked multitude can be just as aptly applied to the open source 
principle:  “What this ultimately boils down to is a … common passion giving rise to a 
distributed movement able to displace the limits and terms within which the political 
constitution of the future is played out” (Network 156).   
   
Having found a way past some possible objections to the creative and political potentialities of 
open source, we can now look at some examples of how this principle may apply within an 
aesthetic paradigm of cultural thought/action. If we are to take open source as a kind of 
metaphor, as an open and collaborative and intrinsically creative approach to production, we 
can look beyond computer code to see how open source transfers to other fields.  In Lovink’s 
view, it is not appropriate to partition open source from the “non-technical” side of culture 
since technology is now inseparable from life overall; therefore, the general principles of open 
source spread readily to other realms (My First 213).  Again, the underlying principle of open 
source might be summed up as: “a self-determining, collective, politically independent mode 
of creating very complex … objects that are made public and freely available to everyone” 
(Kelty x).  As Goriunova points out, licences other than the GPL have been developed, from 
Lawrence Lessig’s Creative Commons (a “legal toolbox” guaranteeing a range of actions), to a 
variety of Open Content licenses dealing with “music, art, text or any publication, sampling,” 
and so on (“Towards”).  With and without new forms of licences, the fields that have taken up 
open source methodologies and principles are diverse: 
There are free encyclopedias, such as Wikipedia, and “free music”—not that copied 
from commercial CDs but that offered for free from the start and distributed in line 
with the GPL principle.  There are visual artists who experiment with “copyleft” and 
open content, using the Creative Commons license and experimenting with the 
exchange of artworks on sites such as www.opuscommons.net … . … Open-source 
principles are also applied in the hard sciences—think of the fascinating open-source 
battle with the human genome project.  … There are also projects like OpenMedicine, 
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OpenBiology and OpenScience, all of which fight the scientific publishing houses and 
their rigid intellectual-property-rights regimes.  (Lovink, My First 213) 
Therefore, we have open source principles applied to open networks of collaborative 
knowledge, as well as to the sharing of artworks and scientific research.  OpenMedicine and 
OpenBiology, to expand, are free, open access, peer-reviewed journals committed to 
disseminating high quality research expediently, with the aims of producing networks of 
collaboration and resisting expensive monopolist journals; OpenScience is a free, open source 
scientific software development project seeking to “encourage a collaborative environment in 
which science can be pursued by anyone who is inspired to discover something new about the 
natural world” (“About OpenScience”).  The sequencing of the human genome also drew upon 
open source principles when it ultimately “placed all the resulting data into the public domain 
rather than allow any participant to patent any of the results” (“Open-Source”).  Such 
initiatives promote access to thought for the benefit of a collective subjectivity, while 
proprietary models serve only a privileged few.  In terms of implementing open source 
methodologies for medical research itself, there are perhaps fewer examples.  Recently, 
however, Australian chemistry researcher Michael Woelfle and colleagues used an open online 
collaborative approach in order to improve the drug treatment for the “neglected tropical 
disease,” schistosomiasis (Woefle et al).  Since the pharmaceutical industry has little interest 
in developing drugs for the poorer countries that are afflicted by tropical diseases, Woelfle and 
his associates chose an open source methodology—calling for international assistance through 
a website, networking forum, blogs and news articles.  No rewards were offered for 
contributing research, “other than peer recognition for having solved a problem and 
contributed to something philanthropically valuable” (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 747).  The 
project was successful, the drug problem resolved, and the researchers concluded that the 
crucial message from the undertaking was that “the research was accelerated by being open” 
(Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748).  Other advantages of such a project are that the process is 
entirely transparent, has the potential to be on-going, and is subject to the “most rigorous” 
peer scrutiny (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748).  The next significant question, for Woelfle and 
colleagues, is whether or not open source will be utilised for the discovery of completely new 
drugs (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748).  This would be of benefit in the area of neglected 
diseases, but also for diseases that affect relatively few people, such as Parkinson’s (“An Open-
Source”).  It seems that while there has been some discussion about open source drug 
discovery, to date there has been little concerted effort (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748).  
Nevertheless, the collective thought available through open source methods—through 
mobilising a research-oriented networked multitude—presents tremendous potential for both 
the creative development of new therapies, and for destabilising the drug monopoly operated 
by “big pharmaceutical.”  To use such a relational, processual methodology would be to engage 
in D+G’s “minor” or “nomad” science, as mentioned earlier, which is opposed to “royal” 
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science: an open source means of doing science would be “minor” to the extent that it is “very 
different from the royal or imperial sciences” (ATP 362).  While royal science plots out “a 
closed space for linear and solid things,” nomad science “operates in an open space throughout 
which things-flows are distributed” (D+G, ATP 361).  To this extent, the minor science of open 
source is inseparable from the flux, becoming and heterogeneity that is “reality itself” (D+G, 
ATP 361).  It does not proceed by way of “reproduction, deduction, or induction,” but, rather, 
aesthetically, by way of “the sensible conditions of intuition and construction” (D+G, ATP 372, 
373).  In this way, it can move toward creating new, perhaps more life-giving perspectives, 
without falling back on secure but limiting “theoretical foundations,” or the rulings of an 
established “authority” (Guattari, “TE” 133), such as capital. 
 
Finally, we return to a more sociopolitical domain, in order to explore how open source 
principles might function in relation to “experimentation with political tactics and forms of 
organi[s]ation” (Terranova, Network 154).  As Terranova points out, the networked multitude 
empowers “a political and cultural milieu that can no longer be subsumed … under a majority”; 
at the same time, it works to develop “informational tactics able to counteract the overbearing 
power of [corporations/governments]” (Network 154).  As such a tactic, the open source model 
works as a resistant sociopolitical collective, in a self-organising but heterogeneous 
communication matrix.  From the starting point of a common passion, a shifting assemblage 
of activists effects a power of sociopolitical differentiation—that is, breaks away from 
dominant forms.  Open source, thus conceived, is the aesthetic becoming of a collective 
subjectivity.  There are numerous contemporary illustrations of such assemblages, two notable 
examples being the large scale movement against the Iraqi war (an ongoing and 
“unprecedented expression of collective consciousness and action bound together through the 
internet” [Cortwright]), and the 2011 Occupy Wall Street campaign (an “open, participatory 
and horizontally organi[s]ed process … [protesting] the blatant injustices of our times 
perpetuated by the economic and political elites” [“About.” New York]).  The latter, of course, 
is also another example of a becoming-revolutionary event materialising in response to the 
global financial crisis.   Such assemblages have, as Terranova states, “given temporary but 
powerful visibility to a process of horizontal and diffuse communication that draws both upon 
the latest technologies (from video cellular telephony to wireless internet access) and also 
upon more established strategies, such as conferences, talks, camps, workshops [and] 
meetings” (Networked 154-55).  In Guattari’s terms, such an assemblage comprises an 
interfacing series of machines, proceeding experimentally (aesthetically).  A third example of 
such an open source-like assemblage is the World Social Forum (WSF), an entity worthy of 
some elaboration.  Commencing in 2001, the WSF can be described as “a meeting place for all 
of the organisations and individuals involved in the struggle against neo-liberalism, without 
the control of any one governmental institution and without the participation of sectarian 
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organisations” (Gilbert, Anticapitalism 91).  The initial WSF was set up in direct opposition to 
the World Economic Forum (WEF), the annual Davos-based summit for finance ministers, 
banks, corporate CEOs and the like, a summit financed by multinational corporations that 
“has been instrumental in advancing neoliberal economic policies since 1971” (Milberry 44).  
Taking place in varying cities, the WSF, like the WEF, runs over five days, and since 12,000 
people attended the first event in 2001, it has regularly attracted between 60,000 and 150,000 
participants (Bond 327).  One of the WSF’s key achievements has been to conceive and initially 
plan the massive February 2003 protest against US/UK intentions to invade Iraq: an 
unparalleled 15 million people worldwide were mobilised to participate in a day of action 
which, although ultimately unsuccessful, impacted strongly upon world leaders (J. Smith 413-
14; Bond 328).  Overall, though, perhaps the WSF’s fundamental achievement has been to 
establish “an alternative pole of world opinion to the dominant neoliberal (market-oriented) 
ideology associated with Davos” (Bond 328).  This is not to say that the WSF is a unified body; 
indeed, its charter clearly states that the forum is not a body at all and that no participants 
may “express positions claiming to be those of all its participants” (“Charter”).  Instead, the 
forum constitutes a space of convergence for a diverse range of groups, movements, networks, 
activists, NGOs, academics and interested individuals, whose starting point or point of 
commonality (or “initial condition,” if we are to look at it from the perspective of soft control) 
is an explicit commitment to oppose neoliberalism and the sovereignty of capital, or, for that 
matter, any mode of imperialism (WSF).  The machinic essence of the collective, however, 
ensures that heterogeneity prevails, since a machine never produces homogeneity.  To this 
extent, Jeremy Gilbert sees the WSF as composing “a democratic space and a space for 
democracy” (“Forum” 222).  The democracy that Gilbert refers to here corresponds to 
becoming-democracy rather than representative democracy, since he means to invoke the 
“fuller and more participatory democracy” that Hardt and Negri’s networked multitude 
enables (“Forum” 232).  In terms of framework, this more participatory democracy involves, 
according to Juris, not one singular open space involving “diverse actors,” but, rather, a range 
of “self-organi[s]ing counter-publics” (Gilbert, “Forum” 235).  In other words, the WSF 
operates as a network of horizontally coordinated, autonomous, self-organising spaces (Juris 
25), with an initial and overarching anti-market agenda.   Concepts and actions are created 
according to such open source principles as “the free and open circulation of information,” 
“decentralized coordination” (Smith et al 29), as well as spontaneous productivity and self-
determination.  Of course, capitalist notions of proprietary ownership are eschewed, and, in 
fact, since 2004 the WSF has run on open source software (Smith and Smythe 803); in 2005 the 
forum also urged its widespread use beyond the forum (Clendinning).  Giuseppe Caruso 
accounts for the WSF’s software preference: 
The WSF chose [open source] software … as one more way to support people’s struggle 
against marginali[s]ation and uneven and unfair distribution of resources (in this case 
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information)—struggles that all the groups involved in the WSF process are conducting 
in their aspiration of building another, more just, world. (174)  
Open source software, therefore, underpins the communicative technology of this forum, 
which amounts to an open source style of networked politics, striving to find ways of thinking 
and living other than those stipulated by capital.  Inevitably, there have been criticisms leveled 
against the WSF, such as it being too top down and not diverse enough (Smith and Smythe 
811).  However, the forum continues to make efforts to build heterogeneity and horizontality, 
and the fact that forums have been held in places such as Mumbai, Nairobi and Senegal also 
reveals a commitment to marginalized regions (Juris 261; Smith and Smythe 812).  Overall, the 
WSF provides an example of an open space architecture that has enabled the struggles of a 
vast array of anti-corporate movements/groups/individuals to become visible.  As a networked 
multitude, it strives to think through the problem of escaping the inequities of the market, to 
create strategies of resistance, and to enact a new model of a becoming democracy.  
 
To conclude here, we face the question of how the concept and process of open source relates 
to thought.  How exactly does it connect to an image of a collective kind of thought, or as 
Guattari phrases it, a “collective sensibility”?  We are not referring to Pierre Lévy’s “collective 
intelligence,” or to any notion relating to Jürgen Habermas’ “public sphere”: Lévy’s concept is a 
largely humanist one (Terranova, Network 85), striving as it does for “the mutual recognition 
and enrichment of individuals” (Lévy 13), while the Habermasian public is consensual and 
exclusive of difference (Blackman 139).  On the evidence presented above, open source may be 
construed as “a space that is common, without being homogenous or even equal” (Terranova, 
Network 154).  Correspondingly, we may conceptualise it as “a collective diagram permitting 
the articulation of individual practices to the benefit of each, without one imposing itself on 
the other (Guattari and Cohn-Bendit, qtd. in Genosko 40).  For Guattari, this kind of collective 
thought is dissensual, to the extent that it does not seek to reach any kind of group consensus 
in solving (political) problems.  Instead, collective thought always allows for dissensus, which 
is the only true way to arrive at “disparity, singularity, marginality”—with all their 
potentialities for rethinking subjectivity (GR 271).  Open source approaches collective thought, 
then, in the sense that it comprises a multiply connected network (or networks) of 
autonomous, creative experiments, whose very aim is to admit and advocate differentiation—
from one another, as well as from any majoritarian framework.  Open source thrives on 
dissensus, just as a collective diagram of creative thought does: dissensus is the very driver.  
For this reason neither open source nor collective thought will ever be a smooth, conflict-free 
process.  However, through both these processes the “excessive value” of life over and above 
the “logic of exchange and equivalence” (Terranova, Network 129), and the essentially excessive 
nature of creativity (Goriunova, “Towards”), are accessed.  The result is an entry into the 
virtuality of thought—the as-yet unthought—and the initiation of something new and 
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potentially free from axiomatic constraint.  Again, this initiation is aesthetically constituted, to 
the extent that it is affectively imbued, and an experimental and auto-constructive process.  
The notion of collective thought, then, of which open source is an example, is a production of 
“collaborations and alliances” that work against the restrictive subjectivity/ies prescribed by 
majoritarian forces; or, to put it another way, it is “the mapping out of productive, joyful 
encounters that increase our capacity to act in the world” (O’Sullivan, “Pragmatics” 321). 
 
To finish this Line of Flight (knowing, of course, that it cannot end in its virtuality), we map 
somewhat more purposively the ways in which Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm, as explored 
through all the preceding examples, enacts a more ethical image of thought.  We start by 
recalling that, for Guattari, today’s predominant paradigm of subjectivity involves, as 
O’Sullivan indicates, “an homogenisation of life and its capture by transcendent points, 
especially around the exchange principle.  This is the organisation of subjectivity around 
money and material production solely for its own sake” (“Guattari’s” 275).  Putting it in 
different terms, Lazzarato observes that “the production of subjectivity [today] takes place in a 
‘common world’ modelled by signs, opinions, languages, slogans and the dispositives of power 
in societies of security” (Aesthetic 175-76).  For Guattari, this situation can lead to “monstrous 
absurdities,” and, therefore, a particular, politico-ethical response is called for, as he explains: 
“in the contemporary context where the primacy of information fluxes that are machinically 
engendered” can lead to “mass mediatic infantalism [and] ignorance of difference and 
alterity”—which is to say, the “homogenetic ‘entrapment’” of subjectivity—it is of the utmost 
importance to “reappropriat[e] the production of subjectivity” (GR 202; C 19, 133).  Overall, 
“[t]he only acceptable end result of human activity is the production of subjectivity such that 
its relation to the world is sustained and enriched” (GR 202).  Again, how can such 
subjectivities be engendered?  As Colman suggests, such “creative change can only occur when 
dominant authorial coding systems (… capitalism, communicative language) are ruptured, 
shifted or mutated” (“Affective” 60).  These functions—of rupturing and mutating—are, as we 
have said, of an aesthetic nature, which brings us to the kind of thought Guattari advocates: 
thought as ethico-aesthetic social practice.  If, for him, the questions are: “how do we change 
mentalities, how do we reinvent social practices that would give back to humanity … a sense of 
responsibility …?” (C 119), the answer is to think aesthetically, to think like an artist.  This 
would involve, first of all, grasping the “processual creativity” of subjectivity (Guattari, C 13), 
which means to understand that it is always amenable to change.  This change will be brought 
about through an ecologically-oriented thought, involving a range of aesthetic techniques.  
Guattari explains: 
A singularity, a rupture of sense, a cut, a fragmentation, the detachment of a semiotic 
content—in a dadaist or surrealist manner—can originate mutant nuclei of 
subjectivation.  Just as chemistry has to purify complex mixtures to extract atomic and 
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homogeneous molecular matter, thus creating an infinite scale of chemical entities 
that have no prior existence, the same is true in the “extraction” and “separation” of 
aesthetic subjectivities or partial objects, in the psychoanalytic sense, that make an 
immense complexification of subjectivity possible—harmonies, polyphonies, 
counterpoints, rhythms and existential orchestrations, until now unheard of and 
unknown.  (C 18-19) 
The artistic practices of cutting into (or apart) and putting back together differently, then, are 
at the bottom of an aesthetic thinking of life in the socius.  As Colman affirms, aesthetic 
thinkers “recognise that the machinic universes they choose, or are chosen to engage with[,] 
are a paradigm of which they are only a part, but which they may modify through their 
aesthetic techniques” (“Affective” 75).  Hence, subjects of unjust regimes may utilise social 
media and ICTs for the unanticipated purposes of disseminating details of repression and 
resistance, hackers may lift strictly authorised information and place it into the public domain 
to expose authoritarian policies, and practitioners of open source may cleave asunder systemic 
hierarchies and enclosures of thinking so as to fashion transparent, continually developing and 
heterogenetic processes of thought.  Each of these is an experimental, aesthetic practice—an 
aesthetic technique of/for thought—detaching and deterritorialising a segment of the real, 
triggering “a function of sense and alterity” (affect), and generating a shift in subjectivity 
(Guattari, C 131).  Guattari often uses the term “transversality” to express the interrelatedness 
of and, therefore, potential for cutting across machinic assemblages: indeed, “experimentation 
with this kind of aesthetic and ethico-political transversality” (C 132) is another apt way to 
characterise a Guattarian image of thought.
51
  Taking up the methods of this transversality 
would be, therefore, to think in ways that bring about “changes in production, ways of living 
and axes of value” (Guattari, C 134).  Because of its potential for thought, it is worth ending 
here with what Guattarian scholar Gary Genosko describes as the “key concepts” of 
transversality; they are: “mobility (traversing domains, levels, dimensions, the ability to carry 
and be carried beyond); creativity (productivity, adventurousness, aspiration, laying down 
lines of flight),” and, finally, “self-engendering (autoproduction, self-positing subjectivity), 















Repetition: thought becoming imperceptible 
 
As a project of Nietzschean active ethics, the goals of this thesis have been two-fold.  First, we 
sought to establish and investigate some of the restrictions that contemporary life places upon 
a Deleuze-Guattarian thought without an image, which is to say thought as the uninhibited 
power to create and expand difference in the world.  To this end, Part 1’s Problem 1 examined 
some of the key ways in which dogmatic thought continues to determine the kind of thinking 
that we habitually enter into.  This thinking is constrained by representational structures and 
processes such as the recognition of identity, resemblance and opposition; the refusal of 
otherness, which manifests as racism, sexism and an extensive array of fascistic practices; the 
privileging of the universal human subject, even—perhaps especially—in times of social and 
global insecurity; the endless expression of opinion, which is both self-centred and mass-
driven; and thought as no more than a mirroring of subject and object.  In Part 1’s Problem 2, 
we explored how information impacts upon thought, beginning with the way informational 
networks maintain control through the circulation of “order-words” that reduce thought and 
life to pre-formed possibilities.  We considered arguments that the compressive nature of 
information denies duration and any other time than now, and that the banality and 
instantaneity of media content cancel out the potentialities of difference and real 
attentiveness.  As well, we saw how computers and the internet may lead to the diminishment 
of thought in the sense of promoting a skimming kind of engagement with images, ideas and 
life itself.  Overall, though, permeating both the dogmatic and the informational problems for 
thought, is the problem of the capitalist axiomatic, which further and most powerfully delimits 
what thinking can do in our current context.  In the representational realm of science, for 
instance, which includes medicine, it promotes certain research areas and refuses others, and 
in the world of the internet, it mines our interests for profit and, indeed, shapes those 
interests.  Representation, as Guattari sees it, is bound to capitalism in the sense that 
capitalism requires a “normal” individual who functions “in terms of a communication based 
on dualist systems” (MR 85, 72), and, as Deleuze emphasises, in this late capitalist milieu, 
information is the system of control (TRM 321).    
 
Our second goal in this work, pursued in Part 2, was to seek ways to counteract, or resist, the 
kinds of oppressions against thought and life outlined in Part 1; we sought a thought that 
might comprise a Deleuze-Guattarian weapon of resistance.  We began with suggestions for 
recovering the potential of affect, which, in the present day, is largely captured by the 
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mediatised strategies of capital and governance.  Affect, for D+G, is a critical mode of thought: 
it is felt thought, the forerunner of concepts.  Techniques such as mindful attention, “stopping 
to think” and practising Bergson’s intuition were proposed as some means through which 
affect can be tuned into, so as to experience the different lines of thought—thought’s 
virtuality—that it may open.  From the affective components of events, new concepts can 
assemble—new ways of conceptualising current circumstances so that the future can be 
different to, more life-affirming than, the past; this is D+G’s, and this project’s, utopian 
objective.  We used the event of the global financial crisis as a fillip to wonder how such 
concepts as becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic might be made anew, so as to 
access ways of seeing our socio-political circumstances outside of majoritarian, capitalistic 
blueprints.  We also approached affect from the angle of Thrift’s recasting of Agamben’s bare 
life into a concept that includes the “half-second delay,” a micro-space/time of creative 
potential wherein thought might be impacted by a range of microbiopolitical techniques.  In 
proposing thought as the creation of new forms, D+G also affirm the power of art as a specific 
way of thinking the new, to the extent that art brings new affects and percepts, blocks of 
sensations, into the world—sensations that are not of the body but that stand alone.  These 
sensations are the world’s imperceptible forces, which the work of art makes palpable; in 
doing so, the art “draws us into [its] compound,” making us become-other, and gives us 
“vibrations, clinches, and openings” that can lead to new ways of being (D+G, WP 175, 177).  
We explored art-as-thought through two examples of contemporary Australian Aboriginal 
painting, in terms of their laying open new ways of perceiving such life elements as landscape, 
animals, movement, space-time and Aboriginality—each one of which is normally conceived 
in limitative and/or negativising representational terms.  Our study of two works of dance also 
showed that this art form has the potential to draw us into a movement-made thought, with 
the sensations in these particular examples shifting beyond anthropocentric prescriptives and 
bringing about the potentialities of becoming-animal.  Through our digital art example, we 
saw how, from the Deleuze-Guattarian standpoints of machinism and ethology, ICTs do have 
the potential to access the Deleuze-Bergsonian virtual of thought, to the extent that they 
operate by way of a relationality of multiple human, technological, social and environmental 
components.  As the Lozano-Hemmer work demonstrates, they even have the ability to 
subvert control capitalism’s own digital surveillance mechanisms, satisfying Deleuze’s criteria 
that it is only when they are taken up as modes of resistance that computer technologies can 
truly prove life enhancing.  Finally, with Guattari, we sought to extend the practices of art into 
the practices of living, by approaching life from the perspective of an ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm.  This paradigm, which is especially enabled by what Guattari names post-mediatic 
technologies, regards subjectivities (individual and group) as autopoietic, processual 
machines, capable of remaking themselves using aesthetic techniques of experimentation.  We 
revisited the concepts of becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic through such 
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examples as the recent wave of colour uprisings and Wikileaks, and offered a concept of 
collective thought through the example of open source, in order to explore how “mutant 
nuclei of subjectivation” (Guattari, C 18) can actively create and self-engender subjectivities 
not sanctioned by the dominant, capitalist world order.  Such aesthetic praxes bring together 
“feelings, action, theory and machinism” in a “collective arrangement” (Guattari, MR 87,93).   
 
Thought, in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, takes multiple pathways.  Fundamentally, “thought is 
creation, not will to truth” (WP 54), and this creation can proceed through a range of 
expressions.  In the sphere of philosophy, thought works to create active concepts.  Concepts 
as they are commonly understood in day-to-day, representational terms are, as Colebrook 
acknowledges, a kind of shortcut ensuring that we do not have to think (Gilles 15).  Properly 
philosophical concepts are the power and difference of thought; through concept creation 
thought reaches into the sub-representative virtual of an event and extracts new ways of 
seeing and, therefore, living its potential.  The philosophical concept of democracy, for 
example, or of sexuality, would undo already actualised forms of these concepts and construct 
them anew (though always provisionally), so as to allow new ways of living them out.  What 
concept creation amounts to is a kind of breaking down of thought’s structures, a dismantling 
of the forms that are determined by the dogmatic image so as to enable us to genuinely think 
difference.  Just so, the thought of nonphilosophy, which we have explored in the mode of art, 
moves away from the object of thought to the forces that make us think: “the condition of 
sensibility and no longer the representation of its sense” (Lambert, Non 9).  In art’s realm of 
sensibility, thought perceives what is imperceptible in the actual world—that which emanates 
from the intensities of the virtual.  Thought enters the region of affects and percepts, inhuman 
becomings that can only be felt and sensed, becomings of real difference that cannot be 
identified or even bounded by channels of information.  Again, art takes regularised thought 
apart, inasmuch as it decomposes into (Deleuze-Proustian) signs that, when perceived, point 
toward “ways of living, possibilities of existence” (Deleuze, N 143).  As Deleuze puts it, “[a]ny 
work of art points a way through for life, finds a way through the cracks” (N 143).  But affect as 
a power of thought is available not only in art; it abounds also in everyday life, as we 
discovered with Stewart’s ordinary affects.  Affect is the “something doing” of life, the “bare 
activity” we sense as “‘change taking place’” (James 73-74).  We are always in the middle of 
change and the unfolding of difference, as D+G imply: “[a] becoming is always in the middle; 
one can only get it by the middle” (ATP 293).  This middle comprises a zone of in-betweenness 
and indiscernibility (D+G, ATP 293), where thought is, again, of the order of the 
imperceptible: unformed, unstructured, affective.  This is thought as encounter, as the jolt of a 
brush with radical discongruity.  From here, thought can keep moving—to create concepts, or 
to become arrested by the dogmatic image or by informational capitalism.  Or perhaps this 
imperceptible thought might become political—which is to say micropolitical, from Guattari’s 
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viewpoint.  In this sense, thought is connected to the productive force of desire, which, as 
micropolitics, Guattari articulates as “a collective direction of libido to parts of the body, 
groups of individuals, constellations of objects and intensities, machines of every kind,” which, 
as we have seen, can unleash “a whole host of expressions and experimentations” (MR 72, 84).  
Thought in an aesthetic paradigm constitutes “a politics of experimentation that takes hold of 
the existing intensities of desire and forms itself into a desiring mechanism in touch with 
historical social reality” (Guattari, MR 87).  This reality, of representational thought structures, 
information networks and control capitalism, can be eaten into by imperceptible lines of 
micropolitical thinking, which begin to grow right in the middle of things, feeling out escape 
routes and producing new ways of living (Guattari, MR 84). 
 
To believe in the world again 
 
We said at the outset that this was a project concerned with ethics, and it is now appropriate 
to address more deliberately how thought, as we have advocated it herein, relates to the ways 
in which D+G conceptualise—or, better, espouse—ethics.  Firstly, we affirm again that D+G’s 
approach is an immanent (rather than transcendent) one, since for them there are no 
overriding laws to apply in reaching so-called ethical decisions, but only the material forces of 
life to negotiate in always singular circumstances.  For D+G, life attains its fullest potential in 
its unfolding of difference, and this, in broad terms, implies that ethics involves the tending of 
this process.   There are, however, some specific ways we might see how this tending of 
difference connects to thought in D+G’s works, and, since the ontological structure of 
difference is the virtual, we return now to that domain.  The virtual, to repeat it anew, is “a 
dimension of self-differentiating differences, … of individuating metamorphic processes, of a 
disorientating ‘spatiali[s]ing’ space, and a floating time of a simultaneous before-after” (Bogue, 
Deleuze’s 8).  When it passes into an actual state of affairs, the virtual is never depleted; rather, 
it continues to subsist in what actually happens (Bogue, Deleuze’s 8).  While common sense-
based, representational thought cannot perceive the virtual, this domain can be sensed “in 
moments of disequilibrium and disorientation” (Bogue, Deleuze’s 9), or “in the strange 
indifference of an intellectual intuition,” as D+G put it (WP 158).  When this occurs, the pure 
event of an occurrence is sensed, and what is actual becomes counter-effectuated: its zones of 
indiscernibility, or shades of difference, become exposed (D+G, WP 159-62).  “We need reasons 
to believe in this world,” Deleuze implores—we need “a belief capable of perpetuating life” (C2 
172).  When there are so many reasons not to believe in the world (D+G, WP 75), the ethical 
act of a thought that seeks the event—that intuits how else the world might be—provides us 
with a pathway to believe in this world, “as it is” (Deleuze, C2 172), with all its limitations and 
problems; for such thought apprehends the potential for change.  This thought is also ethically 
oriented toward the future, inasmuch as it affirms the possibility of the future being different 
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to the oppressions of the present, so that from chaos can emerge “the shadow of the ‘people to 
come’” (D+G, WP 218).  This concept of a “people to come” brings with it another inflection of 
what may be understood as D+G’s ethics: its concern for the constitution of community.  In 
What Is Philosophy? D+G write how the language (or thought) of sensation “summons forth a 
people to come,” who are “a mass-people, [a] world-people” (176, 218); this people, according 
to Bogue, is “a future, yet-to-be collectivity that has a genuine cohesiveness and functionality” 
(Deleuze’s 14).  This function is nothing grandiose, as Deleuze tells us: “[t]his is not exactly a 
people called upon to dominate the world.  It is a minor people, eternally minor, taken up in a 
becoming-revolutionary” (ECC 4).  Becoming-revolutionary people, as we saw in our colour 
revolution examples, and through such groups as the WSF, or even in neighbourhood swap-
meets, are not stable entities, but are always in the process of becoming; Bogue conceives this 
as “a mutual becoming-other of multiple bodies engaged in unpredictable unshapings and 
reshapings of one another” (Deleuze’s 14).  In terms of thought, such a process takes a 
willingness to submit to the impersonal thinking of an ethological approach, whereby thought 
is carried relationally along multiple shifting vectors and partial concatenations.  The 
ethological question, according to Deleuze, is “no longer a matter of utili[s]ations or captures, 
but of sociabilities and communities” (SPP 126).  In other words, “[h]ow do individuals enter 
into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum?  … Now 
we are concerned … with a symphony of Nature, the composition of a world that is 
increasingly wide and intense” (Deleuze, SPP 126).  Guattari’s version of this broader ethology 
is his “ecosophy,” an eco-logic that includes subjectivities, social relations and the 
environment.  For him, to resist the monstrosities of “Integrated World Capitalism,” we need 
to “learn to think transversally” so as to “apprehend the world” across all three viewpoints (TE 
19-20, 29).  The logic of this transversal thinking is based not on communication, but on 
intensities—processual lines of flight that move partial objects out of their totalising frames 
and bring about “the reinvention of the environment and the enrichment of modes of life and 
sensibility” (Guattari, TE 20, 30).  
 
Returning to What Is Philosophy?, though, we find what may be D+G’s most direct statement 
regarding how they approach thought as an ontology of ethics.  “There is no other ethic than 
the amor fati of philosophy,” they write, with amor fati translating to “love of fate” (Bogue, 
Deleuze’s 8).  In Deleuze’s earlier book Nietzsche and Philosophy, he first signals the 
importance of this concept, which he takes from Nietzsche; in The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
declares: “I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is 
beautiful in them—thus I will be one of those who makes things beautiful.  Amor fati: let that 
be my love from now on!  I do not want to wage war against ugliness.  I do not want to accuse” 
(157).  Nietzsche wishes to affirm exactly what happens, what “is necessary in things,” and does 
not want to lament or resent what does not go his way.  Deleuze discusses Nietzsche’s amor 
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fati in terms of a dice throw: instead of throwing dice multiple times so as to attain a “desired, 
willed” combination, we should throw them just once and accept what turns up: “[t]he dice 
which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on 
falling is the affirmation of necessity” (NP 26-27).  Amor fati equates to loving the “fatally 
obtained number,” and to welcoming its “eternal return” (Deleuze, NP 27-28).  Deleuze 
develops amor fati further in The Logic of Sense, when he brings it together with his (Stoic-
derived) notion of the event.  The event, we recall, refers not to what actually occurs, but to 
the “neutral splendo[u]r” of what is “inside what occurs,”—its “eternal truth” (Deleuze, LS 149).  
In other words, what happens is underpinned by an impersonal, incorporeal force (Nietzsche’s 
fate), so to interpret occurrences as “unjust” or “unwarranted” is to cling to “the limits of 
individuals and persons” (Deleuze, LS 149-50).  Ethics, as Deleuze expresses it here, simply 
means “to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event” (LS 
149).  To will the event is to accept and affirm the impersonal virtual reality that constitutes “a” 
life, not to be fixated on “my” life.  Explaining it elsewhere, Deleuze discusses willing the event 
in terms of a wound: “The wound is something that I receive in my body, in a particular place 
at a particular moment, but there is also an eternal truth of the wound as impassive, 
incorporeal event.  ‘My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it!’” (D 65).  The 
dissolution of the self that thinking the event requires is called for most strongly in relation to 
death—that “mortal wound” (Deleuze, LS 151): “Yes, dying is engendered in our bodies, comes 
about in our bodies, but it comes from the Outside, singularly incorporeal, falling upon us like 
the battle which skims over the combatants, like the bird which hovers above the battle” 
(Deleuze, D 65).  To grasp death as the absolute event, then, as that which is most impersonal 
and most beyond what the all-controlling “I” can think or do, is to turn death against itself, 
which to affirm life as unqualifiable difference.  To think the ethic of amor fati is, finally, to 
live the most singular life, a life made up of events and virtualities on a transcendental field of 
pure immanence (Deleuze, PI 31).
52
  A life of immanence involves constructivism, desire, 
relation, difference, creation: surely forces of thought enabling us to believe in the world 
again. 
 
There are other lines of flight this project could have taken.  For instance, we are aware that, 
while we have discussed science several times, we have not addressed it in the terms D+G do 
in What Is Philosophy?  In this book, D+G specify that thought, as a power to transform life, 
occurs in three primary modes: philosophy, art and science.  Each of these modes casts a plane 
over the chaos that is the virtual, and brings back different qualities of thought: we have seen 
how philosophy brings back concepts and constructs a plane of immanence, and art brings 
sensations and lays out a plane of composition; but we have not explored science’s potential to 
bring back functions that make a plane of reference (D+G, WP 202-03).  Explaining the 
distinction between philosophy and science, D+G write that each approaches the “infinite 
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speed” that is the virtual in different ways: philosophy “selects infinite movements of thought 
and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought,” while 
science’s approach is to slow down matter, so that scientific thought, expressed in 
propositions, can “gain a reference able to actualise the virtual” (WP 118; italics removed).  
While the focus of philosophy is thought and the event, then, the focus of science is actual 
states of affairs and bodies (D+G, WP 22).  This does not mean that science as a power of 
thought in D+G’s terms seeks to represent a static world, but more that it is a movement of 
thought that engages with a material world in process (Gaffney, “Introduction” 2-3), and that 
enables the constitution or modification of bodies and states of affairs (D+G, WP 138).  So 
while we have concentrated on philosophy, art, and other facets of non-philosophy, we 
acknowledge the value of science—as outlined in What Is Philosophy?—for thought, but leave 
this for a different investigation (one that might recognise and take up the notable 
contribution of Manuel Delanda).  Similarly, we leave the question of the “thought-brain,” a 
concept D+G introduce in What Is Philosophy?’s concluding chapter.  Here, they present the 
brain as the “junction—not the unity—of the three planes” of philosophy, science and art (WP 
208; italics removed).  As Arkady Plotnitsky notes, “[t]his is an extraordinary conjecture, most 
especially because it relates art, science, and philosophy to certain specific (although, as yet, 
not biologically specified) forms of neural functioning of the brain itself” (259).  In this 
proposal, philosophy, art and science are the “three aspects under which the brain becomes 
subject,” which is to say it becomes “a state of survey without distance, at ground level, a self-
survey” that is coterminous with the concepts it conceives and the sensations it feels (D+G, 
WP 210, 211).  Returning to the concerns of this project, though, it is also the case that there are 
countless pertinent examples that could have been explored but were passed over, and there 
have been many lines opened but not followed far.  It has been a matter of speeds, slownesses 
and degrees; of following the trajectories that were the most intensive in the haecceity that is 
this assemblage, inseparable from the hour, season, atmosphere, life that made it.  This 
assemblage is necessarily unfinished.  In the spirit of D+G’s pragmatics, we leave it here for 
later becomings, for the machinic connections it might make with other contexts, and for any 













1 “D+G” denotes the works written by Deleuze and Guattari together; the thesis also cites many 
works by Deleuze individually, and several by Guattari.  As a philosopher first and foremost, 
Deleuze published more texts than Guattari, and his work is better known.  Correspondingly, there 
has been something of an “absence of Guattari from the canons of university study” (Alliez and 
Goffey 2).  Nevertheless, from his social science practitioner background, Guattari was, in Deleuze’s 
view, an “inventor of unusually creative and versatile ideas” (Dosse 11).  Therefore, although 
Deleuze’s work is foregrounded for much of this project, Guattari’s alone is given prominence in 
the latter section of Part 2. 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all italics within quotes replicate italics within the original source. 
3 For a discussion of the development of the Italian socialist movement "Operaismo," through the 
1960s and 1970s, see Foreword to Virno's Multitude 7-10. 
4 While emotion is not in itself affect, there is a relationship between the two, inasmuch as emotion 
is what comes after or out of affect: "[e]motion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual 
point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions.  …  It is 
intensity owned and recogni[s]ed" (Parables 28; emphasis added).  As Gilbert Simondon puts it, 
“affectivity is the ground of emotion” (qtd. in Adkins). 
5 We take this term from the Sense Lab group at Concordia University, Montreal, founded in 2004 
by Erin Manning, whose activities aim to “explore the active passage from research to creation” 
(“About.” Sense Lab). 
6 For example, Keith Ansell Pearson presents a detailed analysis of Deleuze’s virtual, contra Badiou 
(Philosophy 97-114); Jeffrey Bell (“Charting”) invokes Hume and Peirce in correcting Badiou’s 
misreading of Deleuze’s virtual-actual distinction; Bell (“Badiou’s”) and Mogens Laerke each show 
how Badiou misreads Deleuze’s Spinoza; Daniel Smith demonstrates that, contrary to Badiou’s 
claim, Deleuze’s multiplicity does have a connection to mathematics by way of problematics, and 
exposes Badiou’s mathematical ontology as transcendentalism (“Mathematics”); Bell addresses, by 
way of Whitehead, Badiou’s miscalculation of Deleuze’s approach to politics (“Fear”); Éric Alliez 
shows how Badiou’s disavowal of D+G’s desiring-production and his misreading of becoming-
minoritarian lead him, erroneously, to deny Deleuze’s political philosophy (Anti 7-10); Paul Patton 
also rejects Badiou’s claim that Deleuze’s philosophy is essentially not political (“Deleuze’s); and 
Joshua Ramey refutes Badiou’s overdetermination of Deleuze’s ethics “as simply a stoic preparation 
for dying” (Hermetic 208). 
7 Berressem states that at times, “one suspects that the Deleuzian argument is merely a rhetorical 
glue that holds together a number of textual (auto)samplings that round up once more Žižek’s 
usual suspects: Bush, Slovenia, Cognitive Science, Hitchcock, the Palestine, the Left, the Right, the 
Middle, bad jokes, dumb movies.”  As an example of textual irrelevancies, Berressem offers the 
following: “Between passages of serious engagement with Deleuze, Žižek writes sentences like: ‘And 
to go a step further, is the practice of fist-fucking not the exemplary case of what Deleuze called the 
"expansion of a concept?" ... No wonder Foucault, Deleuze's Other, was practi[s]ing fisting’ 
(Organs 188).  Such a sentence is objectionable not because it is irreverent, politically incorrect or 
because it touches upon a taboo (all of that, in fact, would make it at least slightly interesting), but 
simply because it is irrelevant.” 
8 Robert Thomas’ explanation that his essay was written out of his own experience as a “homeless 
intellectual,” alienated from established intellectual forms of belonging, and separated from his 
own thought and ability to express it, perhaps accounts for his human-centred conception of 
thought. 
9 Deleuze and/or Guattari’s use of “machine” is not metaphoric and has nothing to do with the 
mechanical; rather, it refers to a process that holds together a series of disparate parts: “What we 
term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities” (ATP 330).  By “abstract machine” they 
mean the “consolidated aggregate of matters [and] functions,” which are “real yet nonconcrete,” 
and that open any assemblage into its outside (ATP 510-11).  Put another way, D+G’s machinic 
“operates by the connection of parts.  Unlike an organism or a mechanism, it has no final or 






 Introduced in 1979, “when Chinese policymakers perceived overpopulation as a serious threat to 
future living standards and the viability of economic reforms,” China’s One Child Policy remains 
perhaps “the most ambitious attempt in history to regulate fertility” (Bulte, Heerink and Zhang 25). 
11 “Logocentrism is the term Derrida uses to refer derogatively to the philosophy of 
determinateness, while phallocentrism is the term he uses to describe the way logocentrism itself is 
genderi[s]ed by a ‘masculinist (phallic)’ and ‘patriarchal’ agenda.  Hence, Derrida intentionally 
elides the two terms phallocentrism and logocentrism as ‘phallogocentrism’” (Borody 2). 
12 On the difference between “molar” and “molecular”: “the molar register concerns whole 
organisms, subjects, forms, and their interactions, including social action; while the molecular 
register considers non-subjective being on the level of chemical and physical reactions, intensities, 
in a radically material ‘micropolitics’” (Flieger 41). 
13 As D+G state, “[t]he opposition between minority and majority is not simply quantitative.  ...  It is 
obvious that ‘man’ holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, 
women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc.  ...  Majority assumes a state of power and domination” 
(ATP 105).  On the other hand, minoritarian refers to “a determination different from that of the 
constant ..., by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem” 
(D+G, ATP 105).  The minoritarian “is a potential, creative and created, becoming ... whose value is 
to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritoriali[s]ations of the mean or majority” (D+G, ATP 
106). 
14 Despite its potential for undoing the subordination of women, some feminists, such as Braidotti 
and Luce Irigaray, have taken issue with D+G’s becoming-woman, claiming that “it clashes with 
women’s sense of their own historic struggles” (Braidotti, Nomadic 252, 258), and that it “does away 
with the subject [when] feminism is only beginning to gain some sense of identity” (Colebrook, 
Introduction 10).  In other words, while D+G offer a micropolitics of becoming through becoming-
woman, they deny, it is claimed, the “molar” or subject-base politics of feminism.  This feminist 
objection raises the question, then, of whether “the goals for actual change held by contemporary 
feminist groups” can be reconciled with D+G’s micropolitics of becoming (Cull).  In responding to 
this problematic, Colebrook contends that, in fact, “[t]he molar politics of identities and the 
molecular politics of becoming are not opposed; but the latter must be thought and confronted as 
the possibility and mobilisation of the former” (Introduction, 13-14).  Similarly, Jerry Aline Flieger 
argues that their relationship is more in the order of a paradox, which means that “Deleuzian 
thought and feminist thought may be ‘mapped’ or interwoven in a kind of productive disjunction” 
(62).  Ultimately, “the task that confronts feminism in its confrontation with Deleuze is whether a 
philosophy of becoming, or becoming-woman, can be made to work” (Colebrook, Introduction 12), 
and for many Deleuzian feminists, including Flieger, Olkowski and Colebrook, this task is 
achievable.            
15 Balibar asserts, also, that nationalism maintains an affinity with sexism because of this 
connection between family and nation-state: “the inequality of sexual roles in conjugal love and 
child-rearing constitutes the anchoring point for the juridical, economic, educational and medical 
mediation of the state” (102).  Again, representation’s hierarchical codes pervade each domain.  
16 Bhahbha borrows the concept “imagined communities” from Benedict Anderson’s seminal work 
of the same name. 
17 For Agamben, the state of exception is “the original structure in which law encompasses living 
beings by means of its own suspension” (State 3).  Put another way, through the (seemingly lawful) 
suspension of its own law, the state can effectively turn against its own constituents.  
18 Several writers (such as Timothy Luke, and Kenichi Ohmae) have argued that that the nation-
state is no longer a viable concept in the context of globalisation’s “transnational organisation of 
the economy and the borderless flow of goods and communication” (Rembold and Carrier 361).  
Malcolm Waters, though, claims that the organised nation-state remains highly resistant, possibly 
because it “is the most effective means for establishing sovereignty over territory that human beings 
have yet devised” (156-57).  Similarly, Silvio Waisbord and Nancy Morris claim that, although the 
state has suffered a reduction in information sovereignty, as yet “there is insufficient evidence for 
asserting the death of the state” (ix).  On balance, Saskia Sassen offers the view that while the state 




system and by other transnational processes” (35).  Some of the state’s functions, for example, have 
been transferred to the private sector and to supranational organisations (Sassen 39-40). 
19 “While in October 2010 the Gillard Government announced that it would be release children 
from detention, the Refugee Council of Australia notes that the policy was not immediate and 
continue to remain concerned that protection of children during the refugee determination process 
has not been sufficiently addressed” (Coghlan). 
20 Alberto Toscano explains that D+G utilise an axiomatic system for capitalism since it “differs 
from systems of decoding and overcoding by its capacity to operate directly on decoded flows.  In 
this respect, while it implies a form of capture, its degree of immanence and ubiquity is far greater 
than that of coding systems, all of which require an instance of externality or transcendence” 
(“Axiomatic” 17). 
21 In the wake of the 2011-2012 “News of the World” phone hacking scandal—which implicated 
Rupert Murdoch and his son James in illegal phone tapping activities—it remains to be seen how 
the overall power of the Murdoch corporation is impacted. 
22 While we acknowledge John B. Thompson’s argument that the recipients of media content are 
not “a vast sea of passive, undifferentiated individuals” (24), and that there are “complex ways in 
which media products are taken up by individuals” (25), our angle of approach concerns the fact 
that the process of mass media transmission is not, substantially, a reciprocal activity.   It is, rather, 
“fundamentally asymmetrical” (Thompson 25).  Under these circumstances, and given our 
immersion in a mass media culture—even though media consumption is not an inactive process—
much absorption of dominant media meanings would seem inevitable.  
23 The image is a close-up, headshot of four women simply wearing protest hats; each has a 
relatively unemotional facial expression. 
24 In fact, Guy Debord’s renowned Situationist manifesto, The Society of the Spectacle (originally 
published in 1967), arose out of his concern that, due to Western society’s saturation by the images 
transmitted in “news or propaganda,” advertising, and entertainment, the direct experience of life 
had become replaced by the indirect or mediated experiences of “the spectacle” (12-13).  The 
spectacle results in a detached kind of living, which allows only a visual experience of life.  Debord’s 
theory led to the Situationists inventing “methods of generating authentic, complete experiences” 
that simply could not be reproduced by any set of images, such as May 1968, Woodstock, and the 
like (Mulder, "Media" 293). 
25 To some extent, events in D+G’s sense are beyond the media in a similar way to the Situations 
created by the Debord’s followers.  However, D+G’s events are not deliberate political strategies, 
since they occur all the time in everyday life.   
26 Occasionally, as Herman and Chomsky point out, corporations are willing to sponsor content of 
a more serious nature; but this is often “a result of recent embarrassments that call for a public-
relations offset,” and the “serious” content will still shy away from any particularly divisive or 
controversial issues (18). 
27
 The “virtuality” of new media that is often referred to in terms of “virtual reality” is quite different 
to Deleuze’s virtual. In an effort to establish distance from Platonic forms of thought, Deleuze, 
following Bergson, takes pains to distinguish the dynamic of the actual-virtual from the more 
dominant philosophical categories of the possible-real, which connect to new media’s virtuality.  In 
Deleuze’s explanation, Platonic thought is based around the notion of an original, necessary and 
universal “Idea,” whose qualities are possessed by any number of secondary copies (ECC 136).  This 
original/copy relation is reflected in the relationship between the possible and the real, where the 
real is a mirror or image of the possible.  Put another way, this means that the real is that which is 
“realised” from the possible; as such, the real resembles the possible (Deleuze, B 97, 98).  Such 
resemblance is a determination of representation.  For Deleuze, “the possible is a false notion, the 
source of false problems,” for if the real resembles the possible, “we [can only] give ourselves a real 
that is ready-made, preformed, pre-existent to itself, and that will pass into existence according to 
an order of successive limitations” (B 98).  
28 For D+G, a “haecceity” is an individuation utterly different to a “well-formed subject”; it is the 
intensity of an “individuated aggregate,” made up of a time, the weather, an atmosphere as well as 




29 Strictly speaking, topology is a branch of mathematics.  As Massumi explains, "[t]opology is the 
science of self-varying transformation.  A topological figure is defined as the continuous 
transformation of one geometrical figure into another" (Parables 134). 
30 We acknowledge here the argument that the internet’s open architecture structure—that is, its 
intrinsic openness to new additions (Terranova, Network 55)—is the realisation of D+G’s rhizomatic 
model of thought.  Robin Hamman, for example, sees the internet as “a real world example [of] 
Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome.”  Rajchman, however, warns that although “Deleuze’s language of 
connection, rhizome, network may well sound like talk of [the internet] one must proceed with 
caution” (11).  For Ian Buchanan, D+G’s rhizome has been “misread,” and too much used “in an 
essentially conservative way, looking more to reify and endorse the status quo rather than to 
challenge it” (Deleuze”).  In contrast to D+G’s rhizomatic principle that any point can connect to 
any other, Ian Buchanan notes that the practical reality of internet use means that high traffic 
volumes and low bandwidths often prevent connectivity (“Deleuze”).  Further, the expansion and 
proliferation of websites does not necessarily constitute a multiplicity in D+G’s sense: websites are 
not “dimensions” but, rather, “units” of the internet, since the addition or subtracton of any one site 
does not impact the internet as a whole—as would be the case with dimensions in a multiplicity (I. 
Buchanan, “Deleuze”).  What is more, the internet may appear to be “ascentred, nonsignifying, and 
acephalous,” but movement is still from point to point, and, as we have already seen, Google 
searches are not at all disinterested (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”).  Rather, a search engine such as 
Google can be regarded as “a centring system,” since its omnipresent advertisements direct users to 
commodities, and its page ranking system (whereby it algorithmically ranks the importance of 
sites) is strongly hierarchical (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”).  From a different perspective, Marks’ 
rejection of D+G as “cyber-enthusiasts” (“Information” 210) is based on the claim that “cyberspace” 
and “cybertheory” foregrounds the notion that “information allows us to transcend the body,” 
whereas D+G’s concept of the rhizome is firmly located in a theoretical framework that “views 
body, brain and world as a complex whole which has a material density” (“Information” 202, 196).  
In other words, the rhizome, as it is sequestered by cybertheory, loses its “material complexity” 
(Marks, “Information” 196).   
31 The “digital divide” is most visible in Africa, where, in 2011, there was only 13.5% internet 
penetration.  But uptake is occurring with increasing speed: this 2011 figure grew from only 5% in 
2008 (“Internet Usage”).  With regard to the UN’s “information society agenda,” sociologist Gili 
Drori sees it as simply a reframing of “the development vision” according to the (capitalist) goals of 
globalisation (298). 
32 In fact, Google is a rapidly expanding corporation, now offering numerous applications and 
services in addition to its search archives; these include Gmail’s free email service, YouTube, Orkut 
social networking site, GoogleMaps, Google Earth, office applications, scanned books, and cell 
phone related applications such as Android (Lovink, Networks 151).  This “Googli[s]ation of 
everything,” as Siva Vaidhyanathan calls it, means that, according to Lovink, “there is virtually no 
critic, or academic or business journalist, who can keep up with the scope and speed of its 
development in recent years” (Networks 151). 
33 For Lovink, Carr’s internet technology background as a prior editor of Harvard Business Review 
makes him “the perfect insider critic” (Networks 155).  
34 Writing before 9/11 and the war in Iraq, Richard Dienst takes a different approach in theorising 
television in a post-representational, post-ideological sense.  While Dienst also examines how 
television modulates subindividual capacities or affect, his argument concerns television’s 
relationship to time: “[t]elevision, in its fundamental commercial function, sociali[s]es time” 
(Dienst 61).  Put differently, in contemporary capitalism, television collectivises and valorises not 
only our labour time (as Berardi points out [“Meaning”]), but also our “free” time.  This 
collectivisation of free time “allows us to offer up our social lives as free contributions to capitalist 
power” (Dienst 62).  In this way, our very attention to television’s stream of images is capitalised 
upon.  For Dienst, the “work” of television takes place at a deeply affective level: “televisual images 
do not represent things so much as they take up time, and to work through this time is the most 
pervasive way that subjects can suffer through [and] participate in ... the global unification of 
contemporary capitalism” (64).  If the time of affect is “one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability” 




35 On 24th September 2008, George Bush made a nationally televised address to the nation in 
which he detailed the “distressing scenario” of the “long and painful recession” that would surely 
unfold for the American people should his “economic rescue package” not be supported (Bush).  By 
way of this address—which pre-emptively “makes present the future consequences of an 
eventuality that may or may not occur” (Massumi, “Future”)—Bush attempts to manage the state of 
fear evoked by the 2008 Wall Street meltdown. 
36 At the time of writing, the world is still experiencing major financial repercussions on the back of 
the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis.  As Holmes points out, we are yet to know “what the 
geopolitical consequences of this meltdown will be” (“Interscale”).  However, Holmes suggests that 
the panic will lead to “a sudden retreat to private self-interest, when world-spanning networks of 
confidence collapse to the scale of frightened individuals” (“Interscale”).  On this point he is of the 
same mind as Elliott and Lemert, who, as cited earlier, note the return to individualist dogma as a 
key response to the crisis (xvii).  More troubling, though, is Holmes’ suggestion that, along with 
this retreat to traditional individualism, there will emerge in the US “a new kind of fascism”: 
“[w]hen America’s financial crimes are over,” Holmes writes, “the only thing the politicians can sell 
to the people are police, guns, armies and outright war” (“Financial”).  Relatedly, while Žižek and 
the New Communists (as referred to in the Introduction) may not envisage this particular 
manifestation of Linksfaschismus (left wing fascism), we might also be concerned that such an 
outcome could be compounded by their espousal of violence as a legitimate revolutionary strategy.  
37 In saying “D+G-friendly others,” we invoke Deleuze’s notion of friendship as “an internal 
condition of thought”: this does not refer to “speaking with your friend or remembering him or her, 
etc., but on the contrary going through trials with that person … that are necessary for any 
thinking” (TR 329).  In other words, the “distresses” of friendship add the necessary difference to 
thought.  Therefore, the thought introduced by D+G-friendly others does not necessarily closely 
reproduce D+G, but will lead to productive lines of flight. 
38 In March 2009, the Australian government began paying one-off “Household Stimulus” bonuses 
to vast numbers of means-tested, Australian families.  For example, the “Single Income Family 
Bonus” granted $900 to low and middle-income families with only one main income earner 
(Australia, Centrelink). 
39 Whitehead’s propositions, then, are not part of a discursive system, whereby they would be 
“entirely extensional,” referring to a particular, external state of affairs (D+G, WP 22).  To this 
extent, they are related to D+G’s concepts, which also have nothing to do with a plane of reference 
but are concerned with potentialities.  For a full treatment of Whitehead’s speculative philosophy 
and the nature of propositions, see his Process and Reality. 
40 For a detailed report on the foreclosure (or subprime mortgage) crisis, especially from the 
perspective of “people of colo[u]r and poor people,” see Amaad Rivera et al, “State of the Dream 
2008: Foreclosed.”  In regard to the extent and nature of lender abuse in US foreclosures, see Reid, 
“Foreclosure Abuse Rampant.” 
41 Other theorists interpret Agamben’s bare life differently, which, as Catherine Mills suggests, may 
be a consequence of Agamben’s own somewhat inconsistent use of the concept.  In this case, 
though, we are making use of Thrift’s particular interpretation.  
42 In relation to Aboriginal land rights and Aboriginal “ownership” of land, though, Manning makes 
the important point that Aboriginal understanding of land implies a “singular relation” rather than 
a Western notion of ownership: “[i]t is not the space itself that the Aborigines are calling for 
through their art but the topologies of space-time the land incites in relation to Dreamings of 
which they remain an active part” (168). 
43 Thought as a movement of “infinite speed” is a thought that grasps instantaneously and 
simultaneously “a potential in all its possible relations” (Colebrook, Deleuze 7).  In other words, this 
is a movement of thought that immediately “takes in everything” (D+G, WP 37)—all potentialities 
for becoming.  Just so, extreme slowness is intensive change slowed to the rate of immobility 
(which does not mean non-movement) or suspense—as in “the infinite slowness of the wait” for 
Japanese sumo wrestlers (D+G, ATP 281).  Thought as slowness, just like speed, is thought-
movement that is beyond ordinary perception—thought that is “traversed and energised by 




44 As discussed in Part 1, D+G’s concept of sexuality is based on the notion of productive desire, 
which is to say sexuality is a productive energy that charges diverse fields and bodies.  Certainly, 
sexuality, thus conceived, has the potential to produce couplings across species.  However, D+G 
take pains to point out that there are no guarantees that becomings will result in a better future 
(Bogue, “Alien” 31), and, therefore, they advise that “caution” is the “rule immanent to 
experimentation” (D+G, ATP 130). 
45 As we indicated in the Introduction, and as Karl Jaspers acknowledges, for Nietzsche, “[a]ll 
negation is justified only by the creative positing to which it is preparatory” (156). 
46 For Deleuze, the simulacral has a special power: “the simulacrum is the instance which includes 
a difference within itself… .  It is here that we find the lived reality of a sub-representative domain” 
(DR 69).  Joshua Ramey explains the purpose of the simulacral in art: “for Deleuze, we do not 
depend on art to reveal to us what is already there, but to extract a singularity, a difference, a 
simulacrum from the intersecting series of what appears to be there” (Gilles 23).  
47 Guattari’s use of the term “libertarian” refers to the European rather than U.S. employment of 
the concept: “Libertarianism in Barcelona, and in much of Europe and Latin America, involve a 
radical critique of both the market and the state, while the U.S. variety is oriented toward limiting 
the role of the state to unleash the potential of the free market” (Juris 317n35).  
48 “The 40-second video shows the young woman collapse on the pavement, a pool of blood 
spreading beneath her body, and blood coming out of her nose and mouth, her eyes open and 
staring at the camera.  Two men kneel next to her, pressing on her chest.  One of them is screaming 
out her name, Neda” (Kraidy and Mourad 7). 
49 Chowdhury comes to this suggestion through a comparison of  “the crackdown of the Burmese 
military government in [the] 1988 uprising with that of 2007”: both were similar with regard to scale 
and participation, but there were significantly lower deaths in 2007 (14). 
50 While Wikileaks expresses its purpose in the individualist, humanist terms of “rights,” it works, 
at the same time, to undermine normative understandings of representational democracy. 
51 Deleuze, too, is concerned with the function of “transversals” to interconnect assemblages, 
especially in Proust and Signs.  For a discussion of the relationship between Deleuze’s “transversals” 
and Guattari’s “transversality,” see Bogue, Deleuze’s 1-3. 
52
 Deleuze’s reference to the transcendental field is not related to the transcendent plane of 
representation, which sits in some metaphysical realm beyond the world; rather, he refers here to a 
more radical transcendentalism, describing thought’s absolute connection to the worldly problems 
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